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THE GORGIAS OF PLATO.

THE
G O R G I A S

OF

P L A T O,

CHIEFLY ACCORDING TO STALLBAUM'S TEXT,

WITH

N O T E S,

BY

THEODORE D. WOOLSEY.

PRESIDENT OF YALE COLLEGE.

Athenis diligentius legi Gorgiam: quo in libro in hoc maxime admirabar Platonem,
quod mihi in oratoribus irridendis ipse esse orator summus videbatur.

CIC. DE ORATORE, I. 11.

NEW EDITION, WITH ADDITIONS.

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TO
PROFESSOR FELTON
OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY
THIS EDITION OF GORGIAS
IS INSCRIBED,
AS A MEMORIAL OF LONG FRIENDSHIP,
BY
THE EDITOR.

P R E F A C E.

1. THE text of this edition principally follows Stallbaum's, published at Gotha in 1810. After examining the various readings, as Ast has given them, the editor was led to make about forty changes in the text of Stallbaum's first Gotha edition of 1828. On receiving, not very long since, the same critic's second edition of 1840, mentioned above, the editor was pleased to find a large part of these alterations, and nearly all the more important ones, made by Stallbaum himself. A number of others have since been made, in reliance upon Stallbaum's long study of Plato and ability; and the text now differs from his last revision chiefly in the following places.

450, D, my ed. inserts *ἡ* before *ἀριθμητική*. — 451, A, I have given *οὖν* for *νῦν*. — 459, A, *τοι νῦν δὴ* for *τοίνυν δὴ*. — 460, C, Stallb. has no brackets. — *ibid.* D, omits the words in brackets. — 461, B, *vid. not.* — 462, E, Stallb. has *ἄρ'* for *δ'*. — 465, B, gives *ἐσθῆσιν*. — 466, A, omits the words in brackets. — 472, A, has *ταῦτα* for *ταῦτα*. — *ibid.* B, has *Πυθοῖ*. *Vid. not.* — *ibid.* *ἐνθάδε*. *Vid. not.* — 480, D, has *τοῦτο* for *τούτω*. — 481, A, omits *αὖ* before *θανάτου*. — 483, E, puts a colon after *πλάττοντες*. — 491, D, *vid. not.* — 492, B, omits the words in brackets. — 494, E, omits **το**. —

496, A, reads *ἄνθρωπος*. — 497, A, gives καὶ . . . *νουθετεῖς* to Callicles. Vid. not. — 500, B, brackets κατὰ τὸ σῶμα after *μαγειρικὴν*, which I have omitted. — 505, E, joins οὕτως to the next sentence. — 508, B, inserts **ἄθλιοι**. — 514, C, I have bracketed ἐφ'. — 522, C, have given οὕτως. Vid. not. — 525, D, have omitted τοὺς before τούτων. — 527, C, Stallb. gives ὁ σὸς λόγος. Vid. not.

In the text, like other editors of Plato, I have allowed οὐκοῦν, *nonne igitur*, to be thus accented, and, as I think, for good reasons. In the notes, I have followed what is, I believe, Hermann's practice, in treating a single Greek oxytoned word in an English sentence just as it would be treated in a Greek one. If, for example, *ἄν* occurs in the middle of a clause, it is not written *ἄν*.

2. I have had access to the following editions of Gorgias, which include all the modern ones of much value. 1. Routh's, Oxford, 1784. 2. Findeisen's, — an edition of indifferent judgment. Gotha and Amsterdam, 1796. 3. Heindorf's second, edited by Buttman, Berlin, 1829, — excellent, especially for the Commentary. 4. Bekker's. 5. Stallbaum's Leipzig ed. These are concerned only with the text. Bekker's has some Scholia. 6. Coray's, Paris, 1825, together with Xenophon's Memorab. 7. Ast's, in his Plato. The bulky Commentary on Gorgias is in Vol. XI., Leipzig, 1832; valuable, but ill-arranged and tedious, and not always judicious. 8. Stallbaum's, in his Gotha ed. of Plato, 1828 and 1840. Both text and interpretation owe much to him, and he has collected most of what is useful in other editions.

From these editions, above all from the last, I have derived great assistance, which is often acknowledged and

often not. In a work like this, it would be plainly impossible to trace everything up to its source, but nothing has been adopted without examination ; much, also, is original ; but I fear that, if any one should pass the severe judgment upon the edition, that much of what is faulty is original, he would not be very far out of the way.

Besides these editions, I have consulted several of those works relating to Plato, to which an editor of his dialogues would naturally think of turning for aid. Of this description are Ast's *Lexicon Platonicum* (the first three vols.), which is of no great use after all, Ast's, Socher's, and the first vol. of C. F. Hermann's *Introduction to Plato*, Schleiermacher's and Cousin's translations, and Dobson's translation of Schleiermacher's Prefaces.

3. An introduction is prefixed to the text of the dialogue, with a view to give an explanation and critique of the argument. To this are added, in notes, rather literal translations of a few illustrative passages out of very many from Plato's other writings, most of which I have read with reference to the present edition during its preparation. I had intended to add an index, in which some things omitted in the notes were to find their place, and had made some progress in it, but was tempted by the overpowering tediousness of the task to lay it aside until too late.

4. I have said nothing, thus far, as to the propriety of laying the *Gorgias* before American students of Greek, rather than some other dialogue of the same great author. To persons familiar with the Platonic dialogues, perhaps nothing need be said on this point. Let me say, however, that while many of the dialogues would not have suited my design, on account of their abstruseness or their length, the

Gorgias deserved to be preferred to others equally finished in style, on account of its positive inculcation of truth and its high moral tone. Something better is to be found in it than the miserable doctrine of instruction, and the duty of the politician to obey the popular will.

Yale College, New Haven,
July, 1842.

A SECOND edition of the Gorgias being called for, the editor has done what he could, amid the pressing cares of a new office, to render it, by the necessary changes and additions, less imperfect than the former. In doing this, he has received kind aid from several friends, and takes this opportunity of making his acknowledgments to Professor Crosby of Dartmouth College, Mr. Sophocles of Harvard University, Mr. Hadley of Yale College, and C. A. Bristed, Esq., of New York.

Yale College, June 1, 1848.

INTRODUCTION.

THE times in Greece which just preceded the age of Socrates gave birth to a class of men denominated the Sophists. This title, which before was honorably applied to such as excelled in wisdom or ingenuity, was then chiefly confined to those who, with mercenary views, professed a vain and shallow kind of wisdom. Such is in substance Aristotle's definition of a Sophist. In the successive sketches of Plato's *Sophistes*, he is hit off as a mercenary hunter after rich young men; a dealer and huckster in intellectual wares, especially of his own production; a logomachist; one who, by his power of taking the opposite on all subjects, gets a reputation for wisdom; one who is employed about that which is false, or merely appearing, instead of the invariable objects of true science, and who conceals his ignorance of true science by artificial and crafty turns of words. This last characteristic is one which gives the relation of the Sophist to philosophy. He denied all objective truth, and stood only on the fluctuating, uncertain ground of subjective opinion. Hence, as to truth, he was an unbeliever. He could accommodate himself to one side or its opposite, contending for or against any point, as interest might dictate. Finding nothing in philosophy to employ himself with, he withdrew from the study of it to the arts of practical life, and aimed, by attract-

ing admiration and educating the young, to gain wealth and honor. Gratification or pleasure was the immediate object in his view, and he could have no higher; for to instruct in virtue would imply the existence of unalterable moral differences, which he denied. Or, if he professed to teach virtue and justice, it was only in accommodation to a vague opinion of those who employed him; and it was necessary for him to pervert these notions, in order to make his instructions consistent with the rule of gratification by which he was governed.

It would carry us far beyond our bounds, were we to attempt to exhibit at any length the causes to which this class of men owed their origin and their prominence. These causes lay partly in the unsatisfactory results to which the prevailing systems of Greek philosophy had arrived, and partly in the circumstances of the times. On the one hand, many of the philosophers either wholly denied the existence of truth within the reach of man, or so contracted its dimensions as to make it not worth pursuing. Hence arose scepticism, despair, and the fading away of a serious regard for truth, which were succeeded by frivolity and by the purpose to gain immediate selfish ends through pretensions to superior knowledge. On the other hand, the decay of religious belief which attends upon increasing civilization in heathen countries, and the disregard of political morality so prevalent in Greece, threw uncertainty into the opinions of men upon the most important subjects. Thus the same disease attacked the roots of philosophy, religion, and morals.

In the schools of the philosophers, the art of reasoning and its instrument had received by degrees some attention. Thus logic had been cultivated by the Eleatic sect, but was turned, in the hands of the Sophists, into an art of disputing, applied to puzzle the unpractised and display their

own dexterity. The right and elegant use of words was employed by other Sophists to procure for themselves admiration and pupils. Many of this class of men exhibited their knowledge in public by answering any question that might be proposed to them, or gave lectures prepared with great care; while in private they imparted such instructions to young men as would give them polish and ability in civil and political life. All of them took money for their instructions, — a practice not regarded as entirely honorable at that time in Greece.

The sophistical principles of the time were brought into closer connection with public affairs by means of the art of rhetoric, which arose at about the same era. Rhetoric began to be taught as a means of gaining a cause in the courts at Syracuse after the year 466, when a popular government, succeeding to the sway of Hiero's family, greatly multiplied judicial proceedings. An art like this was calculated to be popular in free states, and especially in Athens, where the judicial function of the people was the most important one; where the crowds of ignorant judges were easily deceived by sophistry; and where there was an uncommon fondness for displays of skill in the use of words.

The sophistical tendency, which we have represented as one in its origin, affected all branches of truth and every art which can be referred to scientific principles. In metaphysics it may be exemplified by the tenets of Protagoras, that all knowledge consists in sensation, and that whatever appears true to any man is true to him; and by the doctrine of Gorgias, that there is no truth which men can ascertain or communicate to one another. In morals and politics, it appeared in the opinions, that there is no natural justice, or that justice is the interest of the stronger; and that pleasure is the chief good. In the use of rhetoric, it showed its nature when Protagoras offered to teach how to prevail

by the worse argument (*τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν*), and when Tisias and Gorgias said that the probable must be held in higher esteem than the true.

The Sophists could not fail to disgust a man like Socrates, who hated show and pretension, and who had a deep veneration for truth. Hence he was sometimes brought into collision with them, and in a degree his doctrines, as well as those of Plato, were shaped by opposition to theirs. And in accordance with this, Plato, especially in his first works, represents Socrates arguing against some false opinion or other maintained by a person imbued with this spirit.

One of the more prominent Sophists, with whom Socrates was contemporary, was Gorgias, after whom this dialogue is named. Gorgias was a Sicilian Greek of Leontini, a Chalcidian town, which lay some twenty miles to the north of Syracuse, and suffered much from its nearness to that powerful Doric state. The birth of Gorgias is assigned by Foss* to the first year of the 71st Olympiad, or 496 B. C. But there is good reason, I think, for putting it several years later. For the art of rhetoric began to flourish at Syracuse after 466 B. C., and Gorgias learned this art from Tisias, a scholar of Corax, the first preceptor.† And with this it accords, that Gorgias heard Empedocles in philosophy, whose birth even Foss places no earlier than the 71st Olympiad, while the ancients say that he flourished from forty to sixty years afterward.

From this time we know nothing of Gorgias until he was

* *De Gorgia Leontino Commentatio.* Halle. 1828.

† This is asserted by the author of the *Prolegomena to the Rhetoric of Hermogenes* (in Walz's Collection, Vol. IV. p. 14). The passage is inserted by Spengel into his valuable book entitled *Artium Scriptores.* Stuttgart. 1828. Foss denies it without authority, "tum propter alius testimonii inopiam, tum propter Tisiæ ætatem."

sixty years old or upwards. In the interval he may have taught rhetoric in Sicily, for Polus of Agrigentum appears at Athens as his disciple, and he probably stood high in his native state. In the second year of the 88th Olympiad, he came to Athens on the following occasion. "The Leontines (Diodor. 12. 53), who were emigrants from Chaleis, and of the same stock with the Athenians, were invaded by the people of Syracuse. As they were pressed by the war, and in danger of being reduced by the superior might of Syracuse, they sent ambassadors to Athens, begging the people to help them as speedily as possible, and rescue their state from its dangers. The principal ambassador among those who were sent was Gorgias, the orator, a man who excelled all his time in eloquence, and first invented the artifices of rhetoric* (*τέχνας ῥητορικὰς*). — On his arrival at Athens he was introduced into the Assembly, and discoursed before the people concernig the alliance. The Athenians, who were fond of displays of genius and skill in the use of words, were struck with wonder by the novelty of his style, by his various antitheses, his clauses of equal length, his words of similar forms and endings, and the like artifices; which then, being new, met with favor, but now seem to be a waste of labor, and are ridiculous if repeated so often as to produce satiety. At last, having persuaded the Athenians to form an alliance with the Leontines, and gained admiration at Athens for his rhetorical art, he returned to his native town." The sensation which his rhetoric produced at Athens is spoken of by others also. The days on which he made his exhibitions were called festivals, and his discourses themselves torches.† "He won great praise," says

* See Spengel, u. s., p. 81.

† This is said by the commentator on Hermog. u. s., p. 15, by Olym-piodor. apud Routh, p. 562, and other late writers.

Socrates in Plato's *Hippias Maj.* (282, B), "by his speeches in the Assembly, and by his private displays of his eloquence. By the instructions he imparted to the young (*συ- νὸν τοῖς νέοις*) he gained a large amount of money, and carried it with him from Athens." If Plato, who is sometimes careless about precise facts and dates, may here be relied upon, he must have stayed long enough at Athens to act the part of a teacher before he went elsewhere. It is probable that, after discharging his mission, he soon returned to Greece, where the rest of his life seems to have been spent. Thessaly was his principal residence, and that he passed no very long time in Athens may be argued from the fact, that Isocrates, an Athenian, received his instructions in that country. There, also, he taught Meno, and Aristippus, one of the nobles of Larissa, and there, or in Bœotia, Proxenus, the comrade of Xenophon. The wealthy families of Thessaly had that rude taste which would make them fond of the glitter and ostentation of Gorgias, and were able to pay him well. He lived in splendor, affecting in his dress the same show and parade which marked his eloquence. (*Ælian*, Var. Hist. 12. 32.) Owing to his habits of temperance, he attained to a very great age, to six or eight years over a century, and acted the rhetorician to the last, by saying, according to *Ælian* (u. s. 2. 35), when invaded by a lethargic sleep, premonitory of his end,—"Sleep is now beginning to lay me in the hands of his brother." His works, in his capacity as a rhetorician, were,—1. One on the art, or on one branch of it, the art of speaking suitably to the occasion. 2. A number of orations, declamatory and laudatory. One of these was delivered at the Olympic festival, in which, like Isocrates afterwards, he tried to unite the Greeks against the Persians. Another was a funeral discourse in honor of Athenians slain in battle, a fragment of which, preserved by a Scholiast on *Hermogenes*,

supplies us with the longest extant specimen of his style. These works exhibited a stately, uncommon, and poetical diction, together with frequent rhetorical figures, which must have been tedious and frigid in the extreme.* Two declamations still extant, bearing his name, are unlike his fragments in style, and ought probably to be regarded as spurious.

Gorgias was, as we have said, at bottom a Sophist,† but he avoided the title, which was not very popular, “and laughed at the Sophists, who professed to know how to make men better, confining himself to instructions concerning the art of speaking.” (Plat. Meno, 95, C.) His literary labors in the more appropriate sphere of the Sophist were confined, so far as we know, to a work entitled *περὶ φύσεως ἢ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος*, which may have been unknown to Plato, but is analyzed in a little treatise among the works of Aristotle. In this work, with such an ominous title, he attempted to prove, first, that nothing exists, then, if any thing exists, that it cannot be known, and, finally, that if known, it cannot be made known to others. Olympiodorus (in Routh’s ed. of Gorgias, p. 567) says, that this work was written in the 84th Olympiad, that is, sixteen years or thereabouts before his embassy to Athens. For the sophis-

* The fragments, which are few, are collected by Foss, but not completely. Thus, Clem. Alex. Strom. 1. 11, § 51, cites some words of Gorgias, apparently from his Olympian oration. The following words are a good sample of the style of Gorgias, and show some just thought. They are cited by Foss from Plutarch. *Γοργίας τὴν τραγῳδίαν εἶπεν εἶναι ἀπάτην ἢν ὁ τε ἀπατήσας δικαιότερος τοῦ μὴ ἀπατήσαντος καὶ ὁ ἀπατηθεὶς σοφώτερος τοῦ μὴ ἀπατηθέντος.*

† And so the men of that time regarded those who displayed their talents after the manner of Gorgias. Thucyd. 3. 38, *ἀκοῆς ἡδονῇ ἡσώμενοι καὶ σοφιστῶν διαταῖς ἐικότις καθήμενοι.* For the estimation in which the Sophists were held, comp. Protag. 316, seq.

tries out of which, with the help of the principles of the Eleatic Sect, he built up this triple wall against truth, I must refer to the treatise of Aristotle,* and to Ritter's history of philosophy.

Such was Gorgias. Of Polus, another speaker in the dialogue, little is known. He was a Sicilian of Agrigentum, a scholar of Gorgias in rhetoric, and perhaps of Empedocles in philosophy. He wrote, together with other works, a treatise, probably on rhetoric, to which Plato refers in the *Gorgias*. As we learn from the *Phædrus* and other sources, he gave great prominence to the figures of that artificial rhetoric of which his master was so fond; such as equality of periods and correspondence of adjoining words in sound; and taught the mode of using maxims and similes under separate heads, to which he gave pedantic names.

Callicles is an unknown Athenian, not a Sophist, as some have regarded him, but rather a contemner of the Sophists; although he carried out in practical life those principles which they laid down. He is a specimen of a considerable number of Athenians of his time, who, while they courted the people, despised it; who would have grasped at tyrannical power, without scruple as to the means; who looked down upon the pursuits of philosophy, when compared with the honors of political life; who had no faith in the distinction between right and wrong, and held pleasure to be the supreme good.

Besides these and Socrates, Chærephon bears a small part at the opening of the dialogue. He was an early friend and a follower of the philosopher, ardent in whatever he undertook, whose variance with his brother is mentioned in *Xen. Memorab.* 2. 3, and who obtained a response from

* It is edited by Foss, in his *Commentatio* before mentioned, and by Mullach (Berlin, 1845).

the Pythia commendatory of Socrates, according to the Apologies of Plato and Xenophon. He went into exile in the time of the thirty tyrants, and died soon afterwards, before his friend's condemnation. He injured his health and complexion through his studies, and received the nicknames of *νυκτερίς*, *νυκτὸς παῖς* (Aristoph. Birds, 1564, and Horarum frag.), for never coming abroad during the day, and of *πίξιμος θάψινος*, for his sallow hue (Eupolis Πόλεων frag., Aristoph. Wasps, 1413), as well as other ridicule from the comic poets.* When, according to the Scholiast on Plato's Apology, these reckless jesters proceeded further to call him a sycophant, a parasite, and a thief, we may put by the side of these aspersions the testimony of Xenophon, who classes him among those friends of Socrates who sought his company to improve themselves in household and civil relations, and who, at no time of their lives, either did, or were charged with doing, any wrong.

The persons of this dialogue are represented as having met in the year after the sea-fight at Arginusæ. Gorgias, being then on a visit at Athens, was lodging at the house of Callicles, and there, it is generally supposed, the dialogue was spoken. There is, however, good reason, I think, to accede to the opinion of Schleiermacher, who lays the scene in some public place, like the Lyceum, where the parties in several other dialogues convened.† At the opening of the

* In the proœmium to Philostrat. Vitæ Sophist., another Chærephon, as we are there expressly told, is brought into connection with Gorgias. He asked the Sophist a foolish question, *Διὰ τί οἱ κίαμοι τὴν μὲν γαστέρα φυσῶσι τὸ δὲ πῦρ οὐ φυσῶσι*; To which the other replied, *Τοῦτο σοὶ καταλείπω σκοπεῖν· ἐγὼ δὲ ἐκείνο πάλαι οἶδα ὅτι ἡ γῆ τοὺς νάρθηκας ἐπὶ τοὺς τοιούτους φύει*. I have seen the opinion somewhere expressed, that the story was first told of this Chærephon, the declaration of Philostrat. notwithstanding.

† For some observations on the time and place of the dialogue, see Appendix, No. I.

work, Socrates and his friend find that they have reached the place where Gorgias and others were assembled, too late to witness his exhibitions of rhetorical skill. In the hope, however, of drawing from him his views concerning his art, they approach and begin the conversation. Gorgias being fatigued, the younger rhetorician, Polus, volunteers to take his place, and answer to the inquiries concerning the nature of rhetoric; but as it is soon apparent that he is unwilling or unable to observe a logical method, Socrates transfers the discourse to Gorgias, from whom he professes to think that more brevity and accuracy of definition may be expected. (447-449.) By a series of questions in his peculiar manner, he gathers from Gorgias that he is a rhetorician, and able to make others such; and that his art is employed about words as instruments of thought. Socrates asks whether the definition is not too general, since several arts called by other names are also employed about words. To this Gorgias replies, that other arts ask principally, "What is to be done?" and use words as a secondary thing; but that rhetoric inquires, "What is to be said?" (-450, B.) Socrates objects that there are other arts, such as those of calculation and astronomy, which mainly depend on words, and demands to what the words relate which rhetoric employs. The most important of human affairs, says Gorgias. (-451, B.) But what are the most important? asks Socrates; for other arts might make a similar claim. The good, replies Gorgias, to which rhetoric opens the way, is freedom for the orator and the power of controlling other men, and this it effects by the power of persuading public assemblies. By this power it brings every other art under its control. (-453.) Socrates still is not satisfied. For although Gorgias has defined rhetoric to be the art of persuasion, he inquires whether other arts, which have to do with words, do not aim at persuasion also. What, then, is

the province and the nature of rhetorical persuasion? Gorgias is brought to admit that its province is to persuade judicial and other popular assemblies concerning things right and wrong; and that it attains its end rather by plausible arguments than by proofs drawn from absolute truth. (-455.) But Socrates still finds it hard to comprehend what is the peculiar sphere of rhetoric. In all public deliberations, the artificer, the general, or other person acquainted with the point in question, can give the best counsel. Where, then, is the orator's place? In reply, Gorgias refers to matters of fact. It was the advice of the political leaders which led to the building of the Athenian walls and docks, and not that of the artificers. He himself had often persuaded sick persons to comply with the directions of physicians, who had exhausted their arguments in vain. There was no occasion when an orator was opposed to an artificer, without gaining an easy victory. Such was the power of rhetoric, but, like other arts, it might be abused by those who learned it. Yet that abuse was no good cause of complaint against the teacher. (-457, C.) Socrates, after offering an apology for his seemingly contentious spirit, now forces Gorgias to allow that the orator may be ignorant of the subject-matter of other arts; all his study being concerned with finding the means of appearing to "those who do not know to know more than those who do." This Gorgias regards as an advantage, since it furnishes the orator with power acquired by small pains.* Socrates, without stopping to examine into the extent of this advantage, inquires whether the case is the same with justice and injustice, good and evil, and the like; whether, without know-

* Philebus. 58, A. "I heard Gorgias say, on a variety of occasions, that the art of persuasion far surpassed all the other arts, since it brought all things under its sway, not by force, but by their own will."

ing what these are in themselves, the orator can gain a reputation for such knowledge ; and whether, as a master in rhetoric, Gorgias would teach a scholar justice, who should come to him unacquainted with its nature. Gorgias has here to reply, either that there is no need of knowing anything about right and wrong in order to be an orator, and that, too, when he is perpetually employed upon questions involving right and wrong ; or that he will teach his students their nature. He chooses the latter alternative, although the previous conversation shows that, to be consistent, he should have taken the former. Socrates now forces him to admit that he who knows justice is just. The rhetorician, then, under his training, must be a just man. But he had before said, that the art might be used for a good or a bad purpose,—to favor justice or injustice. Socrates brings forward this inconsistency as needing explanation, when this, the first part of the dialogue, is broken off by the impatience of Polus. (— 461, B.)

There are two remarks which this portion of the discussion seems to demand. The first is, that, while it ends with an *argumentum ad hominem*, and with fastening upon Gorgias an inconsistency of no importance in itself to philosophical truth, it is not without its use. It shows how little the Sophists had reflected upon the nature of their arts, and how little they cared for truth or justice.* The

* Several passages of Phædrus, a work which treats of the worthlessness of rhetoric when not dependent on philosophy, may be adduced in illustration of what is here said. On 260, A, Phædrus tells Socrates that he hears the remark made, “that one who wishes to be an orator has no need to learn true justice, but only what may seem to be such to the multitude, who will exercise the office of jurymen ; nor the truly good or beautiful, but only the seeming ; for from these sources, and not from the truth, persuasion is derived.” And, again, 272, D : “They say that there is no need of making so much of this, or of taking such a long, round-about

art itself, having in its own nature no reference to truth, but merely to the force of arguments upon the minds of others, and, at the same time, being employed in discussions concerning what is good and just, could in its best estate be as easily used against truth as in its behalf. But as it then was, it was based on sophistical principles and opposed to sound philosophy, its aim being something else than the greatest good. It was an art of acting on the ignorant, and of acting on them by pretending to knowledge. It must use such arguments as were suited to persuade the masses, who are not capable of taking the true philosophical view of things. What arguments could a person ignorant of justice use before an audience also ignorant, when the question related to justice, but such as almost necessarily mislead?

course to reach it. For the orator, who would be well versed in his art, (they maintain,) has no occasion to possess true views in regard to just or true actions, or in regard to men that are such either by nature or education. In fact, they assert that no one in the courts cares for the truth about these things, but only for that which is adapted to persuade. And this is the probable," etc. Plato goes on to illustrate this by an example drawn from Tisias, one of the rhetoricians. If a brave man of weak body should have beaten and stripped of his garment a strong but cowardly man, and the case be brought before a court, neither ought to tell the truth; the coward ought to deny that the weak but courageous man was alone in beating him; while the other should ask, "how he, being so deficient in bodily strength, could have attempted it." He then shows how weak, at its very foundation, that unphilosophical rhetoric is which is built on merely empiric rules; since he who knows what is true must know, also, what is like truth, and he who studies the classes of human minds with philosophy for his guide will know by what arguments each class of minds is most influenced. "But," he adds, very nobly, "the virtuous man will not study this art of rhetoric for the sake of speaking and acting before men, but that he may be able to speak in a manner acceptable to the divinities, and to act so as to please them to the extent of his power."

Plato's opinion of advocates, which was none of the highest, may be found in Book XI. of the Laws, at the end.

But in the second place, if the art taught or presupposed the teaching of justice, its scholars would be a very different sort of persons from what even Gorgias allows that they were. For he who has learned justice is just. This looks to us like sophistry on the part of Socrates himself, as if the knowledge and practice of virtue could not exist apart. But whatever of untruth there is in the proposition, it was not meant for sophistry; it is a part of the system of Socrates and Plato. In the view of Socrates, and in that of Plato at first, all virtue could be resolved into science; all vice into ignorance.* Nor was the reason voluntarily ignorant, but merely deceived by the conceit of knowledge, and false opinion. When this was removed, and knowledge took possession of the mind, there was no cause why he who knew should not act in conformity with his knowledge.

In the second part of the dialogue, Polus takes his master's place. He begins by complaining that Socrates had unfairly involved Gorgias in inconsistency. Gorgias had said that he would teach justice to a scholar ignorant of it, only in accommodation to the prejudices of mankind, who regarded instruction upon that point as of high importance. A discussion now arises, in which Socrates explains in part his views of rhetoric. It is not an art, but a knack, or practical observation of rules aiming to produce pleasure. It belongs to a nature which is adroit, courageous, and skilled in mingling with mankind. It is reducible to flattery; like the arts of cookery, cosmetics, and sophistry, being mere routine or practice, not guided by the laws of absolute truth, and

* Comp. Aristot. Ethic. Eudem. 1. 5, *ἰπιστήμης (Σωκράτης) ὥστ' εἶναι πᾶσας τὰς ἀρετὰς, ὥσθ' ἅμα συμβαίνειν εἰδέναι τε τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ εἶναι δίκαιον*. See, also, Xen. Memorab. 3. 9. 5. Plato appears at first to have entertained the same opinion, but afterwards made virtue to consist in this: that the faculties of the soul respectively perform their parts, and are all obedient to the reason.

aiming at gratification. The real arts relating to the soul and body are two, with a twofold division each; of which the one, — the political art, or that which conserves the public good, — when it seeks to *secure* that good, is called the *legislative* art, when to *restore* it, is called *justice*. To these two arts, two touching the body correspond: gymnastics, aiming to *preserve* bodily good or health, and medicine, to *bring it back*. To these four arts four arts of flattery answer, and, acting adroitly without settled principles, slip into their places. These are sophistry, answering to legislation, rhetoric to justice, cosmetics to gymnastics, and cookery to medicine. Aiming at pleasure, and not at the highest good, these false arts attract and deceive the ignorant and thoughtless. And, being incapable of exact limits from their want of a scientific basis, they run into one another. (–466.) Polus is displeased at this brand of flattery put upon rhetoric, and asks if good orators are so regarded in the states where they live. *Socr.* “They are not regarded at all.” *Pol.* “How not regarded? Have they not the greatest power in their countries?” To this Socrates replies by admitting that they do what seems good to them, but denies that they do what they wish. In explaining this, he shows that what men wish is not what they do, but that for the sake of which they do it. It is a good in prospect which moves to action. Unless, then, the great power which enables orators to dispose, as Polus says, of the lives and fortunes of others, is a good, it is not what they wish. And if to have great power is a good, orators cannot have it, seeing they use that which they call such as an evil. They may do, then, what seems good to them, without either really having great power, or doing what they wish. (–469.) Polus sneers at these views expressed by Socrates. “Just as though you would not choose the liberty of doing what seemed good to you in the state, and would feel no envy if you saw one killing

whom he liked, or stripping him of his goods, or binding him." Socrates earnestly declares, that he regards such a one, if doing this unjustly, as most wretched, and to do wrong as the greatest of evils. Polus is surprised that he should think so, and affirms, that to be wronged is a greater evil than to wrong; and that the possession of supreme power in the state — which is won by the orator — is to be desired as enabling him to do what he thinks fit, — to wrong, if he pleases, and to keep others from wronging him. Upon this, Socrates makes his opponent own that uncontrolled power in the state, if it is a good, may also be an evil. It cannot, therefore, be a good in itself, and something beyond it must determine when it is good and when the contrary. This criterion is, that it shall be justly or unjustly exercised. (— 470, C.) Polus responds in a superior tone to this, as going against the common sense of men, and appeals rhetorically to the prosperity of Archelaus, king of Macedon, which was begun by atrocious crimes. If you wish, says Socrates, to support yourself by examples and by testimony, you will have no want of them. But I shall not consider the matter settled until I force you, with whom I hold the argument, to acknowledge that the unjust man is unhappy, or you compel me to the contrary admission. (— 472, D.)

The discussion during the rest of this part of the dialogue embraces two points, arising out of the proposition, that it is better to wrong than to be wronged: — 1. That the unjust man is, in every event, miserable; and, 2. That if he escapes punishment for his crimes, he is more miserable than if he suffers. And hence no man can prefer doing wrong to being wronged, which Polus says is the choice of all men.

1. Polus acknowledges that it is baser (*αἰσχίον*, more ugly) to wrong, but denies that it is more evil (*κάκιον*). This leads to an analysis of the ideas of the beautiful and the base (*τὸ καλόν, τὸ αἰσχρόν*), in which Socrates shows that

a thing is beautiful owing to its utility or pleasure, or both ; and base, owing to its evil or pain. But to wrong — which has been owned to be baser than to be wronged — is not more painful ; therefore it must be more evil. Neither Polus, then, nor any other man, as desirous of the highest good, can prefer the more evil and base to the less. (— 476.)

2. Polus admits, that to be the object of justice (*διδόναι δίκην*) and to be justly punished for wrong-doing are the same ; that a just punisher supposes one who suffers what is just, and that everything just is ^{καλόν} as far as it is just. If, then, what is suffered is just, it is *καλόν*, and if so, either useful or pleasant. But suffering for doing wrong is not pleasant ; therefore, it is useful or good. This goodness consists in removing pravity of soul, which, of all kinds of badness, is the greatest. Justice, the medicine of the soul, effects this removal : hence, to escape from punishment is more miserable than to be punished. It is better to go unhealed of a disease, than not cured of this inward severer malady. And not to seek this cure from justice is like fearing the pain necessary for attaining to health. (— 480.)

If these things are so, of what use is rhetoric ? For if it place a man in a situation where he can wrong more easily than be wronged, it does him so much the more harm ; and if he be enabled by it to escape the punishment of his misdeeds, again it does him so much the more harm. If it help him to punish an enemy, it benefits that enemy, — an object at which he is far from aiming. He cannot even defend himself against an enemy without doing the enemy this good.* (— 481, C.)

The end reached in this second division of the Gorgias is to set forth in a clear light that a pretended art, like the rhetoric of Gorgias and Polus, which has the gratification

* See Buttmann's view, in the note on 480, E.

of others, as well as one's own, in view, fails, by running against the law of right, to attain to anything good or useful, defeats its own objects, and falls into inconsistency with itself. It will not be doubted by the reader, that the moral tone of this discussion is worthy of the highest praise, and the conclusion most gratifying, considering it is formed by a heathen. But there are several places in the stream of the argument where we may fancy that we see shallows, or touch upon the ground. In the first place, we may question the accuracy of the comparison of the legislative art and justice with the self-styled arts of sophistry and rhetoric. What is the truth of the distinction, and what sphere must we suppose that Plato assigns to rhetoric? In reply, it must be owned, I think, that Plato fluctuates a little,* owing to his analogy between rhetoric and medicine, on the one hand, and between rhetoric and justice, on the other. If we press the resemblance to medicine, rhetoric must be confined to the reparation of injustice, and restoration of the public health. If we follow the parallel with justice, rhetoric must embrace within its limits every case where the question of conformity to the rule of right is involved; the rule of true right being laid down at the outset by the legislative art, and that of seeming right or gratification, in the place of justice, by sophistry. In this part of the dialogue, the narrower notion of rhetoric, determined by comparing it with medicine, seems to prevail in Plato's mind: the art has to do with the courts. And in this Plato was fully justified by the practice of writers on this art, who all, as Aristotle affirms (*Rhet.* 1. 1. 10), said nothing about the popular assembly, and confined their rules of art to the judicial

* Comp. Aristides (2. 377, Dindorf.), *τοτὲ μὲν γέ, φησι, ταυτὸν ἴστιν, ὃ μακάριε, ῥήτωρ καὶ σοφιστής, τοτὲ δ' αὖ τὴν σοφιστικὴν κρείττον εἶναι τῆς ἱστορικῆς καὶ διαφέρειν.* See 517, A, note.

(περὶ τοῦ δικάζεσθαι πάντες πειρῶνται τεχνολογεῖν). But in the latter division of this work, Plato treats the rhetorician and the political man as the same, which accords with the analogy between rhetoric and justice. This is the truer view of the subject, for otherwise the assembly of the people, where there lay open a wide field for false art, must be unoccupied.* We must recollect that Plato himself speaks of the boundaries of rhetoric as uncertain; and, also, that he is not opposing the bare “art of inventing and arranging arguments,” but a sophistical art opposed to truth.†

In the second place, we may doubt whether the analysis of the beautiful into the pleasant and the good, that is, the useful, and of the opposite to the beautiful into the painful and the harmful, is correctly made out, and, consequently, whether the principles of the latter part of the discourse be-

* With more justice still, Socrates, in *Phædr.* 261, A, regards it “as the art of bending men’s minds by words without respect to the occasion, not only in courts and other public assemblies, but also in private meetings; being the same in nature, whether small or great affairs are in question.” To which, in reply, *Phædrus* says, that the rules of art are used in speaking and writing when suits at law are brought, and in speaking when addresses are made to the Assembly; but that he has not heard of a wider application of rhetorical precepts.

† Whately’s definition. Aristotle’s is, δύναμις περὶ ἑκαστον τοῦ θεωρεῖσθαι τὸ ἐπιχειρῆμενον πιθανόν. It is worthy of remark how Aristotle alludes to this dialogue without naming it. He begins with saying, that rhetoric is ἀντίστροφος τῇ διαλεκτικῇ. In speaking of its abuse, he says, “It tries to put on the garb (ὑποδύεται) of the political art”; and, soon afterwards, ἔστι γὰρ μᾶλλον τι τῆς διαλεκτικῆς. *Comp.* 464, B, C. — This conduct of rhetoricians is ascribed to ignorance, or vanity, or other human reasons (1. 2. 7); and doubtless he joined with Plato in condemning the sophistical rhetoric of the preceding age. (*Comp.* 1. 1. 3.) But when he says that the judge himself ought to know whether a thing is *just* or not, and not learn it from the parties, whose only duty is to discuss the *fact*, he must be regarded not only as opposing Plato’s views (454, B), but as condemning the Athenian and every other system where the judges were ignorant.

tween Socrates and Polus, true as we feel them to be, are not built upon the sand. If I am not deceived, Plato does not here intend to enter into a close dialectical exposition of what is meant by τὸ καλόν, the beautiful. But, still, his definition is exact enough for the argument and the purposes of the dialogue. The attempts of others to analyze this idea prove this. Whether the term *beautiful* is or is not applied on account of pleasure derived from contemplating the object so called, or on account of the perception of a certain fitness, implying a relation of the parts to the whole, and of the whole to some good or pleasant end; — whatever we may decide to be the primary and essential characteristic of beautiful objects, it is sufficient, I think, for the argument to say, that pleasure or utility, or both, invariably attend on objects so called, and the author was not required to stop and subject this idea to a closer examination. It is also to be remarked, that the good and the useful are treated here as identical.* Upon this point we need only say, that it is assumed that whatever is good tends to promote the perfection or well-being of the person; in other words, is useful in reaching a good end.

Again, it may be thought that the last argument, concerning the good or utility of punishment, renders it necessary that punishment should reform the offender, whereas Plato, in this work and elsewhere, speaks of incorrigible criminals.†

* Comp. Repub. 2. 379, B. "Is not God truly good, and ought he not to be spoken of as such? Certainly. But nothing good is harmful. Is it? I think not. Can what is not harmful, then, do harm? By no means. Does that which does no harm do any evil (κακόν τι)? No, no more this than the other. But whatever does no evil can be the cause of no evil. Is it so? Assuredly. But what? is the good useful (ὠφέλιμον)? Yes. Is it, then, the cause of well-being (εὐπραγίας)? Yes." Etc.

† On the design and efficacy of punishments in society, a number of

If to suffer *δίκαια* = to suffer *καλά* = to suffer *ὀφέλμα* or *ἀγαθά*, can the criminal help being profited? and does not

passages from the Laws give us Plato's views. One is found in Book XI. 934, A. "Not suffering for the sake of his crime, — for what he has done can never be undone, — but in order that for the future he and they who see him suffering justice (*δικαιοῦμενον*) may either altogether hate wrong-doing, or, at least, that a considerable part of so great an evil may cease." Another occurs in Book IX. 854, D. "For, perhaps, if he suffer this penalty, he may become better, by being rendered more sober-minded (*σωφρονισθείς*). For no penalty which is inflicted by law is inflicted for evil (*γίγνεται ἐπὶ κακῷ*), but has, for the most part, one of two effects: it improves him who is punished, or, at least, checks the growth of his depravity." He then goes on to speak of incurable offenders doing good as examples. On page 862, E, after remarking on the excellence of legal expedients by which transgressors shall be made "to hate wrong, and to love or not hate the nature of right," he continues thus: — "When a lawgiver finds men incurable, he will provide some law and penalty for them, being assured that, for such persons themselves, it is not the better part to live, and that, by withdrawing from life, they will confer a twofold benefit on others: they will serve as an example to others to deter from evil, and will rid the state of bad inhabitants. Thus [that is, on these principles], in the case of such persons must the lawgiver establish death as the penalty for crimes, and in no other way."

In Book V. 728, C, he speaks of becoming like the wicked, and being separated from the good, as the greatest penalties for wrong-doing. "Though this is not penalty (*δίκη*), — since justice and penalty are always beautiful, — but vengeance, which is suffering attendant on iniquity. And as well he who has suffered this vengeance is miserable, as he who avoids suffering it; the one, because there is no cure for him; the other, because he is lost, that many may be saved." In these passages, the end of punishment is to cure and deter, or, at least, such is its result. And with these may be compared such places as *Repub.* 1. 335, where it is said, that a just man cannot harm even an enemy and a bad man. It is true that the notion of *harm* is confined there to making such a man worse, but the reasoning appears to include pain if unproductive of good. Cousin, in his Preface to *Gorgias*, contends very brilliantly, and in some degree justly, that the right to punish in society is derived, not from the good effects of

the argument look like a dead algebraic formula, more than like living moral truth? This difficulty must attend the argument at the first view of it. Nor can it be removed, unless we allow *δίκαια* and *καλὰ* to be what they are, not only in themselves, but also in the apprehension of the sufferer, while *ωφέλεια* is simply objective. The argument now becomes tenable. Punishment can be a good to none who do not receive it as just; nor can it, in the arrangements of this world, fail of being more or less of a good to him who feelingly owns that it is rightly inflicted. But there may be some who do not own this, and they are the incorrigible.

Polus being reduced to silence, Callicles steps forth as the third champion of the arts of show. He begins with doubting whether Socrates is in earnest in maintaining these principles, which would throw human life and conduct off from their old foundations. To this Socrates answers, that he follows wherever philosophy shows the way, just as implicitly as Callicles obeys the popular will, and that, before he can change his tone, he must hear her strike a different key. In reply, Callicles says that it was not philosophical reasoning, but trick, by which Polus was beaten. He had made the incautious admission, that to do wrong is baser (*αἰσχρον*) than to be wronged. It is so, indeed, by law, but not by nature. This ambiguity it is between the naturally

punishment upon the criminal or others, but from the duty of punishing, which is based on the instinctive feeling of desert of evil for doing wrong. He adds, "This theory is, without doubt, only indicated in Plato, but it occurs in a number of places, briefly but positively expressed." I could wish that the learned translator had proved this assertion, which his familiar acquaintance with Plato must have rendered easy. Doubtless Plato could not get rid of the conviction written on the heart, that the sinner *ought* to suffer, or of the tendency to view suffering as a debt owed to justice. But could not Plato try to go further back than this conviction, and search into the reason of the right which it admits?

and the legally beautiful or right which enables crafty reasoners to gain their points. When Polus spoke of that which is legally base, Socrates shuffled the natural into its room. But by nature nothing is baser which is not more harmful. The natural feelings of men, which, when injured, instantly rise against the aggressor, show, that to be wronged is no property of a *man*. The legal definitions of base and wrong deeds are introduced by the many and the weak, in order to keep the strong in check. But herein law is opposed to nature, which teaches that the better ought to have more* than the worse, and the more powerful

* *πλιονεκτεῖν*. *πλιονεξία* is substantially selfishness, to which cause in a very striking passage Plato ascribes all the wrong actions of men. *Leges*, V. 731, D: *πάντων δὲ μίγιστον*, etc. "The greatest of all evils is inherent in the souls of the mass of men, for which they excuse themselves and seek no deliverance from it. This is what the vulgar saying implies, that every man by nature loves himself, and that it is right so to do. But in truth the cause of all errors in every case is to be ascribed to too great self-love. For the lover becomes blind in regard to the object beloved, so that he judges wrongly of the beautiful, the good, and the just, thinking that he ought to honor what pertains to himself before the truth. The man who will be truly great ought not to love himself or his own things, but what is just and right, whether pertaining to his own actions or another man's. From this fault it comes, that all think their own ignorance wisdom. Whence, though we know next to nothing, we think we know everything; and, being unwilling to intrust to others that which we are not well skilled to do, we are forced to make mistakes in doing it. Therefore ought every man to avoid undue self-love, and to seek out some one better than himself, allowing no shame to prevent his taking such a course."

In another fine passage of the same work (*IX*. 875, B), the necessity of law is partly ascribed to the selfishness of man. *δεύτερον δέ*, etc. "In the second place, should any one in theory properly comprehend that this is so [that is, that the political art ought to care for the community more than for the individual, and that it is for the interests of both to have the community, rather than the individual, well arranged], and then rule a state with irresponsible and autocratical power, yet can he not adhere to this persuasion,

than the less powerful. The "good old plan, that they should get who have the power," is the law of nature — ay, and of right — in animals and man, as they show whenever they can seize the occasion. All this is very evident to the man of the world. But philosophy makes a man blind to these truths of common sense, and, if pursued beyond the requirements of education, is the ruin of a man. It unfits him for civil and political life; it is unbecoming for a full-grown man, who should be practical and mix with his fellows; it makes one slink away to a corner with two or three disciples; and, if attacked by foes in the courts, he cannot help himself, but falls into their hands, as defenceless prey, to be slain at their pleasure. (— 486, D.)

In this brilliant passage we see described the contempt felt by the vulgar politician for the true philosopher, and the sympathy of such a man with false and sophistical principles. He aims at pleasure rather than good, and the Sophists give their maxims for the prudential attainment of the same end. There is a plain allusion, also, to the behavior of Socrates at his trial, and to the charges against Socrates and Plato, — especially the latter, — of neglecting the service of the state. The ground which Callicles takes is evidently the only one which can be taken against Socrates,*

and through life keep the interests of the community foremost in the state, and his private interests subordinate; but his mortal nature will ever drive him into selfishness and the pursuit of his own ends (*πλεονεξίαν καὶ ἰδιοπραγίαν*), since it blindly shuns pain and seeks pleasure. Thus it will give a higher place to pleasure and pain than to the more just and good; and, by producing darkness in itself, will at length plunge the man himself and the state into all sorts of evils."

* The philosopher Archelaus, who was, perhaps, an Athenian and a scholar of Anaxagoras, taught (although he may not have meant by his words what the Sophists taught) *τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ τὸ αἰσχροὺν οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ*. This principle is admirably ridiculed in the *Clouds*, 1421, seq. Pla-

but it is equally the foundation of an attack against all morality. If the idea of right is admitted, it must be supreme; and pleasure, if opposed to it, must bow before it. The only escape is to show that pleasure is never inconsistent with the right and the good. But right, as fixed by law, restrains the individual, and is therefore inconsistent with self-gratification. Hence the advocate for pleasure must yield, unless he can show that natural right — which is really such — is another thing from what the opinions of men, expressed in their laws, call such, and that it authorizes selfish indulgence. But if this be natural right, it contains no moral element, implies no relation of one man to others, and sanctions obedience to every desire which looks towards pleasure.

Socrates first answers with exquisite irony to the maxim of Callicles, that the better ought, by natural right, to have more than the worse. If his opponent means, as he admits that he does, by the better (*βελτίους*), the superior and stronger, then, since the many are stronger than the one, as is shown by their enforcing their laws, they have a natural right to make laws for the one. Now they say, in their laws, that to wrong is baser than to be wronged; and hence, according to Callicles, it must naturally be so. (— 489, B.) 2. Callicles now shifts his ground, and makes the better the more intelligent. If so, replies Socrates, and if the more intelligent ought to have more than another of that to which his intelligence relates, then, in a mixed collection of men, a physician ought to have more food and drink than others, while yet the greater portion thus assigned to

to refers to it in a striking passage, *Leges*, X. 890. The discussion with Thrasymachus, in the first part of the *Republic*, attacks a kindred principle, and may be read here to advantage. Hobbes went to the length of any of the ancient Sophists on this point. See Mr. Hallam's *Critique*, *Hist. of Lit.*, Vol. III. 365 — 382, especially the close of the chapter.

him may do him extreme harm. In short, there is no end to the absurdities which will follow from the principle, that intelligence should move in an orbit around desire and not around good. (-491, B.) 3. Callicles forsakes this definition, and the better now become the more intelligent and courageous in politics, — such as are capable of governing.* Socrates here changes his point of attack, and takes a position nearer to the enemy's inner works. For whatever definition Callicles gives, to have more than others (*πλεονεκτεῖν*), or self-gratification, is the centre of the system, and must be laid bare in all its deformity. Do you mean, says he, by governing, governing one's self? At this the man of the world sneers, and pronounces a man's well-being to consist in having as large desires as possible, with the courage and intelligence to fulfil them. These qualities the many do not possess, whence, to hide their weakness, they praise self-restraint and blame incontinence. But it was not so from the beginning; the great and mighty of old acted by another rule; they regarded justice and self-restraint as base and evil, and got all they could from their enemies for themselves and their friends. Good and pleasure are the same. (-492, C.)

Socrates answers this in two ways. He first tries, by selecting some examples of low bodily pleasures, to awaken Callicles to the consciousness of the amazing baseness and evil which may attend a life of enjoyment.† The illustrations which form the long prologue of this part show that a most important topic is begun. (-495, B.) In the second place, he searches for some tests of the nature of pleasure,

* This may be regarded as the notion of the *ἀγαθόν*, the *optimates*, which was somewhat in vogue at the time, only a little altered.

† Comp. Philebus (an important dialogue, in which the nature of the good and the pleasant is closely examined), 46, A, B.

which shall show that it differs from good. To do this, he makes Callicles allow that courage, science, and pleasure are not the same; and that εὖ πράττειν and κακῶς πράττειν are opposites, so that one cannot be in both states at once, any more than he can be well and ill at once. The same may be said of weakness and strength, of swiftness and slowness, of good and bad, of happiness and misery. But pleasure and pain can coexist in the same person at the same time; as, for instance, thirst, a pain, exists, until drinking, which is pleasant, slakes it.* Thus pleasure wants an essential characteristic of good, and pain of evil. (-497, E.) Another test follows, grounded on the admission of Callicles, that the manly and intelligent are good. A foolish boy or man may be glad, and so may a wise one.† In war a coward is as glad, if not more so, when the enemy goes away, than the man of courage. Then the coward is as good as the courageous man, or even better, and yet bad by the concession of Callicles. (-499, B.) In other words, if good is relative to desire, as such, then its absolute nature ceases, it is in a perpetual flux, and alters with every change of desire or character.‡

Callicles now admits that some pleasures are evil and some good. He thus overthrows his argument, for if pleas-

* Comp. Cic. de Fin. 2. 3. 9.

† Comp. Philebus, 55, B: "And, besides, to be compelled to say that a man who feels grief is bad when he feels it, though he be the best of all men, and that one who is glad, the more he is so, at the time when he is so, is the more virtuous."

‡ In a fine passage, Leges, II. 663, Plato teaches that the good and bad judge of pleasure subjectively, or relatively to their own character. He then inquires whose judgment is to be received, as accordant with the truth, and answers, that of the good. Neither the lawgiver, then, should ever separate the pleasant from the right, the good, and the beautiful, nor any one else engaged in educating the young.

ure is in itself a good, evil cannot be affirmed of it. Socrates seizes upon the acknowledgment, and carries him back to a point debated in the first part of the dialogue, — that the good being the end of all actions, the pleasant must be sought for its sake, and not *vice versâ*. (—500, A.) Now to know what pleasures are good and what evil needs an artist, — a man who has studied the invariable absolute principles of true good and right; — whilst the knowledge how to gratify, acquired by observation, and resting on no unchanging truth, has nothing of the nature of true art, and to apply that knowledge calls simply for an exercise of memory.

If this be so, we have a standard by which we may try the pursuits of men; and, according to this standard, must condemn the music which is in vogue at the public contests, dithyrambic poetry, and even tragedy itself, with all its lofty pretensions. But how is it with rhetoric and the orators or statesmen? Do they neglect their own or the public interests? Do they seek to benefit or gratify the community? To this Callicles responds, that the question admits of a double answer; the orators of the present day seek to please the people, and follow their will, but he thinks that Miltiades, Themistocles, Cimon, and Pericles were good men, and aimed at the highest public good. (—503, D.) This Socrates denies, and, to make the matter clearer, goes at some length into the motives which should influence the good orator, — the true political artist. As the physician has health in view, so has he the health of the community, which consists in justice and temperance* (σωφροσύνη, self-

* For σωφροσύνη, comp. Repub. 4. 430, D. It is there compared to a concord and harmony, and called κόσμος τις καὶ ἡδονῶν τινῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἰγυράτεια. This κόσμος consists in the subjugation of the worse part of the soul to the better. Ritter observes (2. 474) that the expression σωφροσύνη

restraint, soundness of mind in regard to all pleasures and excess). Instead of flattering them and following popular desires, such a politician will restrain and chastise the people. (-505, C.) This is further enforced in a most important and admirable passage, by pointing out that the ideas of true good, of virtue, of order, of self-restraint or orderliness, of justice and piety (or the observance of the laws of moral order), of courage, of the well-being of the individual and his happiness, are closely and necessarily connected; while the opposites of these are linked together with the pursuit of pleasure. Neither a man, then, nor a state, which would be happy, can have any end in view inconsistent with justice and temperance. If this be admitted, everything will follow which Socrates had maintained, and his three adversaries had controverted. The orator ought to be just, and to know justice; otherwise he cannot practise or promote it. To be wronged is better than to wrong, for it involves no violation of justice; and to be punished for wrong-doing, than to go unpunished, for it reconciles the soul to justice. The wonder of Callicles, when Socrates defended these latter points, was misplaced. Furthermore, by acting on such principles, he should help himself and his friends, to do which Callicles pronounced him unable. For by living according to these principles, he would avoid the basest and the greatest evil. (-509, C.) But cannot a man, it may be asked, gain the advantage arising from not being wronged, as well as that arising from not wronging others? For the latter, an art is needed. As no one does wrong because he prefers it, but because he thinks to gain some good by it, that art must inculcate

is vaguely used by Plato, especially in his early dialogues; and that the definition in the passages of the *Repub.* which he cites (4. 430, u. s., and 3. 389, D) almost reduces its notion to that of *δικαιοσύνη*.

the nature of true good ; for example, must distinguish it from self-gratification. Is there, also, an art to avoid being wronged ? The only way of preventing injuries in all cases is, to have supreme power yourself, or to be a friend of the supreme power ; — for instance, if the people is that power, to gain its friendship by catering for its desires and following all its whims. But if this is done, the other and greater good must slip out of your hands. Nor is it of any use to say, that, if you do not thus conciliate the sovereign power in the state, you may lose your life. For it is not a man's business in this world to seek to save his life, nor ought the art of rhetoric to make higher pretensions because it saves life than the art of the pilot or the engineer, by each of which the life of those intrusted to its care is preserved, no matter whether it be better for such persons to live or to die. A man's part is to leave it to God how long he shall live, and to find out on what principles he shall pass the term of life given to him ; whether on those of the flattering politician, which will involve the loss of the greatest good, or on those of the man who sacrifices pleasure to the really good and useful. (—514, A.) And the same will apply to the management of a state. Hence the apprenticeship of political life must be in philosophy, which reveals the good and just to those who search for them ; and the true politician, contrary to what Callicles had maintained, must be a philosopher. A man who seeks to play the important part of a leader in the state must first ask himself whether, in his private capacity, he has cultivated justice and temperance, and made men better ; for the aim in the public and in the private sphere is one and the same. With this in mind, we may return to the four great Athenians, and bring their characters to the touchstone. Did Pericles make the Athenians better ? or did they not rather become idle, cowardly, talkative, and covetous through the measures of his admin-

istration? And did not those very Athenians, near the close of his long political life, show their degeneracy, by ungratefully bringing against him a charge of peculation? * The other three met with even worse treatment at the hands of those whom, if skilful politicians, they must have wished and known how to make better. Their ill-success is a proof that they understood not the true art of rhetoric, — that of persuading men to aim at the good, rather than the pleasant; and, indeed, that they were ignorant of the false art, also, if that enables its possessors, as is alleged, to sail in safety amid the storms of politics. (—517, A.)

In this remarkable attack on four of the greatest men of Athens, — men certainly not inferior, in any point, to hundreds of public characters who have been extolled by Christian historians, — we discover an exasperation of feeling in Plato, produced by the unjust fate of his master, and by the wide difference between his own political views and those of his native land. Nor can his character in general be freed from the charge of fault-finding. To this he was led by that uncommonly high standard which the nature of his mind compelled him to form; and, dwelling aloof, as he did, from the turmoil of politics, in contemplative retirement, he could not estimate all the practical difficulties which even a perfect statesman must encounter from a spoiled and self-willed people. But if we strike out what is due to these prejudices, we must find something of justice left in his blame of “the four.” The very fact that he draws a broad line between them and Aristides (526, B) is presumptive proof of a real difference. They were high-minded leaders of parties, who humored the people in many of its wishes for the sake of keeping power, and sought the

* See Appendix, No. II.

greatness, but not the real well-being, of their country. Had they

“to divinity aspired,
Not on the breath of popular applause,
But through dependence on the sacred laws,
Framed in the schools where wisdom dwelt retired,
Intent to trace the ideal path of right,”

had they been philosophical statesmen, aiming at justice and the highest good, the allies of Athens would have been less oppressed; the people would not have grown worse so fast; they themselves would have impressed something of their own virtue upon the state, and been less likely to suffer unjustly from those to whom they had done good.

But is it not strange that Plato should reproach these politicians with their ill-success, as a proof of their want of virtuous statesmanship? This is the point which Aristides, the Sophist, presses most effectively in his long and wearisome defence of “the four.” If ill-success is to be the test, what is to be argued from the two reprobate companions of Socrates, Critias and Alcibiades (*Aristid. de Quatuorviris*, 2. 322, *Dindorf.*, *de Rhet.* 2. 111)? What from Plato’s abortive attempts to make a man out of Dionysius of Syracuse (302–304, 324)? Nor is Plato, the Sophist goes on to allege, consistent with himself, since he praises Pericles, in the *Phædrus*, for his rhetorical skill.* In the *Apology* (31, E), he makes Socrates affirm that no one can be safe who opposes any populace, or strives to prevent injustice in a state, unless he avoid public life and live as a private citizen. (343, 353, 366.) And, in our dialogue itself, he pronounces safety to arise from being like the sovereign power, or from having supreme power in one’s own hands. Again, he says: “I should be a fool not to know

* *Comp. Appendix, No. II.*

that at Athens any man may suffer anything." And yet the fact, that these statesmen were not safe from the effects of popular ingratitude, is his proof that they did not oppose the people, or strive to prevent injustice.

How the reasonableness or consistency of Plato, as to this point, can be defended, I do not see. Ill-success could have the force which he gives it only in case the influence of the four men outweighed the opposing influences of all other causes acting at their time upon the opposite side. In general, however, it may be said that politicians who complain of ingratitude are only reaping what they have sown. They have tickled the nice palate of the people until their cookery pleases no longer; and now, by a rotation in office, which was right in their eyes until they came into power, and wrong afterwards, they are driven from the kitchen by new hands, who pay a price for the situation, and have learned some newer arts of falsehood. It was, perhaps, the sight of such flatterers of the Athenian *demos* fallen into disgrace, that led Plato beyond the bounds of truth, in imputing all the ill-success of politicians to their want of correct principles, — to their aiming at pleasure rather than good. Being preoccupied by this partial view, and having also in his mind the pretensions of the Sophists, — the teachers of such politicians, — that they could make men good, he loses sight of the great truth, that, in a corrupt age, a good man must suffer ill from those whom he tries to benefit.

But to return to the dialogue : — When Socrates had expressed such an opinion of these four great statesmen, Calicles replied, that no one of his own contemporaries could compare with them in the works they had done for the state. In answer, Socrates admits that they had shown uncommon ability in gratifying the desires of the people. They had created the ships, walls, and docks of Athens, but they dif-

ferred in no respect from the politicians of the day in the motives of their administration. If the highest good of the state should be the statesman's aim, they could no more claim this title, than a cook or a writer on cookery could claim to rank with the master of gymnastics in preserving the bodily health. And as such persons, if intrusted with the care of the body, would be blamed when the maladies arising from luxury should come on, so will the politician, who seeks to please rather than to profit, be punished for political evils which he or his predecessors have occasioned. The head of a state may not complain of ingratitude; for it is by his management that the character of those who compose it has grown worse. And the same holds good of the Sophists. They pretend that they can make their disciples better; and yet find fault with these very scholars for keeping back the price of tuition from them, and for other acts of unthankfulness. But what good, demands Callicles, can you say of such worthless men as the Sophists? They are the same with rhetoricians, answers Socrates, or nearly so; only somewhat above them, because they deal with principles which rhetoricians merely apply. If, now, their pretensions are well founded, they, as well as politicians, ought to fear no ingratitude; they should stipulate for no fees of instruction beforehand, trusting to the generosity of those pupils whom they had purged from vice.* (- 521, A.)

Having thus compared the arts which aim at pleasure with those which aim at good, Socrates makes a personal

* Schleiermacher thinks that this is aimed at Aristippus, who, by taking pay for his instructions, brought reproach upon the Socratic philosophers. The best account of the remunerations given to the Sophists which I have met with is contained in Welcker's Essay on Prodicus, his Life and Writings, in Welcker and Näke's *Rheinisches Museum*, 1. 22, seq., and since reprinted in his "Kleine Schriften," Part 2, p. 393, seq.

appeal to Callicles. "Which mode of serving the state do you now exhort me to follow; that of seeking its best interests, or that of catering for its desires?" Callicles persists in telling over the same story, that fidelity in doing good will make him suffer the loss of all things. Socrates acknowledges, with evident allusion to his trial and condemnation, that he is exposed to such dangers from bad men, and that he could say nothing in the court which would win him the favor of his judges. If he should urge, on his defence, that he had opposed the public will when it was basely clamorous for present gratification, that he had striven to make men good, and had their well-being in view, he would fare as a physician might fare before a jury of children with a cook for his accuser. What he called good, they called evil; what he called hurtful, they called pleasant. It was painful to be perplexed; and yet he must lead them through perplexity to truth. Would he not, then, before such judges, be himself perplexed, and at a loss for a defence? "And do you think, then," says Callicles again, "that it is well with a man who cannot help himself?" "Assuredly," replies Socrates, "it would be very ill with me, if I could not give myself that help which has been shown to be truly such,—if I could not observe the rule of right in all my relations. Let a man show me that I am not seeking to help myself thus, and I shall be ashamed of my character, and be grieved if I need punishment. But if I die for want of the flattering art of rhetoric, I shall not be sorry. For no one who is a man, and has reason, fears death in itself, but rather to do wrong. For to go into the other world with a soul full of all manner of iniquity is the worst of evils." (—523, A.)

Having thus brought the two principles of action to the confines of the two states of being, he closes very nobly, by presenting them in contrast beyond the grave. His views

are introduced as an explanation of the common *mythus* concerning a judgment after death ; which, however, Plato scruples not to alter for his own purposes. The views are these : — The character formed by disregarding the good and right, and pursuing pleasure, must be lasting, while all the advantages it offers are temporary, being connected with the world and the wrong judgments of men. But, at death, men will come before a judge who will look at the bare soul, and give sentence according to its qualities. Among transgressors, there are some who are not gone too far in evil to be curable. For these, punishment, bitter as it must be, will prove a good. Others, having passed beyond the reach of a cure, will suffer eternally, as an example to all who shall behold them. Of this description, a large part will be tyrants and other men in power, who had on earth the greatest license to do evil. But if one of these, like Aristides, rises above the temptations of his station on earth, his reward will be so much the greater. The larger number, however, of those who receive rewards will be private persons ; and, more especially, philosophers who had not mingled in public affairs. With this trial in view, Socrates asserts that he strives to bring his soul, in its most healthy condition, before the judge, and that he seeks to lead his fellow-men to do the same. And to this he now urges Callicles, warning him that the trial then will be more serious than all earthly ones, and that, without such a preparation, he will be unable to help himself, but, speechless and perplexed, must submit to worse than earthly indignities. Callicles, he continues, might despise such fables, and the truth they contain, if he could show anything better. But this, neither he, Polus, nor Gorgias had been able to do. They should, therefore, agree with Socrates, that to be, and not to seem to be, a good man is a good thing ; that the next best thing is to become good by submitting to punishment ;

that all flattery of one's self or others, of a few or a multitude, must be shunned; and that rhetoric, like everything else, must be used to promote the right, and that only. "Let us, then," he says in closing, "join together to live virtuously on such principles; then can we best apply ourselves to politics, when we are no longer afloat on the most momentous subjects. This is the only way to live well and to die well."

With respect to the close of the *Gorgias*, which must be counted among the finest passages in Greek, it may be observed that Plato shows elsewhere the same inclination to clothe in a mythical dress those truths which lie beyond the bounds of reason. It seems as if he felt the need of the venerable authority and positive assurances of a revelation upon such points, and resorted to the old traditions of his country as the best substitute which he could find, as having for their foundation real, though distorted, truth.* The *mythos* is something more than mere drapery, something more than a poetical fiction, which, with a beautifully plastic hand, he shapes into a form and meaning corresponding to his awakened moral sense. And yet the freedom with which he treats the *mythos*, and the readiness with which he alters its form on several occasions, prove that he accepted it only in its leading outlines as true; it was to him a *μῦθος*, and yet a *μάλα καλὸς λόγος*. It is found, also, at the close of the *Phædo* and of the *Republic*. He who compares the three passages will perceive that they agree in affirming the rewards and punishments of another life, which are used, with all seriousness, as motives for living

* This remark does not include those *mythi* which are of Plato's own invention. He was led to use them by his poetical temperament, and felt, perhaps, that the view suggested by a beautiful fable was as true as any which could be given; more true, because more beautiful, than if put into abstract propositions.

well here below ; and also in teaching that some criminals are healed by punishment, while others must suffer for ever without hope of a cure.* This Platonic view of the reme-

* Phædo, 113, E. "Those who are judged to be incurable on account of the enormity of their crimes, who have committed many and heinous sacrileges, or numerous unjust and lawless murders, or the like, these their appropriate destiny hurls into Tartarus, whence they never come forth." He then speaks of the punishment of those who have committed curable sins, in a passage too long to be inserted here, and then adds: "With respect to the *mythus*, to affirm positively that these things are as I have narrated them, is not the part of a reasonable man"; and then uses the truth taught in the *mythus* as a motive for virtuous action. In the Republic, the narrator of the *mythus* is represented as near a chasm (see Gorg. 526, B, note) in the ground, by the side of a person who asked another where Ardiaeus was. "Now this Ardiaeus was a tyrant in a Pamphylian city a thousand years before, and had slain his aged father and his elder brother, besides doing, as was said, many other unhallowed deeds. The person so asked replied, said the informant, 'He is not come, nor can he hereafter come hither.' Among the frightful spectacles that we saw, this was one, continued he: — When we were near the mouth of the chasm, and were expecting to go upwards, after enduring all the other things appointed, on a sudden we saw this Ardiaeus and others, nearly all of them tyrants; although some enormous transgressors among private persons were there also. When they thought that they should now go upwards (out of the chasm), the mouth would not let them pass, but uttered a bellowing sound whenever any such incurably wicked person, or any one who had not paid a sufficient penalty, endeavored to ascend. Thereupon, wild men, said he, all fiery to look upon, who stood by, when they heard the bellow, picked out and carried off a part of the transgressors; but Ardiaeus and others they bound hand and foot, and threw them down, and beat them hard, and dragged them along on one side of the road, scraping them upon thorns, while to the by-standers they told the reasons why these sinners suffered these things, and that they were drawn along to be plunged into Tartarus. There, said he, of all the fears many and various which fell upon us, this was the greatest, — lest, when each one was going upwards, the mouth should utter that bellow, and most gladly did each one hear no sound as he ascended." A conception worthy of the highest flights of Dante!

dial nature of punishment, in certain cases, even in another life, seems to have recommended the doctrine of purgatory to some of the Christian fathers.*

Having thus exhibited the argument of the *Gorgias* at some length, it will be in order for us to ask, What is the main subject of the dialogue? A question which it is almost as difficult to answer, in regard to some of the Platonic dialogues, as it would be to express the sum total of an evening's conversation among refined and intelligent persons: the delight you have felt, the instruction you have received, you are conscious of, and you carry away much in your memory; but it is hard to say what was the leading topic of the discourse, or whether there was any. The subject of the *Gorgias* is more easy to be perceived, and yet all have not been agreed concerning it. Olympiodorus (apud Routh) mentions three opinions besides his own:—Some say that it treats of rhetoric; others, of justice and injustice, considered especially in their relations to happiness; others still, absurdly enough, make it relate to the *demiurgus* or divine builder of the world, on account of the *mythus* at the close. “But we say,” continues the Platonic commentator, “that the scope is, to treat of the principles which lead men to political happiness.” With the first of these opinions, Cousin and Stallbaum agree. The latter says, however, that “though the principal point of the discussion is to blame the civil and rhetorical art at that day in vogue, and to show that it could not attain to excellence without the knowledge and practice of philosophy,” yet several other topics are closely united with this, as the difference of the just and the pleasant, the end of human actions, and the constancy of a good man in bearing evils and injuries. Nearly the same is the view taken by Ast. The *Gorgias*,

* Comp. Muenschcr, *Dogmengeschichte*, Vol. II. § 298.

says he, "has a decidedly political tendency ; and all the philosophical inquiries which it contains are intended to show, not only the unmeaning nature, but also the perniciousness, and, in fact, the profligacy, of the political art, when built on sophistry, that is, of the rhetoric there opposed." Another writer on the higher criticism of Plato, Socher, gives this dialogue a wider range. "The whole presents an arena, rising in three gradations. The prize of the contest is the better, happier mode of life ; the parties are philosophy and rhetoric ; that contends for righteousness and virtue ; this for the possession of political power ; the champion of the former is Socrates ; on behalf of the latter, three step forward, Gorgias, a rhetorician, Polus, a Sophist, and Callicles, an Athenian politician." Finally, Schleiermacher and C. F. Hermann, in the words of the latter, regard "the kernel of the dialogue to be, that the good alone is truly useful, and that men harm themselves by wrong-doing ; that, accordingly, the rule of pleasure must give way to the higher rule of the good."*

* All these opinions may be found in the works of their respective advocates, viz. Cousin's in his transl. 3. 130, seq., Stallbaum's in Vol. 2, sec. 1, p. 38, of his second ed., Ast's in his work on Plato's life and writings, p. 133, Socher's in his similar work (Munich, 1820), p. 237, in which he is polemical towards Ast. C. F. Hermann's is contained in his *Introd. to Plato* (Heidelberg, 1838-39, the second vol. has not appeared), p. 476, and Schleiermacher's — the critic to whom the thorough understanding of Plato owes most — in Dobson's translation of his prefaces. While I am upon this subject, let me say, that Schleiermacher hardly receives justice from the hands of this translator. His style, indeed, offers serious difficulties, for his mind was not, "though deep, yet clear." It may be forgiven therefore, to a translator, that sometimes he constructs, out of Schleiermacher's formidable German sentences, something not exactly English, as though he were only half conscious of the meaning. But when such things as the turning of André Dacier, the French translator of parts of

Most of these opinions have something of justice in them, but, with the exception of the last, appear to me to look at a part of the dialogue, rather than at the whole. If rhetoric is the subject, why have the researches into the nature of pleasure, the comparison between suffering injustice and committing it, and the discussion of the efficacy of punishment, so great prominence? Much is said about rhetoric, but it is the vehicle for conveying thought rather than the subject, the starting-point of the dialogue rather than its goal. I should entertain just the opposite opinion to that of Ast above quoted: that the scientific part of the dialogue is the main thing, and rhetoric only an example. Schleiermacher's view, so far as I understand it, or one very similar to it, appears to me to deserve the preference. The main subject is the worthless nature of pleasure, and of the pursuits founded on pleasure, as opposed to the right and the good. Rhetoric, including politics in its corrupt condition at that time, is selected as the most prominent and most esteemed of the arts which minister to pleasure. This exhibition of the subject being admitted, we see a propriety in the introduction of every topic. The right and the good are inseparably linked to each other, and, in fact, united with all that pertains to man's excellence and well-being. But to these, pleasure, pursued for its own sake, is opposed. It is opposed to true good, for it blindly seeks present gratification, however pernicious or debasing. It is opposed to right or justice, for it tries to avoid suffering wrong by inflicting wrong on others. It is opposed to both, because its impulse is to escape from de-

Plato, into Madame Dacier occur, notwithstanding Schleiermacher's "*dem Dacier*," and "*Seiner einleitung*," it may be suspected that the translation was made before sufficient knowledge of German was acquired, — a suspicion from which only the plea of gross carelessness can free the translator.

served punishment, without regard to the good effects of punishment on virtue and happiness. The arts which minister to pleasure — one of which, and the chief in its pretensions, is false rhetoric — fall under the same condemnation. As truth is on the side of good, they have no communion with truth; they are arts of imposition or flattery, calculated to persuade the ignorant, and reared upon no basis of unchanging truth or scientific principles. In the end, as they sacrifice the highest good of those whom they please to their present gratification, they involve in ruin him who practises them, and those who are practised upon. Politics, especially, which, when genuine, aims at the public good, is, when based on these principles, a mischievous trade. And this supreme pursuit of pleasure affects the condition of man, not only in this life, but in the life to come.

Such appears to me to be the subject of the *Gorgias*. But it should be added, that Plato has so handled the subject that the dialogue answers also for a defence of himself and his master. The allusions to the trial of Socrates have been noticed already. He stands before us as the philosopher who suffers reproach and death for seeking men's good rather than their pleasure. But Plato defends himself, also, apparently against friends, who blamed him for not publicly serving the state, as well as against public men, who thought philosophy a useless pursuit. Politics, he asserts, must be founded on the theory and practice of philosophy. No man is a true politician until he becomes τεχνικός; — an artist, a philosopher able to distinguish useful from harmful pleasures, — and reduces his science to practice by making men better. That this is a fair defence I do not assert; for, with true good in view at the outset, the practice perfects a man in the science. He might have said, what he must have felt, that the corruption of the

times, the necessity of using flattering arts, to which he could not resort, would have altogether prevented his success. In such an age, — and such an age is a very long one, — the philosophical statesman, — let me add, the truly enlightened Christian statesman, — the sound pilot of the state, is thrust from the helm, and ignorant apprentices usurp his place. Plato's part, therefore, was to act on a few, and on future times.

I would gladly now draw the attention of my younger readers to the *Gorgias*, as a display of the mind and style of Plato; but the limits of an Introduction forbid me to enlarge upon this topic. I must, therefore, omit to speak of the exquisite style of Plato, and the dramatic form in which he clothes his works. I must only glance at the Platonic Socrates, the centre of Plato's writings; at his admirable irony, now playful and now severe, his unruffled good-nature, his hatred of show and pretence, his attitude as an inquirer rather than as already wise, his unaffected modesty, his propensity to illustrate the great by the small, philosophical truth by common life, his high estimate of moral truth above physical. There are, however, one or two points to be noticed, in which *Gorgias* differs from many of Plato's works. One is, the earnestness, almost amounting to bitterness, with which the argument is carried on. There is less here of playful irony than elsewhere. Another is, that Socrates expresses his opinion, and lays down his principles, more than in most of the dialogues of an earlier date. Another still is, that, compared with the Platonic works of the first period, it has less of the dramatic about it; we have no embellished preface, like that of *Protagoras*, but at the beginning, Socrates, without any delay on the part of the writer, enters into the discussion. All these characteristics may be explained by a predominance of moral feeling, which rises even into indignation, and deprives Plato of part

of his usual tranquillity. With all this, the form is admirable.* The argument grows in interest and importance, until it ends in a strain of highest mood. To mention but a single characteristic, nothing can be finer than the way in which Socrates deals with Callicles in the third part, where he retorts his language upon him, and shows that the indignities which he had described as the rewards of the just man on earth will be heaped upon the unjust in a higher degree hereafter.

The opinion of the greater number of critics assigns the composition of the *Gorgias* to one of the years not long after the death of Socrates, while that event was still fresh in Plato's mind. Athenæus has a story (II. 505, D), that Gorgias read the work, and said, "How well Plato knows how to lampoon!" and another, that Gorgias declared that "he never heard or said such things as Plato reported." If Gorgias died soon after Socrates, as Foss maintains, these anecdotes, which may not be wholly unworthy of credence, would supply us with the latter term for the composition of the dialogue. But there is no certainty in regard to the dates of the birth of Gorgias, and of his age when he came to Athens as ambassador, on which the date of his death depends. A comparison of this dialogue with Plato's other works enables us to come somewhere near the time of its composition in another manner. It occupies a

* Stallbaum, in his *Introd. to the Repub.*, says: "*Hoc monere juvat disserendi quoque elegantiam in Politia tantam regnare ut paucissimi sermones præter Gorgiam, Protagoram, Phædonem, Phædrum, et Symposium, hoc in genere ad eam comparandi sint.*" Ritter, 2. 192. "In regard to Plato's imitative art in dialogue (*dialogisch-mimische kunst*), we consider as his most finished works *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, and *Symposium*, next to which, though at some distance, come *Phædrus* and *Phædo*." Here, however, style, rather than form, is spoken of. As a work of art, I should place *Phædrus* first among all the Platonic dialogues.

middle place, as Schleiermacher teaches us, between the elementary writings of Plato's first years, and the constructive ones of his maturer life. This critic conceives that it was written after Plato's first visit to Sicily, in 389, B. C., when he was forty years of age. Stallbaum brings it much nearer to the death of Socrates, in 399. To this conclusion he is led by a strong resemblance he discovers between the *Gorgias* and *Meno*, which latter dialogue he carries back even to a time before the death of Socrates, on account of Plato's mildness there in attacking Anytus, the accuser of his master. But neither of these considerations has much weight; Plato might and does resemble himself in works written at considerable intervals from one another; and the more gentle tone of *Meno* may be owing to a frame of its author's mind which is not to be accounted for. It is safer to say, that the date cannot be ascertained precisely.

ΚΑΛΛΙΚΛΗΣ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΧΑΙΡΕΦΩΝ,
ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ, ΠΩΛΟΣ.

447 CΑΡ. Ι. ΚΑΛ. Πολέμου καὶ μάχης φασὶ
 χρῆναι, ὃ Σώκρατες, οὕτω μεταλαγχάνειν. ΣΩ.
 Ἀλλ' ἦ, τὸ λεγόμενον, κατόπιν ἐσοτῆς ἤκομεν
 καὶ ὑστεροῦμεν; ΚΑΛ. Καὶ μάλα γε ἀστείας
 ἐσοτῆς· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ καλὰ Γοργίας ἡμῖν ὀλί-
 γον πρότερον ἐπεδείξατο. ΣΩ. Τούτων μέντοι,
 Β ὃ Καλλίκλεις, αἴτιος Χαιρεφῶν ὅδε, ἐν ἀγορᾷ
 ἀναγκάσας ἡμᾶς διατρίψαι. ΧΑΙ. Οὐδὲν πρᾶ-
 γμα, ὃ Σώκρατες· ἐγὼ γὰρ καὶ ἰάσομαι. φίλος
 γάρ μοι Γοργίας, ὥστ' ἐπιδείξεται ἡμῖν, εἰ μὲν
 δοκεῖ, νῦν, ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, ἐσαῦθις. ΚΑΛ. Τι
 δαί, ὃ Χαιρεφῶν; ἐπιθυμεῖ Σωκράτης ἀκοῦσαι
 Γοργίου; ΧΑΙ. Ἐπ' αὐτό γέ τοι τοῦτο πά-
 ρεσμεν. ΚΑΛ. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν βούλησθε παρ'
 ἐμὲ ἦκειν οἴκαδε, παρ' ἐμοὶ γὰρ Γοργίας κα-
 ταλύει καὶ ἐπιδείξεται ὑμῖν. ΣΩ. Εὖ λέγεις,
 C ὃ Καλλίκλεις. ἀλλ' ἄρα ἐθελήσειεν ἂν ἡμῖν δια-
 λεχθῆναι; βούλομαι γὰρ πυθέσθαι παρ' αὐτοῦ,
 τίς ἢ δύναμις τῆς τέχνης τοῦ ἀνδρός, καὶ τί
 ἐστὶν ὃ ἐπαγγέλλεται τε καὶ διδάσκει. τὴν δὲ

ἄλλην ἐπίδειξιν ἐσαῦθις, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, ποιησάσθω. ΚΑΙ. Οὐδὲν οἷον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν, ὃ Σώκρατες. καὶ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἐν τοῦτ' ἦν τῆς ἐπιδείξεως· ἐκέλευε γοῦν νῦν δὴ ἐρωτᾶν ὃ τι τις βούλοιτο τῶν ἐνδον ὄντων, καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντα ἔφη ἀποκρινεῖσθαι. ΣΩ. Ἡ καλῶς λέγεις. Ω Χαιρεφῶν, ἐροῦ αὐτόν. ΧΑΙ. Τί ἔρωμαι; ΣΩ. Δ "Οστις ἐστί. ΧΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις; ΣΩ. Ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐτύγχανεν ὢν ὑποδημάτων δημιουργός, ἀπεκρίνατο ἂν δήπου σοι, ὅτι σκυτοτόμος. ἢ οὐ μανθάνεις ὡς λέγω;

ΣΑΡ. Η. ΧΑΙ. Μανθάνω καὶ ἐρήσομαι. — Εἰπέ μοι, ὃ Γοργία, ἀληθῆ λέγει Καλλικλῆς ὅδε, ὅτι ἐπαγγέλλει ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὃ τι ἂν τίς σε ἐρωτᾷ; ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ, ὃ Χαιρεφῶν· καὶ γὰρ 448 νῦν δὴ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐπηγγελλόμην, καὶ λέγω, ὅτι οὐδεὶς μέ πω ἠρώτηκε καινὸν οὐδὲν πολλῶν ἐτῶν. ΧΑΙ. Ἡ που ἄρα ῥαδίως ἀποκρίνει, ὃ Γοργία. ΓΟΡ. Πάρεσι τούτου πείραν, ὃ Χαιρεφῶν, λαμβάνειν. ΠΩΑ. Νῆ Δία· ἂν δέ γε βούλη, ὃ Χαιρεφῶν, ἐμοῦ. Γοργίας μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀπειρηγένηαι μοι δοκεῖ· πολλὰ γὰρ ἄρτι διελήλυθε. ΧΑΙ. Τί δαί, ὃ Πῶλε; οἶει σὺ κάλλιον ἂν Γοργίου ἀποκρίνασθαι; ΠΩΑ. Τί δέ τοῦτο, ἐάν σοί γε ἱκανῶς; ΧΑΙ. Οὐδέν· ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ Β σὺ βούλει, ἀποκρίνου. ΠΩΑ. Ἐρώτα. ΧΑΙ. Ἐρωτῶ δὴ. εἰ ἐτύγχανε Γοργίας ἐπιστήμων ὢν τῆς τέχνης ἥσπερ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ Ἱρόδικος, τίνα ἂν αὐτὸν ὠνομάζομεν δικαίως; οὐχ ὅπερ ἐκεῖνον; ΠΩΑ. Πάνυ γε. ΧΑΙ. Ἰατρὸν

ἄρα φάσκοντες αὐτὸν εἶναι καλῶς ἂν ἐλέγομεν.

ΠΩΛ. Ναί. ΧΑΙ. Εἰ δέ γε ἥσπερ Ἀριστοφῶν ὁ Ἀγλαοφῶντος ἢ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ ἔμπειρος ἦν τέχνης, τίνα ἂν αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς ἐκαλοῦμεν;

ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον, ὅτι ζωγράφον. ΧΑΙ. Νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ τίνας τέχνης ἐπιστήμων ἐστί, τίνα ἂν καλοῦντες αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς καλοῦμεν; ΠΩΛ. Ὡς Χαιρεφῶν, πολλαὶ τέχναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰσὶν ἐκ τῶν ἐμπειριῶν ἐμπείρως εὑρημέναι· ἐμπειρία μὲν γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸν αἰῶνα ἡμῶν πορεύεσθαι κατὰ τέχνην, ἀπειρία δὲ κατὰ τύχην. ἐκάστων δὲ τούτων μεταλαμβάνουσιν ἄλλοι ἄλλων ἄλλως, τῶν δὲ ἀρίστων οἱ ἀριστοί· ὧν καὶ Γοργίας ἐστὶν ὁδε, καὶ μετέχει τῆς καλλίστης τῶν τεχνῶν.

D CAP. III. ΣΩ. Καλῶς γε, ὦ Γοργία, φαίνεται Πῶλος παρεσκευάσθαι εἰς λόγους· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὃ ὑπέσχετο Χαιρεφῶντι οὐ ποιεῖ. ΓΟΡ. Τί μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ. Τὸ ἐρωτώμενον οὐ πάνυ μοι φαίνεται ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλὰ σύ, εἰ βούλει, ἐροῦ αὐτόν. ΣΩ. Οὐκ, εἰ αὐτῷ γε σοὶ βουλομένῳ ἐστὶν ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ ἂν ἥδιον σέ. δῆλος γὰρ μοι Πῶλος καὶ ἐξ ὧν εἶρηκεν, ὅτι τὴν καλουμένην ρητορικὴν E μᾶλλον μεμελέτηκεν ἢ διαλέγεσθαι. ΠΩΛ. Τί δή, ὦ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ. Ὅτι, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐρομένου Χαιρεφῶντος τίνας Γοργίας ἐπιστήμων τέχνης, ἐγκωμιάζεις μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν τέχνην, ὥσπερ τινὸς ψέγοντος, ἥτις δὲ ἐστίν, οὐκ ἀπεκρίνω. ΠΩΛ. Οὐ γὰρ ἀπεκρινάμην, ὅτι εἴη ἢ καλλίστη; ΣΩ. Καὶ μάλα γε. ἀλλ' οὐδεὶς ἐρωτᾷ

ποία τις εἴη ἡ Γοργίου τέχνη, ἀλλὰ τίς, καὶ ὄν-
 τινά δέοι καλεῖν τὸν Γοργίαν. ὥσπερ τὰ ἔμ-
 προσθέν σοι ὑπετείναιο Χαιρεφῶν καὶ αὐτῷ 449
 καλῶς καὶ διὰ βραχέων ἀπεκρίνω, καὶ νῦν οὕ-
 τως εἰπέ τίς ἡ τέχνη καὶ τίνα Γοργίαν καλεῖν
 χρὴ ἡμᾶς. μᾶλλον δέ, ὃ Γοργία, αὐτὸς ἡμῖν
 εἰπέ τίνα σε χρὴ καλεῖν ὡς τίνος ἐπιστήμονα
 τέχνης. ΓΟΡ. Τῆς ρητορικῆς, ὃ Σώκρατες.
 ΣΩ. Ῥήτορα ἄρα χρὴ σε καλεῖν; ΓΟΡ.
 Ἀγαθόν γε, ὃ Σώκρατες, εἰ δὴ ὁ γε εὐχομαι
 εἶναι, ὡς ἔφη Ὀμηρος, βούλει με καλεῖν. ΣΩ.
 Ἀλλὰ βούλομαι. ΓΟΡ. Κάλει δὴ. ΣΩ.
 Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλους σε φῶμεν δυνατόν εἶναι B
 ποιεῖν; ΓΟΡ. Ἐπαγγέλλομαί γε δὴ ταῦτα οὐ
 μόνον ἐνθάδε, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοθι. ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν
 ἐθελήσας ἂν, ὃ Γοργία, ὥσπερ νῦν διαλεγόμεθα,
 διατελέσαι τὸ μὲν ἐρωτῶν, τὸ δ' ἀποκρινόμενος,
 τὸ δὲ μῆκος τῶν λόγων τοῦτο, οἷον καὶ Πῶλος
 ἤρξατο, ἐσαῦθις ἀποθέσθαι; ἀλλ' ὅπερ ὑπισχνεῖ,
 μὴ ψεύσῃ, ἀλλὰ ἐθέλησον κατὰ βραχὺ τὸ ἐρω-
 τώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ΓΟΡ. Εἰσὶ μὲν, ὃ Σώ-
 κρατες, ἔναι τῶν ἀποκρίσεων ἀναγκαῖαι διὰ C
 μακρῶν τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ
 πειράσομαί γε ὡς διὰ βραχυτάτων. καὶ γὰρ αὖ
 καὶ τοῦτο ἐν ἔστιν ὧν φημι, μηδένα ἂν ἐν βρα-
 χυτέροις ἔμοῦ τὰ αὐτὰ εἰπεῖν. ΣΩ. Τούτου
 μὴν δεῖ, ὃ Γοργία· καί μοι ἐπίδειξιν αὐτοῦ
 τούτου ποιῆσαι, τῆς βραχυλογίας, μακρολογίας
 δὲ ἐσαῦθις. ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλὰ ποιήσω, καὶ οὐδενὸς
 φήσεις βραχυλογωτέρου ἀκοῦσαι.

CAP. IV. ΣΩ. Φέρε δή.—*ρήτορικῆς γὰρ*
 D *φῆς ἐπιστήμων τέχνης εἶναι καὶ ποιῆσαι ἂν καὶ*
ἄλλον ρήτορα.—ἡ ρήτορικὴ περὶ τί τῶν ὄντων
τυγχάνει οὕσα; ὥσπερ ἡ ὑφαντικὴ περὶ τὴν
τῶν ἱματίων ἐργασίαν· ἡ γὰρ; ΓΟΡ. Ναί.
 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ μουσικὴ περὶ τὴν τῶν
 μελῶν ποίησιν; ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Νῆ τὴν
 Ἥραν, ᾧ Γοργία, ἄγαμαί γε τὰς ἀποκρίσεις,
 ὅτι ἀποκρίνει ὡς οἶόν τε διὰ βραχυτάτων.
 ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γὰρ οἶμαι, ᾧ Σώκρατες, ἐπεικῶς
 τοῦτο ποιεῖν. ΣΩ. Εὖ λέγεις. ἴθι δὴ μοι ἀπό-
 E κριναι οὕτω καὶ περὶ τῆς ρήτορικῆς, περὶ τί τῶν
 ὄντων ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη; ΓΟΡ. Περὶ λόγους.
 ΣΩ. Ποίους τούτους, ᾧ Γοργία; ἄρα οἱ δηλοῦ-
 σι τοὺς κάμνοντας, ὥς ἂν διαιτῶμενοι ὑγιαίνοιεν;
 ΓΟΡ. Οὐ. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα περὶ πάντας γε
 τοὺς λόγους ἡ ρήτορικὴ ἐστίν. ΓΟΡ. Οὐ δῆ-
 τα. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν λέγειν γε ποιεῖ δυνατούς.
 ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν περὶ ὧν περ λέγειν,
 καὶ φρονεῖν; ΓΟΡ. Ὡς γὰρ οὐ; ΣΩ. Ἄρ'
 450 οὖν καὶ ἦν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἡ ἰατρικὴ περὶ τῶν
 καμνόντων ποιεῖ δυνατούς εἶναι φρονεῖν καὶ
 λέγειν; ΓΟΡ. Ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. Καὶ ἡ ἰατρικὴ
 ἄρα, ὥς ἔοικε, περὶ λόγους ἐστί. ΓΟΡ. Ναί.
 ΣΩ. Τούς γε περὶ τὰ νοσήματα; ΓΟΡ. Μά-
 λιστα. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ γυμναστικὴ περὶ
 λόγους ἐστὶ τοὺς περὶ εὐεξίαν τε τῶν σωμάτων
 καὶ καχεξίαν; ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Καὶ
 B μὴν καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι, ᾧ Γοργία, οὕτως ἔχου-
 σιν· ἐκάστη αὐτῶν περὶ λόγους ἐστὶ τούτους, οἱ

τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα οὐ ἐκάστη
 ἐστὶν ἡ τέχνη. ΓΟΡ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν
 δὴ ποτε τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας οὐ ρητορικὰς καλεῖς,
 οὔσας περὶ λόγους, εἶπερ ταύτην ρητορικὴν κα-
 λεῖς, ἢ ἂν ἢ περὶ λόγους; ΓΟΡ. Ὅτι, ὦ Σώ-
 κρατες, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων τεχνῶν περὶ χειρουργίας
 τε καὶ τοιαύτας πράξεις, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, πᾶσά
 ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, τῆς δὲ ρητορικῆς οὐδέν ἐστι
 τοιοῦτον χειρουργημα, ἀλλὰ πᾶσα ἡ πράξις καὶ
 ἡ κύρωσις διὰ λόγων ἐστί. διὰ ταῦτ' ἐγὼ τὴν ρητορικὴν τέχνην ἀξιῶ εἶναι περὶ λόγους, ὀρθῶς
 λέγων, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι.

CAP. V. ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν μανθάνω οἷαν αὐ-
 τὴν βούλει καλεῖν; τάχα δὲ εἴσομαι σαφέστερον.
 ἀλλ' ἀπόκριναι. εἰσὶν ἡμῖν τέχναι. ἢ γάρ; ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Πασῶν δέ, οἶμαι, τῶν τε-
 χνῶν τῶν μὲν ἐργασία τὸ πολὺ ἐστὶ καὶ λόγου
 βραχέος δέονται, ἔναι δὲ οὐδενός, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆς
 τέχνης περαίνουτο ἂν καὶ διὰ σιγῆς, οἷον γραφι-
 κὴ καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιία καὶ ἄλλαι πολλάι. τὰς
 τοιαύτας μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, περὶ ἧς οὐ φῆς τὴν
 ρητορικὴν εἶναι. ἢ οὐ; ΓΟΡ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν
 καλῶς ὑπολαμβάνεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Ἐτε-
 ραι δέ γέ εἰσι τῶν τεχνῶν, αἷ διὰ λόγου πᾶν
 περαίνουσι, καὶ ἔργου, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ἢ οὐδενός
 προσδέονται ἢ βραχέος πάνν, οἷον ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ
 καὶ λογιστικὴ καὶ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ πεπτεντικὴ γε
 καὶ ἄλλαι πολλάι τέχναι, ὧν ἔναι σχεδόν τι
 ἴσους τοὺς λόγους ἔχουσι ταῖς πράξεσιν, αἱ δὲ
 πολλάι πλείους καὶ τὸ παράπαν πᾶσα ἡ πράξις

καὶ τὸ κῦρος αὐταῖς διὰ λόγων ἐστί. τῶν τοι-
 ούτων τινά μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν τὴν ῥητορικὴν.
 ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῶς λέγεις. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὔτοι τού-
 των γε οὐδεμίαν οἶμαί σε βούλεσθαι ῥητορικὴν
 καλεῖν, οὐχ ὅτι τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως εἶπες, ὅτι ἡ
 διὰ λόγου τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσα ῥητορικὴ ἐστὶ, καὶ
 ὑπολάβοι ἄν τις, εἰ βούλοιτο δυσχεραίνειν ἐν
 τοῖς λόγοις, Τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἄρα ῥητορικὴν, ᾧ
 Γοργία, λέγεις; ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶμαί σε οὔτε τὴν
 451 ἀριθμητικὴν οὔτε τὴν γεωμετρικὴν ῥητορικὴν λέ-
 γειν. ΓΟΡ. Ὅρθως γὰρ οἶει, ᾧ Σώκρατες, καὶ
 δικαίως ὑπολαμβάνεις.

CAP. VI. ΣΩ. Ἰθι οὖν καὶ σὺ τὴν ἀπόκρι-
 σιν ἣν ἡρόμην διαλέρανόν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἡ ῥητορικὴ
 τυγχάνει μὲν οὕσα τούτων τις τῶν τεχνῶν τῶν
 τὸ πολὺ λόγῳ χρωμένων, τυγχάνουσι δὲ καὶ ἄλ-
 λαι τοιαῦται οὕσαι, πειρῶ εἰπεῖν, ἡ περὶ τί ἐν
 λόγοις τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσα ῥητορικὴ ἐστίν. ὥσπερ
 ἂν εἴ τις με ἔροιτο ὧν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον περὶ ἴσ-
 τिनουσούν τῶν τεχνῶν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τίς ἐστὶν ἡ
 Β ἀριθμητικὴ τέχνη; εἴποιμ' ἂν αὐτῷ, ὥσπερ σὺ
 ἄρτι, ὅτι τῶν διὰ λόγου τις τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσῶν.
 καὶ εἴ με ἐπανέροιτο· Τῶν περὶ τί; εἴποιμ' ἂν,
 ὅτι τῶν περὶ τὸ ἀρτιόν τε καὶ περιττὸν [γνώσεις],
 ὅσα ἂν ἐκάτερα τυγχάνοι ὄντα. εἰ δ' αὖ ἔροιτο·
 Τὴν δὲ λογιστικὴν τίνα καλεῖς τέχνην; εἴποιμ'
 ἂν, ὅτι καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶ τῶν λόγῳ τὸ πᾶν κυρουμέ-
 νων. καὶ εἰ ἐπανέροιτο, Ἡ περὶ τί; εἴποιμ' ἂν
 ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τῷ δῆμῳ συγγραφόμενοι, ὅτι τὰ μὲν
 C ἄλλα καθάπερ ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ ἢ λογιστικὴ ἔχει

περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ γάρ ἐστι, τό τε ἄρτιον καὶ τὸ περιιτόν· διαφέρει δὲ τοσοῦτον, ὅτι καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα πῶς ἔχει πλήθους ἐπισκοπεῖ τὸ περιιτόν καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον ἢ λογιστική. καὶ εἴ τις τὴν ἀστρονομίαν ἀνέροιτο, ἐμοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι καὶ αὕτη λόγῳ κυροῦται τὰ πάντα, Οἱ δὲ λόγοι οἱ τῆς ἀστρονομίας, εἰ φαίη, περὶ τί εἰσιν, ὧς Σώκρατες; εἵπομι' ἄν, ὅτι περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀστρον φορὰν καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης, πῶς πρὸς ἄλληλα D τάχους ἔχει. ΓΟΡ. Ὅρθῶς γε λέγων σύ, ὧς Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Ἰθι δὴ καὶ σύ, ὧς Γοργία. τυγχάνει μὲν γάρ δι' ἢ ῥητορικὴ οὕσα τῶν λόγῳ τὰ πάντα διαπραττομένων τε καὶ κυρουμένων τις. ἢ γάρ; ΓΟΡ. Ἔστι ταῦτα. ΣΩ. Λέγε δὴ τῶν περὶ τί; * τί * ἐστι τοῦτο τῶν ὄντων, περὶ οὗ οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι εἰσίν, οἷς ἢ ῥητορικὴ χρῆται; ΓΟΡ. Τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων, ὧς Σώκρατες, καὶ ἄριστα.

CAP. VII. ΣΩ. Ἄλλ', ὧς Γοργία, ἀμφισβητήσιμον καὶ τοῦτο λέγεις καὶ οὐδέν πω σαφές. Ε οἶμαι γάρ σε ἀκηκοέναι ἐν τοῖς συμποσίοις ἀδόντων ἀνθρώπων τοῦτο τὸ σχολιόν, ἐν ᾧ καταριθμοῦνται ἄδοντες, ὅτι ὑγιαίνειν μὲν ἄριστόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον καλὸν γενέσθαι, τρίτον δέ, ὥς φησιν ὁ ποιητὴς τοῦ σχολιοῦ, τὸ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως. ΓΟΡ. Ἀκήκοα γάρ· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τί τοῦτο λέγεις; ΣΩ. Ὅτι σοι ἀντίκα ἂν παρα-452 σταῖεν οἱ δημιουργοὶ τούτων ὧν ἐπήνεσεν ὁ τὸ σχολιόν ποιήσας, ἱατρός τε καὶ παιδοτρίβης καὶ χρηματιστής, καὶ εἵποι πρῶτον μὲν ὁ ἱατρός, ὅτι,

ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔξαπατᾷ σε Γοργίας· οὐ γὰρ
 ἐστὶν ἡ τούτου τέχνη περὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν
 τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλ' ἡ ἐμὴ. εἰ οὖν αὐτὸν ἐγὼ
 ἐροίμην· Σὺ δὲ τίς ὢν ταῦτα λέγεις; εἴποι ἂν
 ἴσως, ὅτι Ἰατρός. Τί οὖν λέγεις; ἢ τὸ τῆς σῆς
 τέχνης ἔργον μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἀγαθόν; Πῶς γὰρ
 B οὐ, φαίη ἂν ἴσως, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑγίεια; τί δ'
 ἐστὶ μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώποις ὑγείας; Εἰ δ'
 αὖ μετὰ τοῦτον ὁ παιδοτρίβης εἴποι, ὅτι Θαν-
 μάζοιμί γ' ἂν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ αὐτός, εἴ σοι
 ἔχει Γοργίας μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἐπιδειῖξαι τῆς αὐ-
 τοῦ τέχνης ἢ ἐγὼ τῆς ἐμῆς· εἴποιμι' ἂν αὖ καὶ
 πρὸς τοῦτον· Σὺ δὲ δὴ τίς εἶ, ὦ ἄνθρωπε; καὶ
 τί τὸ σὸν ἔργον; Παιδοτρίβης, φαίη ἂν, τὸ δ'
 ἔργον μου ἐστὶ καλοὺς τε καὶ ἰσχυροὺς ποιεῖν
 τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τὰ σώματα. Μετὰ δὲ τὸν παι-
 δοτρίβην εἴποι ἂν ὁ χρηματιστής, ὡς ἐγώ μαι,
 C πάνυ καταφρονῶν ἀπάντων, Σκόπει δῆτα, ὦ
 Σώκρατες, ἐάν σοι πλούτου φανῇ τι μεῖζον ἀγα-
 θὸν ὢν ἢ παρὰ Γοργία ἢ παρ' ἄλλῳ ὁτιοῦν.
 φαῖμεν ἂν οὖν πρὸς αὐτόν· Τί δὲ δὴ; ἢ σὺ
 τούτου δημιουργός; Φαίη ἂν. Τίς ὢν; Χρη-
 ματιστής. Τί οὖν; κρίνεις σὺ μέγιστον ἀνθρώ-
 ποις ἀγαθὸν εἶναι πλοῦτον; φήσομεν. Πῶς
 γὰρ οὐκ; ἐρεῖ. Καὶ μὴν ἀμφισβητεῖ γε Γορ-
 γίας ὅδε τὴν παρ' αὐτῷ τέχνην μεῖζονος ἀγαθοῦ
 αἰτίαν εἶναι ἢ τὴν σήν, φαῖμεν ἂν ἡμεῖς. δῆλον
 D οὖν, ὅτι τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔροισ' ἂν· Καὶ τί ἐστὶ
 τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθόν; ἀποκρινάσθω Γοργίας. Ἴθι
 οὖν νομίσας, ὦ Γοργία, ἐρωτᾶσθαι καὶ ὑπ' ἐκεί-

νων καὶ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ, ἀπόκριναι τί ἐστὶ τοῦτο, ὃ φης σὺ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ σὲ δημιουργὸν εἶναι αὐτοῦ. ΓΟΡ. "Ὅπερ ἐστίν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν καὶ αἴτιον ἅμα μὲν ἐλευθερίας αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἅμα δὲ τοῦ ἄλλων ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ πόλει ἐκάστω. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτο λέγεις; Ε ΓΟΡ. Τὸ πείθειν ἔγωγ' οἷόν τ' εἶναι τοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ δικαστὰς καὶ ἐν βουλευτηρίῳ βουλευτὰς καὶ ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ ἐκκλησιαστὰς καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ ξυλλόγῳ παντί, ὅσις ἂν πολιτικὸς ξύλλογος γίγνηται. καίτοι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει δοῦλον μὲν ἔξεις τὸν ἰατρόν, δοῦλον δὲ τὸν παιδοτρίβην· ὁ δὲ χρηματιστὴς οὗτος ἄλλῳ ἀναφανήσεται χρηματιζόμενος καὶ σὺχ' αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ σοὶ τῷ δυναμένῳ λέγειν καὶ πείθειν τὰ πλήθη.

CAP. VIII. ΣΩ. Νῦν μοι δοκεῖς δηλῶσαι, ὦ Γοργία, ἐγγύτατα τὴν ρητορικὴν ἦντινα τέ- 153
χνην ἡγεῖ εἶναι, καί, εἴ τι ἐγὼ συνήμι, λέγεις, οἷτι πειθοῦς δημιουργός ἐστιν ἡ ρητορικὴ, καὶ ἡ πραγματεία αὐτῆς ἅπασα καὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον εἰς τοῦτο τελευτᾷ. ἢ ἔχεις τι λέγειν ἐπὶ πλεον τὴν ρητορικὴν δύνασθαι ἢ πειθῶ τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ποιεῖν; ΓΟΡ. Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖς ἰκανῶς ὀρίζεσθαι· ἐστὶ γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῆς. ΣΩ. "Ἀκουσον δὴ, ὦ Γοργία. ἐγὼ γὰρ εὔ ἴσθ' ὅτι, ὥς ἐμαυτὸν Β
πειθῶ, εἵπερ τις ἄλλος ἄλλῳ διαλέγεται βουλό-
μενος εἰδέναι αὐτὸ τοῦτο, περὶ οὗτου ὁ λόγος ἐστί, καὶ ἐμὲ εἶναι τούτων ἕνα· ἀξιώ δὲ καὶ σέ.

- ΓΟΡ. Τί οὖν δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ
 ἐρῶ νῦν. ἐγὼ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ῥητορικῆς πειθῶ, ἣτις
 ποτ' ἐστὶν ἢν σὺ λέγεις καὶ περὶ ὧντινων πρα-
 γμάτων ἐστὶ πειθῶ, σαφῶς μὲν εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι οὐκ
 οἶδα, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὑποπιτεύω γε ἢν οἶμαί σε
 λέγειν καὶ περὶ ὧν· οὐδὲν μέντοι ἦτιον ἐρήσο-
 C μαί σε τίνα ποτὲ λέγεις τὴν πειθῶ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς
 ῥητορικῆς καὶ περὶ τίνων αὐτὴν εἶναι. τοῦ οὖν
 ἔνεκα δὴ αὐτοὺς ὑποπιτεύων σὲ ἐρήσομαι, ἀλλ'
 οὐκ αὐτοὺς λέγω; οὐ σοῦ ἔνεκα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου,
 ἵνα οὕτω προῖη, ὥς μάλιστ' ἂν ἡμῖν καταφανὲς
 ποιοῖ περὶ οὗτου λέγεται. σκόπει γάρ, εἴ σοι δοκῶ
 δικαίως ἀνερωτᾶν σε. ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐτύγχανόν σε
 ἐρωτῶν τίς ἐστι τῶν ζωγράφων Ζεῦξις, εἴ μοι
 εἶπες, ὅτι ὁ τὰ ζῶα γράφων, ἄρ' οὐκ ἂν δικαίως
 D σε ἡρόμην ὁ τὰ ποῖα τῶν ζώων γράφων καὶ ποῦ;
 ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Ἄρα διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι
 καὶ ἄλλοι εἰσὶ ζωγράφοι γράφοντες ἄλλα πολλὰ
 ζῶα; ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ γε μηδεὶς ἄλ-
 λος ἢ Ζεῦξις ἔγραφε, καλῶς ἂν σοι ἀπεκέκριτο;
 ΓΟΡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ καὶ περὶ
 τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἰπέ, πότερόν σοι δοκεῖ πειθῶ ποι-
 εῖν ἢ ῥητορικὴ μόνη, ἢ καὶ ἄλλαι τέχναι; λέγω
 δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· ὅστις διδάσκει ὀτιοῦν πρᾶγμα,
 πότερον ὃ διδάσκει πείθει, ἢ οὐ; ΓΟΡ. Οὐ
 δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα πείθει.
 E ΣΩ. Πάλιν δ' εἰ ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τεχνῶν λέγομεν
 ὧνπερ νῦν δὴ, ἢ ἀριθμητικὴ οὐ διδάσκει ἡμᾶς
 ὅσα ἐστὶ τὰ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ καὶ ὁ ἀριθμητικὸς ἀν-
 θρωπος; ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ

πείθει ; ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Πειθοῦς ἄρα δημιουργός ἐστι καὶ ἡ ἀριθμητική. ΓΟΡ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐάν τις ἐρωτᾷ ἡμᾶς ποίας πειθοῦς καὶ περὶ τί, ἀποκρινοῦμεθά που αὐτῷ, ὅτι τῆς διδασκαλικῆς τῆς περὶ τὸ ἀρτιόν τε καὶ 154 τὸ περιττὸν ὅσον ἐστί. καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἃς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν τέχνας ἀπάσας ἔξομεν ἀποδειῖξαι πειθοῦς δημιουργοὺς οὐσας καὶ ἡσινος καὶ περὶ ὅ τι. ἢ οὐ ; ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα ῥητορικὴ μόνη πειθοῦς ἐστὶ δημιουργός. ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

CAP. IX. ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν οὐ μόνη ἀπεργάζεται τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλαι, δικαίως, ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ ζωγράφου, μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπανεροίμεθ' ἂν τὸν λέγοντα, ποίας δὴ πειθοῦς καὶ τῆς περὶ τί πειθοῦς ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐστὶ B τέχνη ; ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι δίκαιον εἶναι ἐπανερέσθαι ; ΓΟΡ. Ἐμοιγε. ΣΩ. Ἀπόκριναι δὴ, ὦ Γοργία, ἐπειδὴ γε καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ οὕτω. ΓΟΡ. Ταύτης τοίνυν τῆς πειθοῦς λέγω, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῆς ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄχλοις, ὥσπερ καὶ ὅρτι ἔλεγον, καὶ περὶ τούτων, ἃ ἐστὶ δίκαιά τε καὶ ἀδίκα. ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐγὼ τοι ὑπώπτενον ταύτην σε λέγειν τὴν πειθὴ καὶ περὶ τούτων, ὦ Γοργία. ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ θαυμάζης, ἐάν C ὀλίγον ὕστερον τοιοῦτόν τί σε ἀνέρωμαι, ὃ δοκεῖ μὲν δῆλον εἶναι, ἐγὼ δ' ἐπανερωτῶ. ὅπερ γὰρ λέγω, τοῦ ἐξῆς ἔνεκα περαίνεσθαι τὸν λόγον ἐρωτῶ, οὐ σοῦ ἔνεκα, ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ ἐθιζώμεθα ὑπονοοῦντες προαρπάζειν ἀλλήλων τὰ λεγόμενα,

ἀλλὰ σὺ τὰ σαντοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὅπως ἂν
 βούλῃ περαίνῃς. *ΓΟΡ.* Καὶ ὀρθῶς γέ μοι
 δοκεῖς ποιεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες. *ΣΩ.* Ἴθι δὴ καὶ
 τόδε ἐπισκεψώμεθα. καλεῖς τι μεμαθηκέναι;
ΓΟΡ. Καλῶ. *ΣΩ.* Τί δέ; πεπιστευκέναι;
ΓΟΡ. Ἐγώ γε. *ΣΩ.* Πότερον οὖν ταυτόν δο-
 κεῖ σοι εἶναι μεμαθηκέναι καὶ πεπιστευκέναι, καὶ
 μάθησις καὶ πίστις, ἢ ἄλλο τι; *ΓΟΡ.* Οἶομαι
 μὲν ἔγώ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο. *ΣΩ.* Καλῶς
 γὰρ οἶει· γνώσει δὲ ἐνθὲνδε. εἰ γάρ τις σε
 ἔροιτο Ἄρ' ἔστι τις, ὦ Γοργία, πίστις ψευδῆς
 καὶ ἀληθῆς; φαίης ἂν, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι. *ΓΟΡ.*
 Ναί. *ΣΩ.* Τί δέ; ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶ ψευδῆς καὶ
 ἀληθῆς; *ΓΟΡ.* Οὐδαμῶς. *ΣΩ.* Δῆλον γὰρ
 Ε αὖ, ὅτι οὐ ταυτόν ἐστιν. *ΓΟΡ.* Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οἷ τέ γε μεμαθηκότες πεπει-
 σμένοι εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ πεπιστευκότες. *ΓΟΡ.* Ἔστι
 ταῦτα. *ΣΩ.* Βούλει οὖν δύο εἶδη θῶμεν πει-
 θοῦς, τὸ μὲν πίστιν παρεχόμενον ἄνευ τοῦ εἰδέ-
 ναι, τὸ δ' ἐπιστήμην; *ΓΟΡ.* Πάνν γε. *ΣΩ.*
 Ποτέρων οὖν ἡ ῥητορικὴ πειθῶ ποιεῖ ἐν δικα-
 στηρίοις τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄχλοις περὶ τῶν δι-
 καίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων; ἐξ ἧς τὸ πιστεύειν γίγνε-
 ται ἄνευ τοῦ εἰδέναι, ἢ ἐξ ἧς τὸ εἰδέναι; *ΓΟΡ.*
 Δῆλον δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἐξ ἧς τὸ πιστεύ-
 455 εἶναι. *ΣΩ.* Ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, πειθοῦς
 δημιουργός ἐστι πιστευτικῆς, ἀλλ' οὐ διδασκαλι-
 κῆς περὶ τὸ δίκαιόν τε καὶ ἀδικον. *ΓΟΡ.* Ναί.
ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἄρα διδασκαλικὸς ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐστὶ δικα-
 στηρίων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄχλων δικαίων τε

πέρι καὶ ἀδίκων, ἀλλὰ πιστικὸς μόνον. οὐ γὰρ
 δῆπον ὄχλον γ' ἂν δύναιτο τοσοῦτον ἐν ὀλίγῳ
 χρόνῳ διδάξαι οὕτω μεγάλα πράγματα. ΓΟΡ.
 Οὐ δῆτα.

CAP. X. ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, ἴδωμεν τί ποτε καὶ B
 λέγομεν περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς· ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ τοι
 οὐδ' αὐτός πω δύναμαι κατανοῆσαι ὃ τι λέγω.
 ὅταν περὶ ἱατρῶν αἰρέσεως ἢ τῇ πόλει σύλλογος,
 ἢ περὶ ναυπηγῶν, ἢ περὶ ἄλλου τινὸς δημιουργι-
 κοῦ ἔθνους, ἄλλο τι ἢ τότε ὁ ῥητορικὸς οὐ συμβ-
 ουλευσει; δῆλον γὰρ, ὅτι ἐν ἐκάστη αἰρέσει
 τὸν τεχνικώτατον δεῖ αἰρεῖσθαι. οὐδ' ὅταν τει-
 χῶν περὶ οἰκοδομήσεως, ἢ λιμένων κατασκευῆς,
 ἢ νεωρίων, ἄλλ' οἱ ἀρχιτέκτονες· οὐδ' αὖ ὅταν
 στρατηγῶν αἰρέσεως πέρι, ἢ τάξεώς τινος πρὸς
 πολεμίους, ἢ χωρίων καταλήψεως συμβουλὴ ἢ, C
 ἄλλ' οἱ στρατηγικοὶ τότε συμβουλεύουσιν, οἱ
 ῥητορικοὶ δὲ οὐ. ἢ πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Γοργία, τὰ
 τοιαῦτα; ἐπειδὴ γὰρ αὐτός τε φης ῥήτωρ εἶναι
 καὶ ἄλλους ποιεῖν ῥητορικούς, εὔ ἔχει τὰ τῆς
 σῆς τέχνης παρὰ σοῦ πυνθάνεσθαι. καὶ ἐμὲ
 νῦν νόμισον καὶ τὸ σὸν σπεύδειν. ἴσως γὰρ
 καὶ τυγχάνει τις τῶν ἔνδον ὄντων μαθητῆς σου
 βουλόμενος γενέσθαι, ὥς ἐγὼ τινὰς σχεδὸν καὶ
 συχνοὺς αἰσθάνομαι, οἳ ἴσως αἰσχύνοιντ' ἂν σε
 ἀνερῆσθαι. ὑπ' ἐμοῦ οὖν ἀνερωτώμενος νόμισον D
 καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνων ἀνερωτᾶσθαι, Τί ἡμῖν, ὦ Γορ-
 γία, ἔσται, ἐάν σοι συνῶμεν; περὶ τίνων τῇ πό-
 λει συμβουλεύειν οἷοί τε ἐσόμεθα; πότερον περὶ
 δικαίου μόνον καὶ ἀδίκου, ἢ καὶ περὶ ὧν νῦν δὴ

Σωκράτης ἔλεγε ; πειρῶ οὖν αὐτοῖς ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ σοι πειράσομαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, σαφῶς ἀποκαλύψαι τὴν τῆς ῥητορικῆς δύναμιν ἅπασαν· αὐτὸς γὰρ καλῶς ὑφηγήσω.

Ε οἶσθα γὰρ δήπου, ὅτι τὰ νεώρια ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τεῖχη τὰ Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἡ τῶν λιμένων κατασκευὴ ἐκ τῆς Θεμιστοκλέους συμβουλῆς γέγονε, τὰ δ' ἐκ τῆς Περικλέους, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκ τῶν δημοιουργῶν. ΣΩ. Λέγεται ταῦτα, ὦ Γοργία, περὶ Θεμιστοκλέους· Περικλέους δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἤκουον, ὅτε συνεβούλευεν ἡμῖν περὶ τοῦ διὰ μέ-
 456 σου τείχους. ΓΟΡ. Καὶ ὅταν γέ τις αἵρεσις ἢ ὧν δὴ σὺ ἔλεγες, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁρᾷς, ὅτι οἱ ῥήτορές εἰσιν οἱ συμβουλευόντες καὶ οἱ νικῶντες τὰς γνώμας περὶ τούτων. ΣΩ. Ταῦτα καὶ θαυμάζων, ὦ Γοργία, πάλαι ἐρωτῶ τίς ποτε ἡ δύναμίς ἐστι τῆς ῥητορικῆς. δαιμονία γὰρ τις ἔμοιγε καταφαίνεται τὸ μέγεθος οὕτω σκοποῦντι.

CAP. XI. ΓΟΡ. Εἰ πάντα γε εἰδείης, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ἀπάσας τὰς δυνάμεις συλλαβοῦσα ὑρ' αὐτῇ ἔχει· μέγα δέ σοι τεκμήριον ἐρῶ· πολλάκις γὰρ ἤδη ἔγωγε μετὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἰατρῶν εἰσελθὼν παρὰ τινα τῶν καμνόντων οὐχὶ ἐθέλοντα ἢ φάρμακον πιεῖν ἢ τεμεῖν ἢ καῦσαι παρασχεῖν τῷ ἰατρῷ, οὐ δυναμένου τοῦ ἰατροῦ πεῖσαι, ἐγὼ ἔπεισα, οὐκ ἄλλη τέχνη ἢ τῇ ῥητορικῇ. φημι δὲ καὶ εἰς πόλιν ὅποι βούλει ἐλθόντα ῥητορικὸν ἄνδρα καὶ ἰατρόν, εἰ δέοι λόγῳ διαγωνίζεσθαι ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ

τινὶ συλλόγῳ, ὁπότερον δεῖ αἰρεθῆναι, ῥήτορα C
 ἢ ἱατρόν, οὐδαμοῦ ἂν φανῆναι τὸν ἱατρόν, ἀλλ'
 αἰρεθῆναι ἂν τὸν εἰπεῖν δυνατόν, εἰ βούλοιτο.
 καὶ εἰ πρὸς ἄλλον γε δημιουργὸν ὄντιναοῦν
 ἀγωνίζοιτο, πείσειεν ἂν αὐτὸν ἐλέσθαι ὁ ῥητορι-
 κὸς μᾶλλον ἢ ἄλλος ὅστισοῦν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι περὶ
 οὗτου οὐκ ἂν πιθανώτερον εἶποι ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἢ
 ἄλλος ὅστισοῦν τῶν δημιουργῶν ἐν πλήθει. Ἡ
 μὲν οὖν δύναμις τοσαύτη ἐστὶ καὶ τοιαύτη τῆς
 τέχνης. δεῖ μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῇ ῥητορικῇ
 χρῆσθαι ὥσπερ καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ ἀγωνίᾳ. καὶ D
 γὰρ τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀγωνίᾳ οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα δεῖ πρὸς
 ἀπαντας χρῆσθαι ἀνθρώπους, ὅτι ἔμαθε πυκτεύ-
 ειν τε καὶ παγκρατιάζειν καὶ ἐν ὅπλοις μάχε-
 σθαι, ὥστε κρείττων εἶναι καὶ φίλων καὶ ἐχθρῶν·
 οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα τοὺς φίλους δεῖ τύπτειν οὐδὲ
 κεντεῖν τε καὶ ἀποκιννύναι. οὐδέ γε μὰ Δία
 ἐάν τις εἰς παλαίστραν φοιτήσας, εὐ ἔχων τὸ
 σῶμα καὶ πυκτικὸς γενόμενος, ἔπειτα τὸν πατέρα
 τύπτῃ καὶ τὴν μητέρα ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν οἰκείων
 ἢ τῶν φίλων, οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα δεῖ τοὺς παιδο- E
 τρίδας καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις διδάσκοντας μά-
 χεσθαι μισεῖν τε καὶ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων.
 ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ παρέδοσαν ἐπὶ τῷ δικαίῳ χρῆ-
 σθαι τούτοις πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ τοὺς ἀδι-
 κοῦντας, ἀμυνομένους, μὴ ὑπάρχοντας· οἱ δὲ 457
 μεταστρέψαντες χρῶνται τῇ ἰσχύϊ καὶ τῇ τέχνῃ
 οὐκ ὀρθῶς. οὐκ οὖν οἱ διδάξαντες πονηροί, οὐδὲ
 ἡ τέχνη οὕτε αἰτία οὕτε πονηρὰ τούτου ἕνεκά
 ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὴ χρῶμενοι, οἷμαι, ὀρθῶς. ὁ

αὐτὸς δὴ λόγος καὶ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς. δυνα-
 τὸς μὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἅπαντάς ἐστιν ὁ ῥήτωρ καὶ
 περὶ παντὸς λέγειν, ὥστε πιθανώτερος εἶναι ἐν
 τοῖς πλήθεσιν ἐμβραχὺ περὶ ὅτου ἂν βούληται.
 B ἀλλ' οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον τούτου ἔνεκα δεῖ οὔτε τοὺς
 ἰατροὺς τὴν δόξαν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, ὅτι δύναιτο ἂν
 τοῦτο ποιῆσαι, οὔτε τοὺς ἄλλους δημιουργοὺς,
 ἀλλὰ δικαίως καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ χρῆσθαι, ὥσπερ
 καὶ τῇ ἀγωνίᾳ. ἔὰν δέ, οἶμαι, ῥητορικὸς γενό-
 μενός τις κᾶτα ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει καὶ τῇ τέχνῃ
 ἀδικῇ, οὐ τὸν διδάξαντα δεῖ μισεῖν τε καὶ ἐκβάλ-
 λειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων. ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ δικαίᾳ
 C χρεία παρέδωκεν, ὁ δ' ἐναντίως χρῆται. τὸν οὖν
 οὐκ ὀρθῶς χρώμενον μισεῖν δίκαιον καὶ ἐκβάλ-
 λειν καὶ ἀποκτινύναι, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν διδάξαντα.

CAP. XII. ΣΩ. Οἶμαι, ὦ Γοργία, καὶ σέ
 ἔμπειρον εἶναι πολλῶν λόγων καὶ καθεωρακέναι
 ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τοιόνδε, ὅτι οὐ ῥαδίως δύνανται
 περὶ ὧν ἂν ἐπιχειρήσωσι διαλέγεσθαι διορισάμε-
 νοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ μαθόντες καὶ διδάξαντες
 D ἑαυτοὺς οὕτω διαλύεσθαι τὰς συνουσίας, ἀλλ'
 ἔὰν περὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητήσωσι καὶ μὴ φῇ ὁ ἕτερος
 τὸν ἕτερον ὀρθῶς λέγειν ἢ μὴ σαφῶς, χαλεπαί-
 νουσί τε καὶ κατὰ φθόνον οἶονται τὸν ἑαυτῶν
 λέγειν, φιλονεικοῦντας, ἀλλ' οὐ ζητοῦντας τὸ
 προκείμενον ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. καὶ ἔνιοί γε τελευτῶν-
 τες αἰσχίστα ἀπαλλάττονται, λαιδορθεύοντες τε
 καὶ εἰπόντες καὶ ἀκούσαντες περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν
 . τοιαῦτα, οἷα καὶ τοὺς παρόντας ἄχθεσθαι ὑπὲρ
 σφῶν αὐτῶν, ὅτι τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων ἡξίωσαν

ἀκροαταὶ γενέσθαι. Τοῦ δὴ ἔνεκα λέγω ταῦτα; Ε
 ὅτι νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς σὺ οὐ πάννυ ἀκόλουθα λέγειν
 οὐδὲ σύμφωνα οἷς τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγες περὶ τῆς
 ῥητορικῆς. φοβοῦμαι οὖν διελέγχειν σε, μὴ με
 ὑπολάβῃς οὐ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα φιλονεικοῦντα λέ-
 γειν τοῦ καταφρανὲς γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς σέ.
 ἐγὼ οὖν, εἰ μὲν καὶ σὺ εἴ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὦν περ 458
 καὶ ἐγώ, ἡδέως ἂν σε διερωτῶην· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἐφῆν
 ἂν. ἐγὼ δὲ τίνων εἰμὶ; τῶν ἡδέως μὲν ἂν ἐλεγ-
 χθέντων, εἴ τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγω, ἡδέως δ' ἂν ἐλεγ-
 ξάντων, εἴ τίς τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγοι, οὐκ ἀηδέ-
 στερον μέντ' ἂν ἐλεγχθέντων ἢ ἐλεγξάντων· μεῖ-
 ζον γάρ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡγοῦμαι, ὅσῳ περ μεῖζον
 ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν αὐτὸν ἀπαλλαγῆναι κακοῦ τοῦ με-
 γίστου ἢ ἄλλον ἀπαλλάξαι. οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶμαι το-
 σοῦτον κακὸν εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅσον δόξα ψευδῆς Β
 περὶ ὧν τυγχάνει νῦν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ὢν. εἰ μὲν
 οὖν καὶ σὺ φηῖς τοιοῦτος εἶναι, διαλεγώμεθα· εἰ
 δὲ καὶ δοκεῖ χρῆναι ἑᾶν, ἐῴμεν ἡδὴ χαίρειν
 καὶ διαλύωμεν τὸν λόγον. ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλὰ φημί
 μὲν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ αὐτὸς τοιοῦτος εἶ-
 ναι, οἷον σὺ ὑφηγεῖ· ἴσως μέντοι χρῆν ἐννοεῖν
 καὶ τὸ τῶν παρόντων. πάλαι γάρ τοι, πρὶν καὶ
 ὑμᾶς ἐλθεῖν, ἐγὼ τοῖς παροῦσι πολλὰ ἐπεδειξά- C
 μην, καὶ νῦν ἴσως πόρρω ἀποτενοῦμεν, ἣν δια-
 λεγώμεθα. σκοπεῖν οὖν χρὴ καὶ τὸ τούτων, μὴ
 τινὰς αὐτῶν κατέχωμεν βουλομένους τι καὶ ἄλλο
 πράττειν.

CAP. XIII. ΧΑΙ. Τοῦ μὲν Θορύβου, ὦ Γορ-
 γία τε καὶ Σώκρατες, αὐτοὶ ἀκούετε τούτων τῶν

ἀνδρῶν, βουλομένων ἀκούειν, εἴαν τι λέγητε·
 ἔμοι δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μὴ γένοιτο τοσαύτη ἀσχο-
 λία, ὥστε τοιούτων λόγων καὶ οὕτω λεγομένων
 D ἀφεμένῳ προϋργιαίτερόν τι γενέσθαι ἄλλο πρᾶτ-
 τειν. ΚΑΛ. Νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς, ὦ Χαιρεσῶν.
 καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς πολλοῖς ἤδη λόγοις παρα-
 γενόμενος οὐκ οἶδ' εἰ πρόποτε ἦσθην οὕτως, ὥσ-
 περ νυνί, ὥστ' ἔμοιγε, κἂν τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην ἐθέ-
 λητε διαλέγεσθαι, χαριεῖσθε. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μήν,
 ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τό γ' ἔμὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει, εἴπερ
 ἐθέλει Γοργίας. ΓΟΡ. Αἰσχρὸν δὴ τὸ λοιπόν,
 ὦ Σώκρατες, γίνεται ἐμέ γε μὴ ἐθέλιν, καὶ
 Ε ταῦτα αὐτὸν ἐπαγγειλάμενον ἐρωτᾷν ὅ τι τις
 βούλεται. ἀλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ τουτοισί, διαλέγου τε
 καὶ ἐρώτα ὅ τι βούλει. ΣΩ. Ἀκούε δὴ, ὦ
 Γοργία, ἃ θαυμάζω ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ σοῦ·
 ἴσως γάρ τοι σοῦ ὀρθῶς λέγοντος ἐγὼ οὐκ ὀρθῶς
 ὑπολαμβάνω. ῥητορικὸν φῆς ποιεῖν οἷός τ' εἶ-
 ναι, εἴαν τις βούληται παρὰ σοῦ μαρθάνειν;
 ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν περὶ πάντων ὥστ'
 459 ἐν ὅχλῳ πιθανὸν εἶναι, οὐ διδάσκοντα, ἀλλὰ πεί-
 θοντα; ΓΟΡ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Ἐλεγε-
 ς τοι νῦν δὴ οἱ καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ τοῦ ἱατροῦ
 πιθανώτερος ἔσται ὁ ῥήτωρ. ΓΟΡ. Καὶ γὰρ
 ἔλεγον, ἐν γε ὅχλῳ. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ ἐν ὅχλῳ
 τοῦτό ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσιν; οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἐν
 γε τοῖς εἰδόσι τοῦ ἱατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται.
 ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τοῦ
 ἱατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται, τοῦ εἰδότος πιθανώ-
 B τερος γίνεται; ΓΟΡ. Πάνν γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκ

ἰατρός γε ὦν· ἢ γάρ; ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Ὁ δὲ μὴ ἰατρός γε δῆπου ἀνεπιστήμων ὦν ὁ ἰατρός ἐπιστήμων. ΓΟΡ. Δῆλον ὅτι. ΣΩ. Ὁ οὐκ εἰδὼς ἄρα τοῦ εἰδότος ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσι πιθανώτερος ἔσται, ὅταν ὁ ῥήτωρ τοῦ ἱατροῦ πιθανώτερος ᾖ. τοῦτο συμβαίνει, ἢ ἄλλο τι; ΓΟΡ. Τοῦτο ἐνταῦθά γε συμβαίνει. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀπάσας τέχνας ὡσαύτως ἔχει ὁ ῥήτωρ καὶ ἡ ῥητορική· αὐτὰ μὲν τὰ πράγματα οὐδὲν δεῖ αὐτὴν εἰδέναι ὅπως ἔχει, μηχανὴν δέ τινα πειθοῦς εὕρησεναι, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς οὐκ εἰδόσι μᾶλλον εἰδέναι τῶν εἰδότων.

CAP. XIV. ΓΟΡ. Οὐκοῦν πολλὴ ῥαστώνη, ὦ Σώκρατες, γίνεται, μὴ μαθόντα τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας, ἀλλὰ μίαν τάντην, μηδὲν ἐλαττοῦσθαι τῶν δημιουργῶν; ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν ἐλαττοῦται ἢ μὴ ἐλαττοῦται ὁ ῥήτωρ τῶν ἄλλων διὰ τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν, αὐτίκα ἐπισκεψόμεθα, ἐάν τι ἡμῖν πρὸς λόγου ᾖ. νῦν δὲ τόδε πρότερον σκεψόμεθα, ἄρα τυγχάνει περὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν οὕτως ἔχων ὁ ῥητορικός ὡς περὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὦν αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι, αὐτὰ μὲν οὐκ εἰδώς, τί ἀγαθὸν ἢ τί κακὸν ἔστιν, ἢ τί καλὸν ἢ τί αἰσχρὸν, ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, πειθῶ δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν μεμηχανημένος, ὥστε δοκεῖν εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδὼς ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσι μᾶλλον τοῦ Εἰδότος; ἢ ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι, καὶ δεῖ προεπιστάμενον ταῦτα ἀφικέσθαι παρὰ σὲ τὸν μέλλοντα μαθήσεσθαι τὴν ῥητορικὴν; εἰ δὲ μή, σὺ ὁ τῆς

ῥητορικῆς διδάσκαλος τούτων μὲν οὐδὲν διδάξεις
 τὸν ἀφικνούμενον·—οὐ γὰρ σὸν ἔργον·—ποιήσεις
 δ' ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖν εἰδέναι αὐτὸν τὰ τοι-
 αῦτα οὐκ εἰδότα καὶ δοκεῖν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι οὐκ
 ὄντα; ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐχ οἷός τε ἔσει αὐτὸν
 διδάξαι τὴν ῥητορικὴν, εἰ μὴ προειδῇ περὶ τού-
 των τὴν ἀλήθειαν; ἢ πῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει, ὃ
 460 Γοργία; καὶ πρὸς Διός, ὥσπερ ἄρτι εἶπες, ἀπο-
 καλύψας τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἰπέ τίς ποθ' ἡ δύναμίς
 ἐστίν. ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ὃ Σώκρα-
 τες, εἰ μὴ τύχῃ μὴ εἰδώς, καὶ ταῦτα παρ' ἐμοῦ
 μαθήσεται. ΣΩ. Ἐχε δὴ· καλῶς γὰρ λέγεις.
 εἰάνπερ ῥητορικὸν σύ τινα ποιήσης, ἀνάγκη αὐ-
 τὸν εἰδέναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἀδίκαια ἥτοι πρότε-
 ρόν γε ἢ ὕστερον μαθόντα παρὰ σοῦ. ΓΟΡ.
 Β Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ὃ τὰ τεκτονικὰ μεμα-
 θηκὼς τεκτονικός, ἢ οὐ; ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ.
 Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὃ τὰ μουσικὰ μουσικός; ΓΟΡ.
 Ναί. ΣΩ. Καὶ ὃ τὰ ἱατρικὰ ἱατρικός; καὶ
 τᾶλλα οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὃ μεμαθηκὼς
 ἕκαστα τοιοῦτός ἐστιν, οἷον ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἕκαστον
 ἀπεργάζεται; ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν
 κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον καὶ ὃ τὰ δίκαια μεμαθη-
 κὼς δίκαιος; ΓΟΡ. Πάντως δήπου. ΣΩ. Ὁ
 C δὲ δίκαιος δίκαιά που πράττει. ΓΟΡ. Ναί.
 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη [τὸν ῥητορικὸν δίκαιον
 εἶναι], τὸν [δὲ] δίκαιον δίκαια βούλεσθαι πράτ-
 τειν; ΓΟΡ. Φαίνεται γε. ΣΩ. Οὐδέποτε
 ἄρα βουλήσεται ὃ γε δίκαιος ἀδικεῖν. ΓΟΡ.
 Ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. Τὸν δὲ ῥητορικὸν ἀνάγκη ἐκ

τοῦ λόγου δίκαιον εἶναι. ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐδέποτε ἄρα βουλήσεται ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἀδικεῖν. ΓΟΡ. Οὐ φαίνεται γε.

CAP. XV. ΣΩ. Μέννησαι οὖν λέγων ὀλίγω D
 πρότερον, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ τοῖς παιδοτρίβαις ἐγκαλεῖν
 οὐδ' ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων, ἐὰν ὁ πύκτις τῇ
 πυκτικῇ [μὴ καλῶς] χρηταί τε καὶ ἀδικῇ; ὡς-
 αὐτως δὲ οὕτω καὶ ἐὰν ὁ ῥήτωρ τῇ ῥητορικῇ
 ἀδίκως χρηταί, μὴ τῷ διδάξαντι ἐγκαλεῖν μηδὲ
 ἐξελαύνειν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ
 οὐκ ὀρθῶς χρωμένῳ τῇ ῥητορικῇ; ἐρρήθη ταῦτα,
 ἢ οὐ; ΓΟΡ. Ἐρρήθη. ΣΩ. Νῦν δέ γε ὁ
 αὐτὸς οὗτος φαίνεται, ὁ ῥητορικὸς, οὐκ ἂν ποτε E
 ἀδικήσας. ἢ οὐ; ΓΟΡ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Καὶ
 ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις γε, ὃ Γοργία, λόγοις ἐλέγετο, ὅτι
 ἡ ῥητορικὴ περὶ λόγους εἶη οὐ τοὺς τοῦ ἀρτίου
 καὶ περιττοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοὺς τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου.
 ἢ γάρ; ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ τοίνυν σου
 τότε ταῦτα λέγοντος ὑπέλαβον, ὡς οὐδέποτε ἂν
 εἶη ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἀδικον πρᾶγμα, ὅ γ' αἰεὶ περὶ
 δικαιοσύνης τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖται. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλί-
 γον ὕστερον ἔλεγες, ὅτι ὁ ῥήτωρ τῇ ῥητορικῇ καὶ
 ἀδίκως χρῆτο, οὕτω θαυμάσας καὶ ἡγησάμενος 461
 οὐ συνάδειν τὰ λεγόμενα ἐκείνους εἶπον τοὺς
 λόγους, ὅτι, εἰ μὲν κέρδος ἡγοῖτο εἶναι τὸ ἐλέγχε-
 σθαι, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ, ἄξιον εἶη διαλέγεσθαι, εἰ δὲ μὴ,
 ἐὰν χαίρειν. ὕστερον δὲ ἡμῶν ἐπισκοπούμενων,
 ὁρᾷς διὴ καὶ αὐτός, ὅτι αὐτὸς ὁμολογεῖται τὸν ῥητο-
 ρικὸν ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἀδίκως χρῆσθαι τῇ ῥητο-
 ρικῇ καὶ ἐθέλειν ἀδικεῖν. ταῦτα οὖν ὅπη ποτε

B ἔχει, μὰ τὸν κύνα, ὦ Γοργία, οὐκ ὀλίγης συνουσίας ἐστίν, ὥστε ἱκανῶς διασκέψασθαι.

CAP. XVI. ΠΩΛ. Τί δαί, ὦ Σώκρατες; οὕτω καὶ σὺ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς δοξάζεις, ὥσπερ νῦν λέγεις; ἢ οἶει, ὅτι Γοργίας ἡσχύνθη σοι μὴ προσομολογῆσαι τὸν ῥητορικὸν ἄνδρα μὴ οὐχὶ καὶ τὰ δίκαια εἰδέναι καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ ἀγαθά, καὶ ἐὰν μὴ ἔλθῃ ταῦτα εἰδὼς παρ' αὐτόν, C αὐτὸς διδάξιν — ἔπειτα ἐκ ταύτης ἴσως τῆς ὁμολογίας ἐναντίον τι συνέβη ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, τοῦθ' ὃ δὴ ἀγαπᾷς, αὐτὸς ἀγαγὼν ἐπὶ τοιαῦτα ἐρωτήματα. ἐπεὶ τίνα οἶει ἀπαρνήσεσθαι μὴ οὐχὶ καὶ αὐτὸν ἐπίστασθαι τὰ δίκαια καὶ ἄλλους διδάξιν; ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄγειν πολλὴ ἀγροικία ἐστὶ τοὺς λόγους. ΣΩ. ὦ κάλλιστε Πῶλε, ἀλλὰ τοὶ ἐξεπίτηδες κτώμεθα ἐταίρους καὶ νίεῖς, ἵνα, ἐπειδὴν αὐτοὶ πρεσβύτεροι γιγνόμενοι σφαλλώμεθα, παρόντες ὑμεῖς οἱ νεώτεροι ἐπα- D τροθοῖτε ἡμῶν τὸν βίον καὶ ἐν ἔργοις καὶ ἐν λόγοις. καὶ νῦν εἴ τι ἐγὼ καὶ Γοργίας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σφαλλόμεθα, σὺ παρὼν ἐπανόρθου· δίκαιος δ' εἶ. καὶ ἐγὼ ἐθέλω τῶν ὁμολογημένων εἴ τί σοι δοκεῖ μὴ καλῶς ὁμολογῆσθαι, ἀναθέσθαι ὃ τι ἂν σὺ βούλῃ, ἐάν μοι ἐν μόνον φυλάττης. ΠΩΛ. Τί τοῦτο λέγεις; ΣΩ. Τὴν μακρολογίαν, ὦ Πῶλε, ἣν καθεύξης, ἥ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπεχείρησας χρῆσθαι. ΠΩΛ. Τί δαί; οὐκ ἐξέ- E σται μοι λέγειν ὅποσα ἂν βούλωμαι; ΣΩ. Δεινὰ μένι' ἂν πάθοις, ὦ βέλτιστε, εἰ Ἀθήναζε ἀφικόμενος, οὗ τῆς Ἑλλάδος πλείστη ἐστὶν ἐξου-

σία τοῦ λέγειν, ἔπειτα σὺ ἐνταῦθα τούτου μόνος ἀνυχήσαις. ἀλλὰ ἀντίθες τοι· “Σοῦ μακρὰ λέγοντος καὶ μὴ ἐθέλοντος τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι, οὐ δεινὰ ἂν αὐτῷ ἐγὼ πάθοιμι, εἰ μὴ ἐξέσται μοι ἀπιέναι καὶ μὴ ἀκούειν σου;” ἀλλ’ εἴ 462
 τι κήδει τοῦ λόγου τοῦ εἰρημένου καὶ ἐπανορθώσασθαι αὐτὸν βούλει, ὥσπερ νῦν διὰ ἔλεγον, ἀναθέμενος ὃ τι σοι δοκεῖ, ἐν τῷ μέρει ἐρωτῶν τε καὶ ἐρωτώμενος, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ τε καὶ Γοργίας, ἔλεγχέ τε καὶ ἐλέγχου. φῆς γὰρ δήπου καὶ σὺ ἐπίστασθαι ἅπερ Γοργίας. ἢ οὐ; ΠΩΛ. Ἐγώ γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ σὺ κελεύεις σαντιὸν ἐρωτῶν ἐκάστοτε ὃ τι ἂν τις βούληται, ὥς ἐπιστάμενος ἀποκρίνεσθαι; ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Β
 ΣΩ. Καὶ νῦν διὰ τούτων ὁπότερον βούλει ποίει· ἐρώτα, ἢ ἀποκρίνου.

CAP. XVII. ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλὰ ποιήσω ταῦτα. καὶ μοι ἀπόκριναι, ὃ Σώκρατες. ἐπειδὴ Γοργίας ἀπορεῖν σοι δοκεῖ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς, σὺ αὐτὴν τίνα φῆς εἶναι; ΣΩ. Ἄρα ἐρωτᾷς ἥντινα τέχνην φησὶ εἶναι; ΠΩΛ. Ἐγώ γε. ΣΩ. Οὐδεμίαν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὃ Πῶλε, ὥς γε πρὸς σὲ τὰ ληθῆ εἰσηῆσθαι. ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλὰ τί σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι; ΣΩ. Πρᾶγμα, ὃ φῆς σὺ ποιῆσαι τέχνην ἐν τῷ συγγράμματι, ὃ ἐγὼ ἔναγχος ἀνέγνω. ΠΩΛ. Τί τοῦτο λέγεις; ΣΩ. Ἐμ- C
 πειρίαν ἔγωγέ τινα. ΠΩΛ. Ἐμπειρίαν ἄρα σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι; ΣΩ. Ἐμοιγε, εἰ μή τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις. ΠΩΛ. Τίνος ἐμπειρία; ΣΩ. Χάριτός τινος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας.

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκοῦν καλὸν σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι, χαρίζεσθαι οἷόν τ' εἶναι ἀνθρώποις; ΣΩ. Τί δέ, ὦ Πῶλε; ἤδη πέπυσαι παρ' ἐμοῦ ὅ τι
 D φημι αὐτὴν εἶναι, ὥστε τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς, εἰ οὐ καλὴ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι; ΠΩΛ. Οὐ γὰρ πέπυσμαι, ὅτι ἐμπειρίαν τινὰ αὐτὴν φης εἶναι; ΣΩ. Βούλει οὖν, ἐπειδὴ τιμᾷς τὸ χαρίζεσθαι, σμικρὸν τί μοι χάρισασθαι; ΠΩΛ. Ἐγώ γε. ΣΩ. Ἐροῦ νῦν με, ὁποιοῖα ἦτις μοι δοκεῖ τέχνη εἶναι. ΠΩΛ. Ἐρωτῶ δὴ, τίς τέχνη ὁποιοῖα; ΣΩ. Οὐδεμία, ὦ Πῶλε. ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλὰ τί; φάθι. ΣΩ. Φημι δὴ, ἐμπειρία τις.
 E ΠΩΛ. Τίνος; φάθι. ΣΩ. Φημι δὴ, χάριτος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας, ὦ Πῶλε. ΠΩΛ. Ταῦτόν δ' ἐστὶν ὁποιοῖα καὶ ῥητορικὴ; ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς γε, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς ἐπιτηδεύσεως μέρος. ΠΩΛ. Τίνος λέγεις ταύτης; ΣΩ. Μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἢ τὸ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν · ὁκνῶ γὰρ Γοργίου ἐνεκα λέγειν, μὴ οἴηταί με διακωμωδεῖν
 463 τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιτήδευμα. ἐγὼ δέ εἰ μὲν τοῦτό ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἣν Γοργίας ἐπιτηδεύει οὐκ οἶδα · καὶ γὰρ ἄρτι ἐκ τοῦ λόγου οὐδὲν ἡμῖν καταφανὲς ἐγένετο τί ποτε οὗτος ἡγεῖται · ὃ δ' ἐγὼ καλῶ τὴν ῥητορικὴν, πράγματός τινός ἐστι μέρος οὐδενὸς τῶν καλῶν. ΓΟΡ. Τίνος, ὦ Σώκρατες; εἰπέ, μηδὲν ἐμὲ αἰσχυνθείς.

CAP. XVIII. ΣΩ. Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, ὦ Γοργία, εἶναί τι ἐπιτήδευμα τεχνικὸν μὲν οὐ, ψυχῆς δὲ στοχαστικῆς καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ φύσει δεινῆς
 B προσομιλεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις · καλῶ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐγὼ

τὸ κεφάλαιον κολακείαν. ταύτης μοι δοκεῖ τῆς ἐπιτηδεύσεως πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα μέρη εἶναι, ἓν δὲ καὶ ἡ ὀψοποιική· ὃ δοκεῖ μὲν εἶναι τέχνη, ὥς δὲ ὁ ἐμὸς λόγος, οὐκ ἔστι τέχνη, ἀλλ' ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή. ταύτης μέροςιον καὶ τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἐγὼ καλῶ καὶ τὴν γε κομμηωτικὴν καὶ τὴν σοφιστικὴν, τέτταρα ταῦτα μέρη ἐπὶ τέτταρσι πράγμασιν. εἰ οὖν βούλεται Πῶλος πυνθάνεσθαι, πυνθανέσθω· οὐ γάρ πω πέπυσται ὁποῖόν φημι ἐγὼ τῆς κολακείας μέροςιον εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἀλλ' αὐτὸν λέληθα οὐπω ἀποκεκριμένος, ὁ δὲ ἐπανερωτᾷ, εἰ οὐ καλὸν ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι. ἐγὼ δὲ αὐτῷ οὐκ ἀποκρινοῦμαι πρότερον εἴτε καλὸν εἴτε αἰσχρὸν ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικὴν, πρὶν ἂν πρῶτον ἀποκρίνωμαι ὅ τι ἐστίν. οὐ γάρ δίκαιον, ὦ Πῶλε· ἀλλ' εἴπερ βούλει πυνθέσθαι, ἐρώτα ὁποῖον μέροςιον τῆς κολακείας φημι εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικὴν. ΠΩΛ. Ἐρωτῶ δὴ, καὶ ἀπόκριναι, ὁποῖον μέροςιον. ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἂν μάθοις ἀποκρινάμενον; ἔστι γὰρ ἡ ῥητορικὴ κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον πολιτικῆς μορίου εἰδῶλον. ΠΩΛ. Τί οὖν; καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν λέγεις αὐτὴν εἶναι; ΣΩ. Αἰσχρὸν ἔγωγε· τὰ γὰρ κακὰ αἰσχρὰ καλῶ· ἐπειδὴ δεῖ σοι ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὥς ἡδὴ εἰδότε ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω. ΓΟΡ. Μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ οὐδὲ αὐτοὺς συνίημι ὅ τι λέγεις. ΣΩ. Εἰκότως γε, ὦ Γοργία· οὐδὲν γάρ πω σαφὲς λέγω, Πῶλος δὲ ὅδε νέος ἐστὶ καὶ ὀξύς. ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτον μὲν ἔα, ἐμοὶ δ' εἰπέ πῶς λέγεις πολιτικῆς μορίου εἰδῶλον εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικὴν. ΣΩ.

Ἄλλ' ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράσαι ὃ γέ μοι φαίνεται εἶναι ἢ ῥητορικὴ· εἰ δὲ μὴ τυγχάνει ὃν τοῦτο, 464 Πῶλος ὁδε ἐλέγξει. σῶμά που καλεῖς τι καὶ ψυχὴν; ΓΟΡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τούτων οἶει τινὰ εἶναι ἑκατέρου εὐεξίαν; ΓΟΡ. Ἐγωγε. ΣΩ. Τί δέ; δοκοῦσαν μὲν εὐεξίαν, οὕσαν δ' οὐ; οἷον τοιόνδε λέγω· πολλοὶ δοκοῦσιν εὖ ἔχειν τὰ σώματα, οὓς οὐκ ἂν ῥαδίως αἰσθοίτο τις, ὅτι οὐκ εὖ ἔχουσιν, ἄλλος ἢ ἰατρός τε καὶ τῶν γυμναστικῶν τις. ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ΣΩ. Τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγω καὶ ἐν σώματι εἶναι καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ, ὅτι ποιεῖ δοκεῖν μὲν B εὖ ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, ἔχει δὲ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον. ΓΟΡ. Ἐστι ταῦτα.

CAP. XIX. ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ σοι, ἐὰν δύνωμαι, σαφέστερον ἐπιδείξω ὃ λέγω. Λυοῖν ὄντοιν τοῖν πραγμάτοιιν δύο λέγω τέχνας· τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ ψυχῇ πολιτικὴν καλῶ, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ σώματι μίαν μὲν οὕτως ὀνομάσαι οὐκ ἔχω σοι, μιᾶς δὲ οὕσης τῆς τοῦ σώματος θεραπείας δύο μόρια λέγω, τὴν μὲν γυμναστικὴν, τὴν δὲ ἰατρικὴν. τῆς δὲ πολιτικῆς ἀντίστροφον μὲν τῇ γυμναστικῇ τὴν νομοθετικὴν, ἀντίστροφον δὲ τῇ ἰατρικῇ τὴν δικαιο- C σύνην. ἐπικοινωνοῦσι μὲν δὴ ἀλλήλαις, ἅτε περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ οὔσαι, ἑκάτεραι τούτων, ἢ τε ἰατρικὴ τῇ γυμναστικῇ καὶ ἢ δικαιοσύνη τῇ νομοθετικῇ· ὁμως δὲ διαφέρουσί τι ἀλλήλων. τετιάρων δὴ τούτων οὐσῶν. καὶ ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον θερα- πευουσῶν, τῶν μὲν τὸ σῶμα, τῶν δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν, ἢ κολακευτικὴ αἰσθομένη, οὐ γνοῦσα λέγω ἀλλὰ

στοχασαμένη, τέτραχα ἑαυτὴν διανείμασα, ὑπο-
 δῦσα ὑπὸ ἑκάστον τῶν μορίων, προσποιεῖται εἶ- D
 ναι τοῦτο, ὅπερ ὑπέδν, καὶ τοῦ μὲν βελτίστου
 οὐδὲν φροντίζει, τῷ δὲ αἰεὶ ἡδίστῳ θηρεύεται τὴν
 ἀνοιαν καὶ ἐξαπατᾷ, ὥστε δοκεῖ πλείστου ἀξία
 εἶναι. ὑπὸ μὲν οὖν τὴν ἰατρικὴν ἢ ὀψοποικὴν
 ὑποδέδυκε, καὶ προσποιεῖται τὰ βέλτιστα σιτία
 τῷ σώματι εἰδέναι, ὥστ', εἰ δέοι ἐν παισὶ δια-
 γωνίζεσθαι ὀψοποιόν τε καὶ ἰατρὸν ἢ ἐν ἀνδράσιν
 οὕτως ἀνοήτοις ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες, πότερος ἐπαῖει
 περὶ τῶν χρηστῶν σιτίων καὶ πονηρῶν, ὁ ἰατρὸς
 ἢ ὁ ὀψοποιός, λιμῷ ἂν ἀποθανεῖν τὸν ἰατρόν. E
 κολακείαν μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ καλῶ, καὶ αἰσχρόν φημι
 εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὃ Πῶλε, — τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς σέ 465
 λέγω, — ὅτι τοῦ ἡδέος στοχάζεται ἀνευ τοῦ βελ-
 τίστου · τέχνην δὲ αὐτὴν οὐ φημι εἶναι, ἀλλ'
 ἐμπειρίαν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει λόγον οὐδένα ἃ προσ-
 φέρει ὅποι' αἴτια τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν, ὥστε τὴν αἰ-
 τίαν ἐκάστου μὴ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν. ἐγὼ δὲ τέχνην
 οὐ καλῶ ὃ ἂν ἢ ἄλογον πρᾶγμα. τούτων δὲ
 πέρι εἰ ἀμφισβητεῖς, ἐθέλω ὑποσχεῖν λόγον.

CAP. XX. Τῇ μὲν οὖν ἰατρικῇ, ὥσπερ λέγω,
 ἢ ὀψοποικὴ κολακεία ὑπόκειται · τῇ δὲ γυμνα- B
 στικῇ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ἢ κοιμω-
 τικῇ, κακοῦργός τε οὖσα καὶ ἀπατηλὴ καὶ ἀγεν-
 νῆς καὶ ἀνελεύθερος, σχήμασι καὶ χρώμασι καὶ
 λειότησι καὶ ἐσθήσει ἀπατῶσα, ὥστε ποιεῖν ἀλλό-
 τριον κάλλος ἐφελκομένους τοῦ οἰκείου τοῦ διὰ
 τῆς γυμναστικῆς ἀμελεῖν. Ἴν' οὖν μὴ μακρολο-
 γῶ, ἐθέλω σοι εἰπεῖν ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι — ἥδη

γὰρ ἂν ἴσως ἀκολουθήσαις — ὅτι ὁ κομμωτικὴ
 C πρὸς γυμναστικὴν, τοῦτο ὀψοποικὴ πρὸς ἰατρι-
 κήν. μᾶλλον δὲ ᾄδε, ὅτι ὁ κομμωτικὴ πρὸς γυ-
 μναστικὴν, τοῦτο σοφιστικὴ πρὸς νομοθετικὴν,
 καὶ ὅτι ὁ ὀψοποικὴ πρὸς ἰατρικὴν, τοῦτο ῥητο-
 ρικὴ πρὸς δικαιοσύνην. Ὅπερ μέντοι λέγω, διέ-
 σιγηκε μὲν οὕτω φύσει· ἅτε δ' ἐγγὺς ὄντων φύ-
 ρονται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ ταῦτα σοφιστὰι καὶ
 ῥήτορες, καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὃ τι χρήσονται οὔτε
 αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς οὔτε οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι τούτοις.

D καὶ γὰρ ἂν, εἰ μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι ἐπεστιάται,
 ἀλλ' αὐτὸ αὐτῷ, καὶ μὴ ὑπὸ ταύτης κατεθεωρεῖ-
 το καὶ διεκρίνεται ἢ τε ὀψοποικὴ καὶ ἢ ἰατρικὴ,
 ὅλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα ἔκρινε σταθμώμενον ταῖς
 χάρισι ταῖς πρὸς αὐτό, τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου ἂν
 πολὺ ἦν, ὃ φίλε Πῶλε· — σὺ γὰρ τούτων ἔμπει-
 ρος· — ὁμοῦ ἂν πάντα χρήματα ἐφύρετο ἐν τῷ
 αὐτῷ, ἀκρίτων ὄντων τῶν τε ἰατρικῶν καὶ ὑγιει-
 νῶν καὶ ὀψοποικῶν. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐγὼ φημι τὴν
 ῥητορικὴν εἶναι, ἀκήκοας· ἀντίστροφον ὀψοποι-

E ίας ἐν ψυχῇ, ὡς ἐκεῖνο ἐν σώματι. Ἴσως μὲν
 οὖν ἄτοπον πεποίηκα, ὅτι σε οὐκ ἔδῳ μακροῦς
 λόγους λέγειν αὐτὸς συχνὸν λόγον ἀποτέτακα.
 ἄξιον μὲν οὖν ἔμοι συγγνώμην ἔχειν ἐστί· λέ-
 γοντος γὰρ μου βραχέα οὐκ ἐμάνθανες, οὐδὲ
 χρῆσθαι τῇ ἀποκρίσει ἦν σοι ἀπεκρινάμην οὐδὲν
 466 οἷός τ' ἦσθα, ἀλλ' ἐδέου διηγρήσεως. εἰ μὲν
 οὖν καὶ ἐγὼ, σοῦ ἀποκρινομένου, μὴ ἔχω ὃ τι
 χρήσωμαι, ἀπότεινε καὶ σὺ λόγον, εἰ μὴ δὲ ἔχω,

ἔα με χρῆσθαι· δίκαιον γάρ. καὶ νῦν ταύτη
τῇ ἀποκρίσει εἴ τι ἔχεις χρῆσθαι, χρῶ.

CAP. XXI. ΠΩΛ. Τί οὖν φῆς; κολακεία
δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἢ ῥητορική; ΣΩ. Κολακείας
μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε εἶπον μύριον. ἀλλ' οὐ μνημο-
νεύεις τηλικούτος ὢν, ὦ Πῶλε; τί τάχα δράσεις
[πρεσβύτης γενόμενος]; ΠΩΛ. Ἄρ' οὖν δοκοῦ-
σί σοι ὡς κόλακες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι φραῦλοι νομίζε- B
σθαι οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ῥήτορες; ΣΩ. Ἐρώτημα τοῦτ'
ἐρωτᾷς, ἢ λόγου τινὸς ἀρχὴν λέγεις; ΠΩΛ.
Ἐρωτῶ ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ νομίζεσθαι ἔμοιγε
δοκοῦσι. ΠΩΛ. Πῶς οὐ νομίζεσθαι; οὐ μέγι-
στον δύνανται ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν; ΣΩ. Οὐκ, εἰ
τὸ δύνασθαι γε λέγεις ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι τῷ δυνα-
μένῳ. ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ λέγω γε. ΣΩ.
Ἐλάχιστον τοίνυν μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει C
δύνασθαι οἱ ῥήτορες. ΠΩΛ. Τί δέ; οὐχ, ὥσ-
περ οἱ τύραννοι, ἀποκτιννύασί τε ὃν ἂν βούλων-
ται, καὶ ἀφαιροῦνται χρήματα καὶ ἐκβάλλουσιν
ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὃν ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς; ΣΩ. Νή
τὸν κύνα, ἀμφιγνοῶ μέντοι, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐφ' ἐκά-
στου ὧν λέγεις, πότερον αὐτὸς ταῦτα λέγεις καὶ
γνώμην σαυτοῦ ἀποφαίνει, ἢ ἐμὲ ἐρωτᾷς. ΠΩΛ.
Ἀλλ' ἔγωγε σὲ ἐρωτῶ. ΣΩ. Εἴεν, ὦ φίλε·
ἔπειτα δύο ἄμα με ἐρωτᾷς; ΠΩΛ. Πῶς δύο;
ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρτι οὕτω πως ἔλεγες, ὅτι ἀποκτιν- D
νύασιν οἱ ῥήτορες οὓς ἂν βούλωνται, ὥσπερ οἱ
τύραννοι, καὶ χρήματα ἀφαιροῦνται καὶ ἐξε-
λαύνουσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὃν ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς;
ΠΩΛ. Ἐγωγε.

CAP. XXII. ΣΩ. Λέγω τοίνυν σοι, ὅτι δύο
 ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ ἐρωτήματα, καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαί γέ
 σοι πρὸς ἀμφοτέρω. φημι γάρ, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐγὼ
 καὶ τοὺς ῥήτορας καὶ τοὺς τυράννους δύνασθαι
 Ἐμὲν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι σμικρότατον, ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ
 ἔλεγον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ποιεῖν ὧν βούλονται, ὥς ἔπος
 εἰπεῖν· ποιεῖν μέντοι ὅ τι ἂν αὐτοῖς δόξη βέλτι-
 στον εἶναι. ΠΩΑ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ μέγα
 δύνασθαι; ΣΩ. Οὐχ, ὥς γέ φησι Πῶλος.
 ΠΩΑ. Ἐγὼ οὐ φημι; φημι μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε.
 ΣΩ. Μὰ τὸν—οὐ σύ γε, ἐπεὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι
 ἔφησ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τῷ δυναμένῳ. ΠΩΑ. Φημι
 γὰρ οὖν. ΣΩ. Ἀγαθὸν οὖν οἶε εἶναι, ἐάν τις
 ποιῇ ταῦτα, ἃ ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ βέλτιστα εἶναι,
 νοῦν μὴ ἔχων; καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖς μέγα δύνα-
 σθαι; ΠΩΑ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀπο-
 δείξεις τοὺς ῥήτορας νοῦν ἔχοντας καὶ τέχνην
 167 τὴν ῥητορικὴν, ἀλλὰ μὴ κολακείαν, ἐμὲ ἐξελέγ-
 ξας; εἰ δέ με ἐάσεις ἀνέλεγκτον, οἱ ῥήτορες οἱ
 ποιοῦντες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ
 τύραννοι οὐδὲν ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο κερτήσονται, εἰ δὴ
 δύναμὶς ἐστίν, ὥς σὺ φῆς, ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν
 ἀνευ νοῦ ἃ δοκεῖ καὶ σὺ ὁμολογεῖς κακὸν εἶναι.
 ἢ οὐ; ΠΩΑ. Ἐγωγε. ΣΩ. Πῶς ἂν οὖν οἱ
 ῥήτορες μέγα δύναιντο ἢ οἱ τύραννοι ἐν ταῖς
 πόλεσιν, ἐάν μὴ Σωκράτης ἐξελεγχθῇ ὑπὸ Πῶ-
 168 λου, ὅτι ποιοῦσιν ἃ βούλονται; ΠΩΑ. Οὗτος
 ἀνὴρ— ΣΩ. Οὐ φημι ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς ἃ βού-
 λονται· ἀλλὰ μ' ἔλεγγε. ΠΩΑ. Οὐκ ἄρτι
 ὁμολόγεις ποιεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς βέλτιστα εἶναι,

τούτου πρόσθεν ; ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ νῦν ὁμολογῶ.
 ΠΩΛ. Οὐκοῦν ποιοῦσιν ἃ βούλονται. ΣΩ.
 Οὐ φημι. ΠΩΛ. Ποιοῦντες δὲ ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς ;
 ΣΩ. Φημί. ΠΩΛ. Σχέτλια λέγεις καὶ ὑπερ-
 φυῇ, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Μὴ κατηγόρει, ὦ λῶστε
 Πῶλε, ἵνα προσείπω σε κατὰ σέ· ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν C
 ἔχεις ἐμὲ ἐρωτᾶν, ἐπίδειξον, ὅτι ψεύδομαι, εἰ δὲ
 μή, αὐτὸς ἀποκρίνου. ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλ' ἐθέλω ἀπο-
 κρίνεσθαι, ἵνα καὶ εἰδῶ ὅ τι λέγεις.

CAP. XXIII. ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν σοι δοκοῦ-
 σιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τοῦτο βούλεσθαι, ὃ ἂν πράττω-
 σιν ἐκάστοτε, ἢ ἐκεῖνο, οὗ ἕνεκα πράττουσι τοῦθ',
 ὃ πράττουσιν ; οἷον οἱ τὰ φάρμακα πίνοντες
 παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν πότερόν σοι δοκοῦσι τοῦτο
 βούλεσθαι, ὅπερ ποιοῦσι, πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον D
 καὶ ἀλγεῖν, ἢ ἐκεῖνο, τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, οὗ ἕνεκα πί-
 νουσιν ; ΠΩΛ. Ἀῖνον, ὅτι τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, οὗ ἕνε-
 κα πίνουσιν. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ πλείοντές τε
 καὶ τὸν ἄλλον χρηματισμὸν χρηματιζόμενοι οὐ
 τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ βούλονται, ὃ ποιοῦσιν ἐκάστοτε·
 τίς γὰρ βούλεται πλεῖν τε καὶ κινδυνεύειν καὶ
 πράγματ' ἔχειν ; ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο, οἶμαι, οὗ ἕνεκα
 πλέουσι, πλουτεῖν· πλούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα πλέουσι.
 ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι οὖν οὔτω
 καὶ περὶ πάντων ; ἐάν τις τι πράττῃ ἕνεκά του,
 οὐ τοῦτο βούλεται, ὃ πράττει, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο, οὗ
 ἕνεκα πράττει. ΠΩΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν E
 ἔστι τι τῶν ὄντων, ὃ οὐχὶ ἦτοι ἀγαθὸν γ' ἐστὶν
 ἢ κακὸν ἢ μεταξὺ τούτων, οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε
 κακόν ; ΠΩΛ. Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν λέγεις εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μὲν σοφίαν
 τε καὶ ὑγίειαν καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ τοι-
 αῦτα, κακὰ δὲ τὰναντία τούτων; ΠΩΛ. Ἔγω-
 γε. ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ ἄρα
 468 τοιᾶδε λέγεις, ἃ ἐνίοτε μὲν μετέχει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ,
 ἐνίοτε δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ, ἐνίοτε δὲ οὐδετέρου, οἷον
 καθῆσθαι καὶ βαδίζειν καὶ τρέχειν καὶ πλεῖν,
 καὶ οἷον αὐτὸ λίθους καὶ ξύλα καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ τοι-
 αῦτα; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις; ἢ ἄλλ' ἅττα καλεῖς τὰ
 μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ; ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ
 ταῦτα. ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν τὰ μεταξὺ ταῦτα
 ἔνεκεν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πράττουσιν, ὅταν πράττωσιν,
 ἢ τὰγαθὰ τῶν μεταξὺ; ΠΩΛ. Τὰ μεταξὺ δὴ-
 Β που τῶν ἀγαθῶν. ΣΩ. Τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄρα διώ-
 κοντες καὶ βαδίζομεν, ὅταν βαδίζωμεν, οἰόμενοι
 βέλτιον εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἔσταμεν, ὅταν
 ἐστῶμεν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἢ οὐ;
 ΠΩΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀποκτίννυμεν,
 εἴ τιν' ἀποκτίννυμεν, καὶ ἐκβάλλομεν καὶ ἀφαι-
 ρούμεθα χρήματα, οἰόμενοι ἄμεινον εἶναι ἡμῶν
 ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἢ μή; ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ.
 Ἐνεκ' ἄρα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἅπαντα ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν
 οἱ ποιοῦντες. ΠΩΛ. Φημί.

CAP. XXIV. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὡμολογήσαμεν, ἃ
 Γ ἔνεκά τοι ποιοῦμεν, μὴ ἐκεῖνα βούλεσθαι, ἀλλ'
 ἐκεῖνο, οὗ ἔνεκα ταῦτα ποιοῦμεν; ΠΩΛ. Μά-
 λιστα. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα σφάττειν βουλόμεθα οὐδ'
 ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων οὐδὲ χρήματα ἀφαι-
 ρεῖσθαι ἀπλῶς οὕτως, ἀλλ' ἐὰν μὲν ὠφέλιμα ἢ
 ταῦτα, βουλόμεθα πράττειν αὐτά, βλαβερά δὲ

ὄντα οὐ βουλόμεθα. τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ βουλόμεθα,
 ὥς φης σύ, τὰ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ οὐ βου-
 λόμεθα, οὐδὲ τὰ κακὰ. ἦ γάρ; ἀληθῆ σοι δοκῶ
 λέγειν, ὦ Πῶλε, ἢ οὐ; Τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνεις; D
 ΠΩΑ. Ἀληθῆ. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ταῦτα ὁμο-
 λογοῦμεν, εἴ τις ἀποκτείνει τινὰ ἢ ἐκβάλλει ἐκ
 πόλεως ἢ ἀφαιρεῖται χρήματα, εἴτε τύραννος ὢν
 εἴτε ρήτωρ, οἴομενος ἄμεινον εἶναι αὐτῷ, τυγ-
 χάνει δὲ ὃν κάκιον, οὗτος δήπου ποιεῖ ἃ δοκεῖ
 αὐτῷ. ἦ γάρ; ΠΩΑ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν
 καὶ ἃ βούλεται, εἴπερ τυγχάνει ταῦτα κακὰ
 ὄντα; Τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνεις; ΠΩΑ. Ἄλλ' οὐ
 μοι δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἃ βούλεται. ΣΩ. Ἔστιν οὖν
 ὅπως ὁ τοιοῦτος μέγα δύναται ἐν τῇ πόλει ταύ- E
 τη, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι ἀγαθόν τι κατὰ
 τὴν σὴν ὁμολογίαν; ΠΩΑ. Οὐκ ἔστιν. ΣΩ.
 Ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, λέγων, ὅτι ἔστιν ἄν-
 θρωπον ποιοῦντα ἐν πόλει ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ μὴ μέγα
 δύνασθαι μηδὲ ποιεῖν ἃ βούλεται. ΠΩΑ. Ὡς
 δὴ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο ἐξεῖναί σοι
 ποιεῖν ὅ τι δοκεῖ σοι ἐν τῇ πόλει μᾶλλον ἢ μή,
 οὐδὲ ζηλοῖς, ὅταν ἴδῃς τινὰ ἢ ἀποκτείναντα ὃν
 ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ ἢ ἀφελόμενον χρήματα ἢ δῆσαντα.
 ΣΩ. Δικαίως, λέγεις, ἢ ἀδίκως; ΠΩΑ. Ὅπό-
 τερ' ἂν ποιῇ, οὐκ ἀμφοτέρως ζηλωτὸν ἔστιν; 469
 ΣΩ. Εὐφήμει, ὦ Πῶλε. ΠΩΑ. Τί δή; ΣΩ.
 Ὅτι οὐ χρὴ οὔτε τοὺς ἀζηλώτους ζηλοῦν οὔτε
 τοὺς ἀθλίους, ἀλλ' ἐλεεῖν. ΠΩΑ. Τί δαί;
 οὔτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν περὶ ὧν ἐγὼ λέγω τῶν ἀν-
 θρώπων; ΣΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; ΠΩΑ. Ὅστις

- οὖν ἀποκτίννυσιν ὃν ἂν δόξῃ αὐτῷ, δικαίως ἀποκτιννύς, ἄθλιος δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι καὶ ἐλεεινός ; ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε, οὐδὲ μέντοι ζηλωτός. ΠΩΛ. Β Οὐκ ἄρτι ἄθλιον ἔφησθα εἶναι ; ΣΩ. Τὸν ἀδίκως γε, ὃ ἔταῖρε, ἀποκτείναντα, καὶ ἐλεεινόν γε πρὸς · τὸν δὲ δικαίως ἀζήλωτον. ΠΩΛ. Ἡ που ὃ γε ἀποθνήσκων ἀδίκως ἐλεεινός τε καὶ ἄθλιός ἐστιν. ΣΩ. Ἡτιον ἢ ὁ ἀποκτιννύς, ὃ Πῶλε, καὶ ἦτιον ἢ ὁ δικαίως ἀποθνήσκων. ΠΩΛ. Πῶς δῆτα, ὃ Σώκρατες ; ΣΩ. Οὕτως, ὥς μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν τυγχάνει ὃν τὸ ἀδικεῖν. ΠΩΛ. Ἡ γὰρ τοῦτο μέγιστον ; οὐ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι μείζον ; ΣΩ. Ἡκιστά γε. ΠΩΛ. Σὺ ἄρα βούλοιο ἂν ἀδικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀδικεῖν ; ΣΩ. Βουλοίμην μὲν ἂν ἔγωγε οὐδέτερον · εἰ δ' ἀναγκαῖον εἴη ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἐλοίμην ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν. ΠΩΛ. Σὺ ἄρα τυραννεῖν οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο ; ΣΩ. Οὐκ, εἰ τὸ τυραννεῖν γε λέγεις ὅπερ ἐγώ. ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλ' ἔγωγε τοῦτο λέγω, ὅπερ ἄρτι, ἐξεῖναι ἐν τῇ πόλει, ὃ ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ποιεῖν τοῦτο, καὶ ἀποκτιννύντι καὶ ἐκβάλλοντι καὶ πάντα πράττοντι κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ δόξαν.

- CAP. XXV. ΣΩ. ὦ μακάριε, ἐμοῦ δὴ λέγοντος τῷ λόγῳ ἐπιλαβοῦ. εἰ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἐν ἀγορᾷ πληθούσῃ λαβὼν ὑπὸ μάλης ἐγχειρίδιον λέγοιμι πρὸς σέ, ὅτι ὦ Πῶλε, ἐμοὶ δύναμεις τις καὶ τυραννὶς θαυμασία ἄρτι προσγένονεν · ἐὰν γὰρ ἄρα ἐμοὶ δόξῃ τινὰ τουτωνὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὧν σὺ ὁρᾷς ἀντίκα μάλα δεῖν τεθνάναι, τεθνήξει

οὗτος, ὃν ἂν δόξη· καὶν τινα δόξη μοι τῆς κεφαλῆς αὐτῶν κατεαγέναι δεῖν, κατεαγὼς ἔσται αὐτίκα μάλα, καὶν θοιμάτιον διεσχίσθαι, διεσχισμένον ἔσται· οὕτω μέγα ἐγὼ δύναμαι ἐν τῇδε τῇ Ε πόλει· εἰ οὖν ἀπιστιοῦντί σοι δείξαιμι τὸ ἐγχειρίδιον, ἴσως ἂν εἴποις ἰδὼν, οἷοι ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω μὲν πάντες ἂν μέγα δύναιντο, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐμπρησθεῖη οἰκία τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἦντιν' ἂν σοι δοκῇ, καὶ τὰ γε Ἀθηναίων νεώρια καὶ τριήρεις καὶ τὰ πλοῖα πάντα καὶ τὰ δημόσια καὶ τὰ ἴδια. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄρα τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι, τὸ ποιεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ. ἢ δοκεῖ σοι; ΠΩΑ. Οὐδ' 470 δῆτα οὕτω γε. ΣΩ. Ἐχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν, διότι μέμψει τὴν τοιαύτην δύναμιν; ΠΩΑ. Ἐγώ γε. ΣΩ. Τί δὴ; λέγε. ΠΩΑ. Ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον τὸν οὕτω πράττοντα ζημιοῦσθαί ἐστι. ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ ζημιοῦσθαι οὐ κακόν; ΠΩΑ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ θαυμάσιε, τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι πάλιν αὖ σοι φαίνεται, ἐὰν μὲν πράττοντι ἃ δοκεῖ ἐπιταί τὸ ὠφελίμως πράττειν, ἀγαθόν τε εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἐστὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι· εἰ δὲ Β μὴ, κακὸν καὶ σμικρὸν δύνασθαι. Σκεψώμεθα δὲ καὶ τόδε. ἄλλο τι ὁμολογοῦμεν ἐνίοτε μὲν ἄμεινον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν, ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἀποκτινύναι τε καὶ ἐξελαύνειν ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι χρήματα, ἐνίοτε δὲ οὐ; ΠΩΑ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ, ὥς ἔοικε, καὶ παρὰ σοῦ καὶ παρ' ἐμοῦ ὁμολογεῖται. ΠΩΑ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Πότε οὖν σὺ φῆς ἄμεινον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν; εἰπέ τίνα ὄρον ὀρίξει. ΠΩΑ. Σὺ

μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπόκριναι ταῦτὸ τοῦτο.
 C ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ μὲν τοίνυν φημί, ὦ Πῶλε, εἴ σοι
 παρ' ἐμοῦ ἡδιόν ἐστιν ἀκούειν, ὅταν μὲν δικαίως
 τις ταῦτα ποιῇ, ἀμεινον εἶναι, ὅταν δὲ ἀδίκως,
 κάκιον.

CAP. XXVI. ΠΩΛ. Χαλεπόν γέ σε ἐλέγξαι,
 ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλ' οὐχὶ κἂν παῖς σε ἐλέγξειεν,
 ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγεις; ΣΩ. Πολλὴν ἄρα ἐγὼ
 τῷ παιδί χάριν ἔξω, ἵσῃν δὲ καὶ σοί, ἐάν με ἐλέγ-
 ξῃς καὶ ἀπαλλάξῃς φλυαρίας. ἀλλὰ μὴ κάμῃς
 φίλον ἄνδρα εὐεργετῶν, ἀλλ' ἔλεγχε. ΠΩΛ.
 D Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδέν γέ σε δεῖ πα-
 λαιοῖς πράγμασιν ἐλέγχειν· τὰ γὰρ ἐχθὲς καὶ
 πρόην γεγονότα ταῦτα ἱκανά σε ἐξελέγξαι ἐστὶ
 καὶ ἀποδείξαι, ὥς πολλοὶ ἀδικοῦντες ἄνθρωποι
 εὐδαίμονές εἰσι. ΣΩ. Τὰ ποῖα ταῦτα; ΠΩΛ.
 Ἀρχέλαον δῆπου τοῦτον τὸν Περδίκκου ὀρᾶς
 ἄρχοντα Μακεδονίας; ΣΩ. Εἰ δὲ μή, ἀλλ'
 ἀκούω γε. ΠΩΛ. Εὐδαίμων οὖν σοι δοκεῖ εἶ-
 ναι ἢ ἄθλιος; ΣΩ. Οὐκ οἶδα, ὦ Πῶλε· οὐ
 γὰρ πω συγγέγονα τῷ ἀνδρί. ΠΩΛ. Τί δαί;
 E συγγενόμενος ἂν γνοίης, ἄλλως δὲ αὐτόθεν οὐ
 γινώσκεις ὅτι εὐδαιμονεῖ; ΣΩ. Μὰ Δί' οὐ
 δῆτα. ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οὐδὲ
 τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα γινώσκειν φήσεις εὐδαίμονα
 ὄντα. ΣΩ. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε ἔρω· οὐ γὰρ οἶδα
 παιδείας ὅπως ἔχει καὶ δικαιοσύνης. ΠΩΛ. Τί
 δέ; ἐν τούτῳ ἢ πᾶσα εὐδαιμονία ἐστίν; ΣΩ.
 Ὡς γε ἐγὼ λέγω, ὦ Πῶλε· τὸν μὲν γὰρ καλὸν
 κάγαθόν ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα εὐδαίμονα εἶναί

φημι, τὸν δὲ ἄδικον καὶ πονηρὸν ἄθλιον. ΠΩΑ. 471 ·
 "Αθλιος ἄρα οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ Ἀρχέλαος κατὰ τὸν
 σὸν λόγον; ΣΩ. Εἴπερ γε, ὦ φίλε, ἄδικος.
 ΠΩΑ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ πῶς οὐκ ἄδικος; ὃ γε
 προσῆκε μὲν τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐδέν, ἦν νῦν ἔχει, ὄντι
 ἐκ γυναικός, ἣ ἦν δούλη Ἀλκέτου, τοῦ Περδίκ-
 κου ἀδελφοῦ, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸ δίκαιον δοῦλος
 ἦν Ἀλκέτου, καὶ εἰ ἐβούλετο τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν,
 ἐδούλευεν ἂν Ἀλκέτῃ καὶ ἦν εὐδαιμών κατὰ τὸν
 σὸν λόγον· νῦν δὲ θαυμασίως ὥς ἄθλιος γέγονεν, B
 ἐπεὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἠδίκηκεν· ὅς γε πρῶτον μὲν
 τοῦτον αὐτὸν τὸν δεσπότην καὶ θειὸν μεταπεμ-
 ψάμενος ὥς ἀποδώσων τὴν ἀρχήν, ἦν Περδίκκας
 αὐτὸν ἀφείλετο, ξενίσας καὶ καταμεθύσας αὐτόν
 τε καὶ τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ Ἀλέξανδρον, ἀνεψιὸν
 αὐτοῦ, σχεδὸν ἡλικιώτην, ἐμβαλὼν εἰς ἄμαξαν,
 νύκτωρ ἐξαγαγὼν ἀπέσφαξέ τε καὶ ἠφάνισεν
 ἀμφοτέρους, καὶ ταῦτα ἀδικήσας ἔλαθεν ἑαυτὸν
 ἀθλιώτατος γενόμενος καὶ οὐ μετεμέλησεν αὐτῷ,
 ἀλλ' ὀλίγον ὕστερον τὸν ἀδελφὸν τὸν γνήσιον, C
 τὸν Περδίκκου υἱόν, παῖδα ὥς ἑπταετῆ, οὗ ἡ
 ἀρχὴ ἐγίγνετο κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον, οὐκ ἐβουλήθη
 εὐδαιμών γενέσθαι δικαίως ἐκθρέψας καὶ ἀπο-
 δοῦς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐκείνῳ, ἀλλ' εἰς φρέαρ ἐμβαλὼν
 ἀποπνίξας πρὸς τὴν μητέρα αὐτοῦ Κλεοπάτραν
 χῆνα ἔφη διώκοντα ἐμπεσεῖν καὶ ἀποθανεῖν.
 τοιγάρτοι νῦν, ἅτε μέγιστα ἠδίκηκώς τῶν ἐν Μα-
 κεδονίᾳ, ἀθλιώτατός ἐστι πάντων Μακεδόνων,
 ἀλλ' οὐκ εὐδαιμονέστατος, καὶ ἴσως ἔστιν ὅστις
 Ἀθηναίων ἀπὸ σοῦ ἀρξάμενος δέξαιτ' ἂν ἄλλος

D ὅστισοῦν Μακεδόνων γενέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ Ἀρχέλαος.

CAP. XXVII. ΣΩ. Καί κατ' ἀρχὰς τῶν λόγων, ὦ Πῶλε, ἔγωγέ σε ἐπῆνεσα, ὅτι μοι δοκεῖς εὖ πρὸς τὴν ῥητορικὴν πεπαιδευῆσθαι, τοῦ δὲ διαλέγεσθαι ἡμεληκέναι· καὶ νῦν ἄλλο τι οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος, ὃ με καὶ ἂν παῖς ἐξελέγξειε, καὶ ἐγὼ ὑπὸ σοῦ νῦν, ὥς σὺ οἶει, ἐξελήλεγμαι τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ, φάσκων τὸν ἀδικοῦντα οὐκ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι; πόθεν, ὦ Ἰθακή; καὶ μὴν οὐδέν γέ σοι τούτων ὁμολογῶ ὧν σὺ φῆς. ΠΩΛ. Οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλεις, ἐπεὶ δοκεῖ γέ σοι ὥς ἐγὼ λέγω. ΣΩ. ὦ Μακάριε, ῥητορικῶς γὰρ με ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐλέγχειν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἡγούμενοι ἐλέγχειν. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ οἱ ἕτεροι τοὺς ἐτέρους δοκοῦσιν ἐλέγχειν, ἐπειδὴ τῶν λόγων ὧν ἂν λέγωσι μάρτυρας πολλοὺς παρέχονται καὶ εὐδοκίμους, ὁ δὲ τᾶναντία λέγων ἓνα τινὰ παρέχεται, ἢ μηδένα. οὗτος δὲ ὁ ἔλεγχος οὐδενὸς ἀξιός ἐστι πρὸς τὴν
472 ἀλήθειαν· ἐνίστε γὰρ ἂν καὶ καταψευδομαρτυρηθεῖη τις ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ δοκούντων εἶναί τι. καὶ νῦν περὶ ὧν σὺ λέγεις ὀλίγου σοι πάντες συμφήσουσι ταῦτα Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ ξένοι· ἐὰν βούλῃ κατ' ἐμοῦ μάρτυρας παρασχέσθαι ὥς οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγω, μαρτυρήσουσί σοι, ἐὰν μὲν βούλῃ, Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ μετ' αὐτοῦ, ὧν οἱ τρίποδες οἱ ἐφεξῆς ἐστιῶτές εἰσιν ἐν τῷ Διονυσίῳ, ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, Ἀριστοκράτης ὁ
B Σκελλίου, οὗ αὖ ἐστιν ἐν Πυθίου τοῦτο τὸ καλὸν ἀνάθημα, ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, ἡ Περικλέους ὄλη

οἰκία, ἢ ἄλλη συγγένεια, ἦντινα ἂν βούλῃ τῶν ἐνθόνδε ἐκλέξασθαι. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ σοι εἰς ὧν οὐχ ὁμολογῶ· οὐ γάρ με σὺ ἀναγκάζεις, ἀλλὰ ψευδομαρτυρας κατ' ἐμοῦ πολλοὺς παρασχόμενος ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐκβάλλειν με ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. ἐγὼ δὲ ἂν μὴ σὲ αὐτὸν ἕνα ὄντα μάρτυρα παράσχωμαι ὁμολογοῦντα περὶ ὧν λέγω, οὐδὲν οἶμαι ἄξιον λόγου μοι πεπεράνθαι περὶ ὧν ἂν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ᾗ· οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ σοί, ἐὰν μὴ C ἐγὼ σοι μαρτυρῶ εἰς ὧν μόνος, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους πάντας τούτους χαίρειν ἐᾷς. ἔστι μὲν οὖν οὗτός τις τρόπος ἐλέγχου, ὥς σύ τε οἶει καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλος, ὃν ἐγὼ αὖ οἶμαι. παραβαλόντες οὖν παρ' ἀλλήλους σκεψώμεθα εἴ τι διοίσουσιν ἀλλήλων. καὶ γὰρ τυγχάνει περὶ ὧν ἀμφισβητοῦμεν οὐ πᾶν μικρὰ ὄντα, ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι ταῦτα, περὶ ὧν εἰδέναι τε κάλλιστον, μὴ εἰδέναι τε αἰσχιστον· τὸ γὰρ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ἔστιν ἢ γινώσκειν ἢ ἀγνοεῖν ὅστις τε εὐδαίμων ἔστι καὶ ὅστις μὴ. αὐτίκα πρῶτον, περὶ D οὗ νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστί, σὺ ἡγεῖ οἷόν τε εἶναι μακάριον ἄνδρα ἀδικοῦντά τε καὶ ἀδικον ὄντα, εἴπερ Ἀρχέλαον ἀδικον μὲν ἡγεῖ εἶναι, εὐδαίμονα δέ. ἄλλο τι ὥς οὕτω σου νομίζοντος διανοώμεθα; ΠΩΑ. Πάνυ γε.

CAP. XXVIII. ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ δέ φημι ἀδύνατον. ἔν μὲν τουτὶ ἀμφισβητοῦμεν. εἶεν· ἀδικῶν δὲ διὴ εὐδαίμων ἔσται ἄρ', ἂν τυγχάνῃ δίκης τε καὶ τιμωρίας; ΠΩΑ. Ἡκιστά γε, ἐπεὶ οὕτω γ' ἂν ἀθλιώτατος εἴη. ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἐὰν ἄρα μὴ τυγ- E

χάνη δίκης ὁ ἀδικῶν, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον εὐδαί-
 μων ἔσται. ΠΩΛ. Φημί. ΣΩ. Κατὰ δέ γε
 τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὦ Πῶλε, ὁ ἀδικῶν τε καὶ ὁ
 ἀδικος πάντως μὲν ἄθλιος, ἀθλιώτερος μέντοι,
 εἰ μὴ διδῷ δίκην μηδὲ τυγχάνη τιμωρίας ἀδι-
 κῶν, ἥττον δὲ ἄθλιος, εἰ μὴ διδῷ δίκην καὶ τυγ-
 473 χάνη δίκης ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων. ΠΩΛ.
 Ὁ ἄτοπα γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιχειρεῖς λέγειν. ΣΩ.
 Πειράσομαι δέ γε καὶ σὲ ποιῆσαι, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ταύ-
 τὰ ἐμοὶ λέγειν· φίλον γάρ σε ἡγοῦμαι. νῦν
 μὲν οὖν ἃ διαφερόμεθα ταῦτ' ἐστί· σκόπει δὲ
 καὶ σύ. εἶπον ἐγὼ πον ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν τὸ
 ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον εἶναι. ΠΩΛ.
 Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Σὺ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι. ΠΩΛ.
 Ναί. ΣΩ. Καὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας ἀθλίους ἔφην
 εἶναι ἐγὼ, καὶ ἐξηλέγχθην ὑπὸ σοῦ. ΠΩΛ.
 Β Ναὶ μὰ Δία. ΣΩ. Ὡς σύ γε οἶει, ὦ Πῶλε.
 ΠΩΛ. Ἀληθῆ γε οἰόμενος ἴσως. ΣΩ. Σὺ δέ
 γε εὐδαίμονας αὖ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας, εἰ μὴ διδῶσι
 δίκην. ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ δὲ
 αὐτοὺς ἀθλιωτάτους φημί, τοὺς δὲ διδόντας δίκην
 ἥττον. βούλει καὶ τοῦτο ἐλέγχειν; ΠΩΛ.
 Ἀλλ' ἔτι τοῦτ' ἐκείνου χαλεπώτερόν ἐστιν, ὦ
 Σώκρατες, ἐξελέγξαι. ΣΩ. Οὐ δήτα, ὦ Πῶλε,
 ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον· τὸ γὰρ ἀληθὲς οὐδέποτε ἐλέγ-
 χεται. ΠΩΛ. Πῶς λέγεις; εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶν ἀνθρω-
 500 πος ληφθῇ τυραννίδι ἐπιβουλεύων, καὶ ληφθεὶς
 στρεβλῶται καὶ ἐκτέμνηται καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς
 ἐκκάηται, καὶ ἄλλας πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας καὶ
 παντοδαπὰς λῶβας αὐτός τε λωβηθεὶς καὶ τοὺς

αὐτοῦ ἐπιδὼν παῖδας τε καὶ γυναῖκα τὸ ἔσχατον ἀναστιαυρωθῇ ἢ καταπιτωθῇ, οὗτος εὐδαιμονέστερος ἔσται ἢ ἐὰν διαφυγὼν τύραννος καταστῇ καὶ ἄρχων ἐν τῇ πόλει διαβιῶ ποιῶν ὃ τι ἂν βούληται, ζηλωτὸς ὢν καὶ εὐδαιμονιζόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων; ταῦτα λέ- D
γεις ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἐξελέγγχειν;

CAP. XXIX. ΣΩ. Μορμολύττει αὖ, ὃ γεν-
ναῖε Πῶλε, καὶ οὐκ ἐλέγγχεις· ἄρτι δὲ ἔμαρτύρου.
ὁμῶς δὲ ὑπόμνησόν με σμικρόν· ἐὰν ἀδίκως ἐπι-
βουλεύων τυραννίδι, εἶπες; ΠΩΛ. Ἐρωγε.
ΣΩ. Εὐδαιμονέστερος μὲν τοίνυν οὐδέποτε ἔσται
οὐδέτερος αὐτῶν, οὔτε ὁ κατειργασμένος τὴν τυ-
ραννίδα ἀδίκως οὔτε ὁ δίκην διδούς· δυοῖν γὰρ
ἀθλίῳ εὐδαιμονέστερος μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη· ἀθλιώ-
τερος μέντοι ὁ διαφυγὼν καὶ τυραννεύσας. Τί E
τοῦτο, ὃ Πῶλε; γελᾷς; ἄλλο αὖ τοῦτο εἶδος
ἐλέγχου ἐστίν, ἐπειδὴν τίς τι εἶπη, καταγελᾶν,
ἐλέγγχειν δὲ μή; ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ οἶμι ἐξεληλέγχθαι,
ὃ Σώκратες, ὅταν τοιαῦτα λέγῃς ἃ οὐδεὶς ἂν
φῆσειεν ἀνθρώπων; ἐπεὶ ἔροῦ τίνα τούτων.
ΣΩ. ὦ Πῶλε, οὐκ εἰμὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, καὶ πέ-
ρυσσι βουλεύειν λαχὼν, ἐπειδὴ ἡ φυλὴ ἐπρυτάνευε
καὶ ἔδει με ἐπιπηφίζειν, γέλωτα παρεῖχον καὶ
οὐκ ἠπιστάμην ἐπιπηφίζειν. μὴ οὖν μηδὲ νῦν 474
με κέλευε ἐπιπηφίζειν τοὺς παρόντας, ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ
ἔχεις τούτων βελτίω ἔλεγχον, ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ
ἔλεγον, ἐμοὶ ἐν τῷ μέρει παράδος, καὶ πείρασαι
τοῦ ἐλέγχου οἷον ἐγὼ οἶμαι δεῖν εἶναι. ἐγὼ γὰρ
ὢν ἂν λέγω ἓνα μὲν παρασχέσθαι μύστυρα ἐπί-

σταμαι, αὐτὸν πρὸς ὃν ἂν μοι ὁ λόγος ᾗ, τοὺς
 δὲ πολλοὺς ἐγὼ χαίρειν, καὶ ἕνα ἐπιψηφίζειν ἐπί-
 B σταμαι, τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς οὐδὲ διαλέγομαι. ὅρα
 οὖν, εἰ ἐθελήσεις ἐν τῷ μέρει διδόναι ἔλεγχον
 ἀποκρινόμενος τὰ ἐρωτώμενα. ἐγὼ γὰρ διὴ οἴ-
 μαι καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους
 τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ
 τὸ μὴ διδόναι δίκην τοῦ διδόναι. ΠΩΑ. Ἐγὼ δέ
 γε οὔτ' ἐμὲ οὔτ' ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα. ἐπεὶ σὺ
 δέξαι' ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν; ΣΩ. Καὶ
 σύ γ' ἂν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες. ΠΩΑ. Πολλοὺ
 γε δεῖ, ἀλλ' οὔτ' ἐγὼ οὔτε σὺ οὔτ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς.
 C ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀποκρινεῖ; ΠΩΑ. Πάνυ μὲν
 οὖν· καὶ γὰρ ἐπιθυμῶ εἰδέναι ὅ τι ποτ' ἐρεῖς.
 ΣΩ. Λέγε δὴ μοι, ἵν' εἰδῇς, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐξ
 ἀρχῆς σε ἡρώτων· πότερον δοκεῖ σοι, ὃ Πῶλε,
 κάκιον εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι; ΠΩΑ.
 Τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἔμοιγε. ΣΩ. Τί δὲ διὴ αἷσχιον;
 πότερον τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι; Ἀποκρίνου.
 ΠΩΑ. Τὸ ἀδικεῖν.

CAP. XXX. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ κάκιον, εἵπερ
 αἷσχιον. ΠΩΑ. Ἡκιστα γε. ΣΩ. Μανθάνω·
 D οὐ ταῦτόν ἡγεῖ σύ, ὥς ἔοικας, καλόν τε καὶ ἀγα-
 θὸν καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἷσχρόν. ΠΩΑ. Οὐ δῆτα
 ΣΩ. Τί δὲ τόδε; τὰ καλὰ πάντα, οἷον καὶ
 σώματα καὶ χρώματα καὶ σχήματα καὶ φωνὰς
 καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα, εἰς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπων καλεῖς
 ἐκάστοτε καλὰ; οἷον πρῶτον τὰ σώματα τὰ κα-
 λὰ οὐχὶ ἦτοι κατὰ τὴν χρεῖαν λέγεις καλὰ εἶναι,
 πρὸς ὃ ἂν ἕκαστον χρήσιμον ᾗ, πρὸς τοῦτο, ἢ

κατὰ ἡδονὴν τινα, εἰάν ἐν τῷ θεωρεῖσθαι χαίρειν ποιῇ τοὺς θεωροῦντας ; ἔχεις τι ἐκτὸς τούτων λέγειν περὶ σώματος κάλλους ; ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἔχω. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα οὕτω καὶ σχήματα καὶ χρώματα ἢ διὰ ἡδονὴν τινα, ἢ διὰ ὠφέλειαν, ἢ δι' ἀμφοτέρω καλὰ προσαγορεύεις ; ΠΩΛ. Ἐγώ γε. ΣΩ. Οὐ καὶ τὰς φωνὰς καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν μουσικὴν πάντα ὡσαύτως ; ΠΩΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν τὰ γε κατὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα οὐ δῆπου ἐκτὸς τούτων ἐστὶ τὰ καλὰ, τοῦ ἢ ὠφέλιμα εἶναι, ἢ ἡδέα, ἢ ἀμφοτέρω. ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. ΣΩ.⁴⁷⁵ Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ τῶν μαθημάτων κάλλος ὡσαύτως ; ΠΩΛ. Πάνν γε· καὶ καλῶς γε νῦν ὀρίζει, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἡδονῇ τε καὶ ἀγαθῷ ὀριζόμενος τὸ καλόν. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ αἰσχροὺν τῷ ἐναντίῳ, λύπῃ τε καὶ κακῷ ; ΠΩΛ. Ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. Ὅταν ἄρα δυοῖν καλοῖν θᾶτερον κάλλιον ἢ, ἢ τῷ ἐτέρῳ τούτοις ἢ ἀμφοτέροις ὑπερβάλλον κάλλιον ἐστίν, ἥτοι ἡδονῇ ἢ ὠφελείᾳ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις. ΠΩΛ. Πάνν γε. ΣΩ. Καὶ ὅταν δὲ δὴ δυοῖν αἰσχροῖν τὸ ἕτερον αἴσχιον ἢ, ἥτοι λύπῃ ἢ κα- B κῷ ὑπερβάλλον αἴσχιον ἔσται. ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ; ΠΩΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, πῶς ἐλέγετο νῦν δὴ περὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι ; οὐκ ἔλεγες τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν αἴσχιον ; ΠΩΛ. Ἐλεγον. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἶπερ αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἥτοι λυπηρότερόν ἐστι καὶ λύπῃ ὑπερβάλλον αἴσχιον ἂν εἴη, ἢ κακῷ, ἢ ἀμφοτέροις ; οὐ καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη ; ΠΩΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ;

C CAP. XXXI. ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν δὴ σκευώμε-
 θα· ἄρα λύπη ὑπερβάλλει τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖ-
 σθαι, καὶ ἀλγοῦσι μᾶλλον οἱ ἀδικοῦντες ἢ οἱ
 ἀδικούμενοι ; ΠΩΛ. Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες,
 τοῦτό γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα λύπη γε ὑπερέχει.
 ΠΩΛ. Οὐ δῆτα. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ λύπη,
 ἀμφοτέροις μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ὑπερβάλλοι. ΠΩΛ.
 Οὐ φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τῷ ἑτέρῳ λείπεται.
 ΠΩΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τῷ κακῷ. ΠΩΛ. Ἐοικεν.
 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν κακῷ ὑπερβάλλον τὸ ἀδικεῖν κά-
 D κιον ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι. ΠΩΛ. Ἀῖῃλον δὴ
 οἷ. ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι οὖν ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν πολλῶν
 ἀνθρώπων καὶ ὑπὸ σοῦ ὁμολογεῖτο ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ
 ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ αἴσχιον εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδι-
 κεῖσθαι ; ΠΩΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Νῦν δέ γε κάκιον
 ἐφάνη. ΠΩΛ. Ἐοικε. ΣΩ. Δέξαιο ἂν οὖν
 σὺ μᾶλλον τὸ κάκιον καὶ τὸ αἴσχιον ἀντὶ τοῦ
 ἦντον ; Μὴ ὅκνει ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὦ Πῶλε —
 οὐδὲν γὰρ βλαβήσει —, ἀλλὰ γενναίως τῷ λόγῳ,
 E ὥσπερ ἱατρῷ, παρέχων ἀποκρίνου, καὶ ἡ φάθι ἢ
 μὴ ἂ ἐρωτῷ. ΠΩΛ. Ἄλλ' οὐκ ἂν δεξαίμην, ὦ
 Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Ἄλλος δέ τις ἀνθρώπων ;
 ΠΩΛ. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ κατὰ γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον.
 ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι οὐτ' ἂν ἐγὼ
 οὐτ' ἂν σὺ οὐτ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων δέξαιτ'
 ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι· κάκιον γὰρ
 τυγχάνει ὄν. ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Ὅρῳς
 οὖν, ὦ Πῶλε, ὁ ἔλεγχος παρὰ τὸν ἔλεγχον παρα-
 βαλλόμενος ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔοικεν, ἀλλὰ σοὶ μὲν οἱ
 ἄλλοι πάντες ὁμολογοῦσι πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐμοὶ δὲ σὺ

ἐξαρχεῖς εἷς ὢν μόνος καὶ ὁμολογῶν καὶ μαρτυ- 476
 ρῶν, καὶ ἐγὼ σὲ μόνον ἐπισηφίζων τοὺς ἄλλους
 ἔῷ χαίρειν. Καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἡμῖν οὕτως ἐχέτω·
 μετὰ τοῦτο δὲ περὶ οὗ τὸ δεύτερον ἡμφεσθητήσα-
 μεν, σκεψώμεθα, τὸ ἀδικοῦντα διδόναι δίκην ἄρα
 μέριστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστίν, ὡς σὺ ᾧ, ἢ μεῖζον τὸ
 μὴ διδόναι, ὡς αὖ ἐγὼ ᾧ. σκοπώμεθα δὲ τῇδε·
 τὸ διδόναι δίκην καὶ τὸ κολάζεσθαι δικαίως ἀδι-
 κοῦντα ἄρα τὸ αὐτὸ καλεῖς; ΠΩΛ. Ἐγώ γε.
 ΣΩ. Ἐχεις οὖν λέγειν, ὡς οὐχὶ τὰ γε δίκαια Β
 πάντα καλὰ ἐστί, καθ' ὅσον δίκαια; καὶ δια-
 σκεψάμενος εἶπέ. ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ
 Σώκρατες.

CAP. XXXII. ΣΩ. Σκόπει δὴ καὶ τόδε· ἄρα
 εἴ τίς τι ποιεῖ, ἀνάγκη τι εἶναι καὶ πάσχον ὑπὸ
 τούτου τοῦ ποιοῦντος; ΠΩΛ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.
 ΣΩ. Ἄρα τοῦτο πάσχον ὃ τὸ ποιοῦν ποιεῖ, καὶ
 τοιοῦτον οἷον ποιεῖ τὸ ποιοῦν; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοι-
 ὄνδε· εἴ τις τύπτει, ἀνάγκη τι τύπτεσθαι;
 ΠΩΛ. Ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰ σφόδρα τύπτει ἢ C
 ταχὺ ὃ τύπτων, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τυπτόμενον τύπτε-
 σθαι; ΠΩΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τοιοῦτον ἄρα πά-
 θος τῷ τυπτομένῳ ἐστίν οἷον ἂν τὸ τύπτον ποιῇ;
 ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ κἀει τις,
 ἀνάγκη τι κἀεσθαι; ΠΩΛ. Πῶς γάρ οὔ; ΣΩ.
 Καὶ εἰ σφόδρα γε κἀει ἢ ἀλγεινῶς, οὕτω κἀεσθαι
 τὸ καόμενον ὡς ἂν τὸ καὸν κάη; ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ
 γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ τέμνει τις, ὃ αὐτὸς
 λόγος; τέμνεται γάρ τι. ΠΩΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ.
 Καὶ εἰ μέγα γε ἢ βαθὺ τὸ τμήμα ἢ ἀλγεινόν,

Δ τοιοῦτον τιμῆμα τέμνεται τὸ τεμνόμενον οἷον τὸ
 τέμνον τέμνει; ΠΩΑ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Συλ-
 λήβδην δὴ ὄρα, εἰ ὁμολογεῖς ὃ ἄρτι ἔλεγον περὶ
 πάντων· οἷον ἂν ποιῇ τὸ ποιοῦν, τοιοῦτον τὸ πά-
 σχον πάσχειν. ΠΩΑ. Ἄλλ' ὁμολογῶ. ΣΩ.
 Τούτων δὴ ὁμολογουμένων, τὸ δίκην διδόναι πό-
 τερον πάσχειν τί ἐστίν ἢ ποιεῖν; ΠΩΑ. Ἀνάγ-
 κη, ὃ Σώκρατες, πάσχειν. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὑπό τινος
 ποιοῦντος; ΠΩΑ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; ὑπό γε τοῦ
 Ε κολάζοντος. ΣΩ. Ὁ δὲ ὀρθῶς κολάζων δικαίως
 κολάζει; ΠΩΑ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Δίκαια ποιῶν, ἢ
 οὐ; ΠΩΑ. Δίκαια. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁ κολαζό-
 μενος δίκην διδούς δίκαια πάσχει; ΠΩΑ.
 Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ δίκαιά που καλὰ ὡμο-
 λόγηται; ΠΩΑ. Πάνν γε. ΣΩ. Τούτων ἄρα
 ὁ μὲν ποιεῖ καλά, ὁ δὲ πάσχει, ὁ κολαζόμενος.
 ΠΩΑ. Ναί.

CAP. XXXIII. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ καλά,
 477 ἀγαθὰ; ἢ γὰρ ἡδέα ἢ ὠφέλιμα. ΠΩΑ. Ἀνάγ-
 κη. ΣΩ. Ἀγαθὰ ἄρα πάσχει ὁ δίκην διδούς;
 ΠΩΑ. Ἐοικεν. ΣΩ. Ὁφελεῖται ἄρα; ΠΩΑ.
 Ναί. ΣΩ. Ἄρα ἥνπερ ἐγὼ ὑπολαμβάνω τὴν
 ὠφέλειαν; βελτίων τὴν ψυχὴν γίγνεται, εἴπερ
 δικαίως κολάζεται; ΠΩΑ. Εἰκός γε. ΣΩ.
 Κακίας ἄρα ψυχῆς ἀπαλλάττεται ὁ δίκην διδούς;
 ΠΩΑ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν τοῦ μεγίστου
 Β ἀπαλλάττεται κακοῦ; Ὡδε δὲ σκόπει. ἐν χρη-
 μάτων κατασκευῇ ἀνθρώπου κακίαν ἄλλην τινὰ
 ἐνορᾷς ἢ πενίαν; ΠΩΑ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ πενίαν.
 ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἐν σώματος κατασκευῇ; κακίαν ἂν

φρίσαις ἀσθένειαν εἶναι καὶ νόσον καὶ αἷσχος καὶ
τὰ τοιαῦτα ; ΠΩΑ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν
καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ πονηρίαν ἡγεῖ τινα εἶναι ; ΠΩΑ.
Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ; ΣΩ. Ταύτην οὖν οὐκ ἀδικίαν
καλεῖς καὶ ἀμαθίαν καὶ δειλίαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ;
ΠΩΑ. Πάννυ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν χρημάτων
καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς, τριῶν ὄντων, τριττὰς C
εἴρηκας πονηρίας, πενίαν, νόσον, ἀδικίαν ;
ΠΩΑ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν τούτων τῶν πονη-
ριῶν αἰσχίστη ; οὐχ ἡ ἀδικία καὶ συλλήβδην ἡ
τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρία ; ΠΩΑ. Πολύ γε. ΣΩ.
Εἰ δὴ αἰσχίστη, καὶ κακίστη ; ΠΩΑ. Πῶς, ὦ
Σώκρατες, λέγεις ; ΣΩ. Ὡδί· αἰεὶ τὸ αἷσχι-
στον, ἥτοι λύπην μεγίστην παρέχον ἢ βλάβην ἢ
ἀμφοτέρω, αἷσχιστόν ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογημένων
ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν. ΠΩΑ. Μάλιστα. ΣΩ. Αἷ-
σχιστον δὲ ἀδικία καὶ σύμπασα ψυχῆς πονηρία
νῦν δὴ ὁμολόγηται ἡμῖν ; ΠΩΑ. Ὡμολόγηται D
γάρ. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡ ἀνιαιρότατόν ἐστιν καὶ
ἀνία ὑπερβάλλον αἷσχιστον τούτων ἐστίν, ἡ
βλάβη, ἢ ἀμφοτέρω ; ΠΩΑ. Ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ.
Ἄρ' οὖν ἀλγεινότερόν ἐστι τοῦ πένεσθαι καὶ
κάννειν τὸ ἀδικον εἶναι καὶ ἀκόλαστον καὶ δει-
λὸν καὶ ἀμαθῆ ; ΠΩΑ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ
Σώκρατες, ἀπὸ τούτων γε. ΣΩ. Ὑπερφυεῖ τινα
ἄρα ὥς μεγάλη βλάβη καὶ κακῷ θαυμασίῳ ὑπερ-
βάλλουσα τᾶλλα ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρία αἷσχιστόν E
ἐστι πάντων, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀλγηδόνι γε, ὥς ὁ σὸς λό-
γος. ΠΩΑ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν που
τό γε μεγίστη βλάβη ὑπερβάλλον μέγιστον ἂν

κακὸν εἶη τῶν ὄντων. ΠΩΑ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Ἡ ἀδικία ἄρα καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ψυχῆς πονηρία μέγιστον τῶν ὄντων κακόν ἐστι; ΠΩΑ. Φαίνεται.

CAP. XXXIV. ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν τέχνη πενίας ἀπαλλάττει; οὐ χρηματιστική; ΠΩΑ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τίς δὲ νόσου; οὐκ ἰατρική; ΠΩΑ. 478 Ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. Τίς δὲ πονηρίας καὶ ἀδικίας; Εἰ μὴ οὕτως εὐπορεῖς, ὥδε σκόπει· ποῖ ἄγομεν καὶ παρὰ τίνας τοὺς κάμνοντας τὰ σώματα; ΠΩΑ. Παρὰ τοὺς ἰατρούς, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Ποῖ δὲ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας καὶ τοὺς ἀκολασταίνοντας; ΠΩΑ. Παρὰ τοὺς δικαστὰς λέγεις; ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν δίκην δώσοντας; ΠΩΑ. Φημί. ΣΩ. Ἐὰρ οὖν οὐ δικαιοσύνη τινὲ χρώμενοι κολλάζουσιν οἱ ὀρθῶς κολάζοντες; ΠΩΑ. Ἀἴνιον B δῆ. ΣΩ. Χρηματιστικὴ μὲν ἄρα πενίας ἀπαλλάττει, ἰατρικὴ δὲ νόσου, δίκη δὲ ἀκολασίας καὶ ἀδικίας. ΠΩΑ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν τούτων κάλλιστόν ἐστιν [ὧν λέγεις]; ΠΩΑ. Τίνων λέγεις; ΣΩ. Χρηματιστικῆς, ἰατρικῆς, δίκης. ΠΩΑ. Πολὺ διαφέρει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡ δίκη. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν αὖ ἥτοι ἡδονὴν πλείστην ποιεῖ, ἢ ὠφέλειαν, ἢ ἀμφοτέρω, εἴπερ κάλλιστόν ἐστι; ΠΩΑ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Ἐὰρ οὖν τὸ ἰατρεῦεσθαι ἡδύ ἐστι, καὶ χαίρουσιν οἱ ἰατρευόμενοι; ΠΩΑ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ὠφέλιC μόν γε. ἢ γάρ; ΠΩΑ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Μεγάλου γὰρ κακοῦ ἀπαλλάττεται, ὥστε λυσιτελεῖ ὑπομεῖναι τὴν ἀλγηδόνα καὶ ὑγιεῖ εἶναι. ΠΩΑ

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ; ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὕτως ἂν περὶ σῶμα εὐδαιμονέστατος ἄνθρωπος εἴη, ἰατρενόμενος, ἢ μηδὲ κάμνων ἀρχήν ; ΠΩΛ. Ἀῖνον, ὅτι μηδὲ κάμνων. ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ τοῦτ' ἦν εὐδαιμονία, ὥς ἔοικε, κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγὴ, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν μηδὲ κτηήσις. ΠΩΛ. Ἔστι ταῦτα. ΣΩ. Τί δέ ; ἀθλιώτερος πότιρος δυοῖν ἐχόντοιν κακὸν εἴτ' ἐν σώματι εἴτ' ἐν ψυχῇ ; ὁ ἰατρενόμενος καὶ ἀπαλλατιόμενος τοῦ κακοῦ, ἢ ὁ μὴ ἰατρενόμενος, ἔχων δέ ; ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται μοι ὁ μὴ ἰατρενόμενος. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ δίκην διδόναι μεγίστου κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγὴ ἦν, πονηρίας ; ΠΩΛ. Ἦν γάρ. ΣΩ. Σωφρονίζει γάρ που καὶ δικαιότερους ποιεῖ καὶ ἱατρικὴ γίγνεται πονηρίας ἢ δίκη. ΠΩΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Εὐδαιμονέστατος μὲν ἄρα ὁ μὴ ἔχων κακίαν ἐν ψυχῇ, ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐφάνη. ΠΩΛ. Ἀῖνον δὴ. ΣΩ. Δεύτερος δὴ που ὁ ἀπαλλατιόμενος. ΠΩΛ. Ἔοικεν. ΣΩ. Οὗτος δ' ἦν ὁ νοουθετούμενός τε καὶ ἐπιπληττόμενος καὶ δίκην διδούς. ΠΩΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Κάκιστα ἄρα ζῇ ὁ ἔχων ἀδικίαν καὶ μὴ ἀπαλλατιόμενος. ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὗτος τυγχάνει ὢν, ὅς ἂν τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικῶν καὶ χρώμενος μεγίστη ἀδικίᾳ διαπράξῃται ὥστε μῆτε νουθετεῖσθαι μῆτε κολάζεσθαι μῆτε δίκην διδόναι, ὥσπερ σὺ φῆς Ἀρχέλαον παρσκευάσθαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τυράννους καὶ ῥήτορας καὶ δυναστας ; ΠΩΛ. Ἔοικε.

CAP. XXXV. ΣΩ. Σχεδὸν γάρ που οὔτοι, ὧ ἄριστε, τὸ αὐτὸ διαπεπραγμένοι εἰσὶ, ὥσπερ ἂν

εἴ τις τοῖς μεγίστοις νοσήμασι συνισχόμενος δια-
 πράξαιτο μὴ διδόναι δίκην τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα
 ἀμαρτημάτων τοῖς ἰατροῖς μηδὲ ἰατρεύεσθαι, φο-
 B βούμενος, ὥσπερ ἀνελὶ παῖς, τὸ κάεσθαι καὶ τὸ
 τέμνεσθαι, ὅτι ἀλγυνόν. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ καὶ σοὶ
 οὕτως; ΠΩΛ. Ἐμοιγε. ΣΩ. Ἀγνοῶν γε, ὥς
 ἔοικεν, οἷόν ἐστιν ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ἀρετὴ σώματος.
 κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ἐκ τῶν νῦν ἡμῶν ὁμολογημένων
 τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν καὶ οἱ τὴν δίκην φεύγοντες,
 ὧ Πῶλε, τὸ ἀλγυνόν αὐτοῦ καθορᾶν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ
 ὠφελίμον τυφλῶς ἔχειν καὶ ἀγνοεῖν ὅσῳ ἀθλιώ-
 τερόν ἐστι μὴ ὑγιούς σώματος μὴ ὑγιεῖ ψυχῇ
 C συννοικεῖν, ἀλλὰ σαθροῦ καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ ἀνοσίφ.
 ὅθεν καὶ πᾶν ποιοῦσιν, ὥστε δίκην μὴ διδόναι
 μὴδ' ἀπαλλάττεσθαι τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, καὶ
 χρήματα παρασκευαζόμενοι καὶ φίλους καὶ ὅπως
 ἂν ᾧσιν ὥς πιθανώτατοι λέγειν. εἰ δὲ ἡμεῖς ἀλη-
 θῇ ὁμολογήκαμεν, ὧ Πῶλε, ἃς αἰσθάνει τὰ
 συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τοῦ λόγου; ἢ βούλει συλλογι-
 σώμεθα αὐτά; ΠΩΛ. Εἰ μὴ σοί γε ἄλλως
 δοκεῖ. ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν συμβαίνει μέγιστον κα-
 κὸν ἢ ἀδικία καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν; ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται
 D γε. ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἀπαλλαγὴ γε ἐφάνη τού-
 του τοῦ κακοῦ τὸ δίκην διδόναι; ΠΩΛ. Κιν-
 δυνεύει. ΣΩ. Τὸ δέ γε μὴ διδόναι ἐμμονὴ τοῦ
 κακοῦ; ΠΩΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Δεύτερον ἄρα ἐστὶ
 τῶν κακῶν μεγέθει τὸ ἀδικεῖν· τὸ δὲ ἀδικοῦντα
 μὴ διδόναι δίκην πάντων μέγιστόν τε καὶ πρῶτον
 κακῶν πέφυκεν. ΠΩΛ. Ἐοικεν. ΣΩ. Ἄρ'
 οὖν οὐ περὶ τούτου, ὧ φίλε, ἡμφεσθητήσαμεν, σὺ

μὲν τὸν Ἀρχέλαον εὐδαιμονίζων τὸν τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικοῦντα δίκην οὐδεμίαν διδόντα, ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦ-
 ναντίον οἶόμενος, εἴτ' Ἀρχέλαος εἴτ' ἄλλος ἀν-
 θρώπων ὅστισοῦν μὴ δίδωσι δίκην ἀδικῶν, τούτῳ
 προσήκειν ἀθλίῳ εἶναι διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων
 ἀνθρώπων, καὶ αἰετὶ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα τοῦ ἀδικουμέ-
 νου ἀθλιώτερον εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὴ διδόντα δίκην
 τοῦ διδόντος; οὐ ταῦτ' ἦν τὰ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ λεγόμε-
 να; ΠΩΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀποδέδεικται,
 ὅτι ἀληθῆ ἐλέγετο; ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται.

CAP. XXXVI. ΣΩ. Εἶεν. εἰ οὖν δὴ ταῦ-
 τα ἀληθῆ, ὦ Πῶλε, τίς ἢ μεγάλη χρεία ἐστὶ τῆς
 ῥητορικῆς; δεῖ μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν νῦν ὁμολογη-
 μένων αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα φυλάττειν, ὅπως
 μὴ ἀδικήσῃ, ὥς ἱκανὸν κακὸν ἔξοντα. οὐ γάρ;
 ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Ἐὰν δέ γε ἀδικήσῃ ἢ
 αὐτός, ἢ ἄλλος τις ὧν ἂν κήδηται, αὐτὸν ἐκόντα
 ἰέναι ἐκεῖσε ὅπου ὡς τάχιστα δώσει δίκην, παρὰ
 τὸν δικαστήν ὥσπερ παρὰ τὸν ἰατρόν, σπεύδον-
 τα ὅπως μὴ ἐγχροнисθὲν τὸ νόσημα τῆς ἀδικίας
 ὑπουλον τὴν ψυχὴν ποιήσῃ καὶ ἀνίατον· ἢ πῶς
 λέγομεν, ὦ Πῶλε, εἴπερ τὰ πρότερον μένει ἡμῖν
 ὁμολογήματα; οὐκ ἀνάγκη ταῦτα ἐκείνοις οὕτω
 μὲν συμφωνεῖν, ἄλλως δὲ μή; ΠΩΛ. Τί γὰρ
 δὴ φῶμεν, ὦ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ. Ἐπὶ μὲν ἄρα
 τὸ ἀπολογεῖσθαι ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀδικίας τῆς αὐτοῦ, ἢ
 γονέων, ἢ ἐταίρων, ἢ παίδων, ἢ πατρίδος ἀδι-
 κούσης οὐ χρήσιμος οὐδὲν ἢ ῥητορικὴ ἡμῖν, ὦ
 Πῶλε, εἰ μὴ εἴ τις ὑπολάβοι ἐπὶ τούναντίον,
 κατηγορεῖν δεῖν μάλιστα μὲν ἑαυτοῦ, ἔπειτα δὲ

καὶ τῶν οἰκείων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅς ἂν ἀεὶ τῶν φίλων τυγχάνη ἀδικῶν, καὶ μὴ ἀποκρύπτεσθαι, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ φανερόν ἄγειν τὸ ἀδίκημα, ἵνα δῶ δίκην καὶ ὑγιῆς γένηται, ἀναγκάζειν τε καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους μὴ ἀποδειλιάν, ἀλλὰ παρέχειν μύσαντα καὶ ἀνδρείως, ὥσπερ τέμνειν καὶ κᾶειν ἱατρῷ, τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν διώκοντα, μὴ

D ὑπολογιζόμενον τὸ ἀλγεινόν· ἐὰν μὲν γε πληγῶν ἄξια ἡδίκηκώς ῃ, τύπτειν παρέχοντα, ἐὰν δὲ δεσμοῦ, δεῖν, ἐὰν δὲ ζημίας, ἀποτίνοντα, ἐὰν δὲ φυγῆς, φεύγοντα, ἐὰν δὲ θανάτου, ἀποθνήσκοντα, αὐτὸν πρῶτον ὄντα κατήγορον καὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο χρώμενον τῇ ῥητορικῇ, ὅπως ἂν καταδήλων τῶν ἀδικημάτων γιγνομένων ἀπαλλάττωνται τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, ἀδικίας.

E φῶμεν οὕτως, ἢ μὴ φῶμεν, ὦ Πῶλε; ΠΩΛ. Ἄτοπα μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, τοῖς μέντοι ἔμπροσθεν ἴσως σοι ὁμολογεῖται. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἢ κᾶεῖνα λυτέον, ἢ τάδε ἀνάγκη συμβαίνειν; ΠΩΛ. Ναί, τοῦτό γε οὕτως ἔχει. ΣΩ. Τοῦναντίον δέ γε αὖ μεταβαλόντα εἰ ἄρα δεῖ τινα κακῶς ποιεῖν, εἴτ' ἐχθρὸν εἴτε ὄντινον, ἐὰν μόνον μὴ αὐτὸς ἀδικῇται ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐχθροῦ, — τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ εὐλαβητέον· — ἐὰν δὲ ἄλλον ἀδικῇ ὁ

481 ἐχθρός, παντὶ τρόπῳ παρασκευαστέον καὶ πράττοντα καὶ λέγοντα, ὅπως μὴ δῶ δίκην μηδὲ ἔλθῃ παρὰ τὸν δικαστήν· ἐὰν δὲ ἔλθῃ, μηχανητέον ὅπως ἂν διαφύγῃ καὶ μὴ δῶ δίκην ὁ ἐχθρός, ἀλλ' ἐὰν τε χρυσίον ἡρπακὼς ῃ πολὺ, μὴ ἀποδιδῶ τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ἔχων ἀναλίσκῃται καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν

καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως, εἴαν τε αὖ
θανάτου ἄξια ἡδίκηκώς ἢ, ὅπως μὴ ἀποθανεῖται,
μάλιστα μὲν μηδέποτε, ἀλλ' ἀθάνατος ἔσται πο- B
νηρὸς ὢν, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ὅπως ὥς πλεῖστον χρόνον βιώ-
σεται τοιοῦτος ὢν. ἐπὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ,
ὦ Πῶλε, ἡ ῥητορικὴ χρήσιμος εἶναι, ἐπεὶ τῷ γε
μὴ μέλλοντι ἀδικεῖν οὐ μεγάλη τίς μοι δοκεῖ ἡ
χρεία αὐτῆς εἶναι, εἰ δὴ καὶ ἔστι τις χρεία· ὥς ἔν
γε τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐδαμῇ ἐφάνη οὔσα.

CAP. XXXVII. ΚΑΛ. Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Χαιρε-
φῶν, σπουδάζει ταῦτα Σωκράτης, ἢ παίζει;
ΧΑΙ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὑπερφυῶς
σπουδάζειν· οὐδὲν μέντοι οἷον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν. C
ΚΑΛ. Νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀλλ' ἐπιθυμῶ. Εἰπέ
μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, πότερόν σε φῶμεν νυνὶ σπου-
δάζοντα, ἢ παίζοντα; εἰ μὲν γὰρ σπουδάζεις τε
καὶ τυγχάνει ταῦτα ἀληθῆ ὄντα, ἃ λέγεις, ἄλλο
τι ἢ ἡμῶν ὁ βίος ἀνατετραμμένος ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀν-
θρώπων καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία πράττομεν, ὥς
ἔοικεν, ἢ ἃ δεῖ; ΣΩ. ὦ Καλλίκλεις, εἰ μὴ τι
ἦν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πάθος, τοῖς μὲν ἄλλο τι, τοῖς
δὲ ἄλλο τι, τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλὰ τις ἡμῶν ἰδιόν τι ἔπα- D
σχε πάθος ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι, οὐκ ἂν ἦν ῥάδιον ἐνδεί-
ξασθαι τῷ ἑτέρῳ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ πάθημα. λέγω δ'
ἐννοήσας, ὅτι ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ νῦν τυγχάνομεν ταῦ-
τόν τι πεπονθότες, ἐρῶντε δύο ὄντε δυεῖν ἐκάτε-
ρος, ἐγὼ μὲν Ἀλκιβιάδου τε τοῦ Κλεινίου καὶ
φιλοσοφίας, σὺ δὲ τοῦ τε Ἀθηναίων δήμου καὶ
τοῦ Πυριλάμπους. αἰσθάνομαι οὖν σου ἐκά-
στοτε, καίπερ ὄντος δεινοῦ, ὅτι ὁπόσ' ἂν φῇ σου

τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ ὅπως ἂν φῇ ἔχειν, οὐ δυναμένον
 E ἀντιλέγειν, ἀλλ' ἄνω καὶ κάτω μεταβαλλομένου·
 ἔν τε τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, ἐάν τι σοῦ λέγοντος ὁ δῆμος
 ὁ Ἀθηναίων μὴ φῇ οὕτως ἔχειν, μεταβαλλόμενος
 λέγεις ἃ ἐκεῖνος βούλεται, καὶ πρὸς τὸν Πυρι-
 λάμπους νεανίαν τὸν καλὸν τοῦτον τοιαῦτα ἑτε-
 ρα πέπονθας. τοῖς γὰρ τῶν παιδικῶν βουλευ-
 μασί τε καὶ λόγοις οὐχ οἷός τ' εἶ ἐναντιοῦσθαι,
 ὥστε, εἴ τίς σου λέγοντος ἐκάστοτε ἃ διὰ τούτους
 λέγεις θαυμάζοι ὡς ἄτοπὰ ἐστίν, ἴσως εἴποις ἂν
 482 αὐτῷ, εἰ βούλοιο τάληθῇ λέγειν, ὅτι, εἰ μὴ τις
 παύσει τὰ σὰ παιδικὰ τούτων τῶν λόγων, οὐδὲ
 σὺ παύσει ποτὲ ταῦτα λέγων. νόμιζε τοίνυν καὶ
 παρ' ἐμοῦ χρῆναι ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἀκούειν, καὶ
 μὴ θαύμαζε, ὅτι ἐγὼ ταῦτα λέγω, ἀλλὰ τὴν φι-
 λοσοφίαν, τὰ ἐμὰ παιδικά, παῦσον ταῦτα λέγου-
 σαν. λέγει γάρ, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε, αἰὲ ἃ νῦν ἐμοῦ
 ἀκούεις, καὶ μοί ἐστι τῶν ἑτέρων παιδικῶν πολὺ
 ἥττον ἔμπληκτος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κλεινίειος οὗτος
 ἄλλοτε ἄλλων ἐστὶ λόγων, ἡ δὲ φιλοσοφία αἰὲ
 B τῶν αὐτῶν. λέγει δὲ ἃ σὺ νῦν θαυμάζεις· πα-
 ρῆσθα δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς λεγομένοις. ἢ οὖν ἐκείνην
 ἐξέλεγχον, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, ὥς οὐ τὸ ἀδικεῖν
 ἐστὶ καὶ ἀδικοῦντα δίκην μὴ διδόναι ἀπάντων
 ἔσχατον κακῶν· ἢ εἰ τοῦτο ἑάσεις ἀνέλεγκτον,
 μὰ τὸν κύνα, τὸν Αἰγυπτίων Θεόν, οὐ σοι ὁμο-
 λογῆσει Καλλικλῆς, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλὰ διαφω-
 νήσει ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ βίῳ. καίτοι ἔγωγε οἶμαι, ὦ
 βέλυστε, καὶ τὴν λύραν μοι κρεῖττον εἶναι ἀναρ-
 C μοστεῖν τε καὶ διαφωνεῖν, καὶ χορὸν ᾧ χορηγοίην,

καὶ πλείστους ἀνθρώπους μὴ ὁμολογεῖν μοι ἀλλ' ἐναντία λέγειν, μᾶλλον ἢ ἓνα ὄντα ἐμὲ ἐμαντῶ ἀσύμφωνον εἶναι καὶ ἐναντία λέγειν.

CAP. XXXVIII. ΚΑΛ. ὦ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖς νεανιεύεσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὡς ἀληθῶς δημηγόρος ὢν· καὶ νῦν ταῦτα δημηγορεῖς ταυτόν παθόντος Πῶλον πάθος, ὅπερ Γοργίου κατηγόρει πρὸς σὲ παθεῖν. ἔφη γάρ που Γοργίαν ἐρωτώμενον ὑπὸ σοῦ, ἐὰν ἀφίκηται παρ' αὐτὸν μὴ ἐπιστάμενος τὰ δίκαια ὁ τὴν ρητορικὴν βουλό- D μενος μαθεῖν, εἰ διδάξει αὐτὸν ὁ Γοργίας, αἰσχυνθῆναι αὐτὸν καὶ φάναι διδάξειν διὰ τὸ ἔθος τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅτι ἀγανακτοῖεν ἄν, εἴ τις μὴ φραίῃ· διὰ δὴ ταύτην τὴν ὁμολογίαν ἀναγκασθῆναι ἐναντία αὐτὸν αὐτῷ εἰπεῖν, σὲ δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγαπᾶν. καὶ σου κατεγέλα, ὥς γέ μοι δοκεῖν, ὀρθῶς τότε. νῦν δὲ πάλιν αὐτὸς ταυτόν τοῦτο ἔπαθε, καὶ ἔρωγε κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὐκ ἄγμαι Πῶλον, ὅτι σοι συνεχώρησε τὸ ἀδικεῖν αἰσχίον E εἶναι τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι· ἐκ ταύτης γὰρ αὖ τῆς ὁμολογίας αὐτὸς ὑπὸ σοῦ συμποδισθεὶς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπεστομίσθη, αἰσχυνθεὶς ἃ ἐνόει εἰπεῖν. σὺ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγεις φορτικά καὶ δημηγορικά, φάσκων τὴν ἀλήθειαν δίδωκειν, ἃ φύσει μὲν οὐκ ἔστι καλά, νόμος δέ. ὡς τὰ πολλὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, ἢ τε φύσις καὶ ὁ νόμος. ἐὰν οὖν τις αἰσχύνηται καὶ μὴ τολμᾷ λέγειν ἅπερ νοεῖ, ἀναγκάζεται 183 ἐναντία λέγειν. ὃ δὴ καὶ σὺ τοῦτο τὸ σοφὸν κατανενοηκῶς κακουργεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ἐὰν μὲν

τις κατὰ νόμον λέγει, κατὰ φύσιν ὑπερωτῶν, εἰ
 δὲ τὰ τῆς φύσεως, τὰ τοῦ νόμου. ὥσπερ αὐτίκα
 ἐν τούτοις, τῷ ἀδικεῖν τε καὶ τῷ ἀδικεῖσθαι, Πώ-
 λου τὸ κατὰ νόμον αἰσχίον λέγοντος, σὺ τὸν νό-
 μον ἐδιώκαθες κατὰ φύσιν. φύσει μὲν γὰρ πᾶν
 αἰσχίον ἐστὶν ὅπερ καὶ κάκιον, * οἷον * τὸ ἀδι-
 B κεῖσθαι, νόμῳ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀνδρὸς
 τοῦτό γ' ἐστὶ τὸ πάθημα, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἀλλ'
 ἀνδραπόδου τινός, ὃ κρεῖττον ἐστὶ τεθνάναι ἢ
 ζῆν, ὅστις ἀδικούμενος καὶ προπηλακιζόμενος μὴ
 οἷόσ τε ἐστὶν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ βοηθεῖν μηδὲ ἄλλῳ οὐ
 ἂν κήδηται. ἀλλ', οἶμαι, οἱ τιθέμενοι τοὺς νό-
 μους οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ἄνθρωποι εἰσι καὶ οἱ πολλοί.
 πρὸς αὐτοὺς οὖν καὶ τὸ αὐτοῖς συμφέρον τοὺς τε
 νόμους τίθενται καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους ἐπαινοῦσι καὶ
 C τοὺς ψόγους ψέγουσιν. — ἐκφοβοῦντές τοὺς ἐρ-
 ῶμενεστέρους τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ δυνατοὺς ὄν-
 τας πλεον ἔχειν, ἵνα μὴ αὐτῶν πλεον ἔχωσι,
 λέγουσιν, ὡς αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἀδικον τὸ πλεονεκτεῖν,
 καὶ τοῦτο ἐστὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὸ πλεον τῶν ἄλλων
 ζητεῖν ἔχειν. ἀγαπῶσι γάρ, οἶμαι, αὐτοὶ ἂν τὸ
 ἴσον ἔχωσι φαυλότεροι ὄντες. CAP. XXXIX.
 διὰ ταῦτα δὴ νόμῳ μὲν τοῦτο ἀδικον καὶ αἰσχρὸν
 λέγεται, τὸ πλεον ζητεῖν ἔχειν τῶν πολλῶν, καὶ
 ἀδικεῖν αὐτὸ καλοῦσιν. ἡ δέ γε, οἶμαι, φύσις
 D αὐτὴ ἀποφαίνει αὐτὸ, ὅτι δίκαιόν ἐστι τὸν ἀμεί-
 νω τοῦ χείρονος πλεον ἔχειν καὶ τὸν δυνατώτε-
 ρον τοῦ ἀδυνατωτέρου. δηλοῖ δὲ ταῦτα πολλα-
 χοῦ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις καὶ
 τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν ὅλαις ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς γέ-

νεσιν, ὅτι οὕτω τὸ δίκαιον κέκριται, τὸν κρείττω
 τοῦ ἥττονος ἄρχειν καὶ πλέον ἔχειν. ἐπεὶ ποίῳ
 δικαίῳ χρώμενος Ξέρξης ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐστρά- Ε
 τευσεν, ἢ ὁ πατήρ αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ Σκύθας; ἢ ἄλλα
 μυρία ἂν τις ἔχοι τοιαῦτα λέγειν. ἀλλ' οἶμαι,
 οὔτοι κατὰ φύσιν [τὴν τοῦ δικαίου] ταῦτα πράτ-
 τουσι, καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία κατὰ νόμον γε τὸν τῆς
 φύσεως, οὐ μέντοι ἴσως κατὰ τοῦτον, ὃν ἡμεῖς
 τιθέμεθα πλάττοντες τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ ἐρρῶ-
 μενεσιτάτους ἡμῶν αὐτῶν· ἐκ νέων λαμβάνοντες,
 ὥσπερ λέοντας κατεπάδοντές τε καὶ γοητεύοντες 184
 καταδουλούμεθα, λέγοντες, ὥς τὸ ἴσον χρηρῆ ἔχειν
 καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. εἰάν
 δέ γε, οἶμαι, φύσιν ἱκανὴν γένηται ἔχων ἀνὴρ,
 πάντα ταῦτα ἀποσεισάμενος καὶ διαρρήξας καὶ
 διαφυγὼν, καταπατήσας τὰ ἡμέτερα γράμματα
 καὶ μαργανεύματα καὶ ἐπιδὰς καὶ νόμους τοὺς
 παρὰ φύσιν ἅπαντας, ἐπαναστὰς ἀνεφάνη δεσπό-
 της ἡμέτερος ὁ δοῦλος, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐξέλαμψε τὸ Β
 τῆς φύσεως δίκαιον. δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ Πίνδαρος
 ἅπερ ἐγὼ λέγω ἐνδείκνυσθαι ἐν τῷ ᾄσματι, ἐν ᾧ
 λέγει, ὅτι Νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς θνα-
 τῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων· οὗτος δὲ δῆ, φησὶν,
 ἄγει δικαίων τὸ βιαιότατον ὑπεριτάτα
 χερί· τεκμαίρομαι ἔργοισιν Ἰπρακλέος,
 ἐπεὶ ἀπριάτας — λέγει οὕτω πως· τὸ γὰρ
 ᾄσμα οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι. λέγει δ', ὅτι οὔτε πριά-
 μενος οὔτε δόντος τοῦ Γηρυόνου ἠλάσατο τὰς
 βοῦς, ὥς τούτου ὄντος τοῦ δικαίου φύσει, καὶ C
 βοῦς καὶ τᾶλλα κτήματα εἶναι πάντα τοῦ Βελ-

τίονός τε καὶ κρείττονος τὰ τῶν χειρόνων τε καὶ ἥτιόνων. CAP. XL. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀληθὲς οὕτως ἔχει, γνώσει δέ, ἂν ἐπὶ τὰ μείζω ἔλθῃς ἑάσας ἤδη φιλοσοφίαν. φιλοσοφία γὰρ τοί ἐστιν, ὃ Σώκρατες, χαρίεν, ἂν τις αὐτοῦ μειρίως ἀψηται ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ· ἐὰν δὲ περαιτέρω τοῦ δέοντος ἐνδιατρίψῃ, διαφθορὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἐὰν γὰρ καὶ πάννυ εὐφυῆς ἦ καὶ πόρρω τῆς ἡλικίας φιλοσοφῇ, ἀνάγκη πάντων ἀπειρον γεγονέναι ἐστίν, ὧν χρὴ ἔμπειρον εἶναι τὸν μέλλοντα καλὸν καὶ γαθὸν καὶ εὐδόκιμον ἔσεσθαι ἄνδρα. καὶ γὰρ τῶν νόμων ἀπειροὶ γίνονται τῶν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν, καὶ τῶν λόγων, οἷς δεῖ χρῶμενον ὁμιλεῖν ἐν τοῖς συμβολαίοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων, καὶ συλλήβδην τῶν ἡθῶν παντάπασιν ἀπειροὶ γίνονται. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἔλθωσιν εἰς τινα ἰδίαν ἢ πολιτικὴν πρᾶξιν, καταγέλαστοι γίνονται, ὥσπερ γε, οἶμαι, οἱ πολιτικοί, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοὶ εἰς τὰς ὑμετέρας διατριβὰς ἔλθωσι καὶ τοὺς λόγους, καταγέλαστοί εἰσι. συμβαίνει γὰρ τὸ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου· λαμπρός τ' ἐστὶν ἕκαστος ἐν τούτῳ,

κάπὶ τοῦτ' ἐπείγεται,

νέμων τὸ πλεῖστον ἡμέρας τούτῳ μέρος,

ἵν' αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τυγχάνῃ βέλτιστος ὢν.

485 ὅπου δ' ἂν φραῦλος ἦ, ἐντεῦθεν φεύγει καὶ λοιδορεῖ τοῦτο, τὸ δ' ἕτερον ἐπαινεῖ, εὐνοία τῇ ἑαυτοῦ, ἡγούμενος οὕτως αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐπαινεῖν. ἀλλ', οἶμαι, τὸ ὀρθότατόν ἐστιν ἀμφοτέρων μετα-

σχεῖν. φιλοσοφίας μὲν, ὅσον παιδείας χάριν,
 καλὸν μετέχειν, καὶ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν μειρακίῳ ὄντι
 φιλοσοφεῖν. ἐπειδὴν δὲ ἤδη πρεσβύτερος ὢν ἄν-
 θρωπος ἔτι φιλοσοφῇ, καταγέλαστον, ὧ Σώκρα-
 τες, τὸ χρῆμα γίγνεται, καὶ ἔγωγε ὁμοιότατον
 πάσχω πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας ὥσπερ πρὸς τοὺς B
 ψελλιζομένους καὶ παίζοντας. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ
 παιδίον ἴδω, ὃ ἔτι προσήκει διαλέγεσθαι οὕτω,
 ψελλιζόμενον καὶ παῖζον, χαίρω τε καὶ χαρίεν
 μοι φαίνεται καὶ ἐλευθέριον καὶ πρέπον τῇ τοῦ
 παιδίου ἡλικίᾳ. ὅταν δὲ σαφῶς διαλεγομένου
 παιδαρίου ἀκούσω, πικρὸν τί μοι δοκεῖ χρῆμα
 εἶναι καὶ ἀνιᾶ μου τὰ ὦτα καὶ μοι δοκεῖ δουλο- C
 πρεπές τι εἶναι. ὅταν δὲ ἀνδρὸς ἀκούσῃ τις
 ψελλιζομένου ἢ παίζοντα ὄρᾳ, καταγέλαστον
 φαίνεται καὶ ἄνανδρον καὶ πληγῶν ἄξιον. ταύ-
 τὸν οὖν ἔγωγε τοῦτο πάσχω καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φι-
 λοσοφοῦντας. παρὰ νέῳ μὲν γὰρ μειρακίῳ ὄρῶν
 φιλοσοφίαν ἄγαμαι, καὶ πρέπειν μοι δοκεῖ, καὶ
 ἡγοῦμαι ἐλεύθερόν τινα εἶναι τοῦτον τὸν ἄνθρω-
 πον, τὸν δὲ μὴ φιλοσοφοῦντα ἀνελεύθερον καὶ
 οὐδέποτε οὐδενὸς ἀξιόσποντα ἐαυτὸν οὔτε καλοῦ D
 οὔτε γενναίου πράγματος. ὅταν δὲ διὰ πρεσβύτε-
 ρον ἴδω ἔτι φιλοσοφοῦντα καὶ μὴ ἀπαλλατιτόμε-
 νον, πληγῶν μοι δοκεῖ ἤδη δεῖσθαι, ὧ Σώκρατες,
 οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ. ὃ γὰρ νῦν διὰ ἔλεγον, ὑπάρχει
 τούτῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ πάντῃ εὐφυεῖς ἦ, ἀνάνδρῳ
 γενέσθαι φεύγοντι τὰ μέσα τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὰς
 ἀγοράς, ἐν αἷς ἔφη ὁ ποιητὴς τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀρι-
 πρεπεῖς γίγνεσθαι, καταδεδυσκότι δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν

βίον βιώναι μετὰ μαιρακίων ἐν γωνία τριῶν ἢ
 Επειτάρων ψιθυρίζοντα, ἐλεύθερον δὲ καὶ μέγα καὶ
 ἱκανὸν μηδέποτε φθέγγασθαι. CAP. XLI. ἐγὼ
 δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρὸς σέ ἐπεικῶς ἔχω φιλικῶς.
 κινδυνεύω οὖν πεπονθέναι νῦν ὅπερ ὁ Ζῆθος
 πρὸς τὸν Ἀμφίονα ὁ Εὐριπίδου, οὐπερ ἐμνή-
 σθην. καὶ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τοιαῦτ' ἄττα ἐπέρχεται
 πρὸς σέ λέγειν, οἷάπερ ἐκεῖνος πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφόν,
 ὅτι ἀμελεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὧν δεῖ σε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι,
 καὶ φύσιν ψυχῆς ᾧδε γενναίαν μαιρα-
 436 κιώδει τινὶ διαπρέπεις μορφώματι, καὶ
 οὔτ' ἂν δίκης βουλαῖσι προθεῖ' ἂν ὀρθῶς
 λόγον, οὔτ' εἰκὸς ἂν καὶ πιθανὸν λάβοις,
 οὔθ' ὑπὲρ ἄλλου νεανικὸν βούλευμα
 βουλεύσαιο. καίτοι, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες — καί
 μοι μηδὲν ἀχθεσθῆς · εὐνοία γὰρ ἐρῶ τῇ σῇ —
 οὐκ αἰσχρὸν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι οὕτως ἔχειν, ὥς ἐγὼ
 σέ οἶμαι ἔχειν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς πόρρῳ ἀεὶ
 φιλοσοφίας ἐλαύνοντας; νῦν γὰρ εἴ τις σοῦ λα-
 βόμενος ἢ ἄλλου ὁτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων εἰς τὸ
 δεσμωτήριον ἀπαγάγοι, φράσκων ἀδικεῖν μηδὲν
 B ἀδικοῦντα, οἷσθ' ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις ὃ τι χρήσαιο
 σαντῶ, ἀλλ' ἰλιγγιώης ἂν καὶ χασμῶ οὐκ ἔχων ὃ
 τι εἴποις, καὶ εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ἀναβάς, κατη-
 γόρου τυχὼν πάνν φαύλου καὶ μοχθηροῦ, ἀπο-
 θάνοις ἂν, εἰ βούλοιτο θανάτου σοι τιμᾶσθαι.
 καίτοι πῶς σοφὸν τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴ τις
 εὐφυᾶ λαβοῦσα τέχνη φῶτα ἔθηκε χεί-
 ρονα, μήτε αὐτὸν αὐτῶ δυνάμενον βοηθεῖν μηδ'
 ἐκσῶσαι ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων μήτε ἑαυτὸν

μήτε ἄλλον μηδένα, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν περισυλᾶ- C
σθαι πᾶσαν τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀτεχνῶς δὲ ἀτιμον ζῆν
ἐν τῇ πόλει; τὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον, εἴ τι καὶ ἀγροικό-
τερον εἰρηῆσθαι, ἔξεστιν ἐπὶ κόρῃς τύπτοντα μὴ
διδόναι δίκην. ἀλλ' ὦ ἴγαθέ, ἐμοὶ πείθου, παῦ-
σαι δ' ἐλέγχων, πραγμάτων δ' εὐμουσίαν
ἄσκει, καὶ ἄσκει ὁπόθεν δόξεις φρονεῖν,
ἄλλοις τὰ κομπὰ ταῦτ' ἀφείς, εἴτε ληρή-
ματα χρὴ φάναι εἶναι εἴτε φλυαρίας, ἐξ ὧν
κενοῖσιν ἐγκατοικήσεις δόμοις. ζηλῶν
οὐκ ἐλέγχοντας ἄνδρας τὰ μικρὰ ταῦτα, ἀλλ' D
οἷς ἐστι καὶ βίος καὶ δόξα καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ
ἀγαθά.

CAP. XLII. ΣΩ. Εἰ χρυσὴν ἔχων ἐτύγγα-
νον τὴν ψυχὴν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἂν οἶει με
ἄσμενον εὐρεῖν τούτων τινὰ τῶν λίθων, ἧ βα-
σανίζουσι τὸν χρυσόν, τὴν ἀρίστην, πρὸς ἣντινα
ἔμελλον προσαγαγὼν αὐτήν, εἴ μοι ὁμολογήσειεν
ἐκείνη καλῶς τεθεραπεῦσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν, εὖ εἰ-
σεσθαι, ὅτι ἱκανῶς ἔχω καὶ οὐδέν μοι δεῖ ἄλλης E
βασάνου; ΚΑΛ. Πρὸς τί δὴ τοῦτ' ἐρωτᾷς, ὦ
Σώκρατες; ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ σοι ἐρῶ νῦν. οἶμαι
ἐγὼ σοὶ ἐντετυχηκῶς τοιούτῳ ἐρμαίῳ ἐντετυχηκέ-
ναι. ΚΑΛ. Τί δὴ; ΣΩ. Εὖ οἶδ', ὅτι, ἂν
μοι σὺ ὁμολογήσης περὶ ὧν ἡ ἐμὴ ψυχὴ δοξάζει,
ταῦτ' ἤδη ἐστὶν αὐτὰ τἀληθῆ. ἐννοῶ γάρ, ὅτι 487
τὸν μέλλοντα βασανιεῖν ἱκανῶς ψυχῆς πέρι ὁρ-
θῶς τε ζώσης καὶ μὴ τρία ἄρα δεῖ ἔχειν, ἃ σὺ
πάντα ἔχεις, ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ εὐνοίαν καὶ
παρρησίαν. ἐγὼ γάρ πολλοῖς ἐντυγχάνω, οἷ

ἐμὲ οὐχ οἷοί τε εἰσὶ βασανίζειν διὰ τὸ μὴ σοφοὶ
 εἶναι ὥσπερ σύ· ἕτεροι δὲ σοφοὶ μὲν εἰσιν, οὐκ
 ἐθέλουσι δέ μοι λέγειν τὴν ἀλήθειαν διὰ τὸ μὴ
 κηδεσθαί μου ὥσπερ σύ· τὼ δὲ ξένῳ τῷδε, Γορ-
 B γίας τε καὶ Πῶλος, σοφῶ μὲν καὶ φίλῳ ἐστὸν
 ἐμῷ, ἐνδεεστέῳ δὲ παρρησίας καὶ αἰσχυνηρο-
 τέῳ μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος· πῶς γὰρ οὐ; ὦ γε εἰς
 τοσοῦτον αἰσχύνης ἐληλύθατον, ὥστε διὰ τὸ αἰ-
 σχύνεσθαι τολμᾷ ἐκάτερος αὐτῶν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ
 ἐναντία λέγειν ἐναντίον πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ
 ταῦτα περὶ τῶν μεγίστων. σὺ δὲ ταῦτα πάντα
 ἔχεις, ἃ οἱ ἄλλοι οὐκ ἔχουσι· πεπαίδευσαί τε γὰρ
 ἱκανῶς, ὥς πολλοὶ ἂν φήσαιεν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ
 C ἐμοί γ' εἴ εὖνους. τίτι τεκμηρίῳ χρῶμαι; ἐγὼ
 σοι ἐρῶ. οἶδα ὑμᾶς ἐγὼ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τέτταρας
 ὄντας, κοινωνοὺς γεγονότας σοφίας, σέ τε καὶ
 Τίσανδρον, τὸν Ἀφιδναῖον, καὶ Ἄνδρωνα, τὸν
 Ἀνδροτίωνος, καὶ Ναυσικύδην, τὸν Χολαργέα.
 καὶ ποτε ὑμῶν ἐγὼ ἐπήκουσα βουλευομένων μέ-
 χρι ὅποι τὴν σοφίαν ἀσκητέον εἴη, καὶ οἶδα, ὅτι
 ἐνίκα ἐν ὑμῖν τοιάδε τις δόξα, μὴ προθυμεῖσθαι
 D εἰς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν φιλοσοφεῖν, ἀλλὰ εὐλαβεῖσθαι
 παρεκελεύεσθε ἀλλήλοις, ὅπως μὴ πέρα τοῦ δέ-
 οντος σοφώτεροι γενόμενοι λήσετε διαφθαρέντες.
 ἐπειδὴ οὖν σου ἀκούω ταῦτα ἐμοὶ συμβουλεύ-
 οντος, ἅπερ τοῖς σεαυτοῦ ἐταιροτάτοις, ἱκανόν
 μοι τεκμηρίον ἐστίν, ὅτι ὥς ἀληθῶς μοι εὖνους εἴ.
 καὶ μὴν, ὅτι γε οἷος παρρησιάζεσθαι καὶ μὴ αἰ-
 σχύνεσθαι, αὐτὸς τε φῆς καὶ ὁ λόγος, ὃν ὀλίγον
 πρότερον ἔλεγες, ὁμολογεῖ σοι. ἔχει δὴ οὕτως

δῆλον ὅτι τούτων πέρι νυνί· ἐάν τι σὺ ἐν τοῖς Ε
 λόγοις ὁμολογήσῃς μοι, βεβασανισμένον τοῦτ'
 ἤδη ἔσται ἱκανῶς ὑπ' ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ, καὶ οὐκέτι
 αὐτὸ δεήσει ἐπ' ἄλλην βάσανον ἀναφέρειν. οὐ
 γὰρ ἂν ποτε αὐτὸ συνεχώρησας σὺ οὔτε σοφίας
 ἐνδεία οὔτ' αἰσχύνῃς περιουσία· οὐδ' αὖ ἀπα-
 τῶν ἐμὲ συγχωρήσῃς ἂν· φίλος γὰρ μοι εἶ, ὥς
 καὶ αὐτὸς φῆς. τῷ ὄντι οὖν ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ σὴ ὁμολο-
 γία τέλος ἤδη ἔξει τῆς ἀληθείας. πάντων δὲ
 καλλίστη ἐστὶν ἡ σκέψις, ᾧ Καλλίκλεις, περὶ τού-
 των ὧν σὺ δὴ μοι ἐπειμήσας, ποῖόν τινα χρὴ εἶ-
 ναι τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τί ἐπιτηδεύειν καὶ μέχρι τοῦ, ⁴⁸⁸
 καὶ πρεσβύτερον καὶ νεώτερον ὄντα. ἐγὼ γὰρ εἴ-
 τι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράττω κατὰ τὸν βίον τὸν ἐμαντοῦ,
 εἴ ἴσθι τοῦτο ὅτι οὐχ ἑκὼν ἔξαμαρτάνω, ἀλλ'
 ἀμαθία τῇ ἐμῇ. σὺ οὖν, ὥσπερ ἤρξω νουθετεῖν
 με, μὴ ἀποστῆς, ἀλλ' ἱκανῶς μοι ἔνδειξαι τί ἐστι
 τοῦτο, ὃ ἐπιτηδευτέον μοι, καὶ τίνα τρόπον κτη-
 σαίμην ἂν αὐτό. καὶ ἐάν με λάβῃς νῦν μὲν σοι
 ὁμολογήσαντα, ἐν δὲ τῷ ὑστέρω χρόνῳ μὴ ταῦτα
 πράττοντα, ἅπερ ὁμολόγησα, πάνυ με ἡγοῦ βλα-
 κα εἶναι καὶ μηκέτι ποτέ με νουθετήσῃς ὑστερον, B
 ὥς μηδενὸς ἄξιον ὄντα. ἐξ ἀρχῆς δέ μοι ἐπανά-
 λαβε, πῶς φῆς τὸ δίκαιον ἔχειν καὶ σὺ καὶ Πίν-
 δαρος τὸ κατὰ φύσιν; ἄγειν βία τὸν κρείττω τὰ
 τῶν ἡτιόνων καὶ ἄρχειν τὸν βελτίω τῶν χειρόνων
 καὶ πλεον ἔχειν τὸν ἀμείνω τοῦ φανυλοτέρου; μὴ
 τι ἄλλο λέγεις τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, ἢ ὀρθῶς μέ-
 ννημαι;

CAP. XLIII. ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ἔλεγον

καὶ τότε, καὶ νῦν λέγω. ΣΩ. Πότερον δὲ τὸν
 C αὐτὸν βελτίω καλεῖς σὺ καὶ κρείττω; οὐδὲ γάρ
 τοι τότε οἷός τ' ἢ μαθεῖν σου τί ποτε λέγεις.
 πότερον τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους κρείττους καλεῖς καὶ
 δεῖ ἀκροᾶσθαι τοῦ ἰσχυροτέρου τοὺς ἀσθενεστέ-
 ρους, οἷόν μοι δοκεῖς καὶ τότε ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὥς αἱ
 μεγάλαι πόλεις ἐπὶ τὰς σμικρὰς κατὰ τὸ φύσει
 δίκαιον ἔρχονται, ὅτι κρείττους εἰσὶ καὶ ἰσχυρό-
 τεραι, ὥς τὸ κρεῖττον καὶ ἰσχυρότερον καὶ βέλτιον
 ταῦτόν ὄν, ἢ ἔστι βελτίω μὲν εἶναι, ἥττω δὲ καὶ
 ἀσθενέστερον, καὶ κρεῖττω μὲν εἶναι, μοχθηρότε-
 D ρον δέ· ἢ ὁ αὐτὸς ὅρος ἐστὶ τοῦ βελτίονος καὶ
 τοῦ κρεῖττονος; τοῦτό μοι αὐτὸ σαφῶς διόρισον,
 ταῦτόν, ἢ ἕτερόν ἐστι τὸ κρεῖττον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον
 καὶ τὸ ἰσχυρότερον; ΚΑΛ. Ἄλλ' ἐγὼ σοι σα-
 φῶς λέγω, ὅτι ταῦτόν ἐστιν. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οἱ
 πολλοὶ τοῦ ἐνὸς κρείττους εἰσὶ κατὰ φύσιν; οἱ
 δὴ καὶ τοὺς νόμους τίθενται ἐπὶ τῷ ἐνί, ὥσπερ καὶ
 σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγες. ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γάρ οὐ; ΣΩ.
 Ταῦ τῶν πολλῶν ἄρα νόμιμα τὰ τῶν κρειπτόνων
 E ἐστί. ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ τῶν
 βελτιόνων; οἱ γάρ κρείττους βελτίους πολὺ
 κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον. ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐ-
 κοῦν τὰ τούτων νόμιμα κατὰ φύσιν καλὰ, κρειπτό-
 νων γε ὄντων; ΚΑΛ. Φημί. ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν
 οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν οὕτως, ὥς ἄρτι αὖ σὺ ἔλεγες,
 489 δίκαιον εἶναι τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν καὶ αἰσχίον τὸ ἀδικοῦν
 τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι; ἐστι ταῦτα, ἢ οὐ; καὶ ὅπως μὴ
 ἀλώσει ἐνταῦθα σὺ αἰσχυνόμενος. νομίζουσιν, ἢ
 οὐ, οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ πλεόν

δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι ; Μὴ φθόνει μοι ἀποκρίνασθαι τοῦτο, Καλλίκλεις, ἔν', ἐάν μοι ὁμολογήσης, βεβαιώσωμαι ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ, ἅτε ἱκανοῦ ἀνδρὸς διαγινῶναι ὁμολογηκότος. ΚΑΛ. Ἄλλ' οἷ γε πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν οὕτως. ΣΩ. Οὐ νόμῳ ἄρα μόνον ἐστὶν αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐδὲ δίκαιον τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ φύσει · ὥστε κινδυνεύεις Β οὐκ ἀληθῇ λέγειν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐδὲ ὀρθῶς ἑμοῦ κατηγορεῖν λέγων ὅτι ἐναντίον ἐστὶν ὁ νόμος καὶ ἡ φύσις, ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ γνούς κακουργῶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ἐάν μὲν τις κατὰ φύσιν λέγῃ, ἐπὶ τὸν νόμον ἄγων, ἐάν δέ τις κατὰ τὸν νόμον, ἐπὶ τὴν φύσιν.

ΣΑΡ. XLIV. ΚΑΛ. Οὗτοσὶ ἀνὴρ οὐ παύσεται φλυαρῶν. Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ αἰσχύνει, τηλικούτος ὢν, ὀνόματα θηρεύων, καὶ ἐάν τις ῥήματι ἀμάρτη, ἔρμαιον τοῦτο ποιούμενος ; C ἔμὲ γὰρ οἶε ἄλλο τι λέγειν τὸ κρείττους εἶναι ἢ τὸ βελτίους ; οὐ πάλαι σοι λέγω, ὅτι ταυτὸν φημι εἶναι τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ κρεῖττον ; ἢ οἶε με λέγειν, ἐάν συρφετὸς συλλεγῇ δούλων καὶ παντοδαπῶν ἀνθρώπων μηδενὸς ἀξίων πλην ἴσως τῷ σώματι ἰσχυρίσασθαι, καὶ οὗτοι φῶσιν, αὐτὰ ταῦτα εἶναι νόμιμα ; ΣΩ. Εἶεν, ὦ σοφώτατε Καλλί- κλεις · οὕτω λέγεις ; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. D ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἐγὼ μὲν, ὦ δαιμόνιε, καὶ αὐτὸς πάλαι τοπάζω τοιοῦτόν τί σε λέγειν τὸ κρεῖττον, καὶ ἀνερωτῶ γλιχόμενος σαφῶς εἰδέναι ὅ τι λέγεις. οὐ γὰρ δῆπου σύ γε τοὺς δύο βελτίους ἡγεῖ τοῦ

ἐνός, οὐδὲ τοὺς σοὺς δούλους βελτίους σοῦ, ὅτι ἰσχυρότεροί εἰσιν ἢ σύ. ἀλλὰ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰπέ, τί ποτε λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους, ἐπειδὴ οὐ τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους; καί, ὦ θαυμάσιε, πρῶτόν με
 Ε προδίδασκε, ἵνα μὴ ἀποφουθήσω παρὰ σοῦ.

ΚΑΑ. Εἰρωνεύει, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Ζῆθον, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὃ σὺ χρώμενος πολλὰ νῦν δὴ εἰρωνεύου πρὸς με. ἀλλ' ἔθι εἰπέ, τίνας λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους εἶναι; ΚΑΑ. Τοὺς ἀμείνους ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Ὅρα, ὅτι σὺ αὐτὸς ὀνόματα λέγεις, δηλοῖς δὲ οὐδέν. οὐκ ἔρεῖς τοὺς βελτίους καὶ κρείττους πότερον τοὺς φρονημωτέρους λέγεις, ἢ ἄλλους τινάς; ΚΑΑ. Ἀλλὰ ναὶ μὰ Δία τούτους λέγω, καὶ σφόδρα γε. ΣΩ.

Πολλάκις ἄρα εἷς φρονῶν μυρίων μὴ φρονούν-
 490 των κρείττων ἐστὶ κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ τοῦτον ἄρχειν δεῖ, τοὺς δ' ἄρχεσθαι, καὶ πλεον ἔχειν τὸν ἄρχοντα τῶν ἀρχομένων. τοῦτο γάρ μοι δοκεῖς βούλεσθαι λέγειν — καὶ οὐ ῥήματα θηρεύω —, εἰ ὁ εἷς τῶν μυρίων κρείττων. ΚΑΑ. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἃ λέγω. τοῦτο γάρ οἵμαι ἐγὼ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι φύσει, τὸ βελτίῳ ὄντι καὶ φρονημώτερον καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ πλεον ἔχειν τῶν φραυλοτέρων.

Β CAP. XLV. ΣΩ. Ἐχε δὴ αὐτοῦ. τί ποτε αὖ νῦν λέγεις; εἰάν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὦμεν, ὥσπερ νῦν, πολλοὶ ἀθρόοι ἄνθρωποι, καὶ ἡμῶν ἢ ἐν κοινῷ πολλὰ σιτία καὶ ποτά, ὦμεν δὲ παντοδαποί, οἱ μὲν ἰσχυροί, οἱ δὲ ἀσθενεῖς, εἷς δὲ ἡμῶν ἢ φρονημώτερος περὶ ταῦτα ἱατρὸς ὢν, ἢ δέ, οἷον εἰκός,

τῶν μὲν ἰσχυρότερος, τῶν δὲ ἀσθενέστερος, ἄλλο τι ἢ οὗτος φρονημώτερος ἡμῶν ὢν βελτίων καὶ κρείττων ἔσται εἰς ταῦτα ; ΚΑΛ. Πάνν γε. ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν τούτων τῶν σιτίων πλέον ἡμῶν ἐκτέον αὐτῷ, ὅτι βελτίων ἔστιν, ἢ τῷ μὲν ἄρχειν πάντα ἐκείνον δεῖ νέμειν, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀναλίσκειν τε αὐτὰ καὶ καταχρῆσθαι εἰς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα οὐ πλεονεκτητόν, εἰ μὴ μέλλει ζημιοῦσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν πλέον, τῶν δ' ἔλαττον ἐκτέον· ἐὰν δὲ τύχη πάντων ἀσθενέστατος ὢν, πάντων ἐλάχιστον τῷ βελτίστῳ, ὧ Καλλίκλεις ; οὐχ οὕτως, ὧ ἄγαθέ ; ΚΑΛ. Περὶ σιτία λέγεις καὶ ποτὰ καὶ ἰατροὺς καὶ φλυαρίας· ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ ταῦτα λέγω. ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν τὸν φρονημώτερον βελτίῳ λέγεις ; Φάθι ἢ μή. ΚΑΛ. Ἐγωγε. ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὐ τὸν βελτίῳ πλέον δεῖν ἔχειν ; ΚΑΛ. Οὐ σιτίων γε οὐδὲ ποτῶν. ΣΩ. Μανθάνω, ἀλλ' ἴσως ἱματίων, καὶ δεῖ τὸν ὑφαντικώτατον μέγιστον ἱμάτιον ἔχειν καὶ πλεῖστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἀμπεχόμενον περιέναι. ΚΑΛ. Ποίων ἱματίων ; ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' εἰς ὑποδήματα δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ πλεονεκτεῖν τὸν φρονημώτερον εἰς ταῦτα καὶ βέλτιστον. τὸν σκυτοτόμον ἴσως μέγιστα δεῖ ὑποδήματα καὶ πλεῖστα ὑποδεδεμένον περιπατεῖν. ΚΑΛ. Ποῖα ὑποδήματα φλυαρεῖς ἔχων ; ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' εἰ μὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεις, ἴσως τὰ τοιάδε· οἷον γεωργικὸν ἄνδρα περὶ γῆν φρόνιμόν τε καὶ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, τοῦτον δὴ ἴσως δεῖ πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν σπερμάτων καὶ ὥς πλείστῳ σπέρματι χρῆσθαι εἰς τὴν αὐτοῦ γῆν. ΚΑΛ. Ὡς ἀεὶ ταῦτ' ἀ λέγεις, ὧ

Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Οὐ μόνον γε, ὦ Καλλίκλεις,
 491 ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν. ΚΑΛ. Νῆ τοὺς
 θεούς, ἀτεχνῶς γε αἰεὶ σκυτέας τε καὶ κναφέας
 καὶ μαγείρους λέγων καὶ ἰατροὺς οὐδὲν παύει,
 ὥς περὶ τούτων ἡμῖν ὄντα τὸν λόγον. ΣΩ.
 Οὐκοῦν σὺ ἐρεῖς περὶ τίνων ὁ κρείττων τε καὶ
 φρονιμώτερος πλέον ἔχων δικαίως πλεονεκτεῖ;
 ἢ οὔτε ἐμοῦ ὑποβάλλοντος ἀνέξει οὔτ' αὐτὸς
 ἐρεῖς; ΚΑΛ. Ἄλλ' ἔγωγε καὶ πάλαι λέγω.
 πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς κρείττους οἷ εἰσιν, οὐ σκυτοτό-
 B μους λέγω οὐδὲ μαγείρους, ἀλλ' οἷ ἂν εἰς τὰ
 τῆς πόλεως πράγματα φρόνιμοι ᾧσιν, ὅντινα ἂν
 τρόπον εὖ οἰκοῖτο, καὶ μὴ μόνον φρόνιμοι, ἀλ-
 λά καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, ἱκανοὶ ὄντες ἃ ἂν νοήσωσιν
 ἐπιτελεῖν, καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμνωσι διὰ μαλακίαν
 ψυχῆς.

CAP. XLVI. ΣΩ. Ὅρας, ὦ βέλτιστε Καλ-
 λίκλεις, ὥς οὐ ταῦτ' αὖ τ' ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖς καὶ
 ἐγὼ σοῦ; σὺ μὲν γὰρ ἐμὲ φῆς αἰεὶ ταῦτ' ἀλέγειν,
 καὶ μέμφει μοι· ἐγὼ δὲ σοῦ τοῦναντίον, ὅτι οὐ-
 C δέποτε ταῦτ' ἀλέγεις περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τοτὲ
 μὲν τοὺς βελτίους τε καὶ κρείττους τοὺς ἰσχυ-
 ρότερους ὠρίζου, αὐτοῖς δὲ τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους,
 νῦν δ' αὖ ἑτερόν τι ἤκεις ἔχων· ἀνδρειότεροί τινες
 ὑπὸ σοῦ λέγονται οἱ κρείττους καὶ οἱ βελτίους.
 ἀλλ' ὦ γαθέ, εἰπὼν ἀπαλλάγηθι τίνας ποτὲ λέ-
 γεις τοὺς βελτίους τε καὶ κρείττους καὶ εἰς ὃ τι.
 ΚΑΛ. Ἄλλ' εἴρηκά γε ἔγωγε τοὺς φρονίμους
 D εἰς τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα καὶ ἀνδρείους.
 τούτους γὰρ προσήκει τῶν πόλεων ἄρχειν, καὶ

τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτ' ἐστί, πλεον ἔχειν τούτους τῶν ἄλλων, τοὺς ἄρχοντας τῶν ἀρχομένων. ΣΩ. Τί δέ; αὐτῶν, ὧ ἐταῖρε; [ἢ τί ἀρχοντας ἢ ἀρχομένους;] ΚΑΛ. Πῶς λέγεις; ΣΩ. Ἐνα ἕκαστον λέγω αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχοντα. ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν δεῖ, αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχεῖν, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων; ΚΑΛ. Πῶς ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχοντα λέγεις; ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ποικίλον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, σώφρονα ὄντα καὶ ἐγκρατῆ αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ, τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἀρχοντα τῶν ἐν ἑαυτῷ. Ε ΚΑΛ. Ὡς ἡδὺς εἶ! τοὺς ἡλιθίους λέγεις τοὺς σώφρονας. ΣΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐκ ἂν γνοίῃ, ὅτι οὕτω λέγω. ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε σφόδρα, ὧ Σώκρατες· ἐπεὶ πῶς ἂν εὐδαίμων γένοιτο ἄνθρωπος δουλεύων ὀϊφροῦν; ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον, ὃ ἐγὼ σοι νῦν παρρησιαζόμενος λέγω, ὅτι δεῖ τὸν ὀρθῶς βιωσόμενον τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας τὰς ἑαυτοῦ ἔαν ὥς μεγίστας εἶναι καὶ μὴ κολάζειν, ταύταις δὲ ὥς μεγίσταις οὖσαις ἱκανὸν εἶναι ὑπηρετεῖν δι' 492 ἀνδρείαν καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ ἀποπιμπλάναι ὧν ἂν αἰεὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία γίγνηται. ἀλλὰ τοῦτ', οἶμαι, τοῖς πολλοῖς οὐ δυνατόν· ὅθεν ψέγουσι τοὺς τοιούτους δι' αἰσχύνην ἀποκρουπτόμενοι τὴν αὐτῶν ἀδυναμίαν, καὶ αἰσχρὸν διή φασιν εἶναι τὴν ἀκολασίαν· ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, δουλούμενοι τοὺς βελτίους τὴν φύσιν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐκπορίζεσθαι ταῖς ἡδοναῖς πλήρωσιν ἐπαινοῦσι τὴν σωφροσύνην Β καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἀνανδρίαν.

ἐπεὶ γε οἷς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπῆρξεν ἢ βασιλέων υἱέσιν εἶναι ἢ αὐτοὺς τῇ φύσει ἱκανοὺς ἐκπορίσασθαι ἀρχὴν τινα ἢ τυραννίδα ἢ δυναστείαν, τί τῇ ἀληθείᾳ αἴσχιον καὶ κάκιον εἶη σωφροσύνης [καὶ δικαιοσύνης] τούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις; οἷς ἐξὸν ἀπολαύειν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ μηδενὸς ἐμποδῶν ὄντος, αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς δεσπότην ἐπαγάγοιντο τὸν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων νόμον τε καὶ λόγον καὶ ψόγον; ἢ πῶς οὐκ ἂν ἄθλιοι γεγονότες εἶησαν ὑπὸ τοῦ καλοῦ τοῦ τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς σωφροσύνης, μηδὲν πλέον νέμοντες τοῖς φίλοις τοῖς αὐτῶν ἢ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, καὶ ταῦτα ἄρχοντες ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῶν πόλει; ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, ᾧ Σώκρατες, ἦν φῆς σὺ διώκειν, ᾧδ' ἔχει· τρυφή καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ ἐλευθερία, ἐὰν ἐπικουρίαν ἔχῃ, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ τε καὶ εὐδαιμονία· τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ καλλωπίσματα, τὰ παρὰ φύσιν συνθήματα, ἀνθρώπων φλυαρία καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξια.

D CΑΡ. XLVII. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἀγεννῶς γε, ᾧ Καλίκλεις, ἐπεξέρχει τῷ λόγῳ παρῶρησιαζόμενος· σαφῶς γὰρ σὺ νῦν λέγεις ἃ οἱ ἄλλοι διανοοῦνται μὲν, λέγειν δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλουσι. δέομαι οὖν ἐγὼ σου μηδενὶ τρόπῳ ἀνεῖναι, ἵνα τῷ ὄντι κατὰδηλον γένηται πῶς βιωτέον. καί μοι λέγε· τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας φῆς οὐ κολαστέον, εἰ μέλλει τις οἶον δεῖ εἶναι, ἐῶντα δὲ αὐτὰς ὥς μεγίστας πλήρωσιν αὐταῖς ἀμύθεν γέ ποθεν ἐτοιμάζειν, καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν; ΚΑΛ. Φημι ἑταῦτα ἐγώ. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα ὀρθῶς λέγονται οἱ

μηδενὸς δεόμενοι εὐδαίμονες εἶναι. ΚΑΛ. Οἱ
λίθοι γὰρ ἂν οὕτω γε καὶ οἱ νεκροὶ εὐδαιμονέ-
στατοι εἶεν. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ καὶ ὥς γε σὺ
λέγεις δεινὸς ὁ βίος. οὐ γάρ τοι θανατάζοιμ' ἂν,
εἰ Εὐριπίδης ἀληθῆ ἐν τοῖσδε λέγει, λέγων

τίς δ' οἶδεν, εἰ τὸ ζῆν μὲν ἔστι κατθανεῖν,
τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν ;

καὶ ἡμεῖς τῷ ὄντι ἴσως τέθναμεν · ὅπερ ἤδη του 493
ἔγωγε καὶ ἤκουσα τῶν σοφῶν, ὡς νῦν ἡμεῖς τέθνα-
μεν, καὶ τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστιν ἡμῶν σῆμα, τῆς δὲ
ψυχῆς τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσὶ, τυγχάνει ὄν
οἶον ἀναπείθεσθαι καὶ μεταπίπτειν ἄνω κάτω,
καὶ τοῦτο ἄρα τις μυθολογῶν κομψὸς ἀνὴρ, ἴσως
Σικελὸς τις ἢ Ἰταλικός, παράγων τῷ ὀνόματι διὰ
τὸ πιθανόν τε καὶ πιστικὸν ὠνόμασε πίθον, τοὺς
δὲ ἀνοήτους ἀμυήτους · τῶν δ' ἀμυήτων τοῦτο B
τῆς ψυχῆς, οὗ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσὶ, τὸ ἀκόλαστον
αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐ στεγανόν, ὡς τετρημένος εἴη πίθος,
διὰ τὴν ἀπληστίαν ἀπεικάσας. τὸνναντίον δὴ
οὗτος σοί, ᾧ Καλλίκλεις, ἐνδείκνυται, ὡς τῶν ἐν
Ἄιδου — τὸ ἀειδὲς δὴ λέγων — οὗτοι ἀθλιώτα-
τοι ἂν εἶεν οἱ ἀμυήτοι, καὶ φοροῖεν εἰς τὸν τετρη-
μένον πίθον ὕδωρ ἑτέρῳ τοιούτῳ τετρημένῳ κο-
σκίνῳ · τὸ δὲ κόσκινον ἄρα λέγει, ὡς ἔφη ὁ πρὸς
ἐμὲ λέγων, τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι · τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν κο- C
σκίνῳ ἀπείκασε τὴν τῶν ἀνοήτων ὡς τετρημένην,
ἅτε οὐ δυναμένην στέγειν δι' ἀπιστίαν τε καὶ
λήθην. ταῦτ' ἐπεικῶς μὲν ἔστιν ὑπὸ τι ἄτοπα,
δηλοῦ μὲν ὃ ἐγὼ βούλομαι σοι ἐνδειξάμενος, ἐάν
πως οἷός τε ᾧ, πεῖσαι μεταθέσθαι, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀπλή-

στως καὶ ἀκολάστως ἔχοντος βίου τὸν κοσμίως
καὶ τοῖς ἀεὶ παροῦσιν ἱκανῶς καὶ ἐξαρκούντως
ἔχοντα βίον ἐλέσθαι. ἀλλὰ πότερον πείθω τί σε
D καὶ μετατίθεσαι εὐδαιμονεστέρους εἶναι τοὺς
κοσμίους τῶν ἀκολάστων, ἢ οὐδέν, ἀλλ' ἂν καὶ
πολλὰ τοιαῦτα μυθολογῶ, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον μετα-
θήσει; ΚΑΛ. Τοῦτ' ἀληθέστερον εἶρηκας, ὦ
Σώκρατες.

CAP. XLVIII. ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, ἄλλην σοι εἰ-
κόνα λέγω ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γυμνασίου τῇ νῦν. σκό-
πει γάρ, εἰ τοιόνδε λέγεις περὶ τοῦ βίου ἑκατέρου
τοῦ τε σώφρονος καὶ τοῦ ἀκολάστου, οἷον εἰ δυ-
εῖν ἀνδροῖν ἑκατέρῳ πίθοι πολλοὶ εἶεν, καὶ τῷ
E μὲν ἑτέρῳ ὑγιεῖς καὶ πλήρεις, ὁ μὲν οἴνου, ὁ δὲ
μέλιτος, ὁ δὲ γάλακτος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πολλῶν,
νάματα δὲ σπάνια καὶ χαλεπὰ ἑκάστου τούτων
εἶη καὶ μετὰ πολλῶν πόνων καὶ χαλεπῶν ἐκπο-
ριζόμενα· ὁ μὲν οὖν ἕτερος πληρωσάμενος μήτ'
ἐποχετεύοι μήτε τι φροντίζει, ἀλλ' ἔνεκα τούτων
ἡσυχίαν ἔχοι· τῷ δ' ἑτέρῳ τὰ μὲν νάματα, ὥσπερ
καὶ ἐκείνῳ, δυνατὰ μὲν πορίζεσθαι, χαλεπὰ δέ,
τὰ δ' ἀγγεῖα τετρημένα καὶ σαθρά, καὶ ἀναγκά-
494 ζοιτο ἀεὶ καὶ νύκτα καὶ ἡμέραν πιμπλάναι αὐτά,
ἢ τὰς ἐσχάτας λυποῖτο λύπας· ἄρα τοιούτου
ἑκατέρῳ ὄντος τοῦ βίου, λέγεις τὸν τοῦ ἀκολά-
στου εὐδαιμονέστερον εἶναι ἢ τὸν τοῦ κοσμίου;
πείθω τί σε ταῦτα λέγων συγχωρῆσαι τὸν κόσμι-
ον βίον τοῦ ἀκολάστου ἀμείνω εἶναι, ἢ οὐ πείθω;
ΚΑΛ. Οὐ πείθεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. τῷ μὲν γάρ
πληρωσαμένῳ ἐκείνῳ οὐκέτ' ἔστιν ἡδονὴ οὐδεμία,

ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἔστιν, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, τὸ ὥσπερ
λίθον ζῆν, ἐπειδὴν πληρώσῃ, μήτε χαίροντα ἔτι P
μήτε λυπούμενον. ἀλλ' ἐν τούτῳ ἐστὶ τὸ ἡδέως
ζῆν, ἐν τῷ ὥς πλεῖστον ἐπιρρῆεῖν. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν
ἀνάγκη γ', ἂν πολὺ ἐπιρρῆῃ, πολὺ καὶ τὸ ἀπιὸν
εἶναι καὶ μεγάλ' ἅπαντα τὰ τρία εἶναι ταῖς
ἐκροαῖς; ΚΑΛ. Πάννυ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Χαρα-
δριοῦ τινα αὖ σὺ βίον λέγεις, ἀλλ' οὐ νεκροῦ
οὐδὲ λίθου. καὶ μοι λέγε, τὸ τοιόνδε λέγεις, οἷον
πεινῆν καὶ πεινῶντα ἐσθίειν; ΚΑΛ. Ἐγώ γε.
ΣΩ. Καὶ διψῆν γε καὶ διψῶντα πίνειν; ΚΑΛ. C
Λέγω, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ἀπάσας ἔχοντα
καὶ δυνάμενον πληροῦντα χαίροντα εὐδαιμόνως
ζῆν.

CAP. XLIX. ΣΩ. Εὖ γε, ὃ βέλτιστε· διατέ-
λει γὰρ ὥσπερ ἤρξω, καὶ ὅπως μὴ ἀπαισχνεῖ.
δεῖ δέ, ὥς ἔοικε, μηδ' ἐμὲ ἀπαισχνυθῆναι. καὶ
πρῶτον μὲν εἰπὲ, εἰ καὶ ψωρῶντα καὶ κνησιῶντα,
ἀφθόνως ἔχοντα τοῦ κνῆσθαι, κνῶμενον διατε-
λοῦντα τὸν βίον εὐδαιμόνως ἔστι ζῆν. ΚΑΛ. D
Ὡς ἄτιπος εἶ, ὃ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς δημη-
γόρος. ΣΩ. Τοιγάρτοι, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, Πῶλον
μὲν καὶ Γοργίαν καὶ ἐξέπληξα καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι
ἐποίησα, σὺ δὲ οὐ μὴ ἐκπλαγῆς οὐδὲ μὴ αἰσχνυθῆς·
ἀνδρεῖος γὰρ εἶ. ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου μόνον. ΚΑΛ.
Φημὶ τοίνυν καὶ τὸν κνῶμενον ἡδέως ἂν βιῶναι.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἡδέως, καὶ εὐδαιμόνως;
ΚΑΛ. Πάννυ γε. ΣΩ. Πότερον εἰ τὴν κεφα- E
λὴν μόνον κνησιῶ, ἢ ἔτι τί σε ἐρωτῶ; ὅρα, ὃ
Καλλίκλεις, τί ἀποκρινεῖ, ἔάν τις σε τὰ ἐχόμενα

τούτοις ἐφεξῆς ἅπαντα ἔρωτᾷ. καί, *τὸ* τούτων τοιούτων ὄντων κεφάλαιον, ὃ τῶν κιναίδων βίος οὗτος οὐ δεινὸς καὶ αἰσχρὸς καὶ ἄθλιος; ἢ τούτους τολμήσεις λέγειν εὐδαίμονας εἶναι, ἐὰν ἀφθόνως ἔχωσιν ὧν δέονται; ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ αἰσχύνει εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγων, ὃ Σώκρατες, τοὺς λόγους; ΣΩ. Ἡ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἄγω ἐνταῦθα, ὃ γενναῖε, ἢ ἐκεῖνος, ὅς ἂν φῇ ἀνέδην οὕτω τοὺς
495 χαίροντας, ὅπως ἂν χαίρωσιν, εὐδαίμονας εἶναι, καὶ μὴ διορίζηται τῶν ἡδονῶν ὅποῖαι ἀγαθαὶ καὶ κακαί; ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν λέγε, πότερον φῆς εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἡδὺ καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἢ εἶναί τι τῶν ἡδέων, ὃ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν; ΚΑΛ. Ἴνα δὴ μοι μὴ ἀνομολογούμενος ἢ ὁ λόγος, ἐὰν ἕτερον φήσω εἶναι, τὸ αὐτὸ φημι εἶναι. ΣΩ. Διαφθείρεις, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, τοὺς πρώτους λόγους, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι μετ' ἐμοῦ ἱκανῶς τὰ ὄντα ἐξετάζοις, εἴπερ παρὰ τὰ
B δοκοῦντα σαντῶ ἔρεῖς. ΚΑΛ. Καὶ γὰρ σύ, ὃ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Οὐ τοίνυν ὀρθῶς ποιῶ οὔτ' ἐγώ, εἴπερ ποιῶ τοῦτο, οὔτε σύ. ἀλλ', ὃ μακάριε, ἄθρει μὴ οὐ τοῦτο ἢ τὸ ἀγαθόν, τὸ πάντως χαίρειν· ταῦτά τε γὰρ τὰ νῦν δὴ αἰνιχθέντα πολλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ φαίνεται συμβαίνοντα, εἰ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ. ΚΑΛ. Ὡς σύ γε οἶε, ὃ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Σὺ δὲ τῶ ὄντι, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, ταῦτα ἰσχυρίζε; ΚΑΛ. Ἐγωγε.
C CAP. L. ΣΩ. Ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἄρα τῶ λόγῳ, ὥς σοῦ σπουδάζοντος; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε σφόδρα. ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ μοι, ἐπειδὴ οὕτω δοκεῖ, διελοῦ τάδε. ἐπιστήμην που καλεῖς τι; ΚΑΛ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐ καὶ ἀνδρείαν νῦν δι᾽ ἑλεγές τινα εἶναι μετὰ ἐπιστήμης; **ΚΑΛ.** Ἐλεγον γάρ. **ΣΩ.** Ἄλλο τι οὖν ὥς ἕτερον τὴν ἀνδρείαν τῆς ἐπιστήμης δύο ταῦτα ἔλεγες; **ΚΑΛ.** Σφόδρα γε. **ΣΩ.** Τί δέ; ἡδονὴν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ταυτόν, ἢ ἕτερον; **ΚΑΛ.** Ἐτερον δήπου, ὃ σοφώτατε σύ. **ΣΩ.** Ἦ καὶ ἀνδρείαν ἑτέραν ἡδονῆς; **ΚΑΛ.** Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; **ΣΩ.** Φέρε δι᾽ ὅπως μεμνησόμεθα ταῦτα, ὅτι Καλλικλῆς ἔφη ὁ Ἀχαρνεὺς ἡδὺ μὲν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ταυτόν εἶναι, ἐπιστήμην δὲ καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ ἀλλήλων καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕτερον. **ΚΑΛ.** Σωκράτης δέ γε ἡμῖν ὁ Ἀλωπεκῆθεν οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ ταῦτα· ἢ ὁμολογεῖ; **ΣΩ.** Οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ· οἶμαι δέ γε οὐδὲ Καλλικλῆς, ὅταν αὐτὸς αὐτὸν θεάσῃται ὀρθῶς. εἰπέ γάρ μοι, τοὺς εὖ πράττοντας τοῖς κακῶς πράττουσιν οὐ τὸνναντίον ἡγεῖ πάθος πεπονθέναι; **ΚΑΛ.** Ἐγώ γε. **ΣΩ.** Ἄρ' οὖν, εἴπερ ἐναντία ἐστὶ ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις, ἀνάγκη περὶ αὐτῶν ἔχειν ὥσπερ περὶ ὑγείας ἔχει καὶ νόσου; οὐ γὰρ ἅμα δῆπου ὑγιαίνει τε καὶ νοσεῖ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲ ἅμα ἀπαλλάττεται ὑγείας τε καὶ νόσου. **ΚΑΛ.** Πῶς λέγεις; **ΣΩ.** Οἷον περὶ οἷου βούλει τοῦ σώματος ἀπολαβὼν σκόπει. ⁴⁹⁶ νοσεῖ που ἄνθρωπος ὀφθαλμούς, ὃ ὄνομα ὀφθαλμία; **ΚΑΛ.** Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; **ΣΩ.** Οὐ δῆπου καὶ ὑγιαίνει γε ἅμα τοὺς αὐτούς; **ΚΑΛ.** Οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν. **ΣΩ.** Τί δέ; ὅταν τῆς ὀφθαλμίας ἀπαλλάττεται, ἄρα τότε καὶ τῆς ὑγείας ἀπαλλάττεται τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν καὶ τελευτῶν ἅμα ἀμφοτέρων ἀπήλλακται; **ΚΑΛ.** Πικιστά γε.

Β ΣΩ. Θαυμάσιον γάρ, οἶμαι, καὶ ἄλογον γίγνεται. ἥ γάρ; ΚΑΛ. Σφόδρα γε. ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἐν μέρει, οἶμαι, ἐκάτερον καὶ λαμβάνει καὶ ἀπολλύει; ΚΑΛ. Φημί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἰσχὺν καὶ ἀσθένειαν ὡσαύτως; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Καὶ τάχος καὶ βραδυτήτα; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ τὰγαθὰ καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τάναντία τούτων, κακὰ τε καὶ ἀθλιότητα, ἐν μέρει λαμβάνει, καὶ ἐν μέρει ἀπαλλάττεται ἐκατέρου; ΚΑΛ. Πάντως δήπου. ΣΩ. Ἐὰν εὐρωμεν ἄρα ἅττα, ὧν ἅμα τε ἀπαλλάττεται ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἅμα ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι ταῦτά γε οὐκ ἂν εἴη τό τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν. ὁμολογοῦμεν ταῦτα; Καὶ εὖ μάλα σκεψάμενος ἀποκρίνου. ΚΑΛ. Ἄλλ' ὑπερφυῶς ὡς ὁμολογῶ.

CAP. LI. ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ὁμολογημένα. τὸ πεινῆν ἔλεγες πότερον ἡδύ, ἢ ἀνιαρὸν εἶναι; αὐτὸ λέγω τὸ πεινῆν. ΚΑΛ. Δ' Ἀνιαρὸν ἔγωγε · τὸ μέντοι πεινῶντα ἐσθίειν ἡδύ. ΣΩ. Μανθάνω · ἀλλ' οὖν τό γε πεινῆν αὐτὸ ἀνιαρόν. ἢ οὐχί; ΚΑΛ. Φημί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ διψῆν; ΚΑΛ. Σφόδρα γε. ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν ἔτι πλείω ἐρωτῶ, ἢ ὁμολογεῖς ἀπασαν ἔνδειαν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ἀνιαρὸν εἶναι; ΚΑΛ. Ὁμολογῶ, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐρώτα. ΣΩ. Εἶεν. διψῶντα δὲ δὴ πίνειν ἄλλο τι ἢ ἡδὺ φῆς εἶναι; ΚΑΛ. Ἐγωγε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τούτου οὐ λέγεις Ε το μὲν διψῶντα λυπούμενον δήπου ἐστί; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ πίνειν πλήρωςίς τε τῆς ἐνδείας καὶ ἡδονῆς; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν

κατὰ τὸ πίνειν χαίρειν λέγεις ; ΚΑΛ. Μάλιστα. ΣΩ. Διψῶντά γε ; ΚΑΛ. Φημί. ΣΩ. Λυπούμενον ; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Λίσθάνει οὖν τὸ συμβαῖνον, ὅτι λυπούμενον χαίρειν λέγεις ἅμα, ὅταν διψῶντα πίνειν λέγῃς ; ἢ οὐχ ἅμα τοῦτο γίνεται κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον καὶ χρόνον εἴτε ψυχῆς εἴτε σώματος βούλει ; οὐδὲν γάρ, οἴμαι, διαφέρει. ἔστι ταῦτα, ἢ οὐ ; ΚΑΛ. Ἔστιν. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν εὖ γε πράττοντα κακῶς πράττειν ἅμα ἀδύνατον ἔφης εἶναι. ΚΑΛ. Φημί γάρ. ΣΩ. Ἀνιῶμενον δέ γε χαίρειν δυ-⁴⁹⁷ νατὸν ὡμολόγηκας. ΚΑΛ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα τὸ χαίρειν ἐστὶν εὖ πράττειν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀνιᾶσθαι κακῶς, ὥστε ἕτερον γίνεται τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ἅτις σοφίζει, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Οἶσθα, ἀλλὰ ἀκκίζει, ὦ Καλλίκλεις. καὶ προῖθί γε ἔτι εἰς τοῦμπροσθεν, ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς, ἵνα εἰδῇς ὡς σοφὸς ὦν με νουθε-^B τεῖς. οὐχ ἅμα διψῶν τε ἕκαστος ἡμῶν πέπνυται καὶ ἅμα ἡδόμενος διὰ τοῦ πίνειν ; ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οἶδα ὅ τι λέγεις. ΓΟΡ. Μηδαμῶς, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου καὶ ἡμῶν ἕνεκα, ἵνα περ-^C ρανθῶσιν οἱ λόγοι. ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλ' αἰεὶ τοιοῦτός ἐστι Σωκράτης, ὦ Γοργία· σμικρὰ καὶ ὀλίγου ἄξια ἀνερωτᾷ καὶ ἐξελέγχει. ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλὰ τί σοὶ διαφέρει ; πάντως οὐ σὴ αὕτη ἢ τιμή, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· ἀλλ' ὑπόσχες Σωκράτει ἐξελέγξαι ὅπως ἂν βούληται. ΚΑΛ. Ἐρώτα δὴ σὺ τὰ σμικρὰ τε καὶ στενὰ ταῦτα, ἐπείπερ Γοργία δο-^C κεῖ οὕτως.

CAP. LII. ΣΩ. Εὐδαίμων εἶ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὅτι τὰ μεγάλα μεμύησαι πρὶν τὰ σμικρά· ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ ὤμην θεμιτὸν εἶναι. ὅθεν οὖν ἀπέλιπες, ἀποκρίνου, εἰ οὐχ ἅμα παύεται διψῶν ἕκαστος ἡμῶν καὶ ἡδόμενος. ΚΑΛ. Φημί. ΣΩ. Οὐκ οὖν καὶ πεινῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν ἅμα παύεται; ΚΑΛ. Ἔστι ταῦτα. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν λυπῶν καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἅμα παύεται; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν οὐχ ἅμα παύεται, ὥς σὺ ὁμολόγεις· νῦν δὲ οὐχ ὁμολογεῖς; ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε. τί οὖν δῆ; ΣΩ. Ὅτι οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ γίγνεται, ὦ φίλε, τὰγαθὰ τοῖς ἡδέσιν οὐδὲ τὰ κακὰ τοῖς ἀνιστοῦσι. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἅμα παύεται, τῶν δὲ οὐ, ὥς ἑτέρων ὄντων. πῶς οὖν ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὰ ἡδέα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τὰ ἀνιστὰ τοῖς κακοῖς; Ἐὰν δὲ βούλη, καὶ τῇδ' ἐπίσκεψαι· οἶμαι γάρ E σοι οὐδὲ ταύτῃ ὁμολογεῖσθαι. ἄθρει δέ· τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς οὐχὶ ἀγαθῶν παρουσία ἀγαθοὺς καλεῖς, ὥσπερ τοὺς οἷς ἂν κάλλος παρῇ; ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας καλεῖς τοὺς ἄφρονας καὶ δειλοὺς; οὐ γὰρ ἄρτι γε, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀνδρείους καὶ φρονίμους ἔλεγες. ἢ οὐ τούτους ἀγαθοὺς καλεῖς; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Τί δέ; παῖδα ἀνόητον χαίροντα ἤδη εἶδες; ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Ἄνδρα δὲ οὐπω εἶδες ἀνόητον χαίροντα; ΚΑΛ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε. ἀλλὰ 198 λὰ τί τοῦτο; ΣΩ. Οὐδέν· ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου. ΚΑΛ. Εἶδον. ΣΩ. Τί δέ; νοῦν ἔχοντα λυπούμενον καὶ χαίροντα; ΚΑΛ. Φημί. ΣΩ.

Πότεροι δὲ μᾶλλον χαίρουσι καὶ λυποῦνται, οἱ φρόνιμοι, ἢ οἱ ἄφρονες; ΚΑΛ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε οὐ πολὺ τι διαφέρειν. ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἀρκεῖ καὶ τοῦτο. ἐν πολέμῳ δὲ ἤδη εἶδες ἄνδρα δειλόν; ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἀπιόντων τῶν πολεμίων πότεροί σοι ἐδόκουν μᾶλλον χαίρειν, οἱ δειλοί, ἢ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι; ΚΑΛ. Ἀμφοτέροισι ἔμοιγε μᾶλλον· εἰ δὲ μή, παραπλησίως γε. Β ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν διαφέρει. χαίρουσι δ' οὖν καὶ οἱ δειλοί; ΚΑΛ. Σφόδρα γε. ΣΩ. Καὶ οἱ ἄφρονες, ὡς ἔοικε. ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Προσιόντων δὲ οἱ δειλοὶ μόνον λυποῦνται, ἢ καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι; ΚΑΛ. Ἀμφοτέροι. ΣΩ. Ἄρα ὁμοίως; ΚΑΛ. Μᾶλλον ἴσως οἱ δειλοί. ΣΩ. Ἀπιόντων δ' οὐ μᾶλλον χαίρουσιν; ΚΑΛ. Ἰσως. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν λυποῦνται μὲν καὶ χαίρουσι καὶ οἱ ἄφρονες καὶ οἱ φρόνιμοι καὶ οἱ δειλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι παραπλησίως, ὡς σὺ φῆς, μᾶλλον δὲ οἱ δειλοὶ τῶν ἀνδρείων; ΚΑΛ. C Φημί. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οἷ γε φρόνιμοι καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι ἀγαθοί, οἱ δὲ δειλοὶ καὶ ἄφρονες κακοί; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Παραπλησίως ἄρα χαίρουσι καὶ λυποῦνται οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ κακοί; ΚΑΛ. Φημί. ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν παραπλησίως εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τε καὶ οἱ κακοί; ἢ καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ εἰσὶν οἱ κακοί;

CAP. LIII. ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί' οὐκ οἶδ' D ὅ τι λέγεις. ΣΩ. Οὐκ οἶσθ', ὅτι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἀγαθῶν φῆς παρουσίᾳ εἶναι ἀγαθοὺς, κακοὺς δὲ κακῶν; τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι τὰς ἡδονάς, κακὰ δὲ

τὰς ἀνίας ; ΚΑΛ. Ἐγωγε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῖς χαίρουσι πάρεστι τὰγαθά, αἰ ἡδοναί, εἴπερ χαίρουσι ; ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ; ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀγαθῶν παρόντων ἀγαθοί εἰσιν οἱ χαίροντες ; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τί δέ ; τοῖς ἀνιωμένοις οὐ πάρεστι τὰ κακά, αἰ λῦπαι ; ΚΑΛ. Πάρεστι. ΣΩ. Κακῶν δέ γε παρουσία φῆς σὺ εἶναι κακοὺς τοὺς κακοὺς. ἢ οὐκέτι φῆς ; ΚΑΛ. Ἐγωγε. ΣΩ. Ἀγαθοὶ ἄρα οἱ ἂν χαίρωσι, κακοὶ δὲ οἱ ἂν ἀνιῶνται ; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Οἱ μὲν γε μᾶλλον μᾶλλον, οἱ δ' ἥτιον ἥτιον, οἱ δὲ παραπλησίως παραπλησίως ; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν φῆς παραπλησίως χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τοὺς φρονίμους καὶ τοὺς ἄφρονας καὶ τοὺς δειλοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀνδρείους, ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι τοὺς δειλοὺς ; ΚΑΛ. Ἐγωγε. ΣΩ. Συλλόγισαι δὴ κοινῇ μετ' ἐμοῦ, τί ἡμῖν συμβαίνει ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογημένων · καὶ δις γάρ τοι καὶ τρεῖς
499 φασι καλὸν εἶναι τὰ καλὰ λέγειν τε καὶ ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι. Ἀγαθὸν μὲν εἶναι τὸν φρόνιμον καὶ ἀνδρεῖόν φαμεν. ἢ γάρ ; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Κακὸν δὲ τὸν ἄφρονα καὶ δειλόν ; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Ἀγαθὸν δὲ αὖ τὸν χαίροντα ; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Κακὸν δὲ τὸν ἀνιῶμενον ; ΚΑΛ. Ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. Ἀνιᾶσθαι δὲ καὶ χαίρειν τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν ὁμοίως, ἴσως δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον τὸν κακόν ; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁμοίως γίγνεται κακὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγα-
B θῷ ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸς ὁ κακός ; οὐ ταῦτα συμβαίνει, καὶ τὰ πρότερα ἐκεῖνα, ἐάν τις ταυ-

τὰ φῆ ἡδέα' τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι ; οὐ ταῦτα ἀνάγκη, ὦ Καλλίκλεις ;

CAP. LIV. ΚΑΛ. Πάσαι τοί σου ἀκροῶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, καθομολογῶν, ἐνθυμούμενος, ὅτι, καὶ παίζων τίς σοι ἐνδῶ ότιοῦν, τούτου ἀσμενος ἔχει ὥσπερ τὰ μειράκια. ὥς δὴ σὺ οἶε ἐμὲ ἢ καὶ ἄλλον όντινοῦν ἀνθρώπων οὐχ ἡγεῖσθαι τὰς μὲν βελτίους ἡδονάς, τὰς δὲ χείρους. ΣΩ. Ἰού ιού, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὥς πανοῦργος εἶ, καί μοι C ὥσπερ παιδὶ χρῆ, τοτὲ μὲν αὖ φάσκων οὕτως ἔχειν, τοτὲ δὲ ἐτέρως, ἐξαπαιτῶν με. καίτοι οὐκ ὦρην γε κατ' ἀρχὰς ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐκόντος εἶναι ἐξαπατηθήσεσθαι, ὥς όντος φίλου· νῦν δὲ ἐψεύσθην, καὶ ὥς ὅκειν, ἀνάγκη μοι κατὰ τὸν παλαιὸν λόγον τὸ παρὸν εἶ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦτο δέχεσθαι τὸ διδόμενον παρὰ σοῦ. ἔστι δὲ δὴ, ὥς ὅκειν, ὃ νῦν λέγεις, ὅτι ἡδοναί τινές εἰσιν αἱ μὲν ἀγαθαί, αἱ δὲ κακαί. ἦ γάρ ; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Ἄρ' D οὖν ἀγαθαὶ μὲν αἱ ὠφέλιμοι, κακαὶ δὲ αἱ βλαβεραί ; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Ὀφέλιμοι δέ γε αἱ ἀγαθόν τι ποιοῦσαι, κακαὶ δὲ αἱ κακόν τι ; ΚΑΛ. Φημί. ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν τὰς τοιάσδε λέγεις, ὅσον κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἄς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν ἐν τῷ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν ἡδονάς· εἰ ἄρα τούτων αἱ μὲν ὑγίειαν ποιοῦσιν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἢ ἰσχὺν ἢ ἄλλην τινὰ ἀρετὴν τοῦ σώματος, αὗται μὲν ἀγαθαί, αἱ δὲ τὰναντία τούτων κακαί ; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ λῦπαι ὡσανύτως αἱ E μὲν χρησταί εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ πονηραί ; ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γάρ οὐ ; ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστὰς καὶ

ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας καὶ αἵρετέον ἐστὶ καὶ πρα-
κτέον; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς
οὐ; ΚΑΛ. Δῆλον δὴ. ΣΩ. Ἐνεκα γάρ που
τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἅπαντα ἡμῖν ἔδοξε πρακτέον εἶναι,
εἰ μνημονεύεις, ἐμοί τε καὶ Πώλῳ. ἄρα καὶ σοὶ
συνδοκεῖ οὕτω, τέλος εἶναι ἀπασῶν τῶν πράξεων
τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἐκείνου ἕνεκεν δεῖν πάντα τὰλλα
500 πράττεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνο τῶν ἄλλων; σύμ-
ψηφος ἡμῖν εἴ καὶ σὺ ἐκ τρίτων; ΚΑΛ. Ἐγω-
γε. ΣΩ. Τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἄρα ἕνεκα δεῖ καὶ τὰλλα
καὶ τὰ ἡδέα πράττειν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰγαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων.
ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν παντὸς ἄν-
δρός ἐστιν ἐκλέξασθαι ποῖα ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων
ἐστὶ καὶ ὅποια κακά, ἢ τεχνικοῦ δεῖ εἰς ἕκαστον;
ΚΑΛ. Τεχνικοῦ.

CLP. LV. ΣΩ. Ἀναμνησθῶμεν δὴ ὧν αὐ
ἐγὼ πρὸς Πῶλον καὶ Γοργίαν ἐτύγχανον λέγων.
B ἔλεγον γάρ, εἰ μνημονεύεις, ὅτι εἶεν παρασκευαῖ
αἱ μὲν μέχρι ἡδονῆς, αὐτὸ τοῦτο μόνον παρα-
σκευάζουσαι, ἀγνοοῦσαι δὲ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ
χεῖρον, αἱ δὲ γινώσκουσαι ὅ τι τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ
ὅ τι κακόν· καὶ ἐτίθην τῶν μὲν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς
τὴν μαγειρικὴν ἐμπειρίαν, ἀλλ' οὐ τέχνην, τῶν
δὲ περὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἰατρικὴν τέχνην. καὶ
πρὸς φίλιον, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, μήτε αὐτὸς οἶον
δεῖν πρὸς ἐμὲ παίζειν μηδ' ὅ τι ἂν τύχῃ πα-
C ρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἀποκρίνου, μήτ' αὐ τὰ παρ'
ἐμοῦ οὕτως ἀποδέχου ὥς παίζοντος. ὁρᾷς γάρ,
ὅτι περὶ τούτου εἰσὶν ἡμῖν οἱ λόγοι, οὐ τί ἂν
μᾶλλον σπουδάσειέ τις καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχων

ἄνθρωπος, ἢ τοῦτο, ὅντινα χρὴ τρόπον ζῆν πότερον ἐπὶ ὃν σὺ παρακαλεῖς ἐμέ, τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς δὴ ταῦτα πράττοντα, λέγοντά τε ἐν τῷ δήμῳ καὶ ῥητορικὴν ἀσχοῦντα καὶ πολιτευόμενον τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, ὃν ὑμεῖς νῦν πολιτεύεσθε, ἢ ἐπὶ τόνδε τὸν βίον τὸν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, καὶ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν οὗτος ἐκείνου διαφέρων; ἴσως οὖν βέλτιστόν ἐστιν, ὡς ἄρτι ἐγὼ ἐπεχείρησα, διαιρεῖσθαι, διελομένους δὲ D καὶ ὁμολογήσαντας ἀλλήλοις, εἰ ἔστι τούτῳ διττὸ τὸ βίω, σκέψασθαι τί τε διαφέρετον ἀλλήλοιν καὶ ὁπότερον βιωτέον αὐτοῖν. ἴσως οὖν οὐπω οἶσθα τί λέγω. ΚΑΛ. Οὐ δῆτα. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐγώ σοι σαφέστερον ἐρῶ. ἐπειδὴ ὁμολογήκαμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ εἶναι μὲν τι ἀγαθόν, εἶναι δέ τι ἡδύ, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἑκατέρου δὲ αὐτοῖν μελέτην τινὰ εἶναι καὶ παρασκευὴν τῆς κτήσεως, τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἡδέος θήραν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ — E αὐτὸ δέ μοι τοῦτο πρῶτον ἢ σύμφαθι, ἢ μὴ · σύμφης; ΚΑΛ. Οὕτω φημί.

CAP. LVI. ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ, ἃ καὶ πρὸς τούσδε ἐγὼ ἔλεγον διομολόγησαί μοι, εἰ ἄρα σοι ἔδοξα τότε ἀληθῆ λέγειν. ἔλεγον δέ πού, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ὀψοποικὴ οὐ μοι δοκεῖ τέχνη εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἐμπειρία, ἢ 501 δ' ἰατρικὴ λέγων, ὅτι ἡ μὲν τούτου οὐ θεραπεύει καὶ τὴν φύσιν ἔσκεπται καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ὣν πράττει, καὶ λόγον ἔχει τούτων ἐκάστου δοῦναι, ἢ ἰατρικὴ · ἡ δ' ἑτέρα τῆς ἡδονῆς, πρὸς ἣν ἡ θεραπεύει αὐτὴ ἐστὶν ἅπασα, κομιδῇ ἀτέχνως ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἔρχεται, οὔτε τι τὴν φύσιν σκεπταμένη τῆς ἡδονῆς οὔτε τὴν αἰτίαν, ἀλόγως τε παντάπασιν,

ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν διαριθμησαμένη, τριβὴ καὶ
 • ἐμπειρία, μνήμην μόνον σωζομένη τοῦ εἰωθότος
 B γίνεσθαι, ᾧ δὴ καὶ πορίζεται τὰς ἡδονάς. ταῦτ'
 οὖν πρῶτον σκόπει εἰ δοκεῖ σοι ἱκανῶς λέγεσθαι,
 καὶ εἶναί τινες καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν τοιαῦται ἄλλαι
 πραγματεῖαι, αἱ μὲν τεχνικαί, προμήθειάν τινα
 ἔχουσαι τοῦ βελτίστου περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, αἱ δὲ
 τούτου μὲν ὀλιγοροῦσαι, ἐσκεμμέναι δ' αὖ, ὥσπερ
 ἐκεῖ, τὴν ἡδονὴν μόνον τῆς ψυχῆς, τίνα ἂν αὐτῇ
 τρόπον γίγνοιτο, ἥτις δὲ ἢ βελτίων ἢ χείρων τῶν
 ἡδονῶν οὔτε σκοπούμεναι, οὔτε μέλον αὐταῖς
 C ἄλλο ἢ χαρίζεσθαι μόνον, εἴτε βέλτιον εἴτε χεῖ-
 ρον. ἔμοι μὲν γάρ, ᾧ Καλλίκλεις, δοκοῦσί τε
 εἶναι, καὶ ἔγωγέ φημι τὸ τοιοῦτον κολακείαν εἶναι
 καὶ περὶ σῶμα καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ περὶ ἄλλο,
 ὅτου ἂν τις τὴν ἡδονὴν θεραπεύῃ ἀσκέπτως ἔχων
 τοῦ ἀμείνονός τε καὶ τοῦ χείρονος · σὺ δὲ δὴ πό-
 τερον συγκατατίθεσαι ἡμῖν περὶ τούτων τὴν αὐ-
 τὴν δόξαν ἢ ἀντίφης; ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἀλλὰ
 συγχωρῶ, ἵνα σοι καὶ περανθῇ ὁ λόγος καὶ Γορ-
 D γία τῷδε χαρίσωμαι. ΣΩ. Πότερον δὲ περὶ μὲν
 μίαν ψυχὴν ἔστι τοῦτο, περὶ δὲ δύο καὶ πολλάς
 οὐκ ἔστιν; ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ δύο καὶ
 περὶ πολλάς. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀθρόαις ἅμα
 χαρίζεσθαι ἔστι μηδὲν σκοπούμενον τὸ βέλτιστον;
 ΚΑΛ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε.

CAP. LVII. ΣΩ. Ἐχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν αἵτινές
 εἰσιν αἱ ἐπιτηδεύσεις αἱ τοῦτο ποιοῦσαι; Μᾶλλον
 δέ, εἰ βούλει, ἐμοῦ ἐρωτῶντος, ἢ μὲν ἂν σοι δοκῇ
 τούτων εἶναι, φάθι, ἢ δ' ἂν μή, μὴ φάθι. πρῶ-

τον δὲ σκεψώμεθα τὴν αὐλητικὴν. οὐ δοκεῖ σοι Ε
 τοιαύτη τις εἶναι, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, τὴν ἡδονὴν ἡμῶν .
 μόνον διώκειν, ἄλλο δ' οὐδὲν φροντίζειν; ΚΑΑ.
 Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ αἱ τοιαίδε
 ἅπασαι, οἷον ἡ κιθαριστικὴ ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι;
 ΚΑΑ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τί δὲ ἡ τῶν χορῶν διδασκα-
 λία καὶ ἡ τῶν διθυράμβων ποιήσις; οὐ τοιαύτη
 τίς σοι καταφαίνεται; ἢ ἡγεῖ τι φροντίζειν Κι-
 νησίαν τὸν Μέλητος, ὅπως ἔρεῖ τι τοιοῦτον, ὅθεν
 ἂν οἱ ἀκούοντες βελτίους γίγνοιτο, ἢ ὅ τι μέλ-502
 λει χαριεῖσθαι τῷ ὄχλῳ τῶν θεατῶν; ΚΑΑ.
 Ἀἴνῳ δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὃ Σώκρατες, Κινησίῳ γε
 πέρι. ΣΩ. Τί δὲ ὁ πατήρ αὐτοῦ Μέλης; ἢ
 πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον βλέπων ἐδόκει σοι κιθαρωδεῖν;
 ἢ ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸ ἡδιστον; ἡνία γὰρ
 ἔδων τοὺς θεατάς. ἀλλὰ δὴ σκόπει· οὐχὶ ἢ τε
 κιθαρωδικὴ δοκεῖ σοι πᾶσα καὶ ἡ τῶν διθυράμβων
 ποιήσις ἡδονῆς χάριν εὐρῆσθαι; ΚΑΑ. Ἔμοι-
 γε. ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δὴ ἡ σεμνὴ αὕτη καὶ θαυμαστὴ Β
 ἢ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποιήσις ἐφ' ὃ ἐσπουδάκε; πότε-
 ρόν ἐστιν αὐτῆς τὸ ἐπιχείρημα καὶ ἡ σπονδὴ, ὥς
 σοὶ δοκεῖ, χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς θεαταῖς μόνον, ἢ καὶ
 διαμάχεσθαι, ἐάν τι αὐτοῖς ἡδὺ μὲν ἢ καὶ κε-
 χαρισμένον, πονηρὸν δέ, ὅπως τοῦτο μὲν μὴ ἔρεῖ,
 εἰ δέ τι τυγχάνει ἀηδὲς καὶ ὠφέλιμον, τοῦτο δὲ
 καὶ λέξει καὶ ἄσεται, ἐάν τε χαίρωσιν ἐάν τε μὴ;
 ποτέρως σοι δοκεῖ παρσκευάσθαι ἢ τῶν τραγωδι-
 ῶν ποιήσις; ΚΑΑ. Ἀἴνῳ δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὃ Σώ- C
 κρατες, ὅτι πρὸς τὴν ἡδονὴν μᾶλλον ὥρμηται καὶ
 τὸ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς θεαταῖς. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ

· τοιοῦτον, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, ἔφαμεν νῦν διὰ κολα-
 κείαν εἶναι; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Φέρε
 δὴ, εἴ τις περιέλοιτο τῆς ποιήσεως πάσης τό τε
 μέλος καὶ τὸν ῥυθμὸν καὶ τὸ μέτρον, ἄλλο τι ἢ
 λόγοι γίνονται τὸ λειπόμενον; ΚΑΛ. Ἀνάγκη.
 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πρὸς πολὺν ὄχλον καὶ δῆμον
 D οὔτοι λέγονται οἱ λόγοι. ΚΑΛ. Φημί. ΣΩ.
 Δημηγορία ἄρα τίς ἐστὶν ἡ ποιητική. ΚΑΛ.
 Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ρητορικὴ δημηγορία
 ἂν εἴη. ἢ οὐ ρητορεύειν δοκοῦσί σοι οἱ ποιηταὶ
 ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις; ΚΑΛ. Ἐμοιγε. ΣΩ. Νῦν
 ἄρα ἡμεῖς εὗρήκαμεν ρητορικὴν τινα πρὸς δῆμον
 τοιοῦτον, οἷον παίδων τε ὁμοῦ καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ
 ἀνδρῶν, καὶ δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων, ἣν οὐ πάνυ
 · ἀγάμεθα · κολακικὴν γὰρ αὐτὴν φάμεν εἶναι.
 ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

CAP. LVIII. ΣΩ. Εἶεν. τί δὲ ἢ πρὸς τὸν
 Ἀθηναίων δῆμον ρητορικὴ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους
 E τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι δῆμους τοὺς τῶν ἐλευθέρων
 ἀνδρῶν, τί ποτε ἡμῖν αὕτη ἐστί; πότερόν σοι δο-
 κοῦσι πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον αἰεὶ λέγειν οἱ ῥήτορες,
 τούτου στοχαζόμενοι, ὅπως οἱ πολῖται ὥς βέλτι-
 στοι ἔσονται διὰ τοὺς αὐτῶν λόγους, ἢ καὶ οὔτοι
 πρὸς τὸ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς πολίταις ὥρμημένοι, καὶ
 ἔνεκα τοῦ ἰδίου τοῦ αὐτῶν ὀλιγωροῦντες τοῦ κοι-
 νοῦ, ὥσπερ παισὶ προσομιλοῦσι τοῖς δῆμοις, χαρίζε-
 σθαι αὐτοῖς πειρώμενοι μόνον, εἰ δέ γε βελτίους
 ἔσονται ἢ χεῖρους διὰ ταῦτα, οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν;
 503 ΚΑΛ. Οὐχ ἀπλοῦν ἔτι τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς · εἰσὶ μὲν
 γὰρ οἱ κηδόμενοι τῶν πολιτῶν λέγουσιν ἃ λέγου-

σιν, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ οἴους σὺ λέγεις. ΣΩ. Ἐξαρκεῖ.
 εἰ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι διπλοῦν, τὸ μὲν ἕτερόν που
 τούτου κολακεία ἂν εἴη καὶ αἰσχρὰ δημηγορία,
 τὸ δ' ἕτερον καλόν, τὸ παρασκευάζειν, ὅπως ὡς
 βέλτισται ἔσονται τῶν πολιτῶν αἱ ψυχαί, καὶ
 διαμάχεσθαι λέγοντα τὰ βέλτιστα, εἴτε ἡδῶ εἴτε
 ἀηδέστερα ἔσται τοῖς ἀκούουσιν. ἀλλ' οὐ πρόποτε B
 σὺ ταύτην εἶδες τὴν ῥητορικὴν· ἢ εἴ τινα ἔχεις
 τῶν ῥητόρων τοιοῦτον εἰπεῖν, τί οὐχὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ
 αὐτὸν ἔφρασας τίς ἐστιν; ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δι'
 οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγέ σοι εἰπεῖν τῶν γε νῦν ῥητόρων οὐ-
 δένα. ΣΩ. Τί δέ; τῶν παλαιῶν ἔχεις τινὰ εἰ-
 πεῖν, δι' ὅντινα αἰτίαν ἔχουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι βελτί-
 οους γεγονέναι, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος ἤρξατο δημηγορεῖν,
 ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ χείρους ὄντες; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ
 οὐκ οἶδα τίς ἐστιν οὗτος. ΚΑΛ. Τί δέ; Θε- C
 μστοκλέα οὐκ ἀκούεις ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γεγονότα
 καὶ Κίμωνα καὶ Μιλτιάδην καὶ Περικλέα του-
 τονὶ τὸν νεωστὶ τετελευτηκότα, οὗ καὶ σὺ ἀκή-
 κοας; ΣΩ. Εἰ ἔστι γε, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἦν πρό-
 τερον σὺ ἔλεγες ἀρετὴν, ἀληθῆς, τὸ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας
 ἀποπιμπλάναι καὶ τὰς αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων·
 εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἐν τῷ ὑστέρῳ λόγῳ
 ἠναγκάσθημεν ἡμεῖς ὁμολογεῖν, ὅτι αἱ μὲν τῶν
 ἐπιθυμιῶν πληρούμεναι βελτίῳ ποιοῦσι τὸν ἄν- D
 θρωπον, ταύτας μὲν ἀποτελεῖν, αἱ δὲ χείρω, μὴ·
 τοῦτο δὲ τέχνη τις εἶναι· τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα τούτων
 τινὰ γεγονέναι ἔχεις εἰπεῖν; ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ ἔχω
 ἔγωγε πῶς εἶπω.

CAP. LIX. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εἰάν ζητῆς καλῶς,

εὐρήσεις. ἴδωμεν δὴ οὕτως ἄτρεμα σκοπού-
 μενοι, εἴ τις τούτων τοιοῦτος γέγονε. φέρε γάρ,
 Εὐ ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον λέγων ἂν
 λέγῃ ἄλλο τι οὐκ εἰκῇ ἔρεῖ, ἀλλ' ἀποβλέπων πρὸς
 τι; ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες δημιουργοὶ βλέ-
 ποντες πρὸς τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον ἕκαστος οὐκ εἰκῇ
 ἐκλεγόμενος προσφέρει ἂν προσφέρει πρὸς τὸ ἔργον
 τὸ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' ὅπως ἂν εἰδός τι αὐτῷ σχῇ τοῦτο,
 ὃ ἐργάζεται. οἷον εἰ βούλει ἰδεῖν τοὺς ζωγρά-
 φους, τοὺς οἰκοδόμους, τοὺς ναυπηγούς, τοὺς
 ἄλλους πάντας δημιουργούς, ὅντινα βούλει αὐ-
 τῶν, ὥς εἰς τάξιν τινὰ ἕκαστος ἕκαστον τίθησιν ὃ
 ἂν τιθῇ, καὶ προσαναγκάζει τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ
 504 πρέπον τε εἶναι καὶ ἀρμόττειν, ἕως ἂν τὸ ἅπαν
 συστήσῃται τεταγμένον τε καὶ κεκοσμημένον
 πρᾶγμα, καὶ οἷ τε δὴ ἄλλοι δημιουργοὶ καὶ οὓς
 νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, οἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμα παιδοτρίβαι τε
 καὶ ἰατροί, κοσμοῦσί που τὸ σῶμα καὶ συντάττου-
 σιν. ὁμολογοῦμεν οὕτω τοῦτ' ἔχειν, ἢ οὐ;
 ΚΑΛ. Ἐστὼ τοῦτο οὕτω. ΣΩ. Τάξεως ἄρα
 καὶ κόσμου τυχοῦσα οἰκία χρησιτὴ ἂν εἴη, ἀταξίας
 Β δὲ μοχθηρά; ΚΑΛ. Φημί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ
 πλοῖον ὁσαύτως; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν
 καὶ τὰ σώματά φαμεν τὰ ἡμέτερα; ΚΑΛ.
 Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἡ ψυχὴ; ἀταξίας τυχοῦ-
 σα ἔσται χρησιτὴ, ἢ τάξεώς τε καὶ κόσμου τινός;
 ΚΑΛ. Ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν καὶ τοῦτο συνο-
 μολογεῖν. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ὀνομά ἐστιν ἐν τῷ σώ-
 ματι τῷ ἐκ τῆς τάξεώς τε καὶ τοῦ κόσμου γιγνο-
 μένῳ; ΚΑΛ. Ὑγίειαν καὶ ἰσχὺν ἴσως λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἐγωγε. τί δὲ αὖ τῷ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐγγιγνο- C
 μένω ἐκ τῆς τάξεως καὶ τοῦ κόσμου; πειρῶ εὐ-
 ρεῖν καὶ εἰπεῖν ὥσπερ ἐκείνω τὸ ὄνομα. ΚΑΛ.
 Τί δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ.
 Ἄλλ' εἰ σοι ἡδιόν ἐστιν, ἐγὼ ἐρῶ. σὺ δέ, ἂν
 μὲν σοι δοκῶ ἐγὼ καλῶς λέγειν, φάθι· εἰ δὲ μὴ,
 ἔλεγχε καὶ μὴ ἐπίτρεπε. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ταῖς μὲν
 τοῦ σώματος τάξεσιν ὄνομα εἶναι ὑγιεινόν, ἐξ
 οὗ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ὑγίεια γίγνεται καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ἀρετὴ
 τοῦ σώματος. ἔστι ταῦτα ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν; ΚΑΛ. D
 Ἔστι. ΣΩ. Ταῖς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τάξεσί τε καὶ
 κοσμήσεσι νόμιμόν τε καὶ νόμος, ὅθεν καὶ νόμι-
 μοι γίγνονται καὶ κόσμιοι· ταῦτα δ' ἔστι δικαιο-
 σύνη τε καὶ σωφροσύνη. φῆς, ἢ οὐ; ΚΑΛ.
 Ἔστω.

CAP. LX. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πρὸς ταῦτα αὖ βλέ-
 πων ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐκεῖνος, ὁ τεχνικός τε καὶ ἀγα-
 θός, καὶ τοὺς λόγους προσοίσει ταῖς ψυχαῖς οὖς
 ἂν λέγη καὶ τὰς πράξεις ἀπάσας, καὶ δῶρον
 ἐάν τι διδῶ, δώσει, καὶ ἐάν τι ἀφαιρῇται, ἀφαι-
 ρήσεται, πρὸς τοῦτο αἰετὸν τὸν νοῦν ἔχων, ὅπως E
 ἂν αὐτοῦ τοῖς πολίταις δικαιοσύνη μὲν ἐν ταῖς
 ψυχαῖς γίγνηται, ἀδικία δὲ ἀπαλλάττηται, καὶ
 σωφροσύνη μὲν ἐγγίγνηται, ἀκολασία δὲ ἀπαλ-
 λάττηται, καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ἀρετὴ ἐγγίγνηται, κακία
 δὲ ἀπίη; συγχωρεῖς, ἢ οὐ; ΚΑΛ. Συγχωρῶ.
 ΣΩ. Τί γὰρ ὄφελος, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, σώματί γε
 κάμνοντι καὶ μοχθηρῶς διακειμένῳ σιτία πολλὰ
 διδόναι καὶ τὰ ἡδίστα ἢ ποτὰ ἢ ἄλλ' ὅτιοῦν, ὃ
 μὴ ὀνήσει αὐτὸ ἔσθ' ὅτε πλεον ἢ τούναντίον, κα-

505 *τά γε τὸν δίκαιον λόγον, καὶ ἔλαττον; ἔστι ταῦ-
 τα; ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω. ΣΩ. Οὐ γάρ, οἶμαι, λυ-
 σιτελεῖ μετὰ μοχθηρίας σώματος ζῆν ἀνθρώπων·
 ἀνάγκη γὰρ οὕτω καὶ ζῆν μοχθηρῶς. ἢ οὐχ
 οὕτω; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰς
 ἐπιθυμίας ἀποπιμπλάναι, οἷον πεινῶντα φαγεῖν
 ὅσον βούλεται ἢ διψῶντα πιεῖν, ὑγιαίνοντα μὲν
 ἔωσιν οἱ ἰατροὶ ὡς τὰ πολλά, κάμνοντα δέ, ὡς
 ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδέποτε ἔωσιν ἐμπίπλασθαι ὧν ἐπι-
 θυμεῖ; συγχωρεῖς τοῦτό γε καὶ σύ; ΚΑΛ.
 Β Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Περὶ δὲ ψυχὴν, ᾧ ἄριστε, οὐχ ὁ αὐ-
 τὸς τρόπος; ἕως μὲν ἂν πονηρὰ ἦ, ἀνόητός τε οὖ-
 σα καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ ἄδικος καὶ ἀνόσιος, εἴργειν
 αὐτὴν δεῖ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν ἄλλ'
 ἅττα ποιεῖν ἢ ἅφ' ὧν βελτίων ἔσται; φῆς, ἢ οὐ;
 ΚΑΛ. Φημί. ΣΩ. Οὕτω γάρ που αὐτῇ ἄμει-
 νον τῇ ψυχῇ. ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν
 τὸ εἴργειν ἐστὶν ἅφ' ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ κολάζειν;
 ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τὸ κολάζεσθαι ἄρα τῇ ψυ-
 χῇ ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ἢ ἡ ἀκολασία, ὥσπερ σὺ νῦν δὴ
 51 *ᾠον. ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ἅττα λέγεις, ᾧ Σώκρα-
 τες, ἀλλ' ἄλλον τινὰ ἐρώτα. ΣΩ. Οὗτος ἀνὴρ
 οὐχ ὑπομένει ὠφελούμενος καὶ αὐτὸς τοῦτο πά-
 σχων, περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος ἐστί, κολαζόμενος. ΚΑΛ.
 Οὐδέ γέ μοι μέλει οὐδὲν ὧν σὺ λέγεις, καὶ ταῦτά
 σοι Γοργίου χάριν ἀπεκρινάμην. ΣΩ. Εἶεν.
 τί οὖν δὴ ποιήσομεν; μεταξὺ τὸν λόγον κατα-
 λύομεν; ΚΑΛ. Αὐτὸς γνώσει. ΣΩ. Ἄλλ'
 7 οὐδὲ τοὺς μύθους φασὶ μεταξὺ θέμις εἶναι κατα-
 λείπειν, ἀλλ' ἐπιθέντας κεφαλὴν, ἵνα μὴ ἄνευ**

κεφαλῆς περιίη. ἀπόκριναι οὖν καὶ τὰ λοιπά,
ἵνα ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος κεφαλὴν λάβῃ.

CAP. LXI. ΚΑΛ. Ὡς βίαιος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρα-
τες. ἐὰν δὲ ἐμοὶ πείθῃ, ἐάσεις χαίρειν τοῦτον
τὸν λόγον, ἢ καὶ ἄλλῳ τῷ διαλέξει. ΣΩ. Τίς
οὖν ἄλλος ἐθέλει; μὴ γάρ τοι ἀτελῇ γε τὸν λό-
γον καταλείπωμεν. ΚΑΛ. Αὐτὸς δὲ οὐκ ἂν
δύναιο διελθεῖν τὸν λόγον, ἢ λέγων κατὰ σαντὸν Ε
ἢ ἀποκρινόμενος σαντῷ; ΣΩ. Ἰνα μοι τὸ τοῦ
Ἐπιχάρμου γένηται, ἃ πρὸ τοῦ δύο ἄνδρες ἔλε-
γον, εἰς ὧν ἱκανὸς γένωμαι. ἀτὰρ κινδυνεύει
ἀναγκαιότατον εἶναι οὕτως. εἰ μέντοι ποιήσο-
μεν, οἶμαι ἔγωγε χρῆναι πάντας ἡμᾶς φιλονείκως
ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ ἀληθὲς τί ἐστι περὶ ὧν
λέγομεν καὶ τί ψεῦδος. κοινὸν γὰρ ἀγαθὸν
ἅπασι φανερὸν γενέσθαι αὐτό. δίδειμι μὲν οὖν
τῷ λόγῳ ἐγὼ ὥς ἂν μοι δοκῇ ἔχειν. ἐὰν δὲ τῷ 506
ὑμῶν μὴ τὰ ὄντα δοκῶ ὁμολογεῖν ἐμμαντῷ, χρὴ
ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ ἐλέγχειν. οὐδὲ γάρ τοι
ἔγωγε εἰδὼς λέγω ἃ λέγω, ἀλλὰ ζητῶ κοινῇ μεθ'
ὑμῶν, ὥστε, ἂν τι φαίνεται λέγων ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν
ἐμοί, ἐγὼ πρῶτος συγχωρήσομαι. λέγω μέντοι
ταῦτα, εἰ δοκεῖ χρῆναι διαπερανθῆναι τὸν λό-
γον. εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλεσθε, ἐῷμεν δὴ χαίρειν καὶ
ἀπίωμεν. ΓΟΡ. Ἄλλ' ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐ δοκεῖ, ὦ
Σώκρατες, χρῆναί πω ἀπιέναι, ἀλλὰ διεξελεῖν Β
σε τὸν λόγον. φαίνεται δέ μοι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις
δοκεῖν. βούλομαι γὰρ ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτὸς ἀκουσαί
σου αὐτοῦ διόντος τὰ ἐπίλοιπα. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ
μὲν δὴ, ὦ Γοργία, καὶ αὐτὸς ἡδέως μὲν ἂν Καλ-

λικλεῖ τούτῳ ἔτι διελεγόμεν, ἕως αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ Ἀμφίονος ἀπέδωκα ῥῆσιν ἀντὶ τῆς τοῦ Ζήθου· ἐπειδὴ δὲ σύ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἐθέλεις συνδιαπερᾶναι τὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' οὖν ἐμοῦ γε ἀκούων
 C ἐπιλαμβάνου, ἔάν τί σοι δοκῶ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν. καί με ἐὰν ἐξελέγξης, οὐκ ἀχθεσθήσομαί σοι, ὥσπερ σὺ ἐμοί, ἀλλὰ μέγιστος εὐεργέτης παρ' ἐμοὶ ἀναγεγράφει. ΚΑΛ. Λέγε, ὦ ῥαθέ, αὐτὸς καὶ πέραινε.

CAP. LXII. ΣΩ. Ἦ ἀκουε δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐμοῦ ἀναλαβόντος τὸν λόγον. Ἄρα τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστίν; Οὐ ταυτόν, ὥς ἐγὼ καὶ Καλλικλῆς ὡμολογήσαμεν. Πότερον δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ ἔνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πρακτέον, ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔνεκα τοῦ ἡδέος; Τὸ ἡδὺ ἔνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Ἦδὺ
 D δέ ἐστι τοῦτο, οὗ παραγενομένου ἡδόμεθα; ἀγαθὸν δέ, οὗ παρόντος ἀγαθοὶ ἐσμεν; Πάνν γε. Ἄλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθοὶ γέ ἐσμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα ὅσα ἀγαθὰ ἐστίν, ἀρετῆς τινος παραγενομένης; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις. Ἄλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἢ γε ἀρετὴ ἐκάστου, καὶ σκεύους καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς αὐτῆς καὶ ζώου παντός, οὐ τῷ εἰκῇ κάλλιστα παραγίγνεται, ἀλλὰ τάξει καὶ ὀρθότητι καὶ τέχνῃ, ἣτις ἐκάστῳ ἀποδέδεται αὐτῶν. Ἄρα ἔστι ταῦτα; Ἐγὼ μὲν
 E γάρ φημι. Τάξει ἄρα τεταγμένον καὶ κεκοσμημένον ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐκάστου; Φαῖνν ἂν ἔγωγε. Κόσμος τις ἄρα ἐγγενόμενος ἐν ἐκάστῳ ὁ ἐκάστου οἰκεῖος ἀγαθὸν παρέχει ἐκαστον τῶν ὄντων; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Καὶ ψυχὴ ἄρα κόσμον ἔχουσα

τὸν ξαυτῆς ἀμείνων τῆς ἀκοσμήτου; Ἀνάγκη.
 Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἢ γε κόσμον ἔχουσα κοσμία; Πῶς
 γὰρ οὐ μέλλει; Ἡ δέ γε κοσμία σώφρων; 507
 Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη. Ἡ ἄρα σώφρων ψυχὴ ἀγαθὴ.
 Ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἔχω παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλα φάναι, ὧ
 φίλε Καλλίκλεις· σὺ δ' εἰ ἔχεις, δίδασκε. ΚΑΛ.
 Λέγ', ὧ γαθέ. ΣΩ. Λέγω δὴ, ὅτι, εἰ ἡ σώφρων
 ἀγαθὴ ἐστίν, ἢ τούναντίον τῇ σώφρονι πεπονθυῖα
 κακὴ ἐστίν. ἦν δὲ αὕτη ἡ ἀφρων τε καὶ ἀκό-
 λαστος; Πάνυ γε. Καὶ μὴν ὁ γε σώφρων τὰ
 προσήκοντα πράττει ἂν καὶ περὶ θεοὺς καὶ περὶ
 ἀνθρώπους; οὐ γὰρ ἂν σωφρονοῖ τὰ μὴ προσή-
 κοντα πράττων. Ἀνάγκη ταῦτ' εἶναι οὕτω.
 Καὶ μὴν περὶ μὲν ἀνθρώπους τὰ προσήκοντα Β
 πράττων δίκαι' ἂν πράττοι, περὶ δὲ θεοὺς ὅσια·
 τὸν δὲ τὰ δίκαια καὶ ὅσια πράττοντα ἀνάγκη δί-
 καιον καὶ ὅσιον εἶναι; Ἔστι ταῦτα. Καὶ μὲν
 δὴ καὶ ἀνδρεῖόν γε ἀνάγκη; οὐ γὰρ δὴ σώφρωνος
 ἀνδρός ἐστιν οὔτε διώκειν οὔτε φεύγειν ἢ μὴ προσ-
 ῆκει, ἀλλ' ἃ δεῖ καὶ πράγματα καὶ ἀνθρώπους
 καὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας φεύγειν καὶ διώκειν, καὶ
 ὑπομένοντα καρτερεῖν ὅπου δεῖ· ὥστε πολλὴ C
 ἀνάγκη, ὧ Καλλίκλεις, τὸν σώφρονα ὥσπερ διήλ-
 θομεν, δίκαιον ὄντα καὶ ἀνδρεῖον καὶ ὅσιον ἀγα-
 θὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι τελέως, τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν εὖ τε καὶ
 καλῶς πράττειν ἢ ἂν πράττη, τὸν δ' εὖ πράττον-
 τα μακάριόν τε καὶ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι, τὸν δὲ πο-
 νηρὸν καὶ κακῶς πράττοντα ἄθλιον. οὗτος δ' ἂν
 εἴη ὁ ἐναντίως ἔχων τῷ σώφρονι, ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ὃν
 σὺ ἐπὶ ἥνεις. CAP. LXIII. Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα

οὕτω τίθεμαι καὶ φημι ταῦτα ἀληθῆ εἶναι. εἰ δὲ
D ἔστιν ἀληθῆ, τὸν βουλόμενον, ὡς ἔοικεν, εὐδαί-
μονα εἶναι σωφροσύνην μὲν διωκτέον καὶ ἀσκη-
τέον, ἀκολασίαν δὲ φευκτέον ὡς ἔχει ποδῶν ἕκα-
στος ἡμῶν, καὶ παρασκευαστέον μάλιστα μὲν
μηδὲν δεῖσθαι τοῦ κολάζεσθαι, ἐὰν δὲ δεηθῇ ἢ
αὐτὸς ἢ ἄλλος τις τῶν οἰκείων, ἢ ἰδιώτης ἢ πόλις,
ἐπιθετέον δίκην καὶ κολαστέον, εἰ μέλλει εὐδαί-
μων εἶναι. οὗτος ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ὁ σκοπὸς εἶναι,
πρὸς ὃν βλέποντα δεῖ ζῆν, καὶ πάντα εἰς τοῦτο
τὰ αὐτοῦ συντείνοντα καὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως
E δικαιοσύνη παρέσται καὶ σωφροσύνη τῷ μακαρίῳ
μέλλοντι ἔσεσθαι, οὕτω πράττειν, οὐκ ἐπιθυμίας
ἕῶντα ἀκολάστους εἶναι καὶ ταύτας ἐπιχειροῦντα
πληροῦν, ἀνήνυτον κακόν, ληστοῦ βίον ζῶντα.
οὔτε γὰρ ἂν ἄλλω ἀνθρώπῳ προσφιλεῖς ἂν εἴη ὁ
τοιοῦτος οὔτε θεῷ. κοινωνεῖν γὰρ ἀδύνατος.
ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ ἔνι κοινωνία, φιλία οὐκ ἂν εἴη. φασὶ
δ' οἱ σοφοί, ὧς Καλλίκλεις, καὶ οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν
508 καὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους τὴν κοινωνίαν συνέχειν
καὶ φιλίαν καὶ κοσμιότητα καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ
δικαιοσύνην, — καὶ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο διὰ ταῦτα κόσ-
μον καλοῦσιν, ὧς ἔταϊρε, — οὐκ ἀκοσμίαν οὐδὲ
ἀκολασίαν. σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς οὐ προσέχειν τὸν
νοῦν τούτοις, καὶ ταῦτα σοφὸς ὢν, ἀλλὰ λέληθέ
σε, ὅτι ἡ ἰσότης ἡ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ ἐν θεοῖς καὶ ἐν
ἀνθρώποις μέγα δύναται. σὺ δὲ πλεονεξίαν οἶει
δεῖν ἀσκεῖν. γεωμετρίας γὰρ ἀμελεῖς. Εἶεν. ἢ
B ἔξελεγκτέος δὴ οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἡμῶν ἐστιν, ὡς οὐ
δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης κτήσεται εὐδαίμονες

οἱ εὐδαίμονες, κακίας δὲ οἱ ἄθλιοι · ἢ εἰ οὗτος ἀληθὴς ἐστὶ, σκεπτόν τί τὰ συμβαίνοντα. τὰ πρόσθεν ἐκεῖνα, ὧς Καλλίκλεις, συμβαίνει πάντα, ἔφ' οἷς σύ με ἤρουν, εἰ σπουδάζων λέγοιμι, λέγοντα, ὅτι κατηγορητέον εἶη καὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ υἱέος καὶ ἐταίρου, ἐάν τι ἀδικῇ, καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ ἐπὶ τοῦτο χρηστέον. καὶ ἃ Πῶλον αἰσχύνη ᾧου συγχωρεῖν, ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἦν, τὸ εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ C ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὅσῳ περ αἰσχίον, τοσοῦτον κάκιον · καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ὀρθῶς ῥητορικὸν ἔσεσθαι δίκαιον ἄρα δεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἐπιστήμονα τῶν δικαίων, ὃ αὖ Γοργίαν ἔφη Πῶλος δι' αἰσχύνην ὁμολογῆσαι. CAP. LXIV. Τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων, σκεψώμεθα τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἃ σὺ ἐμοὶ ὀνειδίζεις, ἄρα καλῶς λέγεται, ἢ οὐ, ὥς ἄρα ἐγὼ οὐχ οἷός τ' εἰμὶ βοηθῆσαι οὔτε ἐμαντιῶ οὔτε τῶν φίλων οὐδενὶ οὐδὲ τῶν οἰκείων, οὐδ' ἐκσῶσαι ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων, εἰμὶ δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ ὥσπερ οἱ ἄτιμοι D τοῦ ἐθέλοντος, ἅν τε τύπτειν βούληται, τὸ νεανικὸν δὴ τοῦτο τοῦ σοῦ λόγου, ἐπὶ κόρῃς, ἐάν τε χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, ἐάν τε ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἐάν τε, τὸ ἔσχατον, ἀποκτεῖναι · καὶ οὕτω διακεῖσθαι πάντων δὴ αἰσχιστόν ἐστιν, ὥς ὁ σὸς λόγος. ὁ δὲ δὴ ἐμός, ὅστις πολλάκις μὲν ἤδη εἴρηται, οὐδὲν δὲ κωλύει καὶ ἔτι λέγεσθαι · οὐ φημι, ὧς Καλλίκλεις, τὸ τύπτεσθαι ἐπὶ κόρῃς ἀδίκως E αἰσχιστόν εἶναι, οὐδέ γε τὸ τέμνεσθαι οὔτε τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἐμὸν οὔτε τὸ βαλάντιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ τύπτειν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ τὰ ἐμὰ ἀδίκως καὶ τέμνειν καὶ αἰσχίον καὶ κάκιον, καὶ κλέπτειν γε ἄρα καὶ ἀνδρα-

ποδίζεσθαι καὶ τοιχωρυχεῖν καὶ συλλήβδην ὀτιοῦν
 ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ τὰ ἐμὰ τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ αἵ-
 σχιον καὶ κάκιον εἶναι ἢ ἐμοὶ τῷ ἀδικουμένῳ.
 ταῦτα ἡμῖν ἄνω ἐκεῖ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λόγοις
 509 οὕτω φανέντα, ὥς ἐγὼ λέγω, κατέχεται καὶ δέ-
 δεται, καὶ εἰ ἀγροικότερόν τι εἰπεῖν ἐστι, σιδηροῖς
 καὶ ἀδαμαντίνοις λόγοις, ὥς γοῦν ἂν δόξειεν
 οὕτωςίν, οὓς σὺ εἰ μὴ λύσεις ἢ σοῦ τις νεανικώ-
 τερος, οὐχ οἷόν τε, ἄλλως λέγοντα ἢ ὥς ἐγὼ νῦν
 λέγω, καλῶς λέγειν· ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος
 ἐστὶν αἰεὶ, ὅτι ἐγὼ ταῦτα οὐκ οἶδα ὅπως ἔχει, ὅτι
 μέντοι ὧν ἐγὼ ἐντειύχηκα, ὥσπερ νῦν, οὐδεὶς οἷός
 B τ' ἐστὶν ἄλλως λέγων μὴ οὐ καταγέλαστος εἶναι.
 ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν αὖ τίθημι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν. εἰ δὲ
 οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστὶν ἢ ἀδι-
 κία τῷ ἀδικοῦντι, καὶ ἔτι τούτου μεῖζον μεγίστου
 ὄντος, εἰ οἷόν τε, τὸ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην,
 τίνα ἂν βοήθειαν μὴ δυνάμενος ἄνθρωπος βοη-
 θεῖν ἐαντιῷ καταγέλαστος ἂν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ εἴη;
 ἄρ' οὐ ταύτην, ἣτις ἀποτρέψει τὴν μεγίστην
 ἡμῶν βλάβην; ἀλλὰ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ταύτην εἶναι
 τὴν αἰσχίστην βοήθειαν, μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν
 μήτε ἐαντιῷ μήτε τοῖς αὐτοῦ φίλοις τε καὶ οἰκεί-
 C οῖς, δευτέραν δὲ τὴν τοῦ δευτέρου κακοῦ καὶ τρί-
 την τὴν τοῦ τρίτου, καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτως· ὥς ἐκά-
 στου κακοῦ μέγεθος πέφυκεν, οὕτω καὶ κάλλος
 τοῦ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐφ' ἑκάστα βοηθεῖν καὶ αἰσχύ-
 νη τοῦ μῆ. ἄρα ἄλλως, ἢ οὕτως ἔχει, ὧς Καλλί-
 κλεις; ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ ἄλλως.

CAP. LXV. ΣΩ. Ἄνοῖν οὖν ὄντιον, τοῦ ἀδι-

κεῖν τε καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι, μεῖζον μὲν φαμεν κακὸν
 τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ἔλαττον δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι. τί οὖν ἂν
 παρασκευασάμενος ἄνθρωπος βοηθήσειεν αὐτῷ,
 ὥστε ἀμφοτέρως τὰς ὠφελείας ταύτας ἔχειν, τὴν D
 τε ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἀδι-
 κεῖσθαι; πότερά δύναμιν, ἢ βούλησιν; ὧδε δὲ
 λέγω· πότερον ἔάν μὴ βούληται ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐκ
 ἀδικήσεται, ἢ ἔάν δύναμιν παρασκευάσῃται τοῦ
 μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐκ ἀδικήσεται; ΚΑΛ. Δῆλον
 δὴ τοῦτο γε, ὅτι ἔάν δύναμιν. ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δὴ
 τοῦ ἀδικεῖν; πότερον ἔάν μὴ βούληται ἀδικεῖν,
 ἱκανὸν τοῦτ' ἐστίν — οὐ γὰρ ἀδικήσῃ —, ἢ καὶ E
 ἐπὶ τοῦτο δεῖ δύναμιν τινα καὶ τέχνην παρα-
 σκευάσασθαι, ὥς, ἔάν μὴ μάθῃ αὐτὰ καὶ ἀσκήσῃ,
 ἀδικήσῃ; Τί οὐκ αὐτό γέ μοι τοῦτο ἀπεκρίνω,
 ὦ Καλλίκλεις; πότερόν σοι δοκοῦμεν ὀρθῶς
 ἀναγκασθῆναι ὁμολογεῖν ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λό-
 γοις ἐγὼ τε καὶ Πῶλος, ἢ οὐ, ἥνίκα ὁμολογήσα-
 μεν μηδὲνα βουλόμενον ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ' ἄκοντας
 τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας πάντας ἀδικεῖν; ΚΑΛ. Ἔστι
 σοι τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως, ἵνα διαπεράνῃς 510
 τὸν λόγον. ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἄρα, ὥς ἔοικε,
 παρασκευαστέον ἐστὶ δύναμιν τινα καὶ τέχνην,
 ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσωμεν. ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ.
 Τίς οὖν ποτ' ἐστὶ τέχνη τῆς παρασκευῆς τοῦ
 μηδὲν ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ὥς ὀλίγιστα; σκέψαι, εἰ σοὶ
 δοκεῖ ἢ περ ἐμοί. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ ἥδε· ἢ
 αὐτὸν ἄρχειν δεῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἢ καὶ τυραννεῖν,
 ἢ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης πολιτείας εἰταῖρον εἶναι.
 ΚΑΛ. Ὅρα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὥς ἐγὼ ἔτοιμός εἰμι

Β ἐπαινεῖν, ἂν τι καλῶς λέγῃς ; τοῦτό μοι δοκεῖς πάννυ καλῶς εἰρηκέναι.

CAP. LXVI. ΣΩ. Σκόπει δὴ καὶ τόδε ξάν σοι δοκῶ εὖ λέγειν. φίλος μοι δοκεῖ ἕκαστος ἑκάστω εἶναι ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα, ὅνπερ οἱ παλαιοὶ τε καὶ σοφοὶ λέγουσιν, ὁ ὅμοιος τῷ ὁμοίῳ. οὐ καὶ σοί ; ΚΑΛ. Ἐμοιγε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅπου τύραννός ἐστιν ἄρχων ἄγριος καὶ ἀπαίδευτος, εἴ τις τούτου ἐν τῇ πόλει πολὺ βελτίων εἴη, φοβοῖτο δῆπου ἂν αὐτὸν ὁ τύραννος καὶ τούτῳ ἐξ
C ἅπαντος τοῦ νοῦ οὐκ ἂν ποτε δύναιτο φίλος γενέσθαι ; ΚΑΛ. Ἐστι ταῦτα. ΣΩ. Οὐδέ γε εἴ τις πολὺ φανλότερος εἴη, οὐδ' ἂν οὗτος · καταφρονοῖ γὰρ ἂν αὐτοῦ ὁ τύραννος καὶ οὐκ ἂν ποτε ὡς πρὸς φίλον σπουδάσειε. ΚΑΛ. Καὶ ταῦτ' ἀληθῆ. ΣΩ. Λείπεται δὴ ἐκεῖνος μόνος ἄξιος λόγου φίλος τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὅς ἂν, ὁμοιότητος ὦν, ταῦτ' ὑέγων καὶ ἐπαινῶν ἐθέλῃ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ὑποκεῖσθαι τῷ ἄρχοντι. οὗτος μέγα ἐν ταύ-
D τη τῇ πόλει δυνήσεται · τοῦτον οὐδεὶς χαίρων ἀδικήσει. οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει ; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Εἰ ἄρα τις ἐννοήσειεν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει τῶν νέων, Τίνα ἂν τρόπον ἐγὼ μέγα δυναίμην καὶ μηδεὶς με ἀδικοίη, αὕτη, ὡς ἔοικεν, αὐτῷ ὁδός ἐστιν, εὐθὺς ἐκ νέου ἐθίζειν αὐτὸν τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν καὶ ἄχθεσθαι τῷ δεσπότῃ, καὶ παρασκευάζειν, ὅπως ὅτι μάλιστα ὅμοιος ἔσται ἐκείνῳ.
E οὐχ οὕτως ; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τούτῳ τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ μέγα δύνασθαι, ὡς ὁ ὑμέτερος λόγος, ἐν τῇ πόλει διαπεπράξεται.

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. *ΣΩ.* Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν; ἢ πολλοῦ δεῖ, εἴπερ ὅμοιος ἔσται τῷ ἄρχοντι, ὄντι ἀδίκῳ, καὶ παρὰ τοῦτω μέγα δυνήσεται; ἀλλ' οἶμαι ἔγωγε, πᾶν τούναντίον οὐτωςὶ ἢ παρασκευὴ ἔσται αὐτῷ ἐπὶ τὸ οἶφ τε εἶναι ὡς πλεῖστα ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην. ἢ γάρ; *ΚΑΛ.* Φαίνεται. *ΣΩ.* Οὐκ οὖν τὸ μέγιστον αὐτῷ κακὸν ὑπάρξει, μοχθηρῷ ὄντι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ λελωθημένῳ διὰ τὴν μίμησιν τοῦ δεσπότου καὶ δύναμιν. *ΚΑΛ.* Οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπη στρέφεις ἐκάστοτε τοὺς λόγους ἄνω καὶ κάτω, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα, ὅτι οὗτος ὁ μιμούμενος τὸν μὴ μιμούμενον ἐκείνον ἀποκτενεῖ, ἐὰν βούληται, καὶ ἀφαιρήσεται τὰ ὄντα; *ΣΩ.* Οἶδα, Β ὦ γὰρθὲ Καλλίκλεις, εἰ μὴ κωφός γ' εἰμί, καὶ σοῦ ἀκούων καὶ Πῶλου ἄρτι πολλάκις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὀλίγον πάντων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει. ἀλλὰ καὶ σὺ ἐμοῦ ἄκουε, ὅτι ἀποκτενεῖ μέν, ἂν βούληται, ἀλλὰ πονηρὸς ὢν καλὸν καγαθὸν ὄντα. *ΚΑΛ.* Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο διὴ καὶ τὸ ἀγανακτητιόν; *ΣΩ.* Οὐ νοῦν γε ἔχοντι, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει. ἢ οἶε δεῖν τοῦτο παρασκευάζεσθαι ἄνθρωπον, ὡς πλεῖστον χρόνον ζῆν, καὶ μελετᾶν τὰς τέχνας ταύτας, αἷ ἡμᾶς ἀεὶ ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων σώζουσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἦν σὺ κε- C λεύεις ἐμὲ μελετᾶν τὴν ῥητορικὴν, τὴν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις διασώζουσιν; *ΚΑΛ.* Ναὶ μὰ Δί' ὀρθῶς γέ σοι συμβουλεύων.

CAP. LXVII. *ΣΩ.* Τί δέ, ὦ βέλτιστε; ἢ καὶ ἡ τοῦ νεῖν ἐπιστήμη σεμνή τίς σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι; *ΚΑΛ.* Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔμοιγε. *ΣΩ.* Καὶ

μὴν σώζει γε καὶ αὕτη ἐκ θανάτου τοὺς ἀνθρώ-
 πους, ὅταν εἰς τοιοῦτον ἐμπέσωσιν, οὗ δεῖ ταύτης
 D τῆς ἐπιστήμης. εἰ δ' αὕτη σοι δοκεῖ σμικρὰ εἶ-
 ναι, ἐγὼ σοι μείζονα ταύτης ἔρω, τὴν κυβερνητι-
 κήν, ἣ οὐ μόνον τὰς ψυχὰς σώζει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ
 σώματα καὶ τὰ χρήματα ἐκ τῶν ἐσχάτων κινδύ-
 νων, ὥσπερ ἡ ῥητορική. καὶ αὕτη μὲν προσε-
 σταλμένη ἐστὶ καὶ κοσμία, καὶ οὐ σεμνύνεται
 ἐσχηματισμένη ὡς ὑπερήφανόν τι διαπραττομένη,
 ἀλλὰ ταῦτά διαπραξαμένη τῇ δικανικῇ, ἐὰν μὲν
 ἐξ Αἰγίνης δεῦρο σώσῃ, οἶμαι, δύ' ὁβολοὺς ἐπρά-
 E ξατο, ἐὰν δὲ ἐξ Αἰγύπτου ἢ ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου, ἐὰν
 πάμπολυ ταύτης τῆς μεγάλης εὐεργεσίας, σώσας
 ἃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ παῖδας καὶ χρή-
 ματα καὶ γυναῖκας, ἀποβιβάσας εἰς τὸν λιμένα
 δύο δραχμὰς ἐπράξατο, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἔχων τὴν τέ-
 χνην καὶ ταῦτα διαπραξάμενος ἐκβὰς παρὰ τὴν
 θάλατταν καὶ τὴν ναῦν περιπατεῖ ἐν μετρίῳ σχή-
 ματι. λογίζεσθαι γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐπίσταται, ὅτι
 ἀδελφὸν ἐστὶν οὕστινας τε ὠφέληκε τῶν συμπλεόν-
 των οὐκ ἐάσας καταποντωθῆναι καὶ οὕστινας
 ἐβλαπεν, εἰδὼς, ὅτι οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς βελτίους ἐξεβί-
 512 βασεν ἢ οἳ ἐνέβησαν, οὔτε τὰ σώματα οὔτε τὰς
 ψυχὰς. λογίζεται οὖν, ὅτι οὐκ, εἰ μὲν τις μεγά-
 λοις καὶ ἀνιάτοις νοσήμασι κατὰ τὸ σῶμα συνε-
 χόμενος μὴ ἀπεπνίγη, οὗτος μὲν ἀθλιός ἐστιν, ὅτι
 οὐκ ἀπέθανε, καὶ οὐδὲν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὠφέληται· εἰ
 δέ τις ἄρα ἐν τῷ τοῦ σώματος τιμιωτέρῳ, τῇ
 ψυχῇ, πολλὰ νοσήματα ἔχει καὶ ἀνιάτα, τούτῳ
 δὲ βιωτέον ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτον ὀνήσειεν, ἂν τε ἐκ

θαλάττης ἂν τε ἐκ δικαστηρίου ἂν τε ἄλλοθεν
 ὀποθενοῦν σώσῃ, ἀλλ' οἶδεν, ὅτι οὐκ ἄμεινόν ἐστι B
 ζῆν τῷ μοχθηρῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· κακῶς γὰρ ἀνάγκη
 ἐστὶ ζῆν. CAP. LXVIII. Διὰ ταῦτα οὐ νόμος
 ἐστὶ σεμνύνεσθαι τὸν κυβερνήτην, καίπερ σώζοντα
 ἡμᾶς. οὐδέ γε, ὦ θαυμάσιε, τὸν μηχανοποιόν, ὃς
 οὔτε στρατηγοῦ, μὴ ὅτι κυβερνήτου, οὔτε ἄλλον
 οὐδενὸς ἐλάττω ἐνίοτε δύναται σώζειν· πόλεις
 γὰρ ἔστιν ὅτε ὅλας σώζει. μή σοι δοκεῖ κατὰ τὸν
 δικανικὸν εἶναι; καίτοι εἰ βούλοιτο λέγειν, ὦ
 Καλλίχλεις, ἅπερ ὑμεῖς, σεμνύνων τὸ πρᾶγμα,
 καταχώσειεν ἂν ὑμᾶς τοῖς λόγοις, λέγων καὶ πα- C
 ρακαλῶν ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖν γίνεσθαι μηχανοποιούς, ὥς
 οὐδὲν τᾶλλά ἐστιν· ἱκανὸς γὰρ αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος.
 ἀλλὰ σὺ οὐδὲν ἦιτον αὐτοῦ καταφρονεῖς καὶ τῆς
 τέχνης τῆς ἐκείνου, καὶ ὥς ἐν ὀνειδίει ἀποκαλέσαις
 ἂν μηχανοποιόν, καὶ τῷ νίει αὐτοῦ οὔτ' ἂν δοῦ-
 ναι θυγατέρα ἐθέλοις, οὔτ' ἂν αὐτὸς τῷ σαντοῦ
 λαβεῖν τὴν ἐκείνου. καίτοι ἐξ ὧν τὰ σαντοῦ ἐπαι-
 νεῖς, τίινι δικαίῳ λόγῳ τοῦ μηχανοποιοῦ καταφρο-
 νεῖς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὧν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον; οἶδ' ὅτι D
 φράιης ἂν βελτίων εἶναι καὶ ἐκ βελτιόνων. τὸ δὲ
 βέλτιον εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ὃ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοῦτ'
 ἐστὶν ἀρετή, τὸ σώζειν αὐτὸν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ὄντα
 ὁποῖός τις ἔιυχε, καταγέλαστος σοι ὁ νόμος γίγνε-
 ται καὶ μηχανοποιοῦ καὶ ἱατροῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
 τεχνῶν, ὅσαι τοῦ σώζειν ἕνεκα πεποίηνται. ἀλλ',
 ὦ μακάριε, ὅρα μὴ ἄλλο τι τὸ γενναῖον καὶ τὸ
 ἀγαθὸν ἢ τοῦ σώζειν τε καὶ σώζεσθαι. μὴ γὰρ
 τοῦτο μὲν, τὸ ζῆν ὅποσονδὴ χρόνον, τὸν γε ὥς E

ἀληθῶς ἄνδρα ξατίον ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ φιλοψυχητέον, ἀλλὰ ἐπιτρέψαντα περὶ τούτων τῷ θεῷ καὶ πιστεύσαντα ταῖς γυναιξίν, ὅτι τὴν εἰμαρμένην οὐδ' ἂν εἷς ἐκφύγοι, τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ σκεπτέον, τίν' ἂν τρόπον τοῦτον ὃν μέλλει χρόνον βιῶναι ὡς ἄριστα βιώῃ, ἄρα ἐξομοίων αὐτὸν τῇ πολιτείᾳ βίῃ ταύτῃ, ἐν ἣ ἂν οἰκῇ, καὶ νῦν δὲ ἄρα δεῖ σέ ὡς ὁμοιότατον γίγνεσθαι τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων, εἰ μέλλεις τούτῳ προσφιλεῖς εἶναι καὶ μέγα δύνασθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει; τοῦθ' ὅρα εἰ σοὶ λυσitteλεῖ καὶ ἐμοί, ὅπως μὴ, ὧ δαιμόνιε, πεισόμεθα ὅπερ φασὶ τὰς τὴν σελήνην καθαιρούσας, τὰς Θετταλίδας· σὺν τοῖς φιλτάτοις ἢ αἵρεσις ἡμῖν ἔσται ταύτης τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς ἐν τῇ πόλει. εἰ δέ σοι οἶε ὄντινον ἄνθρώπων παραδώσειν τέχνην τινὰ τοιαύτην, ἣτις σε ποιήσῃ μέγα δύνασθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει τῇδε ἄνόμοιον ὄντα τῇ πολιτείᾳ εἴτ' ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον εἴτ' ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐκ ὀρθῶς βουλευεῖ, ὧ Καλλίκλεις· οὐ γὰρ μιμητὴν δεῖ εἶναι, ἀλλ' αὐτοφυῶς ὅμοιον τούτοις, εἰ μέλλεις τι γνήσιον ἀπεργάζεσθαι εἰς φιλίαν τῷ Ἀθηναίων δήμῳ καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία τῷ Πυριλάμπους γε πρὸς. ὅστις οὖν σε τούτοις ὁμοιότατον ἀπεργάσσεται, οὗτός σε ποιήσῃ, ὡς ἐπιθυμεῖς πολιτικὸς εἶναι, πολιτικὸν καὶ ῥητορικόν· τῷ αὐτῶν γὰρ ἦθει λεγομένων τῶν λόγων ἕκαστοι χαίρουσι, τῷ δὲ ἄλλοτριῷ ἄχθονται. εἰ μὴ τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις, ὧ φίλη κεφαλή. Λέγομέν τι πρὸς ταῦτα, ὧ Καλλίκλεις;

CAP. LXIX. ΚΑΑ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ὄντινά μοι τρόπον δοκεῖς εὖ λέγειν, ὧ Σώκρατες. πέπονθα δὲ

τὸ τῶν πολλῶν πάθος· οὐ πάνυ σοι πεύθομαι.
 ΣΩ. Ὁ δῆμον γὰρ ἔρως, ὃ Καλλίκευς, ἐνὼν ἐν
 τῇ ψυχῇ τῇ σῇ ἀντιστατεῖ μοι· ἀλλ' ἐὰν πολλά- D
 κeis ἴσως καὶ βέλτιον ταῦτ' αὐτὰ διασκοπώμεθα,
 πεισθήσει. ἀναμνήσθητι δ' οὖν, ὅτι δὴ ἔφαμεν
 εἶναι τὰς παρὰσκευὰς ἐπὶ τὸ ἕκαστον θεραπεύειν
 καὶ σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴν, μίαν μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν ὁμι-
 λεῖν, τὴν ἑτέραν δὲ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, μὴ κατα-
 χαριζόμενον, ἀλλὰ διαμαχόμενον. οὐ ταῦτα ἦν
 ἂ τότε ὠριζόμεθα; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκ-
 οὖν ἡ μὲν ἑτέρα, ἡ πρὸς ἡδονήν, ἀγεννὴς καὶ
 οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ κολακεία τυγχάνει οὕσα. ἡ γάρ; Ε
 ΚΑΛ. Ἐστὼ, εἰ βούλει, σοὶ οὕτως. ΣΩ. Ἡ
 δὲ γε ἑτέρα, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστον ἔσται τοῦτο, εἴτε
 σῶμα τυγχάνει ὃν εἴτε ψυχὴ, ὃ θεραπεύομεν;
 ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὕτως ἡμῖν
 ἐπιχειρητέον ἐστὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς πολίταις θε-
 rapeύειν ὡς βελτίστους αὐτοὺς τοὺς πολίτας ποι-
 οῦντας; ἄνευ γὰρ δὴ τούτου, ὡς ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσ-
 θεν εὐρίσκομεν, οὐδὲν ὄφελος ἄλλην εὐεργεσίαν οὐδὲ
 οὐδεμίαν προσφέρειν, ἐὰν μὴ καλὴ καὶ ἀγαθὴ ἡ δι-
 ἀνοια ἢ τῶν μελλόντων ἢ χρήματα πολλὰ λαμβά-
 νειν ἢ ἀρχὴν τινων ἢ ἄλλην δύναμιν ἥντινοῦν.
 θῶμεν οὕτως ἔχειν; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε, εἰ σοι
 ἡδίων. ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν παρεκαλοῦμεν ἀλλήλους, ὃ
 Καλλίκευς, δημοσίᾳ πράξαντες τῶν πολιτικῶν
 πραγμάτων, ἐπὶ τὰ οἰκοδομικά, ἢ τειχῶν ἢ νεωρί-
 ων ἢ ἱερῶν ἐπὶ τὰ μέγιστα οἰκοδομήματα, πότε-
 ρον ἔδει ἂν ἡμᾶς σκέπασθαι ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ Β
 ἐξετάσαι, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἐπιστάμεθα τὴν τέχνην, ἢ

οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα, τὴν οἰκοδομικὴν, καὶ παρὰ τοῦ
 ἐμάθομεν ; ἔδει ἄν, ἢ οὐ ; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.
 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν δεύτερον αὖ τόδε, εἴ τι πώποτε
 οἰκοδόμημα ὠκοδομήκαμεν ἰδίᾳ ἢ τῶν φίλων τινὶ
 ἢ ἡμέτερον αὐτῶν, καὶ τοῦτο τὸ οἰκοδόμημα κα-
 λὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν ἐστὶ. καὶ εἰ μὲν εὐρίσκομεν σκο-
 C πούμενοι διδασκάλους τε ἡμῶν ἀγαθοὺς καὶ ἔλλο-
 γίμους γεγονότας καὶ οἰκοδομήματα πολλὰ μὲν
 καὶ καλὰ μετὰ τῶν διδασκάλων ὠκοδομημένα
 ἡμῖν, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὑφ' ἡμῶν, ἐπειδὴ τῶν
 διδασκάλων ἀπηλλάγημεν, οὕτω μὲν διακειμένων,
 νοῦν ἔχόντων ἦν ἂν ἵεναι ἐπὶ τὰ δημόσια ἔργα·
 εἰ δὲ μήτε διδάσκαλον εἶχομεν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπι-
 δεῖξαι οἰκοδομήματά τε ἢ μηδὲν ἢ πολλὰ καὶ μη-
 δενὸς ἄξια, οὕτω δὲ ἀνόητον ἦν δῆπου ἐπιχειρεῖν
 τοῖς δημοσίοις ἔργοις καὶ παρακαλεῖν ἀλλήλους
 ἐπ' αὐτά. φῶμεν ταῦτα ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι, ἢ οὐ ;
 D ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

CAF. LXX. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω πάντα, τὰ τε
 ἄλλα, κἂν εἰ ἐπιχειρήσαντες δημοσιεύειν παρεκα-
 λούμεν ἀλλήλους ὥς ἱκανοὶ ἰατροὶ ὄντες, ἐπεσκε-
 ψάμεθα δῆπου ἂν ἐγὼ τε σὲ καὶ σὺ ἐμέ, Φέρε
 πρὸς θεῶν, αὐτοὺς δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης πῶς ἔχει τὸ σῶ-
 μα πρὸς ὑγίειαν ; ἢ ἤδη τίς ἄλλος διὰ Σωκράτην
 ἀπηλλάγη νόσου, ἢ δοῦλος ἢ ἐλεύθερος ; Κἂν
 E ἐγὼ, οἶμαι, περὶ σοῦ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἐσκόπουν.
 καὶ εἰ μὴ ἡύρίσκομεν δι' ἡμᾶς μηδένα βελτίω γε-
 γονότα τὸ σῶμα, μήτε τῶν ξένων μήτε τῶν ἀσίων,
 μήτε ἄνδρα μήτε γυναῖκα, πρὸς Διός, ὦ Καλλί-
 κλεις, οὐ καταγέλαστον ἂν ἦν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ εἰς το-

σοῦτον ἀνοίας ἐλθεῖν ἀνθρώπους, ὥστε, πρὶν ἰδιω-
 τεύοντας πολλὰ μὲν ὅπως ἐτύχομεν ποιῆσαι, πολ-
 λὰ δὲ κατορθῶσαι καὶ γυμνάσασθαι ἱκανῶς τὴν
 τέχνην, τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο, ἐν τῷ πύθῳ τὴν
 κεραμείαν ἐπιχειρεῖν μανθάνειν, καὶ αὐτοὺς τε
 δημοσιεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖν καὶ ἄλλους τοιοῦτους πα-
 ρακαλεῖν; οὐκ ἀνόητόν σοι δοκεῖ ἂν εἶναι οὕτω
 πράττειν; ΚΑΛ. Ἐμοιγε. ΣΩ. Νῦν δέ, ὧ⁵¹⁵
 βέλτιστε ἀνδρῶν, ἐπειδὴ σὺ μὲν αὐτὸς ἄρτι ἄρχει
 πράττειν τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα, ἐμὲ δὲ παρα-
 καλεῖς καὶ ὀνειδίζεις, ὅτι οὐ πράττω, οὐκ ἐπι-
 σκεψόμεθα ἀλλήλους, Φέρε, Καλλικλῆς ἤδη τινὰ
 βελτίῳ πεποίηκε τῶν πολιτῶν; ἔστιν ὅστις πρό-
 τερον πονηρὸς ὢν ἄδικός τε καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ
 ἄφρων διὰ Καλλικλέα καλὸς τε καὶ ἀγαθὸς γέγονεν,
 ἢ ξένος ἢ ἀστός, ἢ δοῦλος ἢ ἐλεύθερος; Λέγε Β
 μοι, εἴαν τις σε ταῦτα ἐξετάξῃ, ὧ Καλλίκλεις, τί
 ἐρεῖς; τίνα φήσεις βελτίῳ πεποιηκέναι ἄνθρωπον
 τῇ συνουσίᾳ τῇ σῇ; — Ὅκνεῖς ἀποκρίνασθαι, εἵ-
 περ ἔστι τοιόνδε τι ἔργον σὸν ἔτι ἰδιωτεύοντος,
 πρὶν δημοσιεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖν; ΚΑΛ. Φιλόνει-
 κος εἶ, ὧ Σώκράτες.

CAP. LXXI. ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὐ φιλονεικία γε
 ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀληθῶς βουλόμενος εἰδέναι ὄντινᾶ
 ποτε τρόπον οἶει δεῖν πολιτεύεσθαι ἐν ἡμῖν, εἰ
 ἄλλου του ἄρα ἐπιμελήσει ἡμῖν ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς
 πόλεως πράγματα ἢ ὅπως οἱ βέλτιστοι οἱ πολῖται
 ὦμεν. ἢ οὐ πολλάκις ἤδη ὠμολογήκαμεν τοῦτο
 δεῖν πράττειν τὸν πολιτικὸν ἄνδρα; ὠμολογή-
 καμεν, ἢ οὐ; ἀποκρίνου. ὠμολογήκαμεν · ἐγὼ

ὑπὲρ σοῦ ἀποκρινοῦμαι. Εἰ τοίνυν τοῦτο δεῖ
 τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα παρασκευάζειν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πό-
 λει, νῦν μοι ἀναμνησθεῖς εἰπὲ περὶ ἐκείνων τῶν
 ἀνδρῶν ὧν ὀλίγω πρότερον ἔλεγες, εἰ ἔτι σοι δο-
 D κοῦσιν ἀγαθοὶ πολῖται γεγονέναι, Περικλῆς καὶ
 Κίμων καὶ Μιλτιάδης καὶ Θεμιστοκλῆς. ΚΑΛ.
 Ἔμοιγε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἀγαθοί, δῆλον ὅτι
 ἕκαστος αὐτῶν βελτίους ἐποίει τοὺς πολίτας ἀντὶ
 χειρόνων. ἐποίει, ἢ οὐ; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ.
 Οὐκοῦν ὅτε Περικλῆς ἤρχετο λέγειν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ,
 χεῖρους ἦσαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἢ ὅτε τὰ τελευταῖα
 ἔλεγεν; ΚΑΛ. Ἴσως. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἴσως δῆ, ὦ
 βέλτιστε, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογημένων,
 Ε εἴπερ ἀγαθός γ' ἦν ἐκεῖνος πολίτης. ΚΑΛ. Τί
 οὖν δῆ; ΣΩ. Οὐδέν. ἀλλὰ τόδε μοι εἰπὲ ἐπὶ
 τούτῳ, εἰ λέγονται Ἀθηναῖοι διὰ Περικλέα βελ-
 τίους γεγονέναι, ἢ πᾶν τούναντίον διαφθαρῆναι
 ὑπ' ἐκείνου. ταυτὶ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἀκούω, Περικλέα
 πεποιηκέναι Ἀθηναίους ἀργοὺς καὶ δειλοὺς καὶ
 λάλους καὶ φιλαργύρους, εἰς μισθοφορίαν πρῶτον
 καταστήσαντα. ΚΑΛ. Τῶν τὰ ὧια κατεαγό-
 των ἀκούεις ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ
 τάδε οὐκέτι ἀκούω, ἀλλ' οἶδα σαφῶς καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ
 σύ, ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἠὺδοκίμει Περικλῆς καὶ
 οὐδεμίαν αἰσχρὰν δίκην κατεψηφίσαντο αὐτοῦ
 Ἀθηναῖοι, ἡνίκα χεῖρους ἦσαν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ καλοὶ
 516 καὶ ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνεσαν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, ἐπὶ τελευτῇ τοῦ
 βίου τοῦ Περικλέους, κλοπὴν αὐτοῦ κατεψηφί-
 σαντο, ὀλίγου δὲ καὶ θανάτου ἐτίμησαν, δῆλον
 ὅτι ὥς πονηροῦ ὄντος.

CAP. LXXII. ΚΑΛ. Τί οὖν ; τούτου ἕνεκα
 κακὸς ἦν Περικλῆς ; ΣΩ. Ὅνων γοῦν ἂν ἐπι-
 μελητῆς καὶ ἵππων καὶ βοῶν τοιοῦτος ὢν κακὸς
 ἂν ἐδόκει εἶναι, εἰ παραλαβὼν μὴ λακτίζοντας
 μηδὲ κυρίτιοντας μηδὲ δάκνοντας ἀπέδειξε ταῦτα
 ἅπαντα ποιοῦντας δι' ἀγριότητα. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι
 κακὸς εἶναι ἐπιμελητῆς ὅστισοῦν ὀτινοῦν ζῶου, ὅς B
 ἂν παραλαβὼν ἡμερώτερα ἀποδείξῃ ἀγριώτερα ἢ
 παρέλαβε ; Δοκεῖ, ἢ οὐ ; ΚΑΛ. Πάνν γε, ἵνα
 σοι χαρίσωμαι. ΣΩ. Καὶ τότε τοίνυν μοι χάρι-
 σαι ἀποκρινάμενος, πότερον καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐν
 τῶν ζῶων ἐστίν, ἢ οὐ ; ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ;
 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀνθρώπων Περικλῆς ἐπεμέλετο ;
 ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ; οὐκ ἔδει αὐτούς, ὥς
 ἄρτι ὁμολογοῦμεν, δικαιότερους γεγονέναι ἀντὶ
 ἀδικωτέρων ὑπ' ἐκείνου, εἴπερ ἐκείνος ἐπεμελεῖτο C
 αὐτῶν ἀγαθὸς ὢν τὰ πολιτικά ; ΚΑΛ. Πάνν
 γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οἷ γε δίκαιοι ἡμεροί, ὥς ἔφη
 Ὅμηρος. σὺ δὲ τί φῆς ; οὐχ οὕτως ; ΚΑΛ.
 Ναί. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγριωτέρους γε αὐτοὺς
 ἀπέφηνεν ἢ οἷους παρέλαβε, καὶ ταῦτ' εἰς αὐτόν,
 ὃν ἦκιστ' ἂν ἐβούλετο. ΚΑΛ. Βούλει σοι ὁμο-
 λογήσω ; ΣΩ. Εἰ δοκῶ γέ σοι ἀληθῆ λέγειν.
 ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω δὴ ταῦτα. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ
 ἀγριωτέρους, ἀδικωτέρους τε καὶ χείρους ; ΚΑΛ.
 Ἔστω. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρ' ἀγαθὸς τὰ πολιτικά Πε- D
 ρικλῆς ἦν ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου. ΚΑΛ. Οὐ σύ
 γε φῆς. ΣΩ. Μὰ Δί' οὐδέ γε σὺ ἐξ ὧν ὁμολο-
 γεῖς. Πάλιν δὲ λέγε μοι περὶ Κίμωνος · οὐκ
 ἐξωστράκισαν αὐτὸν οὗτοι, οὓς ἐθεράπευεν, ἵνα

αὐτοῦ δέκα ἐτῶν μὴ ἀκούσειαν τῆς φωνῆς;† καὶ
 Θεμιστοκλέα ταῦτα ταῦτα ἐποίησαν καὶ φυγῇ
 προσεξημίωσαν; Μιλτιάδην δὲ τὸν ἐν Μαραθῶνι
 Εἰς τὸ βάραθρον ἐμβαλεῖν ἐψηφίσαντο, καὶ εἰ μὴ
 διὰ τὸν πρύτανιν, ἐνέπεσεν ἄν; Καίτοι οὗτοι,
 εἰ ἦσαν ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί, ὥς σὺ φῆς, οὐκ ἂν ποτε
 ταῦτα ἔπασχον. οὐκουν οἳ γε ἀγαθοὶ ἡνίοχοι
 κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν οὐκ ἐκπίπτουσιν ἐκ τῶν ζευγῶν,
 ἐπειδὰν δὲ θεραπεύσωσι τοὺς ἵππους καὶ αὐτοὶ
 ἀμείνους γένωνται ἡνίοχοι, τότε ἐκπίπτουσιν. οὐκ
 ἔστι ταῦτ' οὐτ' ἐν ἡνιοχείᾳ οὐτ' ἐν ἄλλῳ ἔργῳ
 οὐδενί. ἢ δοκεῖ σοι; ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε. ΣΩ.
 Ἀληθεῖς ἄρα, ὥς ἔοικεν, οἱ ἔμπροσθεν λόγοι
 517 ἦσαν, ὅτι οὐδένα ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γε-
 γονότα τὰ πολιτικὰ ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει. σὺ δὲ ὡμο-
 λόγεις τῶν γε νῦν οὐδένα, τῶν μέντοι ἔμπροσθεν,
 καὶ προείλου τούτους τοὺς ἄνδρας. οὗτοι δὲ
 ἀνεφάνησαν ἐξ ἴσου τοῖς νῦν ὄντες, ὥστε, εἰ οὗτοι
 ῥήτορες ἦσαν, οὔτε τῇ ἀληθινῇ ῥητορικῇ ἔχρῳντο
 — οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐξέπεσον — οὔτε τῇ κολακικῇ.

CAP. LXXIII. ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι πολλοῦ
 Β γε δεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μὴ ποτέ τις τῶν νῦν ἔργα
 τοιαῦτα ἐργάσεται, οἷα τούτων ὃς βούλει εἰργα-
 σται. ΣΩ. ὦ δαιμόνιε, οὐδ' ἐγὼ ψέγω τούτους,
 ὥς γε διακόνους εἶναι πόλεως, ἀλλὰ μοι δοκοῦσι
 τῶν γε νῦν διακονικώτεροι γεγονέναι καὶ μᾶλλον
 οἰοί τε ἐκπορίζειν τῇ πόλει ὧν ἐπεθύμει. ἀλλὰ
 γὰρ μεταβιβάζειν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέ-
 πειν, πείθοντες καὶ βιαζόμενοι ἐπὶ τοῦτο, ὅθεν
 ἔμελλον ἀμείνους ἔσεσθαι οἱ πολῖται, ὥς ἔπος

εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν τούτων διέφερον ἐκεῖνοι· ὅπερ μόνον C
 ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀγαθοῦ πολίτου. ναῦς δὲ καὶ τείχη
 καὶ νεώρια καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ἐγὼ σοι
 ὁμολογῶ δεινότερους εἶναι ἐκείνους τούτων ἐκπο-
 ρίζειν. Πρᾶγμα οὖν γελοῖον ποιούμεν ἐγὼ τε
 καὶ σὺ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. ἐν παντὶ γὰρ τῷ χρόνῳ,
 ὃν διαλεγόμεθα, οὐδὲν πανόμεθα εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ
 περιφερόμενοι καὶ ἀγνοοῦντες ἀλλήλων ὅ τι λέ-
 γομεν. ἐγὼ γοῦν σε πολλάκις οἶμαι ὁμολογηκέναι
 καὶ ἐγνωκέναι, ὥς ἄρα διτιῇ αὕτη τις ἡ πραγμα- D
 τεία ἐστὶ καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν,
 καὶ ἡ μὲν ἐτέρα διακονικὴ ἐστίν, ἥ δυνατὸν εἶναι
 ἐκπορίζειν, εἰ μὲν πεινῇ τὰ σώματα ἡμῶν, σιτία,
 εἰ μὲν δὲ διψῇ, ποτά, εἰ μὲν δὲ ριγῷ, ἱμάτια, σιτρώμα-
 τα, ὑποδήματα, ἄλλα ὧν ἔρχεται σώματα εἰς ἐπι-
 θυμίαν. καὶ ἐξεπίτηδές σοι διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν εἰκό-
 νων λέγω, ἵνα ῥᾶον καταμάθῃς. τούτων γὰρ
 ποριστικὸν εἶναι ἢ κάπηλον ὄντα ἢ ἔμπορον ἢ
 δημιουργόν του αὐτῶν τούτων, σιτοποιὸν ἢ ὀμο- E
 ποιὸν ἢ ὑφάντην ἢ σκυτοτόμον ἢ σκυτοδεψόν, οὐ-
 δὲν θαυμαστόν ἐστιν, ὄντα τοιοῦτον δόξαι καὶ
 αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις θεραπευτὴν εἶναι σώματος,
 παντὶ τῷ μὴ εἰδότει, ὅτι ἔστι τις παρὰ ταύτας
 ἀπάσας τέχνη γυμναστική τε καὶ ἰατρική, ἣ δὴ
 τῷ ὄντι ἐστὶ σώματος θεραπεία, ἣν περ καὶ προσή-
 κει τούτων ἄρχειν πασῶν τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ χρῆ-
 σθαι τοῖς τούτων ἔργοις διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι ὅ τι τὸ
 χρηστὸν καὶ πονηρὸν τῶν σιτίων ἢ ποτίων ἐστίν· 518
 εἰς ἀρετὴν σώματος, τὰς δ' ἄλλας πάσας ταύτας
 ἀγνοεῖν· διὸ δὴ καὶ ταύτας μὲν δουλοπρεπεῖς τε

καὶ διακονικάς καὶ ἀνελευθέρους εἶναι περὶ σώ-
 ματος πραγματείαν, τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας· τὴν δὲ
 γυμναστικὴν καὶ ἰατρικὴν κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον δε-
 σποίνας εἶναι τούτων. ταῦτα οὖν ταῦτα ὅτι ἐστι
 καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν, τότε μὲν μοι δοκεῖς μανθάνειν
 ὅτι λέγω, καὶ ὁμολογεῖς ὡς εἰδώς, ὃ τι ἐγὼ λέγω·
 ἤκεις δὲ ὀλίγον ὕστερον λέγων, ὅτι [ἄνθρωποι]

B καλοὶ κάγαθοὶ γεγόνاسι πολῖται ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ
 ἐπειδὴν ἐγὼ ἐρωτῶ οἵτινες, δοκεῖς μοι ὁμοιοτάτους
 προτείνεισθαι ἀνθρώπους περὶ τὰ πολιτικά, ὥσπερ
 ἂν εἰ περὶ τὰ γυμναστικά ἐμοῦ ἐρωτῶντος οἵτινες
 ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν ἢ εἰςὶ σωμάτων θεραπευταί,
 ἔλεγές μοι πάννυ σπουδάζων, Θεαρίων ὁ ἀρτοκόπος
 καὶ Μίθαικος ὁ τὴν ὀψοποιίαν συγγεγραφώς τὴν
 Σικελικὴν καὶ Σάραμβος ὁ κάπηλος, ὅτι οὗτοι
 θαυμάσιοι γεγόνασι σωμάτων θεραπευταί, ὁ μὲν

C ἄρτους θαυμαστοὺς παρασκευάζων, ὁ δὲ ὄψον, ὁ
 δὲ οἶνον. CAP. LXXIV. "Ἴσως ἂν οὖν ἡγα-
 νάκτεις, εἴ σοι ἔλεγον ἐγὼ, ὅτι, "Ἀνθρωπε, ἐπαῖεις
 οὐδὲν περὶ γυμναστικῆς· διακόνους μοι λέγεις
 καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν παρασκευαστὰς ἀνθρώπους, οὐκ
 ἐπαῖοντας καλὸν κάγαθόν οὐδὲν περὶ αὐτῶν, οἷ,
 ἂν οὕτω τύχωσιν, ἐμπλήσαντες καὶ παχύναντες
 τὰ σώματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπαινούμενοι ὑπ' αὐ-

D τῶν, προσαπολοῦσιν αὐτῶν καὶ τὰς ἀρχαίας σάρ-
 κας. οἱ δ' αὖ δι' ἀπειρίαν οὐ τοὺς ἐστιῶντας
 αἰτιάσονται τῶν νόσων αἰτίους εἶναι καὶ τῆς ἀπο-
 βολῆς τῶν ἀρχαίων σαρκῶν, ἀλλ' οἱ ἂν αὐτοῖς
 τύχωσι τότε παρόντες καὶ συμβουλευόντές τι, ὅταν
 δῇ αὐτοῖς ἡκῆ ἢ τότε πλησμονὴ νόσον φέρουσα

συχνῶ ὕστερον χρόνῳ, ἅτε ἄνευ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ γε-
 γονυῖα, τούτους αἰτιάσονται καὶ ψέξουσι καὶ κα-
 κόν τι ποιήσουσιν, ἂν οἷοί τ' ᾧσι, τοὺς δὲ προτέ-
 ρους ἐκείνους καὶ αἰτίους τῶν κακῶν ἐγκωμιά- E
 σουσι. καὶ σὺ νῦν, ᾧ Καλλίκλεις, ὁμοιότατον
 τούτῳ ἐργάζει· ἐγκωμιάζεις ἀνθρώπους, οἳ τού-
 τους εἰστιάκασιν εὐωχοῦντες ᾧν ἐπεθύμουν, καί
 φασι μεγάλην τὴν πόλιν πεποιηκέναι αὐτούς·
 οἷτι δὲ οἶδεῖ καὶ ὑπουλός ἐστι δι' ἐκείνους τοὺς
 παλαιούς, οὐκ αἰσθάνονται. ἄνευ γὰρ σωφροσύ- 519
 νης καὶ δικαιοσύνης λιμένων καὶ νεωρίων καὶ
 τειχῶν καὶ φόρων καὶ τοιούτων φλυαριῶν ἐμπε-
 πλήκασιν τὴν πόλιν. ὅταν οὖν ἔλθῃ ἡ καταβολὴ
 αὕτη τῆς ἀσθενείας, τοὺς τότε παρόντας αἰτιά-
 σονται συμβούλους, Θεμιστοκλέα δὲ καὶ Κίμωνα
 καὶ Περικλέα ἐγκωμιάσουσι, τοὺς αἰτίους τῶν
 κακῶν· σοῦ δὲ ἴσως ἐπιλήψονται, ἐὰν μὴ εὐλαβῇ,
 καὶ τοῦ ἑμοῦ ἐταίρου Ἀλκιβιάδου, ὅταν καὶ τὰ
 ἀρχαῖα προσαπολλύωσι πρὸς οἷς ἐκτιήσαντο, οὐκ B
 αἰτίων ὄντων τῶν κακῶν, ἀλλ' ἴσως συναιτίων.
 καίτοι ἔγωγε ἀνόητον πρᾶγμα καὶ νῦν ὁρῶ γιγνό-
 μενον καὶ ἀκούω τῶν παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν πέρι.
 αἰσθάνομαι γάρ, ὅταν ἡ πόλις τινὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν
 ἀνδρῶν μεταχειρίζεται ὡς ἀδικοῦντα, ἀγανα-
 κτούντων καὶ σχετλιαζόντων, ὡς δεινὰ πάσχουσι·
 πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ τὴν πόλιν πεποιηκότας ἄρα
 ἀδίκως ὑπ' αὐτῆς ἀπόλλυνται, ὡς ὁ τούτων λόγος.
 τὸ δὲ ὅλον ψευδός ἐστι. προστάτης γὰρ πόλεως C
 οὐδ' ἂν εἷς ποτε ἀδίκως ἀπόλοιτο ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῆς
 πόλεως, ἧς προστατεῖ. κινδυνεύει γὰρ ταῦτόν

εἶναι, ὅσοι τε πολιτικοὶ προσποιοῦνται εἶναι καὶ ὅσοι σοφισταί. καὶ γὰρ οἱ σοφισταί, τᾶλλα σοφοὶ ὄντες, τοῦτο ἄτοπον ἐργάζονται πρᾶγμα· φάσκοντες γὰρ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλοι εἶναι πολλάκις κατηγοροῦσι τῶν μαθητῶν, ὡς ἀδικοῦσι σφᾶς αὐτούς, τοὺς τε μισθοὺς ἀποστεροῦντες καὶ ἄλλην χάριν οὐκ ἀποδιδόντες, εὖ πάθόντες ὑπ' αὐτῶν.

Δ καὶ τούτου τοῦ λόγου τί ἂν ἀλογώτερον εἴη πρᾶγμα, ἀνθρώπους ἀγαθοὺς καὶ δικαίους γενομένους, ἐξαίρεθέντας μὲν ἀδικίαν ὑπὸ τοῦ διδασκάλου, σχόντας δὲ δικαιοσύνην, ἀδικεῖν τούτῳ ᾧ οὐκ ἔχουσιν; οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τοῦτο ἄτοπον εἶναι, ᾧ ἐταῖρε; Ὡς ἀληθῶς δημηγορεῖν με ἡνάγκασας, ᾧ Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἐθέλων ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

CLP. LXXV. ΚΑΛ. Σὺ δ' οὐκ ἂν οἷός τ' Ε εἶης λέγειν, εἰ μὴ τίς σοι ἀποκρίνοιτο; ΣΩ. "Εοικά γε· νῦν γοῦν συχνοὺς τείνω τῶν λόγων, ἐπειδὴ μοι οὐκ ἐθέλεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἀλλ', ᾧ ᾗ γαθέ, εἰπέ πρὸς φιλίου, οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἄλογον εἶναι ἀγαθὸν φάσκοντα πεποιηκέναι τινὰ μέμφεσθαι τούτῳ, ὅτι ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἀγαθὸς γεγονώς τε καὶ ὦν ἔπειτα πονηρός ἐστιν; ΚΑΛ. "Εμοίγε δοκεῖ. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀκούεις τοιαῦτα λεγόντων 520 τῶν φασκόντων παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους εἰς ἀρετήν; ΚΑΛ. "Εγωγε. ἀλλὰ τί ἂν λέγοις ἀνθρώπων πέρι οὐδενὸς ἀξίων; ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἂν περὶ ἐκείνων λέγοις, οἳ φάσκοντες προεστάναι τῆς πόλεως καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται, πάλιν αὐτῆς κατηγοροῦσιν, ὅταν τύχῳσιν, ὡς πονηροτάτης; οἷε τι διαφέρειν τούτους ἐκείνων; ταυτόν, ᾧ μα-

κάρι', ἐστὶ σοφιστῆς καὶ ῥήτωρ, ἢ ἑγγύς τι καὶ
 παραπλήσιον, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον πρὸς Πῶλον. σὺ
 δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν τὸ μὲν πάγκαλόν τι οἶε εἶναι, B
 τὴν ῥητορικὴν, τοῦ δὲ καταφρονεῖς. τῇ δὲ ἀλη-
 θεία κάλλιόν ἐστι σοφιστικὴ ῥητορικῆς ὅσῳ περ
 νομοθετικὴ δικαστικῆς καὶ γυμναστικὴ ἰατρικῆς.
 μόνοις δ' ἔγωγε καὶ ὦμην τοῖς δημηγόροις τε καὶ
 σοφισταῖς οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖν μέμφεσθαι τούτῳ τῷ
 πράγματι, ὃ αὐτοὶ παιδεύουσιν, ὡς πονηρόν ἐστιν
 εἰς σφᾶς, ἢ τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ ἅμα καὶ ἑαυτῶν
 κατηγορεῖν, ὅτι οὐδὲν ὠφελήκασιν οὕς φασιν ὠφε-
 λεῖν. οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; ΚΑΑ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. C
 Καὶ προσέσθαι γε δήπου τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἄνευ
 μισθοῦ, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, μόνοις τούτοις ἐνεχώρει, εἴπερ
 ἀληθῆ ἔλεγον. ἄλλην μὲν γὰρ εὐεργεσίαν τις
 εὐεργετηθεὶς, οἷον ταχὺς γενόμενος διὰ παιδοτρί-
 βην, ἴσως ἂν ἀποστειρήσειε τὴν χάριν, εἰ προοῖτο
 αὐτῷ ὁ παιδοτρίβης καὶ μὴ συνθέμενος αὐτῷ μι-
 σθὸν ὅτι μάλιστα ἅμα μεταδιδούς τοῦ τάχους D
 λαμβάνει τὸ ἀργύριον· οὐ γὰρ τῇ βραδυτῇτι,
 οἷμαι, ἀδικοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλ' ὀδικία. ἢ
 γάρ; ΚΑΑ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴ τις αὐτὸ
 τοῦτο ἀφαιρεῖ, τὴν ἀδικίαν, οὐδὲν δεινὸν αὐτῷ
 μήποτε ἀδικηθῆ, ἀλλὰ μόνῳ ἀσφαλές ταύτην τὴν
 εὐεργεσίαν προσέσθαι, εἴπερ τῷ ὄντι δύναιτό τις
 ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν. οὐχ οὕτως; ΚΑΑ. Φημί.

CAP. LXXVI. ΣΩ. Διὰ ταῦτ' ἄρα, ὡς ἔοι-
 κε, τὰς μὲν ἄλλας συμβουλάς συμβουλεύειν λαμ-
 βάνοντα ἀργύριον, οἷον οἰκοδομίας πέρι ἢ τῶν
 ἄλλων τεχνῶν, οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν. ΚΑΑ. Ἐοικέ E

γε. ΣΩ. Περὶ δὲ γε ταύτης τῆς πράξεως, ὄντιν' ἂν τις τρόπον ὡς βέλτιστος εἴη καὶ ἄριστα τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῖ ἢ πόλιν, αἰσχροὺς νενόμισται μὴ φάναι συμβουλεύειν, ἐὰν μὴ τις αὐτῷ ἀργύριον διδῷ. ἢ γάρ; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Ἀἷλον γάρ, ὅτι τοῦτο αἷτιόν ἐστιν, ὅτι μόνη αὕτη τῶν εὐεργεσιῶν τὸν εὖ παθόντα ἐπιθυμεῖν ποιεῖ ἀντ' εὖ ποιεῖν, ὥστε καλὸν δοκεῖ τὸ σημεῖον εἶναι, εἰ εὖ ποιήσας ταύτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἀντ' εὖ πείσεται· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ. ἔστι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχοντα; ΚΑΛ. Ἔστιν. ΣΩ. Ἐπὶ ποτέραν οὖν με παρακαλεῖς τὴν θεραπείαν τῆς πόλεως; διόρισόν μοι· τὴν τοῦ διαμάχεσθαι Ἀθηναίοις, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστοι ἔσονται, ὡς ἰατρον, ἢ ὡς διακονήσονται καὶ πρὸς χάριν ὁμιλήσονται; Τάληθῇ μοι εἰπέ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· δίκαιος γάρ εἰ, ὥσπερ ἤρξω παρῶρησιάζεσθαι πρὸς ἐμέ, διατελεῖν ἃ νοεῖς λέγων. καὶ νῦν εὖ καὶ γενναίως εἰπέ. ΚΑΛ. Λέγω τοίνυν, ὅτι ὡς διακονήσονται. ΣΩ. Κολακεύσονται ἄρα με, ὦ γενναιότατε, παρακαλεῖς. ΚΑΛ. Εἴ σοι Μυσὸν γε ἥδιον καλεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὡς εἰ μὴ ταῦτά γε ποιήσεις — ΣΩ. Μὴ εἶπης ὃ πολλάκις εἶρηκας, ὅτι ἀποκτενεῖ με ὁ βουλόμενος, ἵνα μὴ αὖ καὶ ἐγὼ εἴπω, ὅτι πονηρός γε ὢν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα· μηδ' ὅτι ἀφαιρήσεται, ἐὰν C τι ἔχω, ἵνα μὴ αὖ ἐγὼ εἴπω, ὅτι Ἀλλ' ἀφελόμενος οὐχ ἔξει ὃ τι χρήσεται αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ με ἀδίκως ἀφείλετο, οὕτω καὶ λαβὼν ἀδίκως χρήσεται· εἰ δὲ ἀδίκως, αἰσχροῶς· εἰ δὲ αἰσχροῶς, κακῶς.

CAP. LXXVII. ΚΑΛ. ὦ μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώ-
 κρατες, πιστεύειν μηδ' ἂν ἐν τούτων παθεῖν, ὥς
 οἰκῶν ἐκποδὼν καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἰσαχθεὶς εἰς δικαστή-
 ριον ὑπὸ πάνυ ἴσως μοχθηροῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ
 φαύλου! ΣΩ. Ἀνόητος ἄρα εἰμί, ὦ Καλλί-
 κλεις, ὥς ἀληθῶς, εἰ μὴ οἶομαι ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει
 ὄντινον ἂν, ὃ τι τύχοι, τοῦτο παθεῖν. τότε μέν- D
 ται εὖ οἶδ', ὅτι, ἐάνπερ εἰσὶ εἰς δικαστήριον περὶ
 τούτων τινὸς κινδυνεύων ὧν σὺ λέγεις, ποιηρός
 τίς με ἔσται ὁ εἰσάγων· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν χρηστὸς
 μὴ ἀδικοῦντι' ἀνθρώπον εἰσαγάγοι. καὶ οὐδέν
 γε ἄτοπον, εἰ ἀποθάνοιμι. βούλει σοι εἶπω, διότι
 ταῦτα προσδοκῶ; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Οἶ-
 μαι μετ' ὀλίγων Ἀθηναίων, ἵνα μὴ εἶπω μόνος,
 ἐπιχειρεῖν τῇ ὥς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ καὶ
 πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ μόνος τῶν νῦν. ἄτε οὖν
 οὐ πρὸς χάριν λέγων τοὺς λόγους οὗς λέγω ἐκά- E
 στοτε, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἥδι-
 στον, καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλων ποιεῖν ἃ σὺ παραινεῖς, τὰ
 κομινὰ ταῦτα, οὐχ ἔξω ὃ τι λέγω ἐν τῷ δικαστη-
 ρίῳ. ὁ αὐτὸς δέ μοι ἦκει λόγος, ὅνπερ πρὸς Πῶ-
 λον ἔλεγον· κρινοῦμαι γὰρ ὥς ἐν παιδίῳ ἱατρὸς
 ἂν κρίνοιτο κατηγοροῦντος ὁμοιοῦ. σκόπει
 γάρ, τί ἂν ἀπολογοῖτο ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνθρώπος ἐν
 τούτοις ληφθεὶς, εἰ αὐτοῦ κατηγοροῖ τις λέγων,
 ὅτι ὦ παῖδες, πολλὰ ὑμᾶς καὶ κακὰ ὕδε εἴργα-
 σται ἀνὴρ καὶ αὐτούς, καὶ τοὺς νεωιᾶτους ὑμῶν
 διαφθείρει, τέμνων τε καὶ κᾶων καὶ ἰσχυραίνων 522
 καὶ πνίγων ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ, πικρότατα πώματα δι-
 δοὺς καὶ πεινῇν καὶ διψῇν ἀναγκάζων, οὐχ ὥσπερ

ἐγὼ πολλὰ καὶ ἡδέα καὶ παντοδαπὰ εὐώχουν
 ὑμᾶς. τί ἂν οἶει ἐν τούτῳ τῷ κακῷ ἀποληφθέντα
 τὸν ἱατρὸν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν; ἢ εἰ εἴποι τὴν ἀλήθειαν,
 ὅτι Ταῦτα πάντα ἐγὼ ἐποίουν, ὦ παῖδες, ὑγιει-
 νῶς, ὅποσον οἶει ἂν ἀναβοῇσαι τοὺς τοιούτους
 δικαστάς; οὐ μέγα; ΚΑΛ. Ἴσως οἴεσθαί γε
 χρή. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οἶει ἐν πάσῃ ἀπορίᾳ ἂν αὐ-
 B τὸν ἔχουσθαι ὅτι χρή εἰπεῖν; ΚΑΛ. Πάννυ γε.

CAP. LXXVIII. ΣΩ. Τοιοῦτον μέντοι καὶ
 ἐγὼ οἶδ' ὅτι πάθος πάθοιμι ἂν εἰσελθὼν εἰς δικα-
 στήριον. οὔτε γὰρ ἡδονὰς ἄς ἐκπεπόρικα ἔξω
 αὐτοῖς λέγειν, ἄς οὗτοι εὐεργεσίας καὶ ὠφελείας
 νομίζουσιν, ἐγὼ δὲ οὔτε τοὺς πορίζοντας ζηλῶ
 οὔτε οἷς πορίζεται· ἐάν τέ τίς με ἢ νεωτέρους φῆ
 διαφθεῖρειν ἀπορεῖν ποιοῦντα, ἢ τοὺς πρεσβυτέ-
 ρους κακηγορεῖν λέγοντα πικροὺς λόγους ἢ ἰδίᾳ
 ἢ δημοσίᾳ, οὔτε τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔξω εἰπεῖν, ὅτι Δικαίως
 C πάντα ταῦτα ἐγὼ λέγω, καὶ πράττω τὸ ὑμέτερον
 δὴ τοῦτο, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδέν.
 ὥστε ἴσως, ὅτι ἂν τύχω, τοῦτο πείσομαι. ΚΑΛ.
 Δοκεῖ οὖν σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, καλῶς ἔχειν ἄνθρω-
 πος ἐν πόλει οὕτως διακείμενος καὶ ἀδύνατος ὢν
 ἑαυτῷ βοηθεῖν; ΣΩ. Εἰ ἐκεῖνό γε ἐν αὐτῷ
 ὑπάρχον, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὃ σὺ πολλάκις ὠμολόγη-
 σας· εἰ βεβοηθηκὼς εἴη αὐτῷ, μήτε περὶ ἀνθρώ-
 D πους μήτε περὶ θεοὺς ἄδικον μηδὲν μήτε εἰρηκὼς
 μήτε εἰργασμένος. αὕτη γὰρ τις βοήθεια ἑαυτῷ
 πολλάκις ἡμῖν ὠμολόγηται κρατίστη εἶναι. εἰ
 μὲν οὖν ἐμέ τις ἐξελέγχοι ταύτην τὴν βοήθειαν
 ἀδύνατον ὄντα ἑμαυτῷ καὶ ἄλλῳ βοηθεῖν, αἰσχυν-

νοίμην ἂν καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ ἐν ὀλίγοις ἐξελεγχόμενος καὶ μόνος ὑπὸ μόνου, καὶ εἰ διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἀδυναμίαν ἀποθνήσκωμι, ἀγανακτοίην ἂν · εἰ δὲ κολακικῆς ῥητορικῆς ἐνδεία τελευτήσῃν ἔγωγε, εὖ οἶδα, ὅτι ῥαδίως ἴδοις ἂν με φέροντα τὸν θάνατον. αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν οὐδεὶς φοβεῖται, ὅστις μὴ παντάπασιν ἀλόγιστός τε καὶ ἄνανδρός ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν φοβεῖται · πολλῶν γὰρ ἀδικημάτων γέμοντα τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς "Αἰδου ἀφικέσθαι πάντων ἔσχατον κακῶν ἐστίν. εἰ δὲ βούλει, σοὶ ἐγώ, ὥς τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ἐθέλω λόγον λέξαι. ΚΑΛ. Ἄλλ' ἐπέπερ γε καὶ τᾶλλα ἐπερانا, καὶ τοῦτο πέρανον.

CAP. LXXIX. ΣΩ. Ἄκουε δὴ, φασί, μάλα 523
καλοῦ λόγον, ὃν σὺ μὲν ἡγήσει μῦθον, ὥς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον · ὥς ἀληθῆ γὰρ ὄντα σοι λέξω ἃ μέλλω λέγειν. Ὡσπερ γὰρ Ὅμηρος λέγει, διενείμαντο τὴν ἀρχὴν ὁ Ζεὺς καὶ ὁ Ποσειδῶν καὶ ὁ Πλούτων, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς παρέλαβον. ἦν οὖν νόμος ὅδε περὶ ἀνθρώπων ἐπὶ Κρόνου, καὶ αἰ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἐστίν ἐν θεοῖς, τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸν μὲν δικαίως τὸν βίον διελθόντα καὶ ὀσίως, ἐπειδὴν τελευτήσῃ, ἐς μακάρων νήσους ἀπ- B
όντα οἰκεῖν ἐν πάσῃ εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἐκτὸς κακῶν, τὸν δὲ ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέςως εἰς τὸ τῆς τίσεώς τε καὶ δίκης δεσμωτήριον, ὃ δὴ τάρταρον καλοῦσιν, ἵεναι. τούτων δὲ δικασταὶ ἐπὶ Κρόνου καὶ ἔτι νῦν τοῦ Διὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντες ζῶντες ἦσαν ζώντων, ἐκεῖνη τῇ ἡμέρᾳ δικάζοντες, ἣ μέλλοιεν τελευτᾶν. κακῶς οὖν αἱ δίκαι ἐκρίνοντο. ὃ τε οὖν Πλούτων

καὶ οἱ ἐπιμεληταὶ οἱ ἐκ μακάρων νήσων ἰόντες
 C ἔλεγον πρὸς τὸν Αἴα, ὅτι φοιτῶν σφιν ἄνθρωποι
 ἐκατέρωσε ἀνάξιοι. εἶπεν οὖν ὁ Ζεὺς, Ἄλλ'
 ἐγὼ, ἔφη, παύσω τοῦτο γιγνόμενον. νῦν μὲν γὰρ
 κακῶς αἱ δίκαι δικάζονται. ἀμπεχόμενοι γὰρ,
 ἔφη, οἱ κρινόμενοι κρίνονται· ζῶντες γὰρ κρίνον-
 ται. πολλοὶ οὖν, ἧ δ' ὅς, ψυχὰς πονηρὰς ἔχοντες
 ἡμφιεσμένοι εἰσὶ σώματά τε καλὰ καὶ γένη καὶ
 πλούτους, καί, ἐπειδὴν ἡ κρίσις ἦ, ἔρχονται αὐ-
 τοῖς πολλοὶ μάρτυρες, μαρτυρήσοντες, ὡς δικαίως
 D βεβιώκασιν. οἱ οὖν δικασταὶ ὑπὸ τε τούτων ἐκ-
 πλῆιτονται, καὶ ἅμα καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀμπεχόμενοι δι-
 κάζουσι, πρὸ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς αὐτῶν ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ
 ὦτα καὶ ὅλον τὸ σῶμα προκεκαλυμμένοι. ταῦτα
 δὴ αὐτοῖς πάντα ἐπίπροσθεν γίνεται, καὶ τὰ αὐ-
 τῶν ἀμυρίσματα καὶ τὰ τῶν κρινομένων. πρῶτον
 μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, παυστέον ἐστὶ προειδίας αὐτοῦς
 τὸν θάνατον· νῦν μὲν γὰρ προΐσασι. τοῦτο μὲν
 οὖν καὶ δὴ εἴρηται τῷ Προμηθεῖ ὅπως ἂν παύσῃ
 E αὐτῶν. ἔπειτα γυμνοὺς κριτέον ἀπάντων τού-
 των· τεθνεῶτας γὰρ δεῖ κρίνεσθαι. καὶ τὸν κρι-
 τὴν δεῖ γυμνὸν εἶναι, τεθνεῶτα, αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ
 αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν θεωροῦντα ἐξαίφνης ἀποθανόν-
 τος ἐκάστου, ἔρημον πάντων τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ
 καταλιπόντα ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς πάντα ἐκεῖνον τὸν
 κόσμον, ἵνα δικαία ἡ κρίσις ἦ. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦ-
 τα ἐγνωκὼς πρότερος ἢ ὑμεῖς ἐποιησάμην δικα-
 στὰς υἱεῖς ἑμαυτοῦ, δύο μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας, Μίνω
 521 τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυν, ἓνα δὲ ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης,
 Αἰακόν. οὗτοι οὖν ἐπειδὴν τελευτήσωσι, δικά-

σουσιν ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι, ἐν τῇ τριόδῳ ἐξ ἧς φερετον τὸ ὁδὸν, ἥ μὲν εἰς μακάρων νήσους, ἥ δ' εἰς τάρταρον. καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας Ῥαδάμανθους κρινεῖ, τοὺς δὲ ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης Αἰακός. Μίνω δὲ πρεσβεῖα δώσω, ἐπιδιακρίνειν, ἐὰν ἀπορήτόν τι τὸ ἐτέρω, ἵνα ὡς δικαιοτάτῃ ἢ κρίσις ἢ περὶ τῆς πορείας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

CAP. LXXX. Ταῦτ' ἔστιν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἃ ἐγὼ ἀκηκοὺς πιστεύω ἀληθῆ εἶναι. καὶ ἐκ τούτων τῶν λόγων τοιόνδε τι λογίζομαι συμβαίνειν. Ὁ θάνατος τυγχάνει ὧν, ὡς ἔμοι δοκεῖ, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ δυοῖν πραγμάτοις διάλυσις, τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος, ἀπ' ἀλλήλοιν. ἐπειδὴν δὲ διαλυθῆτον ἄρα ἀπ' ἀλλήλοιν, οὐ πολὺ ἥττον ἐκάτερον αὐτοῖν ἔχει τὴν ἕξιν τὴν αὐτοῦ ἥνπερ καὶ ὅτε ἔζη ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τό τε σῶμα τὴν φύσιν τὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰ θεραπεύματα καὶ τὰ παθήματα, ἔνδηλα πάντα. οἷον εἴ τις μέγα ἦν τὸ σῶμα φύσει ἢ τροφῇ ἢ ἀμφοτέρω ζῶντος, τούτου καὶ ἐπειδὴν ἀποθάνῃ ὁ νεκρὸς μέγας. καὶ εἰ παχύς, παχύς καὶ ἀποθανόντος, καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτως. καὶ εἰ αὖ ἐπετήδευε κομᾶν, κομήτης τούτου καὶ ὁ νεκρός. μαστιγίας αὖ εἴ τις ἦν καὶ ἔχνη εἶχε τῶν πληγῶν οὐλὰς ἐν τῷ σώματι ἢ ὑπὸ μαστίγων ἢ ἄλλων τραυμάτων ζῶν, καὶ τεθνεῶτος τὸ σῶμα ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ταῦτα ἔχον. κατεαγότα τε εἴ του ἦν μέλη ἢ διεστραμμένα ζῶντος, καὶ τεθνεῶτος ταῦτα ταῦτα ἔνδηλα. ἐνὶ δὲ λόγῳ, οἷος εἶναι παρσκευάστο τὸ σῶμα ζῶν, ἔνδηλα ταῦτα καὶ τελευτήσαντος ἢ πάντα ἢ τὰ πολλὰ ἐπὶ τινα χρόνον.

ταὐτὸν δὴ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτ' ἄρα καὶ περὶ τὴν γυ-
 χὴν εἶναι, ὧς Καλλίκλεις· ἐνδηλα πάντα ἐστὶν ἐν
 τῇ ψυχῇ, ἐπειδὴν γυμνωθῇ τοῦ σώματος, τὰ τε
 τῆς φύσεως καὶ τὰ παθήματα ἅ διὰ τὴν ἐπιτή-
 δευσιν ἐκάστου πράγματος ἔσχεν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὁ
 Εἰς ἄνθρωπος. Ἐπειδὴν οὖν ἀφίκωνται παρὰ τὸν
 δικαστήν, οἱ μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας παρὰ τὸν Ῥαδά-
 μανθον, ὁ Ῥαδάμανθος ἐκείνους ἐπιστήσας θε-
 ᾶται ἐκάστου τὴν ψυχὴν, οὐκ εἰδὼς ὅτου ἐστίν,
 ἀλλὰ πολλάκις τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως ἐπιλαβόμε-
 νος ἢ ἄλλου ὁτιοῦν βασιλέως ἢ δυνάστου κατεῖ-
 δεν οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ὄν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ διαμεμαστι-
 525 γωμένην καὶ οὐλῶν μεστὴν ὑπὸ ἐπιιορκιῶν καὶ
 ἀδικίας, ἃ ἐκάστῳ ἢ πράξις αὐτοῦ ἐξωμόρξατο εἰς
 τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ πάντα σκολιὰ ὑπὸ ψεύδους καὶ
 ἀλαζονείας καὶ οὐδὲν εὐθύ διὰ τὸ ἄνευ ἀληθείας
 τεθράφθαι· καὶ ὑπὸ ἐξουσίας καὶ τρυφῆς καὶ
 ὕβρεως καὶ ἀκρατίας τῶν πράξεων ἀσυμμετρίας
 τε καὶ αἰσχροτήτος γέμουσαν τὴν ψυχὴν εἶδεν.
 ἰδὼν δὲ ἀτίμως ταύτην ἀπέπεμψεν εὐθύ τῆς φρου-
 ρᾶς, οἱ μὲλλοντες ἐλθοῦσα ἀνατλήναι τὰ προσήκοντα
 πάθη. CAP. LXXXI. Προσὴκει δὲ παντὶ τῷ
 Β ἐν τιμωρίᾳ ὄντι, ὑπ' ἄλλου ὀρθῶς τιμωρουμένῳ, ἢ
 βελτίονι γίνεσθαι καὶ ὀνίνασθαι ἢ παραδείγμα-
 τι τοῖς ἄλλοις γίνεσθαι, ἢ ἄλλοι ὀρθῶντες πά-
 σχοντα ἃ ἂν πάσχη φοβούμενοι βελτίους γίγνων-
 ται. εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ μὲν ὠφελούμενοί τε καὶ δίκην
 διδόντες ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων οὔτοι, οἱ ἂν
 ἰάσιμα ἁμαρτήματα ἁμάρτωσιν· ὅμως δὲ δι' ἀλγη-
 δόνων καὶ ὀδυνῶν γίγνεται αὐτοῖς ἡ ὠφέλεια καὶ

ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν ᾿Αιδου· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἄλλως ἀδικίας ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. οἱ δ' ἂν τὰ ἔσχατα ἀδική- C
 σωσι καὶ διὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀδικήματα ἀνίατοι γένωνται, ἐκ τούτων τὰ παραδείγματα γίνεσθαι, καὶ οὗτοι αὐτοὶ μὲν οὐκέτι ὀνίνανται οὐδέν, ἅτε ἀνίατοι ὄντες, ἄλλοι δὲ ὀνίνανται οἱ τούτους ὀρώ-
 ντες διὰ τὰς ἁμαρτίας τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ὀδυνηρότατα καὶ φοβερώτατα πάθη πάσχοντας τὸν αἰεὶ χρόνον, ἅτεχνως παραδείγματα ἀνηρημένους ἐκεῖ ἐν ᾿Αιδου ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, τοῖς αἰεὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ἀφικνουμένοις θεάματα καὶ νοουθήματα. ὣν ἐγὼ D
 φημι ἓνα καὶ Ἀρχέλαον ἔσεσθαι, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγει Πῶλος, καὶ ἄλλον ὅστις ἂν τοιοῦτος τύραννος ᾖ. οἶμαι δὲ καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς εἶναι τούτων τῶν παραδειγμάτων ἐκ τυράννων καὶ βασιλέων καὶ δυναστῶν καὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων πραξάντων γεγονότας· οὗτοι γὰρ διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν μέγιστα καὶ ἀνοσιώ-
 τατα ἁμαρτήματα ἁμαρτάνουσι. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τούτοις καὶ Ὅμηρος· βασιλέας γὰρ καὶ δυνά-
 στας ἐκεῖνος πεποίηκε τοὺς ἐν ᾿Αιδου τὸν αἰεὶ E
 χρόνον τιμωρουμένους, Τάνταλον καὶ Σίσυφον καὶ Τιτυόν. Θερσίτην δέ, καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος πονηρὸς ἦν ιδιώτης, οὐδεὶς πεποίηκε μεγάλαις τιμωρίαις συνεχόμενον ὡς ἀνίατον· οὐ γάρ, οἶμαι, ἔξῃν αὐτῷ· διὸ καὶ εὐδαιμονέστερος ἦν ἢ οἷς ἔξῃν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἐκ τῶν δυναμένων εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ σφόδρα πονηροὶ γιγνόμενοι ἄνθρωποι· 526
 οὐδὲν μὴν κωλύει καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ἐργίγνεσθαι, καὶ σφόδρα γε ἄξιον ἄγασθαι τῶν γιγνομένων· χαλεπὸν γάρ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, καὶ

πολλοῦ ἐπαίνου ἄξιον ἐν μεγάλῃ ἐξουσίᾳ τοῦ
 ἀδικεῖν γενόμενον δικαίως διαβιῶναι. ὀλίγοι δὲ
 γίνονται οἱ τοιοῦτοι· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἄλλο-
 θι γεγόνασιν, οἷμαι δὲ καὶ ἔσονται καλοὶ καγαθοὶ
 B ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν τοῦ δικαίως διαχειρίζειν
 ἃ ἂν τις ἐπιτρέπη· εἷς δὲ καὶ πάνυ ἐλλόγιμος
 γέγονε καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους Ἑλληνας, Ἀριστεί-
 δης ὁ Λυσιμάχου. οἱ δὲ πολλοί, ὧς ἄριστε, κακοὶ
 γίνονται τῶν δυναστῶν. CAP. LXXXII. Ὅπερ
 οὖν ἔλεγον, ἐπειδὴν ὁ Παδάμανθους ἐκεῖνος τοι-
 οῦτόν τινα λάβῃ, ἄλλο μὲν περὶ αὐτοῦ οὐκ οἶδεν
 οὐδέν, οὐθ' ὅστις οὐθ' ὄντινων, ὅτι δὲ πονηρός
 τις· καὶ τοῦτο κατιδὼν ἀπέπεμψε εἰς τάρταρον,
 C ἐπισημνηνόμενος, ἔάν τε ἰάσιμος ἔάν τε ἀνίατος
 δοκῇ εἶναι· ὁ δὲ ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενος τὰ προσή-
 κοντα πάσχει. ἐνίστε δ' ἄλλην εἰσιδὼν ὁσίως βε-
 βιωκυῖαν καὶ μετ' ἀληθείας, ἀνδρὸς ἰδιώτου ἢ
 ἄλλου τινός, μάλιστα μὲν, ἔγωγέ φημι, ὧς Καλλί-
 κλεις, φιλοσόφου τὰ αὐτοῦ πράξαντος καὶ οὐ πο-
 λυπραγμονήσαντος ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ἡγάσθη τε καὶ ἐς
 μακάρων νήσους ἀπέπεμψε. ταῦτα ταῦτα καὶ ὁ
 Αἰακός. ἐκάτερος δὲ τούτων ῥάβδον ἔχων δικάζει.
 D ὁ δὲ Μίνως ἐπισκοπῶν κάθηται μόνος, ἔχων χρυ-
 σοῦν σκῆπτρον, ὥς φησιν Ὀδυσσεὺς ὁ Ὀμήρου
 ἰδεῖν αὐτὸν

χρύσειον σκῆπτρον ἔχοντα, θεμιστεύοντα νέ-
 κυσσιν.

Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὧς Καλλίκλεις, ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν
 λόγων πέπεισμαι, καὶ σκοπῶ, ὅπως ἀποφανοῦμαι
 τῷ κριτῇ ὡς ὑγιεστάτην τὴν ψυχὴν. χαίρειν οὖν

ἐάσας τὰς τιμὰς τὰς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὴν
 ἀλήθειαν σκοπῶν πειράσομαι τῷ ὄντι ὡς ἂν δύνω-
 μαι βέλτιστος ὦν καὶ ζῆν καί, ἐπειδὰν ἀποθνή- E
 σκω, ἀποθνήσκειν. παρακαλῶ δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους
 πάντας ἀνθρώπους, καθ' ὅσον δύναμαι, καὶ δὴ
 καὶ σὲ ἀντιπαρακαλῶ ἐπὶ τοῦτον τὸν βίον καὶ
 τὸν ἀγῶνα τοῦτον, ὃν ἐγὼ φημι ἀντὶ πάντων τῶν
 ἐνθάδε ἀγόνων εἶναι, καὶ ὀνειδίζω σοι, ὅτι οὐχ
 οἷός τ' ἔσει σαυτῷ βοηθῆσαι, ὅταν ἡ δίκη σοι ᾗ
 καὶ ἡ κρίσις ἦν νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ἀλλὰ ἐλθὼν
 παρὰ τὸν δικαστὴν τὸν τῆς Αἰγίνης υἱόν, ἐπειδάν 527
 σου ἐπιλαβόμενος ἄγῃ, χασμῆσει καὶ ἰλιγγιάσεις
 οὐδὲν ἦτιον ἢ ἐγὼ ἐνθάδε σὺ ἐκεῖ, καὶ σε ἴσως
 τυπτήσῃ τις καὶ ἐπὶ κόρῃς ἀτίμως, καὶ πάντως
 προπηλακίῃ.

Τάχα δ' οὖν ταῦτα μῦθος σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι,
 ὥσπερ γραός, καὶ καταφρονεῖς αὐτῶν. καὶ οὐδέν
 γ' ἂν ἦν θαυμαστὸν καταφρονεῖν τούτων, εἴ πῃ
 ζητοῦντες εἶχομεν αὐτῶν βελτίῳ καὶ ἀληθέστερα
 εὖρεῖν · νῦν δὲ ὁρᾷς, ὅτι τρεῖς ὄντες ὑμεῖς, οἵπερ
 σοφώτατοί ἐστε τῶν νῦν Ἑλλήνων, σύ τε καὶ B
 Πῶλος καὶ Γοργίας, οὐκ ἔχετε ἀποδεῖξαι, ὡς δεῖ
 ἄλλον τινὰ βίον ζῆν ἢ τοῦτον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐκεῖσε
 φαίνεται συμφέρων, ἀλλ' ἐν τοσούτοις λόγοις τῶν
 ἄλλων ἐλεγχομένων μόνος οὗτος ἡρεμεῖ ὁ λόγος,
 ὡς εὐλαβητέον ἐστὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀδι-
 κεῖσθαι, καὶ παντὸς μᾶλλον ἀνδρὶ μελετητέον οὐ
 τὸ δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι καὶ ἰδίᾳ
 καὶ δημοσίᾳ · ἐὰν δέ τις κατὰ τι κακὸς γίγνηται,
 κολαστέος ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο δεύτερον ἀγαθὸν μετὰ C

τὸ εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸ γίνεσθαι καὶ κολαζόμενον
 διδόναι δίκην · καὶ πᾶσαν κολακείαν καὶ τὴν
 περὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὴν περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ περὶ
 ὀλίγους καὶ περὶ πολλούς, φευκτέον · καὶ τῇ ῥη-
 τορικῇ οὕτω χρηστέον, ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον αἰεὶ, καὶ τῇ
 ἄλλῃ πάσῃ πράξει.

CAP. LXXXIII. Ἐμοὶ οὖν πειθόμενος ἀκο-
 λούθησον ἐνταῦθα, οἷ ἁφικόμενος εὐδαιμονήσεις
 καὶ ζῶν καὶ τελευτήσας, ὥς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει.
 καὶ ἕασόν τινά σου καταφρονῆσαι ὥς ἀνοήτου
 D καὶ προπηλακίσαι, ἐὰν βούληται, καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία
 σύ γε θαρρῶν πατάξαι τὴν ἄτιμον ταύτην πλη-
 γήν · οὐδὲν γὰρ δεινὸν πείσει, ἐὰν τῷ ὄντι ἦς κα-
 λὸς καὶ γαθός, ἀσκῶν ἀρετὴν. καὶ περὶ οὕτω κοινῇ
 ἀσκήσαντες, τότε ἤδη, ἐὰν δοκῇ χρῆναι, ἐπιθησό-
 μεθα τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, ἢ ὅποιον ἂν τι ἡμῖν δοκῇ,
 τότε βουλευσόμεθα, βελτίους ὄντες βουλευέσθαι
 ἢ νῦν. αἰσχρὸν γὰρ ἔχοντάς γε ὥς νῦν φαινό-
 μεθα ἔχειν, ἔπειτα νεανιεύεσθαι ὥς τι ὄντας, οἷς
 E οὐδέποτε ταῦτά δοκεῖ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ ταῦτα
 περὶ τῶν μεγίστων · εἰς τοσοῦτον ἤκομεν ἀπαιδευ-
 σίας! ὥσπερ οὖν ἡγεμόνι τῷ λόγῳ χρησώμεθα
 τῷ νῦν παραφανέντι, ὃς ἡμῖν σημαίνει, ὅτι οὗτος
 ὁ τρόπος ἀριστος τοῦ βίου, καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην
 καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν ἀσκοῦντας καὶ ζῆν καὶ
 τεθνάναι. τούτῳ οὖν ἐπώμεθα, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους
 παρακαλῶμεν, μὴ ἐκείνῳ, ᾧ σὺ πιστεύων ἐμὲ πα-
 ρακαλεῖς · ἔστι γὰρ οὐδενὸς ἄξιος, ᾧ Καλλίκλεις.

NOTES.

· · N O T E S .

N. B. The references follow the marginal pages and letters of the text, which are those of the Paris edition of 1578, edited by H. Stephanus. Mt. stands for Matthiæ's Grammar, second edition; K., for Kühner's Middle Grammar, translated by Edwards and Taylor; Cr., for Crosby's, second edition; and Soph., for that of Sophocles, quoted according to the original sections: — in the new edition (1847) the earlier and present sections are collated at the beginning.

447 A. οὕτω μεταλαγχάνειν, *so to take part in*; i. e. in the present instance, *to take no part in at all*. Callicles says, "It were well to have such a share in a battle, as you have had in listening to Gorgias"; i. e. it were well to arrive too late for an unpleasant employment, but not for a feast such as we have had. For the selection of *war* in this proverbial phrase, comp. Phædr. 242, B, οὐ πόλεμον ἀγγελλεις, *what you tell me is not at all disagreeable*; and so Laws, 702, D. — τὸ λεγόμενον, *as the saying is*. Soph. § 167, N. 2. Cr. § 334. 8. The accusative may be explained by considering it as the object of the general notion of action contained in the verbs, = are we doing τὸ λεγόμενον, i. e. are we too late. — ἐπεδείξατο. This verb in the middle, with an accus. (e. g. σοφίαν or a neuter adjective) or without, especially denotes that ostentatious display of their art, which the sophists and rhetoricians at this time were wont to make. — τούτων refers to ἤκομεν καὶ ὑστερούμεν. As the verbs denote but one act, τούτου might be used equally well, and the plural is not unfrequently used in referring to a single verb. Comp. 492, C.

B. ἐγὼ γὰρ καὶ ἰάσομαι. καὶ, *also*, refers to a suppressed clause. *No matter : for if I did the harm, I will also find the remedy.* According to Olympiod. and a Schol., the words are drawn from the Telephus of Euripides, being spoken by Achilles, who wounded that hero. — εἰ μὲν δοκεῖ. The indic. implies belief that such is the view of Socrates ; while in εἰν δὲ βούλῃ the subjunctive expresses the wish as a mere possible contingency. — ἐσαῦθις, *again, at another time, hereafter.* So εἰσαῦθις ἀναβαλοῦ, Sympos. 174, E ; εἰσαῦθις ἀποθέσθαι, Euthydem. 275, A. — τί δαί ; usually, where δαί is found, δὲ is in some MSS. as a various reading. The longer form, it is now admitted, is properly retained after τί and πῶς, where wonder or indignation is expressed. — οὐκοῦν . . . ὑμῖν. Stallb., Ast, and others explain the construction by regarding ἦκειν as used imperatively (Soph. § 219, N. 6 ; Cr. § 625 ; K. § 306, R. 11), ἀκοῦσαι Γοργίου being understood. I incline to regard ἐπιδείξεται ὑμῖν as the proper apodosis, which, owing to the intervention of the clause beginning with γάρ, deserts its own construction for that of the interposed clause. The sense is, *Well, then, whenever you wish to come to my house, Gorgias will exhibit to you, for he lodges with me.* So, apparently, Heindorf. Comp. Soph. Œd. R. 227–229, where the clause πείσεται γὰρ οὐδέν turns the apodosis following it, which would be naturally γῆς ἀπίτω ἀβλαβής, into γῆς δ' ἄπεισιν ἀβλαβής. — εὖ λέγεις, i. e. you are very civil in inviting us to your house, and quite right in wishing to spare Gorgias further fatigue. But, etc.

C. διαλεχθῆναι, here, *to discourse by way of question and answer*, tacitly contrasted with an ἐπίδειξις, in which Gorgias would be the sole speaker. Hence, *to hold a discussion, or search for truth* in that way, as Socrates did. Socrates, in Xen. Mem. 4. 5. 12, defines it κοινῇ βουλευέσθαι διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη τὰ πράγματα. In the end, the

notion of question and answer faded away from the derivatives of this word; and that of logical reasoning, or that of the science of unchangeable, absolute truth, remained. — δύναμις, *essence, nature*. — τοῦ ἀνδρός pronominis fere partes agit, ut exprimi possit pronomine possessivo. Ast. *The art of the man* = his art, with perhaps something of contempt in τοῦ ἀνδρός. — τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν, *to ask him in person, or himself*. And so 481, B. αὐτὸν is taken with the object of ἐρωτᾶν not expressed.

D. ἐροῦ, second aor., not ἔρον. No present is used by the Attics. Soph. § 118, *sub voce*; K. § 166; Cr. § 298. — ὅτι ἐπαγγέλλει ἀποκρίνεσθαι. Cic. de Fin. 2, init.: “Quorum [sophistarum] e numero primus est ausus Leontinus Gorgias in conventu poscere quaestionem, id est, jubere dicere, qua de re quis vellet audire.” This is spoken of at length by Philostr. Vit. Sophist., Proœm.

- 448 A. ἡ πον . . . ἀποκρίνει, *no doubt, then, you answer with ease, O Gorgias*. Ast translates ῥαδίως, *libenter*, but his power to answer, and not his willingness, is in question. — ἂν δέ γε βούλῃ, ἐμοῦ, sc. λάμβανε πείραν. For λ. πείραν spoken of a person, comp. εἰ βούλει λαβεῖν μου πείραν, Protag. 341, E, cited by Ast. — τί δὲ . . . ἱκανῶς; *but what difference does that make, if I answer well enough for you?* To the common formula, τί τοῦτο; is sometimes added διαφέρει, which Stallb. here supplies. But τί can well be a nominative. τί τοῦτο; *what is that?* i. e. what of that?

B. Ἡρόδικος, a brother of Gorgias, of whom we know nothing besides his name and calling. He is not to be confounded, as the Scholiast well observes, with another man often mentioned by Plato, Herodicus of Selymbria in Thrace, and originally of Megara; who first taught gymnastics, but on the failure of his health gave himself up to the attempt to recover it; and was among the earliest to

cure diseases by exercise. — *τίνα ἄν . . . ὀνομάζομεν.* The predicate-accusative with *καλεῖν*, *ὀνομάζειν*, may be *τίνα*, referring to any one by name or by some appellation taken from his art, business, etc.; or *τί*, which is neuter on account of *ὄνομα*. Here in *τίνα ἄν . . . οὐχ ὅπερ* both forms occur together. — *ἡ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ.* Polygnotus of Thasos, the most celebrated of this family of painters. He painted upon the wall of the Stoa Pæcile at Athens gratuitously, and at Delphi. Of his pictures from epic subjects in a hall near the Delphian temple, Pausanias gives a minute account (10. 25. seq.), which has enabled two artists of the present day to reproduce his designs in the spirit of ancient art.

C. *νὺν δ' ἐπειδὴ.* In this sentence, both the main clause and that which furnishes the reason are interrogative, a usage which would be awkward in English, but is lively and favorable to brevity. A little below, 451, A, we have the interrogative included between the article and participle (*ἡ περὶ τί . . . ἔχουσα*), as it often is found within a relative sentence. Comp. Cr. § 539. 2. — *ὦ Χαιρεφῶν.* The words which follow are plainly not in the style of conversation. The juxtaposition of words from the same root (*ἐμπειριῶν ἐμπείρως*, *ἄλλοι ἄλλων ἄλλως*, *ἀρίστων ἄριστοι*), *αἰῶνα* for *βίον*, and the antithetical form of the clauses, all show, that either the style of Polus is imitated by Plato, or that words from a treatise of his are here put into his mouth. They are quoted as his by Syrianus on Hermogenes. (1. 44. Walz.) See 462, B.

D. *σοὶ βουλομένῳ ἐστίν.* Soph. § 196, N. 2; Cr. § 408; K. 284. 10. c. — *δῆλος γὰρ . . . διαλέγεσθαι*, *for it is plain to me, even from what he has said, that Polus has studied the art of rhetoric, so called, rather than how to discourse* (logically) *by way of question and answer.* *δῆλος*, etc., for *δῆλόν ἐστιν*, *ὅτι* *Πῶλος*, by attraction, as it is sometimes called. The

tendency to give prominence to the main word — here the subject — of the second clause caused it to be pushed forward into the leading clause. This made that clause personal instead of impersonal, and bound the two clauses together more closely.

E. ἐρωτᾷ. So all the MSS., but the editors give ἡρώτα,* on account of ποία τις εἴη. But this is unnecessary, for the present may be rhetorically for the imperfect, or may include it. Nobody asks you = nobody asked you or now asks you. Comp. Xen. Anab. 1. 1. 3, διαβάλλει . . . ὥς ἐπιβουλεύοι, for διέβαλλε. In this sentence, ποῖος and τίς, which belong to direct inquiry, are found in company with ὅστις, by which indirect questions are introduced. Comp. ποία and ὁποία together, 500, A. Comp. also οἷαν for ὁποίαν, 450, C, ὅσα for ὁπόσα, 451, B, and other passages. — ὥσπερ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν. For the asyndeton, comp. 450, B, note. For τὰ ἔμπροσθεν, comp. Soph. § 141, N. 1; Cr. § 478, a. The second clause begins at καὶ νῦν οὕτως.

449 A. ὑποτείνεσθαι, est quæstionem ita proponere ut alteri subicias quid respondendum sit, et in universo proponere quæstionem. Ast. — ὥς τίνος . . . τέχνης. Another form of compound interrogation, when one clause has the participial structure (ἐπιστήμονα, sc. ὄντα). — ἀγαθόν γε, not bene moratum, as Routh translates it, but plainly egregium certe. — ὥς ἔφη Ὀμηρος. Il. 6. 211, and elsewhere.

B. οὐκοῦν. See Preface. — ἄλλοθι. See Introd. pp. xiii., xiv. — ἀλλ' ὅπερ, etc., but be not false to the promise you make. Socrates takes for granted that he consents. Hence ὅπερ, which Ast would change into εἴπερ, is justly defended by Stallb. — εἰςὶ . . . ποιείσθαι, = ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν ἐνίας (Heind.), or ἐν ἐνίαις ποιείσθαι. See 448, D. In some of the answers it is necessary to discourse at length.

* Stallb. has ἐρωτᾷ in his second edition.

C, D. ὥς διὰ βραχυτάτων = ὥς βραχύτατα, or ὥς οἶόν τε διὰ βραχυτάτων, just below. — With this boast of Gorgias, comp. the ironical passages in Protag. 329, B, 334, D. The latter runs thus: "O Protagoras, I happen to be an oblivious sort of person, and if I have a long speech made to me, I forget what is the topic of discourse; therefore, as, in case I were somewhat deaf, you would think that you ought to talk in a louder tone with me than with others, to carry on a conversation with me; so, seeing I am so forgetful, abridge your answers, and make them shorter, to enable me to follow you." — πᾶν . . . ἐπικεικῶς, *quite sufficiently, or very well.*

E. ποίους τούτους . . . ὑγιαίνουσιν; *what kind of words? are they those which make known by what sort of regimen the sick can get well?* Understand περὶ with ποίους τούτους; as in 450, A, line 4. This is a condensed expression for ποιοὶ εἰσιν οὗτοι περὶ οὗς ἐστιν; The subject of ὑγιαίνουσιν is attracted forwards to δηλοῦσι as its object. ὥς is *quomodo*, not *ut*, and to be taken with διαιτώμενοι. The two words have the same sense as τίνι διαίτῃ. Comp. 453, C. — οὐκοῦν περὶ ὧν περ, etc. = οὐκοῦν ποιεῖ δυνατοὺς καὶ φρονεῖν περὶ τούτων περὶ ὧν περ λέγειν δυνατοὺς ποιεῖ.

B. οὕτως ἔχουσιν· ἐκάστη. One of a number of the in- 450 stances of asyndeton which occur in this dialogue. Some are owing to earnestness of feeling (449, A, ὥσπερ . . . ἀπεκρίνω); some heighten the effect of contrast by bringing clauses closely together (503, E, τοὺς ζωγράφους . . . τοὺς ἄλλους), or making a word more emphatic (510, C); but in the greater number the second clause is added without a particle to explain the first, and, like a noun in apposition, would rather be separated than connected by a particle. Comp. K. § 325. — ὥς ἔπος εἰπείν. This common phrase nearly always, in this work, moderates the force of some universal word, as πᾶς, οὐδεὶς. According to Lobeck (para-

lipom. Gram. Græc. 59), ἔπος εἰπεῖν occurs very often, εἰπεῖν ἔπος rarely. It denotes, 1. *ut ita dicam*, as here; 2. *speaking inaccurately*, the opposite of ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ. — τῆς δὲ ῥητορικῆς. The sense is, *But there is no such manual operation pertaining to rhetoric, but all its activity and efficiency are exercised by means of words.* The Scholiast says, that χειρουργημα and κύρωσις are provincial words brought by Gorgias from his native town, Leontini. This is probably a mere random assertion, and unlikely in itself. But the use of these words, instead of χειρουργία and κῆρος, may be intended to show forth the artificial and elaborate style of Gorgias. Thucydides uses κύρωσις (Lib. 6. 103).

C. ἀρ' οὖν . . . καλεῖν; *Indeed, I perceive what sort of art you wish to call it.* So Ast. "Formula ἀρ' οὖν eodem modo ut οὐκ οὖν initio per interrogationem cum negatione junctam affirmat." Hermann on Soph. Antig. 628 (632). Or we need only say that ἀρα, as it often does, requires an affirmative answer. Stallb. retains the interrogative force of ἀρα, and supposes the question to require a negative answer. *Do I understand, etc., i. e. I do not understand.* But μανθάνω can denote a perception that is not yet clear. Prof. Crosby remarks on this passage as follows: — "Is there not a species of anacoluthon at the beginning of this chapter? 'Do I then understand what you would call it? However, I shall soon know.' He seems to me to be first intending to ask Gorgias directly, whether the idea he obtains from his answer is the true one; but then another mode of satisfying himself occurs, and he changes the discourse abruptly." — For τῶν μὲν . . . ἔνιαι δὲ, comp. Soph. § 142, N. 3.

E. οὐχ ὅτι . . . εἶπες, *although in the expression which you make use of you so said.* οὕτως refers to the succeeding subordinate clause. οὐχ ὅτι is properly elliptical for οὐ λέγω, or οὐκ ἐρῶ ὅτι, and sometimes, followed by ἀλλά, means *not*

only, or not only not. Comp. Mt. § 624. 4. — δυσχεραίνειν, *to be captious* in the discourse or discussion.

B. εἴποιμ' ἂν . . . ὄντα. Complete the sentence by τις 451
 τῶν κῦρος ἐχουσῶν, *I would say that it is one of those arts that exert their power with regard to* (whose efficiency consists in inquiring concerning) *the odd and even, how many there can be of each*, i. e. that it is an art, which asks *how many there are*, and whose elements are odd and even numbers. γνῶσις is due to a copyist, who thought the structure deficient. — ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τῇ δῆμῳ συγγραφόμενοι, *as those say who draw up written motions in the meetings of the people*, i. e. who offer amendments in the assembly. The clearest light has been thrown upon this phrase recently by Boeckh, in his *Inscriptiones Græcæ*, Vol. I. No. 84. The allusion is to the formula τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ τῇ βουλῇ, sc. ἔδοξεν, which was used by those who, in the assembly, made amendments to the decrees or *probouleumata* brought down from the council. They employed the phrase to avoid the trouble of reading over those parts of the decree which they left unaltered. σύγγραμμα is so used of a clause in a decree by Æschines c. Ctes. § 127 Bekker. The Scholiast, with less success, explains these words of cases where two or more bills proposed by the same person followed one another in succession. It was the custom to prefix the names of the citizen, of his father, his demus, and tribe, to his resolution. In such cases the herald, says he, to save time, would say τὰ μὲν ἄλλα κατὰ ταῦτά, *the same as before*. But this explanation is unfortunate for several obvious reasons. Still more so is Coray's, who understands οἱ συγγραφόμενοι of public contractors.

C. διαφέρει δὲ τοσούτον, etc., *but it differs (ἡ λογιστική) thus much: that the art of calculating considers how the odd and the even are related to themselves* (i. e. odd to odd and even to even) *and to each other in respect to number*.

For *πῶς ἔχει πλήθους*, see Soph. § 188, N.; Cr. § 363, β; K. § 274. 3. This definition of *λογιστική* is found again in Charmides, 166, A. Arithmetic seems in Plato's definition to be employed with number in general, and *λογιστική* to be the vulgar art of reckoning, in which numbers are considered in their relations. A later distinction in the science of number was into Arithmetic, which inquired *περὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ καθ' ἑαυτό*, and Music *περὶ τοῦ πρὸς ἄλλοις*, i. e. concerning the relations of numbers. Sometimes, as here, the former term included the whole science of number, but was used *ἰδιαίτερον περὶ τοῦ τοσοῦ καθ' αὐτό*, more especially of numbers in themselves considered.

D. The second *τί* is added by Stallbaum from a conjecture of Heindorf, and seems necessary to the text. The stars denote insertion. — *ἀμφισβητήσιμον καὶ τοῦτο λέγεις*. See Eurip. Alcest. 106, and p. 452, E, *τί . . . τοῦτο λέγεις*; also Cr. § 528.

E. *τοῦτο τὸ σκολιόν*. This scolium, or *table-song*, is ascribed by the Scholiast to Simonides or to Epicharmus. It is often quoted, as by Athenæus at the end of his work. Comp. a fine passage, Laws 1. 631. The whole song is, —

“*ὑγιαίνειν μὲν ἄριστον ἀνδρὶ θνατῷ,
δεύτερον δὲ καλὸν φῦν γενέσθαι,
τὸ τρίτον δὲ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως,
καὶ τὸ τέταρτον ἡβᾶν μετὰ τῶν φίλων.*”

Plato does not allude to the last line, because no trade or employment is concerned with it.

- 452 A. *ιατρός τε . . . χρηματιστής*. They are named in the order suggested by the scolium. Heindorf wished to read *ὁ ιατρός τε*, but Buttmann observes (the remark does not appear in the second ed. of Heind.), that the article so used would denote that one person had all the attributes mentioned: *ὁ τε ιατρός καὶ χρηματιστής*, on the contrary, would

sufficiently discriminate the persons; or, in ambiguous cases, ὁ τε ἰατρὸς καὶ ὁ χρηματιστής. — εἴποι . . . ὅτι . . . ἐξαπατᾷ. For oratio recta after ὅτι, comp. Cr. § 609, a.

B. θανμάζοιμί γ' ἂν . . . εἴ σοι ἔχει. The reason, according to Stallb., why there is here an indic. in the protasis with an opt. in the apodosis is, that what the pædotribe says, "interlocutoris mentem potius quam suam ipsius opinionem respiciat." As, however, ἔχει ἐπιδείξαι is, in *his own opinion*, only a possibility, he says θανμάζοιμι ἂν. But perhaps θανμάζοιμι ἂν may be considered the optative of politeness, which expresses, under the form of a possibility, something real and absolute. Comp. Kühner's largest Gr. § 817. 6. — τέχνης depends on ἀγαθόν, *good* pertaining to his art.

C. πάνν καταφρονῶν ἀπάντων is added in satire, to show the higher pretensions of the meanest of the three employments. Gorgias and the sophists held philosophy in like contempt, compared with the arts of show. One of the comic poets, Anaxandrides (Athenæus, 694, F), proposes to comply with these high claims so far as to change the place of the second and third lines of the scolium. He says, "when the author of it named making money as the third best thing," —

"τοῦθ', ὁρᾷς, ἐμαίνετο,

μετὰ τὴν ὑγίειαν γὰρ τὸ πλουτεῖν διαφέρει.

καλὸς δὲ πεινῶν ἐστὶν αἰσχροὺς θηρίον."

— καὶ μὴν . . . ὅδε, *and yet you see Gorgias here maintains on the contrary.*

D. καὶ σέ . . . αὐτοῦ. There is here a change not unknown to our language from the relative to the demonstrative construction. — αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, i. e. the cause why the men themselves who are possessed of the art are free. αὐτοῖς is used on account of the contrast with others whom they govern. There is here a certain rhetorical col-

oring, which may be intended as an imitation of the style of Gorgias.

E. τὸ πείθειν ἔγωγ' οἶόν τ' εἶναι, *I certainly pronounce it, or mean by it the being able to persuade*, etc. — ἐν ἁλλῳ συλλόγω, *facile intelligas τοὺς συλλεγέοντας*. Stallb. — ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει, i. e. *when in or invested with this power*. — ἀλλὰ σοὶ is added as if ἁλλῳ had not gone before. Comp. 521, D, οὐ πρὸς χάριν . . . ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἥδιστον.

453 A. τὸ κεφάλαιον εἰς τοῦτο τελευτᾷ, i. e. *its sum and substance, its essential quality ends in this or tends to this as its result*, τοῦτο referring to πειθοῦς. τελευτᾷ, meaning *to end*, takes the preposition εἰς and adverbs of motion to a place after it, as including the previous motion, together with the end itself; = *to come to an end*. So ἄρχειν, *to begin*, is joined with ἀπὸ, ἐκ, and adverbs of motion from a place, = *to start*. — ἡ ἔχεις . . . δύνασθαι. Here τι seems to be taken with δύνασθαι, and ἐπὶ πλέον is *to a greater extent, plus*. Comp. ταῦτα ἐπὶ πλέον εἰπεῖν, *Laws*, 697, C; ἐπὶ πλέον τι δύναται, *Politicus* 305, B. So also ἐπ' ἔλαττον, ἐπὶ πολὺ, ἐπὶ σμικρὸν (*Soph. Electr.* 414), are used.

B. ἐγὼ γὰρ . . . τούτων ἔνα, *be assured that I, as I flatter myself, — if any other person engages in conversation with another, because he wishes to know the very nature of that about which the discourse is held, that I also, I say, — am a person of that description*. It is often the case, as here, that an infinitive and its subject are introduced after ὅτι. This happens, for the most part, when a clause intervening between ὅτι and the infinitive renders the change from the grammatical construction to its equivalent one less obvious. But here there is an anacoluthon also. Owing to the change just mentioned, ἐγὼ is left by itself, and ἐμέ takes its place. — ἐγὼ . . . οὐκ οἶδα. Here notice the emphatic position of ἐγὼ, the attraction of τὴν . . . πειθῶ to the main

sentence, in which οἶδα is, and the interposition of εἰ ἴσθ' ὅτι between the adverb and the verb.

C. οὐ σοῦ ἔνεκα . . . λέγεται, *not on your account* (to draw anything further from you), *but on account of the discussion, that it may go on in the way in which it can make the subject discussed most clear to us.* Some authorities have ποιῇ, which arose from not perceiving that ὥς here is *quomodo*, and not *ut*. See 449, E. — ὥσπερ ἄν. ἄν belongs to ἡρόμην, and is repeated on account of its distance from the verb, occasioned by the conditional clause. Comp. 447, D. — Ζεῦξις. As this great painter painted for Archelaus, king of Macedon, who died in the same year with Socrates, there is here no anachronism, and Pliny's date for his entrance on his art (Olymp. 95. 4, after the death of Socrates) must be incorrect. — καὶ ποῦ. These words have given no little trouble to the interpreters, because *the place where* a painter's works are, which is their natural meaning, has nothing to do with the definition of his art. Ast's explanation of ποῦ as meaning *where, in what thing, in regard to what* (i. e. what animals and what properties of them, etc.), and Cousin's, *where, on what*, as canvas or stone, are hardly deserving of mention. Others suppose the text corrupt. Heind. conjectures πόσου, *for how much*, and Coray, τοῦ, *whose son*. But how the compensation or the father of Zeuxis had anything more to do with the definition of his art than the place where he painted, they do not inform us. Stallb., after Routh, would read πῶς, which makes good sense, though it departs too much from the letters of the actual text. I conjecture (that I likewise may contribute my mite) that the sentence originally ended at γράφων; which, indeed, may be argued from the fact, that Plato afterwards only alludes to τὰ ζῶα. To this τὰ ποῖα τῶν ζώων, and ἄλλα πολλὰ ζῶα, point; and no other definition of the art of Zeuxis is hinted at. Next to γράφων

came ἡ οὖ, HOY, which was corrupted into ΠΟΥ; and then καὶ was added to bring ποῦ into grammatical connection with the sentence. For the confusion of Η and Π in the MSS., Bast's Epist. Palæograph. in Schæfer's Gregory Corinth., p. 716, may be consulted. A similar corruption of ἡ οὖ into πού, in Repub. 437, D, is removed in modern editions.

D. καλῶς ἂν σοι ἀπεκρίτο; *would your answer have been a good one?* This verb, like several other deponents, is used both actively and passively, — a usage almost confined to the perfect, pluperfect, and aorist. Comp. Soph. § 208, N. 2; K. § 252; Cr. § 561. — οὐ δῆτα denies the latter part of the alternative, οὐ πείθει.

454 A. τὸν λέγοντα, *him who makes this assertion*, that rhetoric is the art of persuasion.

B, C. ταύτης . . . τῆς πειθοῦς λέγω, sc. τὴν ῥητορικὴν τέχνην εἶναι. — ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ θαυμάζῃς, etc. The form of this sentence changes a little as it proceeds. ὅπερ γὰρ λέγω is written as if μὴ θαύμαζε had gone before. The proper apodosis of ἵνα . . . θαυμάζῃς is τοῦ ἐξῆς . . . ἐρωτῶ, but the connection is broken up by γὰρ in ὅπερ γὰρ λέγω. The sense of ὅπερ . . . λέγω is, *for as I say* (i. e. as I was just saying, 453, C), *I put the inquiry that the discourse may be finished in due order, — not on your account, but that we may not be in the habit of too soon catching up each other's words on mere suspicion* (of what they mean, and without giving one another time for explanation). With προαρπάξιν . . . τὰ λεγόμενα, comp. Herodot. 9. 91, ὁ δὲ ὑπαρπάσας τὸν ἐπίλοιπον λόγον.

E. βούλει . . . θῶμεν like *visne videamus, volo hoc contingat*. Soph. § 219. 3, last ed.; Cr. § 611. 3; K. § 259. 1. 6.

455 A. πιστευτικῆς, *productive of belief*. — διδασκαλικῆς, *able to impart instruction or knowledge*, i. e. knowledge founded upon absolute, unchangeable principles. — ἀλλὰ πιστικὸς

μόνον, *able to cause belief and nothing more* (aiming at conviction, and not at truth). This word has been altered into *πειστικός* by Stephens, Heindorf, Coray, and Buttmann; and some MSS. favor the change. Bekker, Stallb., and Ast, with reason, retain *πιστικός*. For, as is shown by Ast at great length, *πειστικός* denotes (*having relation to, having to do with*, i. e.) *able to produce* *πειθώ*, and is the more general word, and not necessarily opposed to *διδασκαλικός*; while *πιστικός* means *able to produce πίστιν*, which has just been contrasted with *ἐπιστήμην* (454, D). Again, as to the form of the word, — which, according to Buttmann, cannot analogically be derived from *πίστις*, — Ast observes that adjectives in *-ικός* are freely derived, not only from verbs, but also from nouns (*ἀρχή, ἀρχικός*), adjectives (*φίλος, φιλικός*), and imaginary forms (*νουθετικός* from *νουθέτης*). What objection, then, is there to regarding *πιστός*, or *πίστις* (comp. *φύσις, φυσικός, φθίσις, φθισικός*), as the source of *πιστικός*? However derived, such words may take a genitive. But here there is no necessity of supplying a genitive with *πιστικός*.

B. ἴδωμεν τί ποτε καὶ λέγομεν. The force of *καὶ* in such a case, before a verb, seems to me to correspond with that of *even*. *Let us see what we are even saying*, where an emphasis is thrown on the verb; = *what we can mean*. A few MSS. have *λέγωμεν*, which gives the inapposite sense of *let us see what we shall say*. — *περὶ ἱατρῶν αἰρέσεως*. “The ancient states maintained public physicians at a salary; and Hippocrates is said to have been so employed at Athens. Such physicians had assistants, especially slaves, who practised among the poorer sort of people. The famous Democedes of Croton, about Olymp. 60, although as yet little money was in circulation, received the large salary of thirty-six Æginetic minæ or an Attic talent of silver (\$1,017). When he was called to Athens, he received one hundred minæ

(§ 1,692), until Polycrates, tyrant of Samos, engaged his services for two talents (§ 2,034).” Boeckh’s Civil Econ. of Athens, I. § 21. — ἄλλο τι ἢ (literally, *is there anything else than, is it not true*) is a very common formula in Plato, meaning no more than *nonne*. Very often ἄλλο τι, without ἢ, is found in the same sense at the beginning of a sentence; and Bekker always prefers it to ἄλλο τι ἢ. According to Hermann on Viger, note 110, when the latter is used, the interrogation extends to the end of the sentence; but when ἄλλο τι, it stops with those words. — αἰρεῖσθαι is in the middle. — After ἡ νεωρίων, supply συμβουλεύσει δ ῥητορικός. And, just below, a similar clause, which is to be supplied in thought before ἀλλ’ οἱ στρατηγικοί, is afterwards in part expressed. — A passage precisely like this occurs in Protag. 319, B.

C. τὸ σὸν σπεύδειν, *tuis rebus studere*. See 458, B, note. — τινὰς σχεδὸν καὶ συχνούς. *τινὲς* includes many and few, as the more generic word (Wytttenbach on Phædo, p. 116), and therefore πολλοί, ὀλίγοι, and similar words, often follow to define it. Here καί, on account of the position of σχεδόν, seems to me not to be *and*, but *even*. The sense is, *some, almost even many*, i. e. *some, indeed even quite a number*.

D. αὐτὸς . . . καλῶς ὑφηγήσω, *for you yourself have admirably led the way*, i. e. in speaking about the docks, etc., just now you suggested a good answer.

E. τὰ δ’ ἐκ τῆς Περικλέους. τὰ δὲ is used as if τὰ μὲν had preceded: *and partly through that of Pericles*. — ἐκ τῶν δημιουργῶν, *through the advice of the artificers*. Heind. and Buttmann wish to read τῆς δημιουργῶν. But there is no need of this, because a man effects what his advice effects; and such brevity is common in Greek. Thus, in Alcibiad. I. 135, E, cited by Ast, we have πελαργοῦ ἄρα ὁ ἐμὸς ἔρωσ οὐδὲν διοίσει, *my love then will not differ*

from a stork, i. e. from a stork's love ; and in Repub. 375, A, we have οἷτι διαφέρειν φύσιν γενναίου σκύλακος εἰς φυλακὴν (in respect to keeping guard) νεανίσκου εὐγενοῦς ; Comp. Soph. § 186, N. 1. — τοῦ διὰ μέσου τείχους. According to Colonel Leake (Topography of Athens, 354–357), this expression denotes *both the long walls*, which, as he supposes, reached from Athens to Piræus and Port Phalerum ; so named as being between the city and the seaports, and also called *τείχος* in the singular, as forming a sort of fortification. Plutarch (Vita Pericl. § 13) alluding to this passage, interprets the words — perhaps carelessly — by τὸ μακρὸν τείχος, and thus sanctions Leake's view. But Harpocraton, s. v. διὰ μέσου τείχους, explains the phrase of the *southern* of the two long walls, so styled as being *between* the northern and the Phaleric wall ; and this southern wall it is, says he, which Plato mentions in Gorgias. This is so confirmed by Thucyd. 2. 13, — who speaks of a Phaleric wall reaching to the city, and also of the long walls reaching, both of them, from the city to Piræus, the outer or northern one of which was guarded, — that it is not easy to see how the opinion of Leake can stand. See the commentators on Thucyd. l. c., especially Dr. Arnold. Now this inner or southern leg of the long walls, τὸ μακρὸν τείχος τὸ νότιον (Æschin. de Fals. Leg. § 174, Bekker), was built after the thirty years' peace with Sparta, i. e. after B. C. 445, when Pericles began to be at the head of affairs, and when Socrates was over twenty years old.

A. οἱ νικῶντες τὰς γνώμας, Soph. § 164, N. 2 ; K. § 278. 456 2 ; Cr. § 433. — πάλαι ἐρωτῶ. πάλαι is very often found with the present of an action begun in the past and still continued. — Join τὸ μέγεθος with δαιμονία, as the accus. of specification. — εἰ πάντα γε εἰδείης. The apodosis must be something like δαιμονία ἂν καταφαίνοιτο, which is pointed at by γε.

B. μετὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ. See 448, B. — ἡ τεμεῖν ἡ καῦσαι, etc., *to put himself into the physician's hands, to be cut or cauterized*. A heated iron was applied to the wound for the purpose of stanching blood by the ἱατρός, who, as Routh observes, exercised both the medical and the surgical arts. παρασχέιν, sc. ἐαυτόν; comp. 475, D. For τεμεῖν, καῦσαι, see Soph. § 219. 2; Cr. § 621. β. An infinitive so used, if it have the direct object of the leading verb for its subject, is in the passive, but otherwise in the active.

C. οὐδαμοῦ . . . φανῆναι, *would be of no account*. Comp. Soph. Antig. 183, τοῦτον οὐδαμοῦ λέγω; Xen. Memorab. 1. 2. 52, μηδαμοῦ εἶναι, *to be nowhere*, in no estimation. — εἰ βούλοιο is elegantly added, says Stallb., to denote the arrogance and pretension of Gorgias, = if he chose to give himself the trouble.

D. ἔμαθε, sc. τις. Soph. § 157, N. 8; K. § 238, R. 3; Cr. § 546. This omission of the indefinite subject τις is common in this dialogue, as is also the transition from a singular verb to a plural, or the contrary, where the subject is an indefinite one. — ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι dicuntur qui veris armis certare discunt. Nam vulgo juvenus non veris armis se exercebat sed rudibus, aut pilis præpilatis, quæ dicuntur Græcis ἐσφαιρωμένα ἀκόντια [i. e. with a ball covering the point]. Quæ sunt verba Casauboni ad Theophrast. Charact. p. 79, ed. Fischer. Stallb.

E. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γάρ, etc., *for they intrusted* (them to their scholars) *for the purpose of using them aright against their foes, and those who wrong them, in defending themselves, not in beginning an assault*. τοῦτοις refers to the means of defence used in the arts just named. The subject of χρῆσθαι is to be gathered from the context, viz. such persons as learn to box, and beat their friends. The forms of ὑπάρχειν, and those of ἀμύνομαι, are often contrasted, in the senses of acting on the *offensive* and *defensive*. — μετα-

στρέψαντες, turning round, i. e. *on the contrary*. Comp. μεταβαλὼν, 480, E.

A. ἐμβραχύ, *in short*, is taken with περὶ ὅτου ἂν βούληται, 457 to show that that phrase comprises all that can be said, or is used in its widest sense. Its force is like that of *omnino*.

B. καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ . . . ὥσπερ καί. For καί, in each member of the sentence, comp. the note on Electr. 1301, where it is said that καὶ often stands after words of comparison to show connection, without any force that can be given in English. See also 458, A, at the beginning. — καῖτα. Post participia, καὶ εἴτα, καὶ ἔπειτα inferuntur, ubi εἴτα et ἔπειτα expectes. Stallb. A frequent idiom.

C. δύνανται, sc. οἱ λέγοντες, implied in τῶν λόγων; or, more exactly, the subject is indefinite, and plural, because the action of conversing requires more than one. — οὕτω repeats and recalls the participles. Join διαλύεσθαι to δύνανται.

D. μὴ σαφῶς, i. e. μὴ φῆ (deny) τὸν ἕτερον σαφῶς λέγειν. — καὶ κατὰ φθόνον, etc., *and they think that they are* (i. e. each thinks that the other is) *speaking out of envy*, or with ill feelings towards each other, having a contentious spirit, and not seeking after that which was proposed in the discussion. For ἐαυτῶν = ἀλλήλων, Soph. § 145, N. 2; K. § 302. 7; Cr. § 507. 7. — τελευτῶντες, Cr. § 457. a; K. § 312, R. 3. — οἶα καὶ, etc., *so that even the by-standers feel vexed for themselves, because they consented to be listeners to such people*. The infinitive follows οἶα here, as it so often does ὥστε.

E. διελέγχειν, *to go on, or through with a refutation of*. διὰ has the same force in διερωτήην below. In the next words, the sense is, *Lest you should suppose that I speak with my zeal for debate not directed towards the subject, that it may become plain, but against you*. For τοῦ γενέσθαι, comp. Soph. § 187. 1; K. § 308. 2. (b); Cr. § 372.

With genitives in this relation of the motive, ἔνεκα is often found.

458 A. τῶν ἡδέως . . . ἂν ἐλεγχθέντων = τούτων οἱ ἡδέως ἂν ἐλεγχθεῖεν. K. § 260. 2. (5); Cr. § 615. 2. Comp. Euthyphro 3, D, where Socrates says, that he converses, not only without taking pay for it, ἀλλὰ καὶ προστιθεὶς ἂν ἡδέως, sc. μισθόν, but even *with a willingness to give pay*, if any one is disposed to hear him. Here προστιθεὶς without ἂν would mean, that he *actually paid* his listeners. — Just below, for εἴ τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγω, we should expect εἴ τι . . . λέγοιεν, or, with the transition to the first person, λέγοιμι, parallel to the succeeding λέγοι. The reason for using λέγω seems to be that given by Stallb., which Ast opposes: that Socrates, in speaking of himself, denotes the *probability* of *his* being in an error by εἰ with an indicative; but only the *possibility* of error on the part of *another* by εἰ and an optative. — αὐτὸν ἀπαλλαγῆναι. Comp. for αὐτὸν emphatic (the word with which it agrees being omitted), 447, C, οὐδὲν οἶον αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν.

B. ὅσον δόξα ψευδής. Græci in hujusmodi comparationibus modo casus præcedenti nomini accommodant, modo nominativum ponunt, intellecto verbo superiore. Stallb. Comp. Repub. 334, B, τοῦτο μέντοι ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ εἶτι, ὠφελεῖν μὲν τοὺς φίλους ἢ δικαιοσύνην, where τὴν δικαιοσύνην would have been more common. See Cr. § 655. 4. — τὸ τῶν παρόντων, the *interests* or *feelings* of the *present company*. And so τὸ τούτων, just below; τὸ σὺν σπεύδουσ' ἅμα, καὶ τοῦ μὸν αὐτῆς, Soph. Electr. 251. Such formulæ are sometimes little more than circumlocutions for the pronoun. Comp. τό γ' ἐμόν, 458, D. — The Schol. thinks that Gorgias is here finding an excuse to break off. But probably nothing more than polite attention to the wishes of the auditors is intended. Gorgias is uniformly polite to Socrates, and willing to continue the discourse. Comp. 497, B, 506, A.

C. πόρρω ἀποτενοῦμεν, *we shall extend too far, be too prolix*. The verb is here used without an object, or, if anything is understood, it is ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, rather than τὸν λόγον. — ἐμοὶ δ' οὖν, etc., *and as for that (οὖν), may I myself also never have so much business, that leaving a conversation such as this, and so carried on (i. e. on a subject of such importance, and so interesting), it may be of more importance for me to do anything else*.

D. τὸ ἐμὸν is the subject of κωλύει. — τὸ λοιπόν, *after this*, i. e. since all the others wish that the debate should continue. — καὶ ταῦτα, etc., *and that too* (i. e. and especially) *when I myself announced, that whatever questions any one wishes to put he may do so*.

A. ἔλεγές τοι νῦν δὴ, *you were saying certainly just now*. 459 I have written τοι νῦν δὴ for τοίνυν δὴ, at Bekker's suggestion, on account of the sense. — τὸ ἐν ὀχλῷ τοῦτο, *this expression ἐν ὀχλῷ*. This is the subject of ἐστίν, and the remaining words the predicate. — ἐν τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσιν. Compare the negative μὴ here, and in ὁ μὴ ἱατρός, with οὐ in ὁ οὐκ εἰδώς, ἐν τοῖς οὐκ εἰδόσιν, just below. In the first two cases, the negation is general and indefinite: "before such as do not know, whoever they are," "he who is no physician, supposing such a person to exist." In the other two cases, the negation being made concerning something definite and particular (the orator and the crowd), οὐ is properly used.

B. ἐνταῦθα, i. e. in the case of the art of medicine.

C. ῥαστώνη, *saving of trouble, convenience*. — εἰάν τι ἡμῖν πρὸς λόγον ᾖ, *if it come at all within the scope of our discourse*. πρὸς, (literally,) on the side of, in favor of, to the advantage of.

D. οὕτως ἔχων. This clause is afterwards defined by αὐτὰ μὲν οὐκ εἰδώς.

A. ὥσπερ ἄρτι εἶπες. See 455, D. — οἶμαι is paren- 460

thetical : hence *μαθήσεται* follows, and not *μαθήσεσθαι*. — *ἔχε δὲ*, as Ast says, is a formula of exhorting, like *ἄγε γῆ* ; as Heindorf, a “formula subsistendi et inhibendi,” = *ἔχε σεαυτόν* ; as Stallb., after Hermann, one of admonishing another to remember something, and perceive its results, = *ἔχε τοῦτο*. Its use, here, at least, consists in drawing attention, in causing one to *stop* and consider something, especially some objection derived from what had been said.

B. *τάλλα οὕτω*, sc. *ἔχει*. — *κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον*, *after the same form of speech, after the same analogy*. The next words, being explicative of this clause, are without a connecting particle.

C. The words here inclosed in brackets are so injurious to the sense, that there can be little doubt, I think, of their being interpolations. The reasoning is this : He who has learned justice is just. The just does justly. Therefore he wills or prefers to do justly. Therefore he never will prefer to do unjustly. The orator, if taught justice by Gorgias, is just, and therefore will never will or prefer to do unjustly. For this passage, consult the Introduction. — *ἐκ τοῦ λόγου*, *from what has been said ; as follows from the argument*. These words show that Socrates begins here to apply what has been conceded to the case of the rhetorician, which is proof that the words in brackets are indefensible.

D. *ἐκβάλλειν*, sc. *αὐτούς*, and so with *ἐξελαύνειν*, just below. When the same noun follows two verbs, or a participle and a verb, in different cases, the Greeks content themselves usually with expressing it once. Comp. Mt. § 428. 2. — *ὡσαύτως οὕτω*, *in the selfsame way*. These adverbs answer, as Coray observes, to *ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος*.

E. *φαίνεται . . . οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἀδικήσας*, *appears incapable of ever doing injustice*, = *φαίνεται ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἀδικήσκει*. F. A. Wolf, on Demosth. c. Leptin. (p. 468, ed. Reiske),

lays down the rule, that φαίνομαι with an infin. = *videor*, but with a particip. *palam sum*. — ὁ γ' . . . ποιῆται, *since it is always discoursing*. For the use of the relative, comp. note on 488, D. Here ὁ, which refers to ἡ ῥητορική, is put in the gender of the predicate πρᾶγμα, by attraction. Comp. 463, E.

A. εἶπον . . . ὅτι . . . ἄξιον εἶη. Here ἂν is not used, because the sense is, *I said that it was worth while*. With ἂν the sense would be, *I said that it would be worth while*. The first is a direct assertion, in *oratio obliqua*; the second a hypothetical one, in the same form. And so just above, 460, E, ἐλέγετο ὅτι ἡ ῥητορική . . . εἶη, *that rhetoric was*, but ὑπέλαβον ὥς οὐδέποτε ἂν εἶη, *that it never could be*.

B. μὰ τὸν κύνα. A very common oath in the mouth of Socrates, concerning which much has been written. In 482, B, we have μὰ τὸν κύνα, τὸν Αἰγυπτίων θεόν, i. e. "latriator Anubis," which is either a comic addition to the original formula, μὰ τὸν κύνα, or else shows the oath to be of Egyptian origin. Mr. Mitchell (*Aristoph. Wasps*, Appendix, Note D) is of the latter opinion. We refer those who wish to pursue this point further to the Commentt. and the Scholl. on that play, v. 83, Solanus on Lucian's *Vit. Auct.* (Vol. III. p. 520, ed. Lehm.), and Coray on this place. The ancients thought that such oaths were introduced by Rhadamanthus, to avoid swearing by a divinity on a common occasion. Zeno, the Stoic, in imitation of Socrates, swore by the caper-bush. — οὐκ ὀλίγης συνοουσίας, *haud exigui est sermonis*. — καὶ . . . δοξάζεις. According to Ast, καὶ affects δοξάζεις, being a little out of its place. Do you *even* or *really* think? — ἦ οἶε . . . ἐρωτήματα. A passage of considerable difficulty, which seems to be best explained by regarding the sentence, with Schleierm., as a broken one; which is indicated in this edition by a dash after διδάξεν. Polus is so eager, that he cannot end his

sentence grammatically, but must make a rhetorical exhibition of his feelings. The sense is, *Or do you think, because Gorgias was ashamed not to admit, both that the orator must understand the just, beautiful, and good; and that he himself would give instruction in these subjects, if one should come to him (to study oratory) ignorant of them;—then, perhaps, from this admission, an inconsistency arose in the discussion, to wit (ὅη) the very thing which you take satisfaction in, though you yourself led the way to such questions (i. e. though you alone, by your artful questions, are to blame for the inconsistency).* For the first sentence, Schleierm. supplies a close from τοῖθ' ὁ δὴ ἀγαπᾷς, as if Polus had at first meant to say, “Or do you think, because Gorgias,” etc. . . . “to find your pleasure therein.” But perhaps some other close of more emphasis may be gathered from the context, such as, (“do you think, because Gorgias, through shame, made certain admissions,) *that therefore his inconsistency is to be charged to rhetoric.*” The other attempts to explain this sentence which I have seen are,—1. Ast’s, who gives to οἷσι the sense of *ρομίζεις*, and supplies οὔτω. *Or do you think so because, etc.* 2. Stallb., in his first ed., translates thus: *an putas Gorgiam præ pudore negasse, etc.* But this perverts the sense. Comp. 482, C, D, where the passage is alluded to and in part explained. He also ends the sentence beginning with ἡ οἷσι at εἵτα,—a strange and flat close to the period. 3. In his second edition, where he blames Ast for his “mira commenta,” deserting his former view, he continues the sense in an unbroken period, and treats οἷσι as though it did not affect the structure. The sense then becomes, *because Gorgias was ashamed to deny, etc. . . . did therefore, do you suppose, from this admission an inconsistency arise, etc.?* But an inconsistency did arise, for the very reason contained in the words οὔτι Γοργίας, etc. This is evident from

482, D. The words of Polus then become unmeaning. — *μὴ προσομολογῆσαι . . . μὴ οὐχί.* *μὴ οὐ* sometimes, as here, follows a simply negative expression, = *quin* before a subjunctive. But more usually it follows a verb of negative import, when *οὐ* precedes such a verb. Thus *ἀπαρνοῦμαι μὴ ἐπίστασθαι*, *I deny that I know*, but *οὐκ ἀπαρνοῦμαι μὴ οὐκ ἐπίστασθαι*, *I do not deny that I know*. An analogous formula to this latter is found just below, 461, C, — *τίνα ὅξει ἀπαρνήσεσθαι μὴ οὐχὶ καὶ αὐτὸν ἐπίστασθαι*, — where the interrog. implies a negative.

D. *ἐπανορθοῖτε*. Most of the MSS. have the opt. here in lieu of the subj. after a present in the principal clause. The reasons given for the opt. in the present case by Stallb. and Ast are scarcely sufficient. — *δίκαιος δ' εἶ*, and *it is right for you so to do*. For *δίκαιος*, see Mt. § 297; K. § 307, R. 6; Cr. § 551. It is for *δίκαιόν ἐστί σε*, etc., owing to the cause explained in the note on 448, D. — *ἀναθέσθαι*, to retract, properly, to put a piece over again, to change a move in playing draughts. Comp. Xen. Memorab. 2. 4. 4. Cicero, in a frag. of his Hortensius, says, “Itaque tibi concedo, quod in duodecim scriptis solemus, ut calculum reducas, si te alicujus dicti pœnitet,” borrowing his figure perhaps from Plato. The subject of *ἀναθέσθαι* Ast takes to be *σε* understood. “Quod fieri non posse manifestum est,” says Stallb. But such cases are possible, and we believe Ast to be right. Here, *σοι δοκεῖ*, just before, and *ὃ τι ἂν σὺ βούλῃ*, just after, almost forbid us to supply *με*. A stronger case occurs Theætet. 151, C: “For many feel so towards me, as positively to be ready to bite me, when I strip them of some folly of theirs,” — *καὶ οὐκ ὄνται εὐνοία τοῦτο ποιεῖν*, i. e. that *I* do this. (Such is the MS. reading.) — *φυλάττης*, if you will only observe one thing. The middle, if you will guard against, might stand here.

E. οὐ . . . λέγειν, *where of all Greece there is the greatest liberty of speech*, Ἑλλάδος being a genitive partitive. — ἀντίθεσ, *put over against it*, sc. this, viz. σοῦ μακρὰ λέγοντος, etc. For this latter passage, compare Aristoph. Acharn. 303, σοῦ δ' ἐγὼ λόγους λέγοντος οὐκ ἀκούσομαι μακροῦς. — τοι, *though*.

462 B. νῦν δὴ, *nunc igitur*. — ἐν τῷ συγγράμματι. Aristotle (Metaphys. init.) refers to this treatise, or to the words of Polus of like import on 448, C, and approves of his opinion making experience the foundation of art.

C. οὐκοῦν καλὸν . . . ἀνθρώποις; *does not rhetoric, then, namely, to have the faculty of giving pleasure to men, seem to you to be a good thing?* The last clause of the sentence explains, and is in apposition with, ἡ ῥητορική. οἶόν τ' εἶναι = *τινα οἶόν τ' εἶναι*.

D. βούλει οὖν, etc., *are you willing, then, since you prize giving pleasure, to give me a little pleasure?* For the play on χαρίζομαι (which itself playfully alludes to χάριτός τινος καὶ ἡδονῆς, just above), comp. 516, B. In this sentence, the present infinitive denotes the *habit* of Polus; χαρίσασθαι, that which Socrates wishes him to do *in this instance*.

E. τίνος λέγεις ταύτης; Comp. 449, E, note on ποίους τούτους. — μὴ ἀγροικότερον ᾗ, *I fear that it may seem too rude*. For δέδοικα omitted, comp. Soph. § 214, N. 4; Cr. § 602. 2. The comparative, which here denotes a lower degree of the quality than the positive, is usual in such apologies.

463 A. δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι . . . ἀνθρώποις, *it seems to me, then, to be a sort of study, that has not indeed the properties of an art, but which belongs to a mind dexterous in attaining its ends, and manly, and possessed of a natural talent to communicate with men*.

B. ὥς δὲ ὁ ἐμὸς λόγος, etc., *yet, as I maintain, is not an art but experience, or a routine and practice, i. e. has*

nothing to do with absolute truth and reason, but proceeds from accidental discovery that a certain end is gained by certain means. — κομμωτικὴ differt a κοσμητικῇ quâ honestus ornatus quæritur. Stallb.

C. τέτταρα . . . πράγμασιν, *four divisions these* (of flattery or the art of show) *relating to four matters or subjects*. These four subjects, according to Coray and Stallb., are words, food, the ornamenting of the body, and philosophical disquisitions. — ἀποκεκριμένος. Comp. 453, D, note. — πρὶν ἂν . . . ἀποκρίνωμαι. With πρὶν “subjunctivum non usurpant tragici, nisi in priore membro adsit negandi aut prohibendi significatio.” Elmsley on Medea, 215. In which case ἂν accompanies πρὶν, with some exceptions almost confined to poetry, and the subjunctive aorist has the sense of the exact future of Latin; e. g. here *priusquam respondero*. For the reason why the subjunctive follows πρὶν, see Mt. § 522, C.; K. § 337. 9. b.

D. ἀποκρινάμενον, sc. μου. Comp. 461, D, note. — πολιτικῆς μορίου εἶδωλον, *a shadow or semblance of a division of the political art*, “*civilitatis particulæ simulacrum*,” as translated by Quintil. 2. 15. 25, where this passage is examined.

E. Πῶλος δὲ ὄδε. There is here, probably, an allusion to the meaning of the name *colt*, as Schleierm. remarks. For another pun on the name of Polus, comp. Aristot. Rhet. 2. 23: ὡς Κόνων Θρασύβουλον “*θρασύβουλον*” ἐκάλει, καὶ Ἡρόδικος (of Selymbria, comp. 448, B, note) Θρασύμαχον, “*αἰεὶ θρασύμαχος εἶ*,” καὶ Πῶλον, “*αἰεὶ σὺν πῶλος εἶ*,” καὶ Δράκοντα τὸν νομοθέτην, ὅτι οὐκ ἀνθρώπου οἱ νόμοι ἀλλὰ δράκοντος. — In τυγχάνει ὃν τοῦτο, the predicate τοῦτο determines the gender of ὃν by attraction, instead of ῥητορικῇ, to which it refers. Comp. 460, E.

A. οἷον τοιόνδε λέγω, *for instance I mean as follows*, lit. 461
erally, “*cf which sort I mention such a thing as this, viz.*”

This, with or without the article before *τοιόνδε*, is a common formula in Plato, when examples are adduced. — τὰ σώματα is the accus. of specification.

B. ἔχει δὲ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον, i. e. εὔ. The subject of ἔχει is supplied by the preceding accusatives, σῶμα and ψυχήν. *But, or, while yet they (soul and body) are none the more in a good condition.* Another construction also is possible : ὅτι ποιεῖ (τινα) δοκεῖν μὲν εὔ ἔχειν (κατὰ) τὸ σῶμα . . . ἔχει δέ, *while he is none the more in a good condition.* — τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ σώματι, etc., *but the art for the body I am not able to name to you off-hand by one name.* σῶμα and ψυχὴ freely take and lose the article (comp. 465, D). They lose it, perhaps, as approaching the nature of abstract nouns. In 463, E, they could not have it. μίαν is the predicate-accusative. οὔτω, *thus, in these present circumstances*, is often equivalent to *illico*. Comp. 509, A. — τῆς δὲ πολιτικῆς, etc. Here λέγω is to be supplied in thought, and τῆς πολιτικῆς depends on τὴν νομοθετικὴν, its part. The sense is, *And of the political art I mention (one branch) the legislative as the counterpart to the gymnastic art, and (the other) justice as the counterpart to medicine.* The political art, or the general art of securing the public good, has two divisions, *first*, that which consists in securing the moral welfare by *law*, which prescribes what is right, and according to which the public health will be preserved; and, *secondly*, that which restores this health when once impaired, or *justice*, the judge's art. (See Introduction.) Analogous to these arts for the soul are, for the body, gymnastics, or the art of preserving, and medicine, or that of restoring health. Plato elsewhere insists on the analogy between the healing art and justice, e. g. in *Repub.* 441, C, — a fine passage, where, however, justice is taken in the higher sense of that controlling virtue, which brings all the parts of the soul, like those of a well-regulated state, into their due place and order.

C. πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, *with a view to the greatest good*. — οὐ γνοῦσα λέγω ἀλλὰ στοχασαμένη. As αἰσθομένη is a general word denoting mental perceptions, whencesoever derived, it is explained by this clause, *not guided by knowledge, I would have you understand, but by guess*. Comp. 463, A. — ὑποδῦσα ὑπὸ ἑκαστον, *having slipped under, or by stealth put on the garb of each of the four divisions*.

D. θηρεύεται τὴν ἄνοιαν, *hunts for, seeks to captivate ignorance, or the unwary*. — τῷ . . . ἀεὶ ἡδίστῳ, *by that which is at the time the most agreeable*.

A. τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς σέ λέγω alludes to 463, D, where Po-465 lus puts the question concerning the quality of rhetoric. Comp. 448, C — E. — ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει λόγον οὐδένα ἃ προσφέρει, *because it cannot explain what sort of things those are in their nature, which it makes use of*. Here we see what Plato thought that a τέχνη must be. The MSS. give, almost unanimously, ᾧ προσφέρει ἃ προσφέρει, and the editors, without MS. authority, ᾧν προσφέρει. I have restored a part of the MS. reading, and have since observed that Stallb., in his second edition, has made the same change. — ὑποσχέιν λόγον, *to submit the reason, or rationale, to explain and defend a position*.

B. ὑπόκειται, *puts itself under, puts on the form or mask of*, = ὑποδύνει above. — ὥστε ποιεῖν . . . ἀμελεῖν, *so as to make men attach to themselves adventitious beauty, and neglect their own, obtained through the gymnastic art*.

C. ὅπερ μέντοι λέγω. In the ensuing words, down to ὀψοποιικῶν, the thoughts seem to be only half expressed, as if Socrates, anxious to avoid a long speech, were hastening to an end. Some editors suppose that the text has sustained an injury, but, as I think, without reason. Such, says Socrates, are these arts in their nature; but in practice the Sophists' art and rhetoric are confounded together;

and the like would be true of cookery and medicine, if the body judged of them without a presiding mind. The thoughts are not essential to the argument, and are only thrown out *en passant*. ὅπερ . . . λέγω refers to what has just preceded; *but as I say, or was just saying*. — διέστηκη. The subject of this verb, according to Buttmann in Heindorf's edition, is all the arts before mentioned, and ὄντων has the same subject, which is ταῦτα understood, referring to these arts. Stallb. restricts διέστηκεν, with reason, I think, in his first edition, to σοφιστικὴ καὶ ῥητορικὴ. ὄντων may be used instead of ὄντες, referring to σοφισταὶ καὶ ῥήτορες, next following. A participle is sometimes found in the genitive absolute, when its subject is the same as that of the verb; the cause of which seems to be a desire of the writer to express the thought contained in the participle more distinctly. The grammatical construction is caused by Plato's passing in thought from the *arts* to those *who pursue them*. — ἄτε δ' ἐγγὺς ὄντων, *but, inasmuch as they are conterminous arts, sophists and orators are* (mixed together in the same place and about the same things, i. e. are) *confounded together, and indiscriminately give themselves to the same pursuit, and they know not what to make of themselves, nor their fellow-men of them* (i. e. neither they nor others have any exact idea of their so-called arts). For the thought, comp. 520, A: ταῦτόν, ὦ μακάριε, ἐστὶ σοφιστῆς καὶ ῥήτωρ, ἣ ἐγγὺς τι καὶ παραπλήσιον, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον πρὸς Πῶλον.

D. τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου ἂν πολὺ ᾔην, *what the well-known (τοῦ) Anaxagoras said (his tenet) would hold extensively* (in regard to these arts). For the uses of the article, see Soph. § 176, and § 139, N. 1; Cr. §§ 477. α, 479. Anaxagoras taught that all things were in a chaos at first: then came MIND, and arranged them. In other words, he ascribed to an intelligent author, not creation, nor motion and

quality, but only arrangement ; which was, however, a step beyond the earlier Ionic philosophers, who accounted for all phenomena by the physical properties of matter. — σὺ γὰρ τούτων ἔμπειρος. The Schol. of the Clarke MS. supposes these words to allude to the rhetorical figure called *παρίσωσις*, which takes place when similar words, as φίλε Πῶλε here, are brought together. Another Schol. explains them of the acquaintance of Polus with the philosophy of Anaxagoras, — to which sect, says he, Polus belonged, — a piece of information probably picked out of the text. Perhaps nothing more than ironical praise of Polus for great knowledge is intended. Comp. 462, A.

E. ὥς ἐκείνο ἐν σώματι, sc. ἀντίστροφόν ἐστι τῆς ῥητορικῆς. The clause might be removed without injury to the sense. ἀντίστροφον here governs a genitive, but a dative, 464, B. Some other compounds of ἀντι vary in the same way as to their regimen. ἐκείνο, referring to ὀψοποιίας, accommodates its gender to that of ἀντίστροφον.

A. Init. *If, therefore, I too, when you answer, shall not 466 know what to make (of it), do you likewise prolong your discourse ; but if I shall, let me make use of it.* The dative, which should follow χρήσωμαι, is contained in ἀποκρινόμενου.

B. οὐδὲ νομίζεσθαι, *not even to be thought of*, i. e. to be held in no estimation at all. This verb, which just above has a predicate, φαῦλοι, is here used absolutely. Our verbs *to regard*, *to consider*, and others, are capable of the same twofold use.

C. The colon, which most editors put after κύνα, ought, as it seems to me, to be erased. Comp. μὰ τὸν Δία . . . ἀλλ', 463, D, νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀλλ', 481, C, where the formula of swearing unites in one clause with what follows. Socrates does not answer Polus by the phrase νῆ τὸν κύνα, but only begins his answer in the next chapter.

E. οὐδὲν γὰρ ποιεῖν, etc. Comp. Repub. 9. 577, E. "Is not the state that is enslaved and under a tyrant far from doing what it wishes? Very far. And the soul, accordingly, that is governed by a tyrant, will be very far from doing what it may wish (if we speak of the whole soul); and, drawn along forcibly by urgent lust, will be full of agitation and regret." For ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, qualifying οὐδὲν, see 450, B. — ἐγὼ οὐ φημι; *egone nego?* — μὰ τόν. The Schol. on Aristoph. Frogs, 1421, thinks that the name of the divinity is omitted out of reverence. But the omission seems intended rather for comic effect, as though the right divinity did not readily occur to the mind. — καὶ τέχνην τὴν ῥητορικὴν. Supply οὖσαν. Comp. 495, C.

467 A. ἐμὲ ἐξελέγξας. The aorist participle, which Heindorf declares to be used for the present, has its own force. Polus could come to his conclusion, *when he had refuted*, or *by refuting*. The argument may be considered as *the preliminary* to the conclusion, or as *the means* of reaching it. In the first case, the aorist is needed; the present, if used, would have the second sense. — οὐδὲν ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο κεκτήσονται. By τοῦτο, he means τὸ ποιεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς. — ἐξελεγχθῆ . . . ὅτι. The verb is here used *in sensu pragnanti*, unless Socrates *be refuted*, and *it be shown that*, thus answering nearly to our verb *convince*.

B. οὗτος ἀνὴρ. An instance of aposiopesis or reticentia, a figure often caused by excited feelings, which cannot find the language to express themselves. "In hac formula recte omittitur articulus, quoniam dicitur δεικτικῶς de eo qui præsens est." Stallb. οὗτος contains a shade of contempt sometimes like *iste*. Comp. 489, B, 505, C. — καὶ γὰρ non est *etenim*, sed καὶ pertinet ad νῦν. Stallb.; i. e. καὶ is *also*. — ἵνα προσείπω σε κατὰ σέ, *that I may address you in your own style*. This refers to λῶστε Πῶλε, and the artificial juxtaposition of words of equal length, or of similar form or sound. Comp. 448, C, 465, D.

C. πίνοντες παρά, i. e. πίνοντες τὰ φάρμακα, λαβόντες αὐτὰ παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν, a *constructio prægnans*.

D. οἱ πλείοντες, i. e. who make voyages for commercial purposes. — ἀλλ’ ἐκείνο . . . πλουτεῖν, when a demonstrative pronoun thus prepares the way for the infinitive, the latter often loses its article. Comp. τοῦτο . . . ἐξεῖναι, 469, C. But, just above, we have not only τοῦτο, πίνειν, but also ἐκείνο, τὸ ὑγιαίνειν. — ἄλλο τι . . . οὔτω. Supply ἔχει. *Is it not so, then, in all cases?*

E. πολλὴ ἀνάγκη. The preceding question of Socrates is equivalent to a negative proposition, which is here to be supplied; sc. that there is nothing which is not either good or bad, etc.

A. πράττονσι, *on fait*, like λέγουσι, *on dit*. The same 468 indefinite subject appears just before in the first person plural, βαδίζομεν, etc.

C. ἀπλῶς οὕτως, *thus in themselves considered*, without respect to something further.

E. ἐν τῇ πόλει ταύτῃ. Not in this city, Athens, nor does ταύτῃ denote *in this way*, but *in this just-mentioned city*, i. e. in the supposed city. If Athens had been intended, Socrates, living there, would have said, as Stallb. after Boeckh on Pindar (Not. Crit. in Olymp. 6. 102) observes, ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει. Comp. this formula so used, 469, D, fin.; Leges 932, A. ὅδε seems to be the strongest, and, so to speak, most objective of the demonstratives, and to point especially at that which has a close outward relation (as that of place) to the ‘speaker. — ἔστιν . . . δύνασθαι. ἔστιν = *fieri potest*. — ὥς δῆ, *as forsooth, just as though*. Stallb. translates these words by *quasi vero*, Ast by *nam revera*.

A. περὶ ὧν . . . τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Comp. Soph. § 151. 3; 469 K. § 332. 8; Cr. § 522.

B. καὶ ἐλεεινόν γε πρὸς· *præpositioni πρὸς absolute posi-*

tæ (*præterea*) adjungi solet particula γε. Ast, = *yes, and pitiable besides*. — πῶς, *cur.* — οὕτως, ὥς, *for this reason that*. And so, in English, we say *how is this?* nearly in the sense of *why is this?* the reason of which is, that the manner in which a thing is done often involves the cause why it is done.

C. ἐξείναι. Supply τινι, to which αὐτῷ refers, in the next line.

D. τῷ λόγῳ is added to explain the sense in which ἐπιλαβοῦ is used, *attack in your discourse, refute by argument*. δὴ seems to belong to the imperative, with the usual hortatory sense. — ἐν ἀγορᾷ πληθούσῃ, *in the agora, when it is crowded*, which it was between early morning and midday. This phrase denotes place, — not time, as Stallb. says, to which ἐν is opposed. περὶ ἀγορὰν πλήθουσσαν is a common phrase for time. ἀγορά, even when definitely used, is often without an article, like πόλις, πατήρ, and many other nouns. And this is particularly frequent after prepositions. Comp. 447, A. — τεθνήξει, *he shall be dead*, the meaning of τέθνηκα put into a future. This appears to be the received form in old Attic, and τεθνήξεται came into use afterwards. See Elmsl. on Aristoph. Acharn. 590. — τινὰ . . . τῆς κεφαλῆς αὐτῶν κατεαγέναι, *that any of them shall have his head broken*, like συντριβῆναι τῆς κεφαλῆς, Aristoph. Peace, 71. But the accusative may also follow this verb, as in 515, E. Yet the accusative of κεφαλὴ was disallowed by the Atticists, although used by Lysias and others of the best writers.

E. τρίρεις, desidero articulum. Stallb. αἱ, which may have been absorbed by καὶ (KAÍ for KAIAI), is added by Coray. But the article is unnecessary, being implied or contained in τὰ, as Ast observes. One article often suffices, even for two substantives of different genders, or for two

words separated by disjunctive particles. Comp. Hermann on Eurip. Hec. 593 of his second edition.

A. τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι, etc. The construction is anacoluthous; καὶ τοῦτο . . . ἐστὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι being, for the sake of greater emphasis, in the place of καὶ εἶναι μέγα δύνασθαι. The sense is, *To have great power appears to you to be a good, if success follows a man while he acts as seems best to him; and this* (i. e. the use of great power when accompanied with success), *as it seems, is to have great power; but otherwise to have great power is a bad thing, and is to have little power.* Socrates shows the absurdities into which Polus, on his own ground, falls.

B. εἰπὲ τίνα ὅρον ὀρίζει. τίς is here used like ὅστις in indirect inquiry. See 447, C, 448, E, etc.

C. χαλεπὸν γέ σε ἐλέγξει. These words are obviously spoken in irony.

D. ἀλλ' ἀκούω γε. Routh and other editors since suppose that by this form of words Socrates conveys ridicule of ὀρᾶς, just above, which is used quite rhetorically. This may be so, but ἀκούω is often thus used for ἀκήκοα. Comp. 515, E; Cr. § 579, ζ; K. § 255. 1. R. — οὐκ οἶδα. The noble passage down to ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ is freely translated by Cicero, Tusc. Quæst. 5. 12. — αὐτόθεν, *ex ipsa re*. Stallb., *from the nature of the case itself*.

E. παιδείας ὅπως ἔχει. See 451, C. — τὸν . . . ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα. See 469, E, note.

A. Archelaus began his reign by the foul means mentioned in the text, in 413 B. C., and died by assassination in 399. He seems to have been an able prince, and he made, according to Thucyd. (2. 100), more internal improvements in Macedonia than all his predecessors. His desire of the society of men of letters is well known; besides Euripides, the poet Agathon and others resorted to his court. (Ælian. Var. Hist. 2. 21.) Socrates, also, is said to have been in-

vited, and to have replied, ὕβριν εἶναι μὴ δύνασθαι ἀμύνασθαι ὁμοίως εὖ παθόντα ὥσπερ καὶ κακῶς. (Aristot. Rhet. 2. 23.) He said, also, that Archelaus had spent 400 minæ in getting his palace painted by Zeuxis, but had spent nothing on himself. (Ælian. u. s. 14, 17.) Athenæus, in a bitter passage, filled with aspersions of Plato (Lib. 11. sub fin.), says that the philosopher was, according to the testimony of his nephew, Speusippus, on very good terms with the man whom he here speaks so ill of. But as Plato was scarcely thirty when Archelaus died, and until that time a man of little distinction, the story is probably distorted and exaggerated. — ἐδούλευεν ἄν. Some few MSS. give ἐδούλευσεν. Heindorf condemns Routh for adopting ἐδούλευεν, saying that the latter, with ἄν, is *serviret*; the former, *servisset*. But this is not so. The imperfect indicative with ἄν, “plerumque refertur ad præsens. Sæpe vero etiam ad præteritum, ejusmodi quidem, quod diuturnitatem aliquam vel repetitionem facti continet.” Hermann de partic. ἄν, II. 10.

B. θαυμασίως ὥς ἄθλιος. See 477, D, note. — μεταπεμφάμενος, etc. “Insignis est hic locus eo, quod plurima participia cumulantur, copula non intercedente.” Stallb. In this, the style of rhetoric seems to be imitated. The circumstances are compressed into one sentence, and vibrated, so to speak, one after another with rapidity, for the sake of the greater effect.

C. ἐμβαλὼν εἰς φρέαρ, according to Ast and Stallb., denotes the manner in which the action of ἀποπνίξας took place, *having drowned him by throwing him into a well*. Perhaps it may suit the rhetorical style here better, if they are taken side by side, as if καὶ were in the text, *having thrown him into the well (and so) drowned him*. For ἀποπνίξας, comp. 512, A. — ἀρξάμενος ἀπὸ σοῦ, *tuque imprimis, seu interque eos tu primus*. Heindorf, who has adduced a number of examples of the phrase.

D. τοῦ . . . ἡμεληκέναι. This clause is brought, by a negligent freedom of style, under the influence of ὅτι, although Socrates of course did not praise Polus for ignorance of the art of conversation. δὲ has the force of *quantum*; *although you seem to have neglected the art of discussing*. — πόθεν. Comp. my note on Eurip. Alcest. 95.

A. δοκούντων εἶναι τι. Cr., § 450, regards τι as indeclinable, *eorum qui videntur esse aliquid*; not as predic. accus., *eorum qui se putant esse aliquid*. *Aliquis* and *aliquid* are both used by classical Roman writers in the same emphatic way. Cic. Tusc. Quæst. 5. 36. 104: *an quidquam stultius, quam quos singulos contempnas, eos esse aliquid putare universos*. And so τις, τινές, as in the noted line of Pindar, τί δέ τις; τί δ' οὔ τις; σκιᾶς ὄνار ἄνθρωπος, Pyth. 8. 95; and in Demosth. c. Mid. § 213, πλούσιοι πολλοὶ . . . τὸ δοκεῖν τινές εἶναι δι' εὐπορίαν προσειληφότες, which favors Crosby's view. — ὀλίγου. Soph. § 220 (223. 2); Cr. § 623. — Νικίας. This well-known wealthy general perished in the Sicilian disaster, some seven years before the time when this dialogue is feigned to have been held. He is, however, without anachronism, selected as a witness, in the same way that the testimony of Homer might be appealed to. The men here named were not selected on account of their unjust actions, — for they were, perhaps, all of them, among the best Athenian public men, — but probably on account of their wealth, illustrious connections, and ancestry. Socrates means to say, that the spirit of all the great and opulent families in the city led them to prefer prosperous injustice before depressed goodness. — οἱ τρίποδες. A favorite kind of votive offering. The tripods here spoken of were set up on the top of small temples in the inclosure of the temple of Bacchus, in commemoration of victories in which the dedicators were the *choragi* of their tribes. — Ἀριστοκράτης, son of Scellias. This man,

one of the more moderate aristocrats, after helping, in 411 B. C., to overturn the Athenian constitution, soon again united with Theramenes to put down the more violent revolutionists. His dislike of democracy is punned upon in Aristoph. Birds, 125. We find probably the same person acting as general with Alcibiades, 407 B. C., and one of the commanders in the great sea-fight of Arginusæ, 406 B. C. With five colleagues, he perished, the victim of the popular frenzy which succeeded that event. It would not, then, seem very apposite to cite him the next year as a witness of the tenets of Polus, which his own experience so sadly belied. Either Plato forgot the date of this transaction, or with concealed irony selects the case of this man as really disproving what it is intended to prove. And he may have adduced the others with the same feeling.

B. ἐν Πυθίου, sc. ἱερῶ, in the temple of Apollo Pythius at Athens. So I have no hesitation in reading, with Coray, after one MS., for the common Πυθοί, Delphi. For τοῦτο points at a votive offering well known and familiar to Athenians, and this temple (i. e. its sacred precinct) was the place where those who conquered in the cyclic choruses at the Thargelia deposited their tripods. Comp. Boeckh's Inscrip., no. 213, and Thucyd. 6. 54. — τῶν ἐνθένδε is for τῶν ἐνθάδε, by attraction or accommodation to ἐκλέξασθαι, which contains the notion of taking *from*. — ἐκβάλλειν . . . ἀληθοῦς. In these words there is an elegant allusion to actions of ejection. There is, also, according to Stallb., a play upon οὐσία, which means not only *substance*, *estate*, but *reality*, *truth*. ἐκβάλλειν, also, may allude to the tyrants before mentioned; as though Socrates had said, "You mean to act the part of one of these tyrants, whom you admire so much, and expel me from my only substance, the truth, by getting a multitude of opinions in your favor."

C. ὃν ἐγὼ αὖ οἶμαι. Supply τρόπον ἐλέγχου εἶναι, and comp. 473, C, 508, B.

D. σὺ ἡγεῖ οἶόν τε εἶναι. οἶον is neuter, and εἶναι is to be taken with μακάριον ἄνδρα; another εἶναι being understood, unless we say that the one in the text by brachylogy performs a double part. Comp. Repub. 486, A: οἶόν τε οἶει τούτῳ μέγα τι δοκεῖν εἶναι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον. — ἄλλο τι . . . διανοώμεθα; shall we not suppose that you think so? For the genitive absolute with ὥς, after a verb of knowing, comp. Soph. § 192, N. 2; Mt. § 569. 5; K. § 312, R. 12; Cr. § 640. — ἄρα interrogative is sometimes found out of its usual place at the beginning of the sentence, like other words of the same class. It is, however, before the most important clause. Comp. 476, A.

A. ὑπὸ θεῶν. ὑπὸ is used because τυγχάνη δίκης con- 473 tains a passive idea = κολάζηται.

B. ἀληθῆ . . . ἴσως. Hoc ἴσως cum irrisione dictum de re certa ut Lat. *fortasse*. Stallb. — ἀλλ' ἔτι τοῦτ' . . . χαλεπώτερον alludes to 470, C, χαλεπὸν γέ σε ἐλέγξει, and is ironical.

C. ἐκτέμνηται, *exsecetur*. Ast. — τοὺς αὐτοῦ ἐπιδὼν παῖδας. Supply λωβηθέντας. ἐπιδεῖν (to look upon, to live to see), “ponitur semper in rebus gravioribus, et ἐπὶ συμφορᾶς ut ait Thomas Magister, p. 335.” Wyttenbach on Plut. de sera num. vindict., p. 17, referred to by Heindorf and others. Not *semper*, but *sæpe*. We have, for instance, Eurip. Med. 1025, πρὶν σφῶν ὄνασθαι καπιδεῖν εὐδαίμονας; Plut. Pelopid. § 34, Διαγόραν ἐπιδόντα υἱὸς στεφανουμένους Ὀλυμπίασιν, and so several times in Plutarch's lives. — καταπιττωθῆ, *pice oblitus cremetur*. — οὗτος εὐδαιμονέστερος ἔσται. The compar. here has far less authority in its favor than the superl.; and quite a number of MSS. have εὐδαίμων. Stallb. inclines to the superl., but no sure example has been adduced of this degree used for the compara-

tive and followed by ἤ. — καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων, *and by strangers besides*, or *and by the rest of men*, viz. *strangers*. This seemingly pleonastic use of ἄλλος is quite common. Comp. 480, D; Phædo, 110, E, γῆ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις; Leg. 7. 789, D, κάλλος καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ῥώμην; Xen. Cyrop. 7. 3, βοῦς καὶ ἵππους . . . καὶ ἄλλα πρόβατα πολλά.

D. μορμολύττει αὖ, etc., *you are this time bringing up bugbears, and not attempting a refutation; and just now you were bringing up witnesses*. Socrates is making game of the rhetorical substitutes for philosophical proof used by Polus. For ἄρτι δὲ ἐμαρτύρου, comp. 470, D, 472, A, to which places there is a reference. — δυοῖν γὰρ ἀθλίειν. Supply οὐδέτερος.

E. ἄλλο αὖ τοῦτο εἶδος ἐλέγχου. This may allude to a rhetorical precept of Gorgias mentioned by Aristot. Rhet. 3. 18, that the "impression produced by the serious discourse of the adverse party must be destroyed by mirth; and that of his mirth by seriousness." — καὶ πέρυσσι βουλεύειν λαχὼν . . . οὐκ ἠπιστάμην ἐπιψηφίζειν. Socrates, in his ironical way, attributes to ignorance a proceeding which sprang from a conscientious regard to law, and crowned him with the highest honor. It is narrated by Xenophon, in his Hellenics, 1. 7, and mentioned by him (Memorab. 1. 1. 18, and 4. 4. 2) and Plato (Apol. Socr. 32, A), and in the dialogue Axiochus, § 12. Socrates happened to be the Epistates or president of the Prytanes, and as such the presiding officer in the assembly, on the day when the generals who had conquered at Arginusæ (comp. 472, A, note) were brought before the people on a charge of having neglected to pick up the bodies of the citizens that were floating in the water. It was proposed, contrary to the laws, to try them all at once by a summary process. Some of the Prytanes, who declared that they would not put the vote contrary to the laws, were frightened from their pur-

pose by the rage of the people, "and all promised that they would put the vote, except Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus, who only said that he would do everything according to the laws." (Xen. Hellen. u. s.) Whether Socrates was overruled by his colleagues it does not appear. One is tempted to conjecture that they took the affair out of his hands, and pretended that his delay in allowing the assembly to vote proceeded from ignorance; and that to this he playfully alludes. His conduct, however, was viewed by all in its true light. There is some reason to believe, however, that for that day he stayed proceedings upon the proposition. "But on the next day, Theramenes and Callixenus, with their party, by suborning fraudulently chosen *proedri*, procured the condemnation of the generals without a trial." (Axiochus, u. s.) This passage from a work ascribed to a disciple of Socrates, but commonly regarded as spurious, is important, not only for this item of information, but also for the statement, which may have some historical basis, that the foul plot against the generals was consummated by means of the *proedri non-contribules*, as they are called, who were drawn according to a pretended lot, on the day of the assembly, by the Epistates for the day, who was the successor of Socrates.

A. ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον is to be taken with ἐμοὶ . . . 474 παράδος, as *I was saying just now, hand over the proof to me in my turn.* He refers to 472, C.

B. τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς οὐδὲ διαλέγομαι. These words with some bitterness silently contrast the philosopher with the orator, who aims to persuade the many. — διδόναι ἔλεγχον, *to give an opportunity of refutation, to let (another) take up the argument.* — πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. In this formula, καὶ is often added before δεῖ in the sense of *even*.

D. τί δὲ τόδε; intellige λέγεις. Stallb. — εἰς οὐδὲν ἀποβλίπων, etc. *Do you call beautiful things in general*

(τὰ καλὰ πάντα) *beautiful in each instance without having reference to anything further?* i. e. do you consider beauty a fundamental quality, or resolve it into something else? — πρὸς ὃ ἄν. These words down to τοῦτο are exegetical of the preceding clause.

E. καὶ μὴν τά γε . . . ἀμφοτέρω. In this sentence, Ast wishes to write καλὰ without the article, thus making it a predicate. τὰ καλὰ is added by way of explanation. τὰ κατὰ . . . νόμους = οἱ νόμοι. The sense is, *And, moreover, laws and studies — those that are beautiful, that is — are not removed from (are not without) these properties, viz. the useful or pleasant, or both.*

475 A. τὸ τῶν μαθημάτων κάλλος ὡσαύτως. Supply ἔχει. — καλῶς . . . ὀρίζει. This conveys a bitter satire of Polus, who by pleasure and the good meant the same thing. — οὐκοῦν τὸ αἰσχρὸν τῷ ἐναντίῳ, i. e. οὐκοῦν καλῶς ὀρίζομαι, τῷ ἐναντίῳ ὀριζόμενος τὸ αἰσχρὸν.

B. οὐ καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη; frequens apud Plat. dictio pro quâ quis expectet οὐ καὶ τοῦτο ἀναγκαῖον; infra, p. 499, B, οὐ ταῦτα ἀνάγκη. Stallb.

C. οὐκοῦν τῷ ἐτέρῳ λείπεται, sc. ὑπερβάλλειν αὐτό.

D. ἀντὶ τοῦ ἦττον, sc. κακοῦ καὶ αἰσχροῦ.

E. For παρέχων, see 456, B. — ὁ ἔλεγχος . . . οὐδὲν ἕοικεν, *my mode of proof when put by the side of your mode of proof is quite unlike it.*

476 A. σκεψώμεθι, σκοπώμεθα. The present imperative, and the subjunctive used for it, seem sometimes to have a closer reference to the present time than the aorist; and therefore to be more urgent. Comp. *let us be going*, and *let us go*, in English. It has been remarked (first, I believe, by Elmsley), that in the present and imperfect the Attics say σκοπῶ, ἐσκόπουν, or σκοποῦμαι, ἐσκοπούμην, but not σκέπτομαι, ἐσκεπτόμην. There is only one instance of σκέπτομαι in Plato to very many of σκοπῶ. On the con-

trary, they never use σκοπῶ in the future, aorist, or perfect.

B. διασκεψάμενος, *after careful consideration*. — ἄρα τοῦτο πάσχον, sc. ἐστί, or better, ἀνάγκη τοῦτο πάσχον εἶναι (i. e. πάσχειν), τοῦτο being the object. The participle is used to continue the form of the preceding discourse.

C. The Attic form κάω is justly preferred by all modern editors to καίω, having, as it does, the support of several MSS.

D. τούτων δὴ ὁμολογουμένων. The participle is properly in the present, as the clause may be resolved into ἐπειδὴ ταῦθ' ὁμολογοῦμεν.

A. ἄρα ἤνπερ ἐγὼ ὑπολαμβάνω τὴν ὠφέλειαν; Supply 477 ὠφελεῖται, to be taken with its cognate noun, and for the place of ὠφέλειαν in the sentence, comp. Soph. § 151, Rem. 7; K. § 332. 8; Cr. § 522.

B. ἐν χρημάτων κατασκευῇ ἀνθρώπου, *in the condition of a man's property*. So Schleierm. Comp. Repub. 544, E, αἱ τῶν ιδιωτῶν κατασκευαὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, and 449, A, περὶ ιδιωτῶν ψυχῆς τρόπου κατασκευῇ. Ast, in his translation, joins ἀνθρώπου with κακίαν.

C. ἀεὶ τὸ αἰσχιστον, etc. *In every case, that which is most ugly is most ugly, from what has been admitted before, either as occasioning pain in the greatest degree, or harm, or both*. The student will have observed that καλός, αἰσχυρός, preserve the same sense throughout the discussion, and there seems to be no fit word except *ugly* by which to translate the latter of the two. And yet *ugly* will not bear to be used in as wide an extent as αἰσχυρός. ἀγαθός, κακός, denote the relation of anything to our well-being, especially to future and ultimate well-being as opposed to pleasure in the present time.

D. οὐκοῦν ἡ ἀναιρότατόν, etc. *Therefore it is either most unpleasant, and the ugliest of them because it exceeds*

(them) in unpleasantness, or (it is so because it exceeds them) in hurtfulness, or in both. *τούτων* refers to the two *πονηρία* of soul and body. — *ὑπερφυεῖ τινα . . . ὥς μεγάλη βλάβη*, by some extraordinarily great harm. This may be explained as a *confusio duarum locutionum*, *ὑπερφυές ἐστίν ὥς μεγάλη βλάβη*, it is astonishing by how great a harm, and *ὑπερφυεῖ τινα βλάβη*, by some astonishing harm. The common formula *ὑπερφυῶς ὥς*, *θαυμαστῶς ὥς*, with an adjective, can be explained in the same way, or by an attraction by which the adjectives *ὑπερφυές*, *θαυμαστόν* (*ἐστίν*) are changed in their form by the relative adverb.

E. *ἀπαλλάττει*. This means no more than “has a tendency to free.” Some are beyond the reach of cure by punishment (525, C). Nor does Socrates teach here that the ultimate object of punishment is to free the bad man from his badness, as that of medicine is to cure the sick. The comparison is not to be pressed in all respects.

478 A. *εἰ μὴ οὕτως εὐπορεῖς*, if on this view of the subject you are not prepared to answer.

C. *ἀπαλλάττεται*. The subject is to be found in *οἱ ἰατρενόμενοι*, such as are under cure, which, being indefinite, readily gives place to a singular. — *ἰατρενόμενος* is added to explain *οὕτως*. — *ἀρχήν*, *omnino*, used chiefly with negatives. Comp. Soph. Antig. 92. — *τὴν ἀρχήν μηδὲ κτήσις*, the not even possessing it at all.

D. *ιατρικὴ γίγνεται πονηρίας ἢ δίκη*. Hoc dictum multorum imitatione celebratum esse docuit Wyttenbach. ad Plutarch. de sera numinis vindicta, p. 23. Stallb.

E. *οὗτος δ' ἦν*, but this was, i. e. this is, as we proved, he who, etc.

479 A. *διαπράξεται ὥστε*. This verb and *ἐκπράσσω* are often followed by *ὥστε* before an infinitive. Comp. Soph. Antig. 303. Eurip. Alcest. 298. — *ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις*. In phrases like this, an apodosis to which *ἂν* belongs is to be supplied:

here διαπράττειτο is to be repeated. A little below ὥσπερ ἀνὲν παῖς = ὥσπερ φοβοῖτο ἀνὲν εἰ παῖς εἶη.

B. τὸ ἀλγεινὸν αὐτοῦ καθορᾶν is added to explain τοιοῦτόν τι. αὐτοῦ refers to δίκην διδόναι, implied in δίκην, just above. — μὴ ὑγιὺς σώματος stands, with a brevity which is not uncommon in comparisons, for τοῦ συνοικεῖν μὴ ὑγιεῖ σώματι, in order to prevent the repetition of συνοικεῖν. Comp. 455, E, note; Soph. Antig. 75; and Soph. § 186, N. 1; K. § 323, R. 6; Cr. § 461, R. 2.

C. παρὰσκεινάζομενοι. This verb can be followed by an accusative, and by a clause beginning with ὅπως. The two constructions are here united. — ὅπως ἀνὲν ὧσιν, *the means whereby they may be*. — συμβαίνει μέγιστον κακόν. This verb may be united with the participle or infinitive of εἰμί, or with a simple predicate, as here. Comp. Soph. Electr. 261; note in my ed.

E. τὸν ἀδικοῦντα . . . διδόντα, *the one who, though he commits the greatest wrongs, suffers no punishment for them*. — φαίνεται, sc. ἀποδεδεῖχθαι.

A. αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν . . . φυλάττειν, etc. *For one needs to keep guard especially over himself, lest he act unjustly, on the ground that (if he so act) he will be possessed of a serious evil*. The subject of φυλάττειν is τινά, with which αὐτὸν is to be joined; and the same omission of the indefinite subject occurs a few lines below. — ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσῃ. One MS. has ἀδικήσει, and one other ποιήσει, just below. The old doctrine of Dawes, that ὅπως μὴ cannot be followed by a first aorist subjunctive, but requires either a second aorist subjunctive or future indicative, is now exploded by all respectable scholars.

B. ἢ πῶς λέγομεν. λέγομεν, which Bekker prefers, would be equally good here. Comp. τί φῶμεν, just below. The difference is, that πῶς λέγομεν = *what is our opinion?* πῶς λέγωμεν, *what shall we say?* what ought to be our opinion? what have we good reason to believe?

C. εἰ μὴ εἰ. "Sometimes a second εἰ follows εἰ μὴ, as in Latin *nisi si*." Mt. § 617. d; K. § 340, R. 5; Cr. § 667. 2. Stallb., on Sympos. 205, E, says: "Alterum εἰ rem magis etiam reddit incertam, ut quod exceptioni conditionem adjiciat." — ἐπὶ τὸνναντίον. According to Stallb., χρήσιμον εἶναι is here to be supplied, and the clause κατηγορεῖν δεῖν, being explanatory of τὸνναντίον, follows without a copula. But this view of the construction overlooks δεῖν. It may explained by supplying οὐ χρήσιμος . . . ἡμῖν again in thought with εἰ μὴ τις, etc., or in other words, Plato, studious of brevity, proceeds as if he had forgotten all of the sentence preceding οὐ χρήσιμος. *For making a defence, etc., . . . rhetoric is of no use at all to us* (nor is it of any use), *unless one should suppose, on the contrary, that he ought to be an accuser first of all of himself, etc.* — ὅς ἂν αἰεί. Here αἰεί = *at any time*. — ἀλλὰ παρέχειν μύσαντα, etc., *but to give himself up, with his eyes closed and manfully, as to a physician, etc.* μύσαντα expresses endurance of calamity with determination, the impressions concerning pain derived from the sense of sight, and their effects in weakening resolution, being thus prevented by the will of him who shuts his eyes. Comp. Soph. Antig. 421.

E. σοι ὁμολογείται. Heindorf and Coray would exclude σοι from the text. If it be the pleonastic dative, as it is called, the sense is *for you*, i. e. *I am willing to own to you that they agree with what was said before.* — τὸνναντίον, etc. If, on the other hand, says Soerates, one would do evil to another, he must save him by the use of rhetoric from punishment. Thus the rhetoricians, who place the value of their art in doing good to a friend, and harming an enemy, do just the contrary; they harm their friends by saving them from justice, and do good to their enemies by the opposite. All this proceeds upon the principles with regard to justice and injustice which Polus has been com-

pelled to admit. The parenthesis *ἐὰν μόνον . . . ἐνλαβητέον*, as understood by Buttmann, amounts to this: that this method of doing evil to an enemy is only applicable in case the enemy wrongs a third person; for when the enemy wrongs the orator himself, to do evil to him thus, namely, to save him from justice, would be but exposing the orator to fresh injuries from him. By rhetoric, then, he cannot gain the point he desires, namely, to do evil to his adversary without injuring himself. — *μεταβαλόντα*, *mutata ratione*, *vicissim*. Comp. *μεταστρέψας*, 456, E. It agrees with the subject of *ποιεῖν*. The abundance of words to denote opposition is worthy of notice: *τοῦναντίον*, *αὖ*, and this participle. — *ἐὰν δὲ ἄλλον*, etc. *δὲ* often resumes the subject after a parenthesis. The sense of the first part of this sentence is as follows: *But on the other hand, again, if, reversing the case, one has need to do harm to any person, whether enemy or anyone whomsoever, — provided only one be not himself wronged by his enemy; for that must be guarded against, — if, I say, an enemy wrong another, he (that other) must procure in every way, by deed and word, that he (the enemy) suffer not punishment nor come before the judge.*

A. *ἀναλίσκηται*. This, according to Coray, is an iso-481
lated instance of the middle of *ἀναλίσκω* used as the active, and to be altered into *ἀναλίσκη*. This word and *ἀποδιδῶ* are in a different tense from the aorists preceding, as containing the signification of continuance, which, however, rather belongs to *μὴ ἀποδιδῶ* taken together than to the verb in itself.

C. *νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀλλά*. Comp. 466, C, note. — *πότερόν σε φῶμεν . . . σπουδάζοντα*. For verbs meaning to speak construed with a participle, see Mt. § 555, Obs. 2. — *εἰ μὴ τι ἦν*, etc. *If men had not the same state of mind, some of them some one, and others some other* (i. e. if classes or portions of mankind did not agree in one or another state

of mind), but each of us had a peculiar state of mind different from what the rest of mankind had, it would not be easy to manifest your own state of mind to another.

D. ἴδιον ἤ. This construction with ἤ, which belongs to ἄλλος, ἐναντίος, and similar words, is adopted here by ἴδιος, on account of the notion of *difference* implied in it. — πεπονθότες. Soph. § 137, N. 6; Cr. § 337. a; K. § 241, R. 8. Then follows ἐρῶντε, because δύο renders the *duality* of the persons more striking. — Ἀλκιβιάδου. At the time when Plato would have us suppose this dialogue to be spoken, Alcibiades, then a man of forty and upwards, had retired for the last time from Athens, and long before that the intimacy between him and Socrates had ceased. That intimacy was of the purest kind on the part of Socrates. He saw in the young Alcibiades high natural endowments, and hoped to win him over to the love of wisdom and virtue. But political ambition and his passions were more attractive. — τοῦ Πυριλάμπους, the son of Pylilampes, whose name was Demus. Pylilampes was a wealthy Athenian, and a friend of Pericles. He reared peacocks (see Plutarch. Pericl. § 13; Athenæus, p. 397, C), as did his son Demus; and this, being then a new bird in Greece, attracted visitors from so far off as Sparta and Thessaly. On the first day of the month, and at no other time, this living picture-gallery was open to all. Demus was as much admired for his beauty as one of his peacocks. Hence the parody in Aristoph. Wasps, 97 (acted seventeen years before the date of this dialogue): καὶ νῆ Δί' ἣν ἴδῃ γέ που γεγραμμένον | τὸν Πυριλάμπους ἐν θύρᾳ Δῆμον καλόν, | ἴδων παρέγραψε πλησίον, “Κημὸς καλός,” i. e. where he finds written Δῆμος καλός, “Demus is beautiful,” he writes close by it, “Κημὸς” — the top-piece of the judge’s ballot-box — “is beautiful.” Pylilampes also was considered as handsome and as large a man as any in Asia, whither he went on embassies to the great king and

others. (Charmides, 158, A, if another person of the name be not meant.) We find Demus commanding a galley at Cyprus, before the battle of Cnidus, which happened in 394 B. C. (Lysias de Bonis Aristoph. § 25, Bekker.) The object of Socrates here is to teach Callicles, in a playful way, that he feels constrained to follow his object of attachment, philosophy, wherever it leads him; just as Callicles obeys the whims of the people. I know not why Alcibiades is brought in, unless it be for the reason which Ast has given: that, though aside from his main object, it serves to put Socrates in contrast with the politicians and orators. "I love beauty of mind," he says, "in Alcibiades, truth and justice in philosophy; but you love external beauty in Demus, and an ignorant, unjust Athenian people." — ὅτι . . . οὐ δυναμένον. There is here a confusion of two expressions, ὅτι . . . δύνασθαι, and δυναμένου, without ὅτι, construed with σου. ὅτι thus becomes idle.

A. τῶν ἐτέρων παιδικῶν. The latter word could have an honest sense. — ἔμπληκτος, *fickle*. It has this sense in Lysis, 214, C (where it is joined to ἀστάθμητος), Soph. Ajax, 1358, and elsewhere.

B. ἐκείνην ἐξέλεγξον . . . ὥς, *refute her (philosophy) and show that*. See 467, A.

C. ὦ Σώκρατες. The sense is, *O Socrates, you seem to take airs upon yourself in your discourses, being in very truth nothing but an haranguer; and in the present instance you make this harangue because the same thing has befallen Polus, which, he said, befell Gorgias in respect to you*. The first clause relates to the general habit of Socrates, which, as Callicles, judging him falsely, says, was that of bringing a man into perplexity by sophistical arguments, and then of crowing over him, as from a loftier moral ground. The second clause asserts this to be true in the instance of Polus. δημηγόρος (comp. δημηγορικά, 482, E)

means one who, like a popular speaker, gains his ends by sophistry and pretence of honesty. — ταῦτόν παρόντος furnishes the ground or else the occasion why Socrates indulged in this spirit.

D. ὅτι ἀγανακτοῖεν ἄν, εἴ τις μὴ φαίη, *because they would be displeased if any one were to refuse.* Without ἄν the sense would be, *they were displeased.* With ἄν, the verb, if put into *oratio recta*, would be in the *optative*; without ἄν, in the *indicative.* Comp. 461, A.

E. σὺ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι, ὦ Σώκρατες, etc. *For, O Socrates, while you profess to be in pursuit of the truth, you in reality turn (the conversation) to such vulgar and popular things as these, which are not beautiful by nature, but by law.* For φορτικά, comp. Mitchell on Aristoph. Wasps, 66. It may be translated, also, *disagreeable, disgusting.* Schol. φορτικά ἐστὶ τὰ βάρος ἐμποιοῦντα, and so Ast, Stallb. It is joined with δικανικά, *in the style of pleadings*, in Plat. Apol. Socr. 32, A. δημηγορικά, Schol. τὰ πρὸς τὴν τῶν πολλῶν βλέποντα δόξαν, i. e. *in the style of a δημηγόρος.* — ὥς τὰ πολλὰ δέ. δε is rarely found after the third word of the clause. Here, however, ὥς τ. π. are in a manner one word. See Poppo's note ὅτι ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι δέ, Thucyd. 1. 6.

483 A. τοῦτο τὸ σοφὸν is in apposition with its relative, being added to explain it. — κακουργεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, *you deal unfairly in your discussions.* — ὑπερωτῶν, *asking slyly.* He says, that, if a person speaks of anything as *according to law*, Socrates changes the ground cunningly, and asks about it *according to nature*, and the contrary. — Πώλου τὸ κατὰ νόμον αἰσχρον, etc., literally, *when Polus spoke of that which was more ugly according to law, you followed up the law according to nature*, i. e. in your argument you followed out law, as if it were nature. Ast, with some reason, wishes to erase τὸ κατὰ νόμον and κατὰ φύσιν, which last words are wanting in some books. The sense would then

be, When Polus spoke of that which was more ugly, you urged the law, i. e. you spoke of that which was by law more ugly. For the phrase, διωκ. κατὰ νόμον, comp. Repub. 5. 454, B, κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα διώκειν, *to pursue an inquiry according to the letter*, and not the idea. For ἐδιώκαθες (which Elmsley on Medea, 186, regards as an aorist, but which here seems to be an imperfect, and its infinitive, Euthyphron 15, D, a present). I beg leave to refer to my note on Antigone, 1096, second edition. — τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι. οἶον, though in no MS., is added before τὸ by several editors, and assists the sense; though without it ἀδικεῖσθαι (a part) may be regarded as added in apposition, to explain πᾶν (the general idea). Being pronounced by the scribes like the ending ιον of κάκιον, οἶον might easily be absorbed by that word.

B. οἱ τιθέμενοι τοὺς νόμους. See 488, D.

C. ἐκφοβοῦντες. After this word, τε stands in a few MSS. It seems to have been added to do away with the asyndeton; which, however, is allowable here, as what follows is an illustration of the foregoing. — ἀγαπῶσι γάρ, etc. *For they are contented if they are put on an equality when they are inferior.* — ἡ . . . φύσις. Stallb. observes, that οἶμαι is sometimes interposed between a noun and its article or preposition.

D. δηλοί. Not φύσις δηλοί, but ταῦτα δηλοί, *these things show* that they are so. But Stallb. and Ast give the verb an intransitive sense here. *These things are evident* that they are so, i. e. it is evident.

E. κατὰ φύσιν τὴν τοῦ δικαίου. The three last words, though in all the MSS., are looked on by several editors as interpolated. Ast retains them, translating φύσιν δικαίου, *not the nature of justice, but natural justice.* He remarks, that a noun governing a genitive may sometimes be resolved into an adjective qualifying that genitive; and cites,

in his support, Aristoph. Plut. 268, ὃ χρυσὸν ἀγγείλας ἐπῶν, i. e. *golden words*; Phædrus, 275, A, σοφίας . . . ἀλήθειαν πορίζεις, *true wisdom*. — ὃν ἡμεῖς τιθέμεθα πλάττοντες, etc. The primary idea, as Heindorf observes, is expressed by the participle. The sense is, *Not however, perhaps, according to that law which we enact, (thereby) moulding those among us who have the best gifts and most strength; — taking them in their youth, by our incantations and juggleries, we tame them as we would lions*, etc. The asyndeton at ἐκ νέων is like a number already noticed: the clause is epexegetical of the foregoing. See 450, B. ἴσως is used sarcastically, the thing being regarded as certain by Callicles.

- 484 A. ἀνὴρ, according to Stallb. and Ast, is here used unemphatically as *a man, a person*. If contempt were expressed, ἄνθρωπος would have been chosen, as in 518, C. — ἀποσεισάμενος contains a figure drawn from a horse *throwing* his rider. — γράμματα, *written ordinances*. — ἐπαναστὰς, etc. *He rises upon us and turns out our master*, — *this slave* that was, i. e. this one whose spirit we had curbed by laws against nature. The aorists ἀνεφάνη, ἐξέλαμψε, denote an action wholly indefinite in regard to time, and thus answer to εἰν γένηται in the protasis, instead of presents or futures. The aorist, in such cases, represents a general truth as a matter of experience; the present, as something oft occurring in the existing state of things; the future, as something sure to happen, as the effect of existing causes.

B. νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεύς. This fragment of an uncertain poem of Pindar's is often referred to, especially by Plato. It is treated of at large by Boeckh, Pind. Vol. III. 610. Boeckh makes it probable that the words κατὰ φύσιν, or something equivalent, belong to the passage; φησὶν, having the same sound, and almost the same letters, as φύσιν,

may have caused that word to be omitted. οὗτος δὲ δὴ are interposed by Callicles. Something like this followed in Pindar: ἐπεὶ Γηρυόνα βόας Κυκλωπίων ἐπὶ προβύρων Εὐρυσθέος ἀναιήτας (?) τε καὶ ἀπριάτας ἤλασεν. Coray supposes that Callicles perverted the sense of Pindar, but the same turn is given to the words in Leges, 10. 890, A, and Aristides (2. 69, Dindorf) knows no other. The sense of ἄγει δικαίων τὸ βιαίτατον, according to Boeckh, is *affert vim maximam, justam vim efficiens*; i. e. *law* (the law of nature) *makes use of might, and calls it right*. ἄγει and δικαίων have the same object. Socrates interprets ἄγει, below (488, B), in the sense of *carrying off, plundering*, which is suited to the action of Hercules. Hence Ast derives his translation, *lex abigit s. rapit, ex suo jure agens, violentissime*; where τὸ β. is treated as an adverbial phrase. But Aristides, by using the opposite phrase, ἄγει τὰ δίκαια πρεσβεύων, shows that τὸ βιαίτατον is at least the object of δικαίων. — τούτου refers forward to καὶ βοῦς . . . εἶναι.

C. The changes of number here are worthy of notice: *τις . . . ἄφηται, . . . τῶν ἀνθρώπων, . . . εὐφυνῆς ἦ, . . . γίγνεται*. — ἡλικία de *ætate juvenili* intelligendum. Itaque πόρρῳ τῆς ἡλικίας est *ultra juventutem*. Stallb. πόρρῳ can take a genitive in two relations. 1. That of the thing *from which* one is far off; as, Phædrus, 238, D, οὐκέτι πόρρῳ διθυράμβων φθέγγομαι, *my words are not far from the style of dithyrambs*. 2. That *in respect of which* one is far advanced; as Symposium, 217, D, διελεγόμην πόρρῳ τῶν νυκτῶν, *I conversed to a late hour of the night*; infra 486, A, πόρρῳ δὲ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἐλαύνοντας, *always pushing forwards in philosophy*; and in the text the sense can be, *to too late a period of his youth*.

D. καλὸς καγαθὸς ἀνὴρ, in the mouth of Callicles, means quite another thing from what the same words would intend if used by Socrates. In earlier times the *optimates* were

so called, i. e. the name was given to men of a certain birth. By the standard of Callicles, it would belong to a man of the highest rank in public estimation. The moral character of the individual gave him a right to this title, in the estimation of Socrates. Comp. Welcker, Præf. to Theognis, p. 25. — ἐν τοῖς συμβολαίοις, *in stipulations, or business transactions* in general. The word denotes both private and public contracts, and treaties of commerce. — ἡθῶν, *characters*.

E. τὸ τοῦ E. See 465, D. The following lines are from the Antiope, and, as the Schol. says, from a speech of Zethus to Amphion. Valckenaer, in his Diatribe on the frag. of Eurip. (the seventh and eighth chapters of which are devoted to this play), gives these words to Amphion. — ὅν' αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ, etc., *where, i. e. in whatsoever, he happens to do his best*, whereinsoever he most excels. One MS. only has τυγχάνει, a reading which the editors before Stallb. generally preferred. But it is now admitted on all hands, that in the poets relative words occasionally are joined to the subjunctive without ἄν. Cousin translates this line, “afin de se surpasser lui-même.” It is strange that he did not see that in the very next line Plato interprets the ancient and poetical ἔναι, *where* (which the Attic prose-writers did not entirely give up), by ὅπου ἄν. — For αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ, see Soph. § 144, N. 4, and § 232; and for βέλτιστος αὐτοῦ, § 177, N. 5; Cr. § 464. The comparative with the reflexive pronoun in the genitive denotes the having gone beyond a previous or usual state; the superlative with the same, the possession of the quality in the highest degree to which the person spoken of attains.

- 485 A. εὐνοία τῇ ἑαυτοῦ, *out of regard to himself, through self-love*. The genitive is objective, as is the possessive pronoun, 486, A, εὐνοία τῇ σῇ. — ὅσον παιδείας χάριν, *just for the sake of education*. — ὁμοιότατον πάσχω, *I feel very*

much the same thing. To ὅμοιος, in the second clause, ὥσπερ succeeds, instead of ὅπερ or οἷον. Comp. Xen. Symposium, 4. 37, ὅμοιά μοι δοκοῦσι πάσχειν ὥσπερ εἴ τις πολλὰ ἐσθίων μηδέποτε ἐμπίπλαιο, and 518, B.

D. ἔφη ὁ ποιητής, in Iliad, 9. 441.

E. ικανόν, *satisfactory*, answerable to his powers, or to the expectations formed of him. — μηδέποτε. Heusdrius μηδὲν excidisse suspicabatur. Sed vere monuit Boeckhius (in Plat. Minoem et Leges Comment. p. 112) sæpius ita τι et μηδὲν omitti. Stallb. — ἐπεικῶς ἔχω φιλικῶς, *am quite friendly*.

A. In the Antiope of Euripides, a dialogue between the 486 brothers Zethus and Amphion was contained, in which the former, who was a shepherd, exhorts the other to give up the art of music, to which he had devoted himself. The dialogue, as the remains show, involved a brilliant comparison between the life of the practical man and of one devoted to the arts. See Appendix, No. 3. — μειρακιῶδει . . . μορφώματι, *you strive to ornament a soul so nobly endowed by a puerile form, or outside.* μορφώματι denotes external decoration; here, the musical and poetical pursuits of Amphion. — οὐτ' ἂν δίκης, etc., *nor in the counsels of justice couldst thou put forth thy words, nor take hold of anything probable and persuasive*; i. e. Zethus denies to his brother the power to defend himself in suits at law, and to use the arts of persuasion. — ἀπαγάγοι. The word points at the ἀπαγωγή of Attic law, a summary process by which the accused could be dragged before the proper magistrate, and locked in prison, without previous citation. One of the crimes to which this process was applicable was ἀσέβεια, the offence for which Socrates, though by another process, was actually tried. There is an allusion below, no doubt, to what actually happened; to the seeming helplessness and unskillfulness of Socrates at his trial; to his

accusers, who were men of little influence or repute ; and especially to the leading one, Meletus, a bad poet and a bad man ; as well as to the penalty of death, which they attached to their indictment. — ἀδικεῖν, says Stallb., accipiendum pro ἡδικηκέναι. Heindorf on Protag. p. 310, D, makes the same remark, and brings a number of examples in proof of it. One is from Lysias, p. 678, Reiske : οἱ δ' ἡδικηκότες ἐκπριάμενοι τοὺς κατηγοροὺς οὐδὲν ἔδοξαν ἀδικεῖν. According to Ast, the present includes the past, = *to have done and to be still doing wrong*. This is often true, but it will not explain such a case as this from Lysias, p. 136, Reiske, cited by Heindorf: ἀξιώ δέ, ὦ βουλή, εἰ μὲν ἀδικῶ, μηδεμῶς συγγνώμης τυγχάνειν, where one crime some time before committed is spoken of. The true explanation is, perhaps, that ἀδικῶ properly means, *I am a wrongdoer*, as well as *I am doing wrong*. But he is a *wrongdoer who has done wrong*.

B. κατηγοροῦ . . . μοχθηροῦ, a very common and paltry sort of accuser ; referring to the accuser's standing in general. — θανάτου . . . τιμᾶσθαι, *to lay his damages against you at death*, which happily is an expression we do not use, because our law, unlike that of Athens, never places human life in the power of a vile or revengeful accuser, and of a throng of unrestricted judges. τιμᾶσθαι, *to make his own estimate, set his price*, is the usual word for the plaintiff's claim of satisfaction, whether pecuniary or penal. The court were said τιμᾶν. The defendant was said ἀντι-τιμᾶσθαι, *to estimate in his turn what ought to be the verdict*, or ὑποτιμᾶσθαι, *to give his reduced estimate*, in case he had been voted guilty by the judges. And all this was allowed only in certain suits called ἀγῶνες τιμητοί, or those in which the laws had not settled the penalty, but left it to the judges. One of these was ἀσέβεια, for which Socrates was tried. On being found guilty, his ὑποτίμημα was called

for; and instead of naming some small mullet which might have saved his life, he named support in the Prytaneum. This led the judges, who usually chose between the accuser's estimate and that of the accused, to sentence him to death. — περισυλᾶσθαι, ζῆν. These infinitives, as Stallb. remarks, depend on ἔθηκε, which is followed at first by a participle, δυνάμενον, added as a paraphrase of the poet's χείρονα, and then by an infinitive. — ἀτεχνῶς. See 491, A.

C. εἴ τι καὶ ἀγροικότερον. See 509, A, note. — ἐπὶ κόρρης τύπτειν, to strike a person upon the side of the head or temples, is spoken only of blows with the flat hand, and was the highest insult at Athens. See 527, D. — πραγμάτων . . . εὐμονσίαν. This expression is from Eurip., and alludes to Amphion's pursuit. His brother says, No longer practise music, but musicalness of conduct, i. e. that which is in harmony with your nature and powers.

D. ἀγαθά. A. Gellius (10. 22) has quoted the passage from φιλοσοφία γάρ, 484, C, to this place, but misapprehends its import. — τὴν ἀρίστην is in opposition to τινὰ τῶν λίθων. Just above we should expect αἷς βασανίζουσι for ἦ, referring to τούτων τῶν λίθων; but ἦ comes from Plato's having τινὰ λίθον in his mind. — προσαγαγόν, *admoveans*, is used with allusion to gold, which was brought to the touchstone to be rubbed upon it, that a judgment might be formed by the color. The order here is, πρὸς ἣν προσαγαγὼν αὐτήν, ἔμελλον εὖ εἶσεσθαι εἰ. Comp. Herodot. 7. 10: "Pure gold we do not distinguish by itself, but when we rub it (viz. on the touchstone) by the side of other gold, then we distinguish the better."

E. ἄν = ἂ ἄν. — αὐτὰ τὰληθῆ, true in themselves, or the very truth.

A. ψυχῆς πέρι . . . μῆ, as to the soul's living rightly and 487 the opposite.

B. μάλλον τοῦ δέοντος. μάλλον is often thus used with a comparative instead of a positive; and in the same way πέρα, just below, 487, D.

C. Andron is mentioned in Protag. 315, C. He was probably the father of Androtion, an orator and disciple of Isocrates, against whom an oration of Demosthenes was written. — ἐπήκουσα. So Bekker, Ast, and others, with most MSS. Stallb. prefers ὑπήκουσα, *I overheard*. (This he retracts in his second edition.)

D. ἐὺλαβεῖσθαι . . . διαφθαρέντες. Strikingly like Ecclesiastes vii. 16: "Neither make thyself overwise. Why shouldst thou destroy thyself?"

E. δῆλον ὅτι are often interposed in the middle of a sentence, without having an effect on the construction. And so οἶσθ' ὅτι. — τέλος τῆς ἀληθείας, *de veritate perfecta et consummata accipio*. Heindorf. — τὸν ἄνδρα, i. e. mankind. The article is used because ἀνὴρ has its widest generic sense, and thus forms a definite whole.

488 A. εὖ ἴσθι τοῦτο ὅτι. τοῦτο traxerim ad ἐξαμαρτάνω. Nam Demostheni familiaris formula εὖ ἴσθι τοῦθ' ὅτι, Platonī, quod sciam, non item. Heindorf.

B. ἄγειν. See 484, B, note. If ἄγειν is there correctly explained by Boeckh, we must suppose that Socrates plays upon the word, without essentially injuring the sense of the passage from Pindar.

C. ἀκροᾶσθαι, *obedire*, like ἀκούειν. — τότε, i. e. *antea*, quum de his rebus disputares. Sic τότε passim ponitur. Stallb. — τί ποτε λέγεις. The present embraces the whole time of the present discussion. Hence it is here for ἔλεγες.

D. οἱ δὲ καί, etc. *Since, indeed, they even make laws for the one*, i. e. to control the one. The relative, as often elsewhere, renders a reason; i. e. = the demonstrative with γάρ. τίθεμαι νόμον is used of a people, or one empowered by them, making laws, the maker being one of the party

to be governed; τίθημι νόμον, of a sovereign or a divine lawgiver.

A. ὅπως μὴ ἀλώσει. See Soph. § 214, N. 3; Cr. § 602. 489 3; K. § 330, R. 4. — αἰσχυρόμενος. Socrates refers with admirable irony to 482, C, D. — ἵνα . . . βεβαιώσωμαι, etc., *that I may get confirmation (for it) from you, seeing that a man who is competent to decide has admitted it.*

B. κινδυνεύεις οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγειν, *it seems that you were not speaking the truth*; for λέγειν is the infinitive of the imperfect. — ἄ . . . κακουργῶ. He quotes what Callicles said, 483, A. — ὀνόματα θηρεύων, *verba aucupans*. Comp. 490, A. The same metaphor is seen in our word *captious*. — ὀήματι ἀμαρτεῖν, *to use a wrong expression*.

C. ἢ οἶε με λέγειν, etc. *Or do you think my opinion to be, that if a rabble should be collected of slaves and of all sorts of men, of no account except by reason of their bodily strength, and these persons should say anything, that these very things which they say ought to have the force of law.* Join τῷ ἰσχυρίσασθαι together. This verb can mean *pol- lere, contendere, fidere*. For the first meaning, which is less common, but seems to belong to it here, comp. Dio Cass. 44, p. 406, Reimar: χαλεπὸν ἰσχυρίζομενόν τι τῷ σώ- ματι φρονιμώτατον ἐκβῆναι, *difficile est corpore esse valido, et animo prudenti*. φῶσιν must be taken absolutely, without an object, in the sense of *decreeing, determining*, but with contemptuous disparagement; unless we read, with Heindorf, ἅττα for αὐτά. And αὐτὰ ταῦτα refers to the edicts implied in φῶσιν.

D. τοὺς δύο . . . τοῦ ενός. As the numerals are opposed to one another, they have a certain definiteness. Hence the article. So τὰ δύο μέρη, sc. out of three, *two thirds*. Comp. Cr. § 483. — τί ποτε λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους is as legitimate an expression as τίνας ποτε, which Routh wished to put into its place.

E. προδίδασκε. Schol. περιτεύει ἡ πρόθεσις Ἀττικῶς. I believe that in προδιδάσκειν, προμανθάνειν (Aristoph. Clouds, 476, 966), πρὸ means *forwards*, and that it is prefixed without adding much to the meaning of the verbs, because the idea of *advance* is involved in learning and teaching. This word alludes to a school, as is shown by ἀποφοιτήσω. — οὐ μὰ τὸν Ζῆθον. Comp. 485, E. Most MSS. want οὐ, which, however, is necessary here, for although μὰ is almost confined to oaths expressly or impliedly negative, it is in itself merely affirmative, being connected, perhaps, in origin with μήν, μέν. — ᾧ σὺ χρώμενος, etc., *whose words you used of me just now with much raillery*. — ὀνόματα λέγεις, *you utter mere words*.

490 B. πολλοὶ ἄθροοι, *multi simul*. Sæpenumero sic junguntur. Stallb.

C. ἢ οὖν τούτων τῶν σιτίων, etc. *Must he then have more of these provisions than we, because he is better; or ought he, in virtue of his authority, to distribute them all, etc.* — εἰ μὴ μέλλει ζημιῶσθαι, *unless he intends to pay the penalty (by making himself ill)*. — πάντων ἐλάχιστον τῷ βελτίστῳ. Supply ἐκτέον.

D. ποίων ἱματίων; sc. δεῖ αὐτὸν πλεόν ἔχειν. ποῖος is often used in questions conveying wonder, indignation, or contempt. Aristoph. Clouds, 366, Ὁ Ζεὺς . . . οὐ θεὸς ἐστίν; | ποῖος Ζεὺς; οὐ μὴ ληρήσεις; οὐδ' ἔστι Ζεὺς. Just below we have ποῖα ὑποδήματα . . . ἔχων; *what shoes are you talking nonsense about?* ἔχων here takes an accusative, unless we write ποῖα ὑποδήματα; φλυαρεῖς ἔχων. Of this last phrase explanations, not quite satisfactory, are given by Hermann on Viger, note 228; Mt. § 567; Cr. § 632; K. § 668, R. 1 (largest Gr.). Comp. 497, A.

E. ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν. Comp. Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 6, ὁ δέ γε ταύτου δεινότερον, ἔφη, ὦ Ἱππία, οὐ μόνον ἀεὶ τὰ αὐτὰ λέγω, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν· σὺ δ' ἴσως, διὰ τὸ πολυμαθὴς εἶναι, περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ λέγεις.

A. ἀτεχνῶς, *absolutely, positively*. You never stop talk- 491
ing always about cobblers and fullers and cooks, and posi-
tively nothing else. In the sense *without art*, the penult
 has the acute accent. — ἀεὶ . . . λέγων . . . οὐδὲν παύει. ἀεὶ is
 joined thus redundantly with οὐδὲν παύομαι again, 517, C, and
 in Leges, 2. 662, E. Socrates was often thus reproached
 or derided for drawing his illustrations from homely sources.
 He was led to it by love of simplicity, contempt for preten-
 sion, the desire to find a general truth by means of familiar
 instances, and frequent conversations with artisans. See a
 fine passage in Sympos. 221, E. — περὶ τίνων . . . πλεόν
 ἔχων. Heind. remarks that περὶ τι, not περὶ τινος, is the
 usual formula with πλεόν ἔχειν. — τοὺς κρείττους οἳ εἰσιν, etc.,
by the better, namely, by who they are I do not mean, etc.
 οἳ εἰσιν dictum est cum abundantia quadam qualem Calli-
 cles in hac oratione sectatur passim. Poterat enim omitti.
 Stallb.

B. For κατηγορεῖν with the genitive of the person, see
 Soph. § 183. 2 (§ 194, N. 3).

D. τί δέ; . . . ἀρχομένους; The reading and pointing
 here are quite uncertain. The passage in brackets is
 omitted by Bekker, after one MS. It has the look of an
 explanation of τί δέ. Nor does Socrates afterwards do
 anything with ἀρχομένους, while ἄρχοντας is easily supplied
 with αὐτῶν. The sense without this passage is, *But what?*
Does justice consist in this, that those who rule themselves
should have more than others. Stallbaum's reading in his
 second ed. is αὐτῶν . . . τί [ἢ τί] ἄρχοντας ἢ ἀρχομένους;
 where τί is *quatenus, qua in parte*. But how can ἀρχομέ-
 nous be the subject of πλεόν ἔχειν? or how could he say
quatenus sibi met ipsis imperantes unless he had already
 spoken of governing one's self. — ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν δεῖ.
 δεῖ sometimes takes an accusative of the thing, when that
 is a pronoun.

E. ὥς ἡδὺς εἶ answers nearly to the French *comme vous êtes plaisant !* how ridiculous or foolish you are ! γλυκὺς is used in the same way. — τοὺς ἡλιθίους λέγεις τοὺς σώφρονας, *you mean those fools the temperate.* The one accusative is in apposition with the other ; unless, with Stallb., we make τοὺς ἡλιθίους the predicate-accusative ; in which case the sense is, *by the temperate you mean the silly.* The sophists struck a disastrous blow against morality by giving it this title. Comp. Repub. 348, D. “What !” says Socrates to the sophist Thrasymachus ; “do you call justice (κακίαν) badness ?” “No,” said he, “but (πάνυ γενναίαν εὐήθειαν) very noble folly.” — πάνυ γε σφόδρα, sc. τοῦτο λέγεις.

492 B. οἷς . . . ὑπῆρξεν . . . νίεσιν εἶναι ἢ αὐτοὺς . . . ἱκανούς. εἶναι belongs to both clauses. For the transition from the dat. dependent on the verb to the accus. construed with the infinitive, comp. 510, E, fin., and Soph. Electra, 962. — τί . . . κάκιον εἶη, for τί ἂν . . . κάκιον εἶη. Comp. τίς . . . κατὰσχοι, Soph. Antig. 605 ; Mt. § 515, Obs. ἂν may have dropped out here, as τί itself is wanting in ten MSS., both being absorbed, so to speak, by the last two syllables of δυναστείαν. — οἷς ἐξόν, etc. A contracted expression for οἷ, ἐξόν αὐτοῖς . . . αὐτοὶ ἐπαγάγουτο, which is much the same as εἰ, ἐξόν αὐτοῖς, etc., *if, when they had it in their power, . . . they were themselves to introduce.* Comp. Repub. 465, fin. : “Do you remember that some one reproved us, because we, in his opinion, made (ποιοῖμεν) our guards not happy, οἷς ἐξόν πάντα ἔχειν τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν οὐδὲν ἔχοιεν, *who, when they could possess everything belonging to the citizens, were to have nothing.*”

C. τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀρετή, etc. τοῦτο refers, not to the three nouns just preceding, but rather to εἰν ἐπικουρίαν ἔχει, — to the condition of things when τρυφή, etc. are able to supply their wants. — τὰ δὲ ἄλλα. The predicate is φλναρία καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξια.

D. ἀμόθεν γέ ποθεν, *undecunque*, from obsol. ἀμός, Attic ἀμός, = τις, whence μηδαμοῦ. This is Bekker's emendation of ἄλλοθεν ποθεν, which is evidently a false reading. — ἐτοιμάζειν is for ἐτοιμαστέον, which the construction of the first clause would require. With this infin. supply δέιν involved in κολαστέον.

E. ὥς γε σὺ λέγεις . . . ὁ βίος, *such a life as you mention*. — The lines here quoted are probably from the Polyidus of Eurip., and very similar to another fragment from his Phrixus. The second trimeter is completed by κάτω νομίζεται. The passage is parodied by Aristoph. in the Frogs, 1477.

A. The singular passage next following is introduced 493 by the way, and perhaps half in sport. At the beginning of an argument concerning the good and the pleasant, Socrates takes breath a moment, and changes reasoning for playful illustration. He first mentions an opinion concerning the true life, which was expressed by the Orphic and Pythagorean theologists; — that the body is the tomb of the soul, release from which will admit it into real existence. To this dogma Plato alludes in Cratylus, 400, C. He says (ironically throughout), upon the derivation of σῶμα, that it may come from σῆμα, because some call the body the σῆμα of the soul, as being that in which in this present it is buried; or because the soul σημαίνει by means of the body its thoughts and wishes. But he thinks that the name is due to the followers of Orpheus especially, who taught that the soul was inclosed and kept (σώζειν) in it to atone for its crimes in an earlier state. This derivation, he says, would require no change of letter. The Pythagorean Philolaus (Boeckh's Philolaus 181, Clem. Alex. Strom. 3. 3, p. 518, Potter) says, that “the old theologers and diviners testify, that the soul is joined to the body to suffer a certain penalty, and is buried in it καθάπερ ἐν σάματι.” To this, and to the

comparison of the body to a prison, there is frequent allusion. Socrates now passes on to an allegorical explanation of the fable of the Danaides, which illustrates the unsatisfactory nature of devotion to animal desire. It was the doctrine of some Mysteries (the Orphic or Bacchic especially), that the initiated fared better in the world below than the uninitiated, and use was made of this fable to show the difference in their condition. The fable was afterwards spiritualized, as we see in the text, and applied to the soul and its parts. It may be doubted who is the author of this punning allegory. Boeckh contends that it was Philolaus, who was a native of Croton or Tarentum. But there is no evidence that this allegory, and the dogma first spoken of, are to be attributed to the same person. The Schol. refers it to Empedocles, and Olympiod. (apud Stallb.) does the same. But their assertions may be mere guesses. Ast regards it as Plato's own invention, playfully ascribed to an Italian or Sicilian, for the purpose of laughing at the countrymen of Polus and Gorgias. — τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς, etc. *And that that part of the soul in which the desires lodge is capable of being persuaded, and of changing from one side to the other.* There may be a side-thrust at rhetoric, the object of which is πείθειν, when it is said that the part of the soul which contains the desires is moved this way and that by persuasion. — μυθολογῶν, *expressing in the form of a fable.* — The ensuing words, as Buttmann, in Heindorf's ed., observes, seem to be taken from a song of Timocreon of Rhodes, a lyric poet contemporary with the Persian war; of which song a few words in Ionic a minore dimeters preserved by Hephæstion (p. 71, Gaisford) are as follows: Σικελὸς κομψὸς ἀνὴρ ποτὶ τὰν ματέρ' ἔφα. — κομψός. On this word, Ruhnken (Timæus s. v.) says: κομψὸν dicitur quicquid scitum et venustum est. Plerisque autem locis, apud Platonem vox habet aliquid ironiæ Socraticæ, ut non

tam de vera et naturali, quam de nimia et adscititia venustate capienda videtur. Gorg. 521, E. Pro *splendidis nugis* sumendum est Gorg. 486, C. Neque tamen desunt loci ubi simpliciter et sine ironia ad laudem referatur: which he considers to be the case here. It answers to nice, fine, refined, and witty. I cannot help thinking that it here contains something of irony. — παράγων τῷ ὀνόματι, *making a change in the word*, altering its sound a little.

B. τῶν δ' ἀμνήτων, etc., *and that that part of the soul of the uninitiated, where the desires reside, — its incontinent and irretentive part, — he said that this was a cask with holes in it; making the comparison on account of its ἀπληστία. ἀμνήτους*, besides its similarity to ἀνόητους, seems to have a double sense, uninitiated (ἀ, μνείν) and *not closing*, unable to contain, as if from ἀ, μύειν. The construction is completed by supplying ἔφη, suggested by ὠνόμασε. αὐτοῦ seems to refer to ψυχῆς, although no reason appears why the neuter should here be chosen. Heindorf wished to read διὰ τὸ ἀκόλαστον, in which case αὐτοῦ would refer to τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς. — τονναντίον and σοὶ are to be joined, *the opposite of what you have expressed*. — τὸ αἰδὲς δὴ λέγων, *meaning of course the invisible*, i. e. the intellectual, as opposed to the material. Comp. Phædo 80, D, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἄρα, τὸ αἰδὲς, τὸ εἰς τοιοῦτον ἕτερον τόπον οἰχόμενον. — οὔτοι . . . κοσκίνῳ, *that these uninitiated persons are, as it would seem (εἰεν ἄν), the most wretched, and carry water into the cask with holes in a sieve likewise perforated*. The early mysteries seem to have consisted of purifications, the effect of which was to remove guilt. Hence the initiated escaped the punishment in the future world which was to fall on others. This was denoted by making use of certain fables of the poets, which exhibited the popular view of the punishment of great offenders, and applying them to the uninitiated.

C. ἄτε οὐ δυναμένην, etc., *on account, namely, of its inability to retain, through unbelief and forgetfulness.* ἀπιστίαν alludes to πίθον. — ἐπιεικῶς. Non explicuerim cum Heindorfio *satis, admodum*, sed habet vim affirmandi atque concedendi, ut Latinorum *utique, sane quidem.* Stallb. *Ut candide loquar.* Routh. — ὑπό τι, *aliquatenus, quodammodo.* Stallb. — δηλοῖ μὴν, etc. *Yet they make that clear, by the exhibition of which I wish to persuade you — if in any wise I can — to change your mind.* — μεταθέσθαι, sc. γνώμην or ψῆφον. The next words explain μεταθέσθαι, and therefore have no need of καί, which is in some editions. Just below, μετατίθεσθαι is used in what is called the *constructio prægnans* like ἐξελέγχω, p. 482, B. The sense is, *And do you change your opinion, and say that, etc.*

D. ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γυμνασίου τῇ νῦν, *from the same school with that just now*, from some allegorizing sophist. For ὁ αὐτὸς followed by the dative, in brief phrases, see Soph. § 195, N. 3. — After οἶον supply λέγοις ἄν.

E. νάματα . . . ἐκάστου τούτων, *liquors belonging to, or put into, each of these tubs.*

494 B. χαραδριῶν. A bird, so called from the ravines and beds of torrents where it lives, of a yellowish color, and very voracious. ἅμα τῷ ἐσθίειν ἐκκρίνει, says the Schol. The Schol. on this place, and many others, mention that these birds were reputed to cure the jaundice by being looked at; whence those who brought them into town for sale kept them covered, lest they should effect a cure for nothing. More about the bird will be found in Schneider on Aristot. Hist. Animal., Vol. IV. 80, seq. He thinks it to be the Charadrius ædicnemus or C. hiaticula of Linnæus. — τὸ τοιόνδε λέγεις, οἶον, *do you allow that there is such a thing as.*

C. λέγω, καὶ, etc. λέγω, to be repeated after καὶ in the

sense of *speaking of*, takes a personal object with which the participles agree. The sense is, *Yes, and I speak of* (allow that there is such a thing as) *a man having all the other desires, and able to live happily by taking pleasure in feeding them.* — ὅπως μή, i. e. σκόπει ὅπως μή, as usual. ἀπαισχυνέει is used with allusion to what Callicles has said of the modesty of Gorgias and Polus, as in 489, A. — κνώμενον διατελοῦντα τὸν βίον explains the preceding clause. Hence the asyndeton. — δημηγόρος, *coarse, vulgar*.

D. ἀνδρείος γὰρ εἶ. This alludes ironically to his definition of the βέλτιστοι as being the ἀνδρείοι (491, C).

E. τὸ . . . κεφάλαιον, *id quod rerum hujus generis* (i. e. turpissimarum) *caput est*. Ast. κεφάλαιον is in apposition with ὁ βίος. — ἀνέδην, *freely or openly*.

A. ἀνομολογούμενος, *inconsistent, disagreeing*; from ὁμο- 495 λογούμενος, used as an adjective, and ἀ priv. — διαφθείρεις . . . λόγους, *you make what we have said before good for nothing*.

B. καὶ γὰρ σύ. *Well, what of that? For you do too*, i. e. παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα σαντῶ λέγεις.

C. διελοῦ τάδε, etc. *Explain the following. You mean something probably by ἐπιστήμη* (certain knowledge), *do you not?* — ἄλλο τι οὖν, etc. *Did you not accordingly, on the ground that knowledge was a different thing from manliness, speak of these as τὴν?* The allusion in this and the prior question is to 491, A, B. With τὴν ἀνδρείαν, οὖσαν is to be supplied. The accus. absol. is often found without the participle of εἰμί expressed. Bekker, without MS. authority, adds ὄν after ἕτερον, which is a very probable conjecture, as ὄν may easily have been swallowed up by ἕτερον. The participle ὄν would be attracted in gender to the predicate.

D. ὁ Ἀχαρνεύς. Socrates playfully but severely imitates the solemn style of covenants, in which the *demus* of the

parties was mentioned. Some of the *demi*, as that to which Socrates belonged, had no corresponding adjective forms. The want was in most cases supplied by an adverb in *θεν* taken with the article.

- 496 Α. *περὶ οὗτου . . . ἀπολαβών*, look at this with regard to any part of the body you please, taking it by itself, or separately. — *ῥῆ*, which disease, refers to *νοσεῖν* implied in *νοσεῖ*.

C. *ὑπερφύως ὥς*. Comp. 447, D.

D. *οὐκοῦν τούτου οὐ λέγεις*, etc. In that of which you are speaking, the one part, viz. *διψῶντα*, being thirsty, is then feeling pain, is it not? He was speaking of *διψῶντα πίνειν*.

E. *κατὰ τὸ πίνειν χαίρειν λέγεις*; do you speak of taking pleasure so far forth as the act of drinking is concerned? i. e. does the pleasure go with the drinking? — *λυπούμενον*; at the same time that the person feels pain? — *εἴτε ψυχῆς εἴτε σώματος*. Stallb. would read *ψυχῆς πέρι*. But there can be no objection to taking *τόπον* with the genitives; and *χρόνον* is excused by being in its company.

- 497 Α. *γίγνεται*. See 525, E, note. — *ἀκκίζει*. Olymp. apud Stallb. *προσποῇ μωρίαν καὶ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι*. Mæris defines *ἀκκισμός* as the Attic expression for *προσποίησις*. From examples of the use of the word, its meaning evidently is, to pretend that you do not, particularly to decline taking a thing (as food at table) when you want it. Comp. Coray on Heliodor. 2. 64. *θρύπτομαι* has sometimes much the same sense, e. g. in Plut. Anton. § 12, where it is used of the feigned reluctance of Cæsar to wear the crown. — *ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς*. Comp. 490, E, note. Stallb. (first ed.) and Ast suppose this to be a gloss. Stallb. (second ed.), after Winckelmann on Euthydem. 295, C (quite a parallel passage, *οὐκ ἀποκρίνεται, ἔφη, πρὸς ἃ ἂν ὑπολαμβάνῃς, ὅτι ἔχων φλυαρεῖς καὶ ἀρχαιότερος εἶ τοῦ δέοντος*), gives *καὶ προῖθι γε . . .*

νουθετεῖς to Callicles, and *οὐχ ἅμα . . . πίνειν* to Socrates. On this passage we may remark, — 1. That *ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς*, a choice Attic expression, has not the look of a gloss, and it is not easy to say what it is a gloss upon. 2. The phrase is not in dramatic keeping with the politeness of the Platonic Socrates. But then, 3. As Callicles wishes to break off the discourse, *πρόϊθι εἰς τοῦμπροσθεν* is not what *he* would say. 4. *νουθετεῖς* can only point at the advice given by Callicles to Socrates, on pp. 484–486, and not to anything said by Socrates. Comp. 488, A, *ὥσπερ ἤρξω νουθετεῖν με*, referring to Callicles. 5. There is no mark of a change of person at *οὐχ ἅμα*, and little at *καὶ πρόϊθι*. These last considerations induce me to reject Winckelmann's view, and to regard it even more probable that *ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς* are words spoken by Socrates. But I can arrive at no sure affirmative conclusion respecting the passage.

B. *οὐ σὴ αὐτῇ ἡ τιμῇ, this damage or cost is not yours, i. e. this does you no harm.*

C. *ὅτι τὰ μέγала μεμύησαι.* There is an elegant allusion to the mysteries of Ceres; which were divided into the small, held in the city, and the great, held chiefly at Eleusis. The latter could not be witnessed until a year or more after initiation into the other. The sentiment is something like that in Artegall's words to the Giant: —

“For how canst thou those greater secrets know,
That dost not know the least thing of them all?
Ill can he rule the great, that cannot reach the small.”

—— *ᾧθεν ἀπέλιπες ἀποκρίνον, answer beginning where you left off.* The usual construction of *ἄρχω* with an adverb of motion is here adopted by *ἀποκρίνομαι*. —— *πεινῶν* is a participle; *παύεται* here adopts two constructions.

D. *ὁμολογεῖσθαι* seems to mean *to agree with itself*; *σοι* being the ethical dative, and *τὸν λόγον* or *ταῖτα* understood the subject. But *ὁμολ. σοι* may also denote *to be consistent with your previous admissions.* Comp. 487, D.

E. τοὺς οἷς ἂν κάλλος παρῇ. Supply καλοὺς καλεῖς. The article is here used as a demonstrative, — a usage not uncommon before a relative sentence introduced by ὅς, ὅσος, or οἷος.

498 A. ἀμφότεροι ἔμοιγε μᾶλλον, i. e. χαίρειν δοκοῦσι. This is said in contempt, as if Socrates were not deserving of a sensible answer.

C. ἡ καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον, etc. If cowards, who, according to Callicles, are the bad, feel more pleasure and pain than brave men when enemies retire and advance, and if pleasure and pain are the same as good and evil, then the bad are both bad and good in a higher degree than the good, which is absurd. After μᾶλλον ἀγαθοί, the MSS. have οἱ ἀγαθοί, which Routh and succeeding editors have justly left out, as wholly perverting the sense.

E. δις γάρ τοι, etc. A proverb, imputed by the Schol. to Empedocles, a part of one of whose hexameters v. 164 in Sturz's Emped.) is καὶ δις γὰρ ὁ δεῖ καλὸν ἔστιν ἐνισπείν. τοι, *you know*, is often used in making familiar remarks or citing well-known passages. A little below, in 499, B, πάλαι τοι, it has, according to Stallb., "vim confirmandi cum quadam admiratione vel indignatione," = *really*, or *don't you know*.

499 B. ὥς δῆ, see 468, E. — ἰὺ sometimes expresses *grief*, sometimes *joy*, or, as here, *wonder*. It is oxytoned by all the editors of Plato. Others would write ἰὺ, either always, or when it does not denote grief.

C. αὖ, *again*, refers to 491, C. He is again inconsistent with himself. — ἐκόντος εἶναι, *if you could help it, if you had your way about it*. See Soph. § 221, N. 3; Cr. § 623, N.; K. § 306, R. 8. According to Hermann (Append. to Viger, de pleonasmo), it is not simply *sponte*, but *quantum quis sponte quid faciat*, and is used "de eo potissimum quod quis facere detrectat." Dr. Arnold (on Thu-

cyd. 2. 89), after Hermann, says that ἐκὼν εἶναι “is used generally in negative sentences where the speaker wishes to qualify his denial or refusal, by saying that he will not do it if he can help it, but that very possibly he may not be able to help it.” He adds, that in Prometheus, 266 (ἐκὼν ἐκὼν ἡμαρτον), ἐκὼν εἶναι would make nonsense. — τὸ παρὸν εὖ ποιεῖν, *to do well what is in one's power, to make the best of what you have.* This proverb again occurs in Leges, 12. 959, C. — ἡδοναὶ τινές . . . αἱ μὲν . . . αἱ δέ. The constant use of ὁ μὲν, ὁ δέ, in antitheses, seems to be the reason why (by a kind of apposition, perhaps) they follow τινες here. Instead of τινες μὲν . . . ἄλλαι δέ, *some, . . . others*, we have, as if the contrast needed to be made stronger, *some, these I say . . . those.* Comp. Eurip. Hec. 1185, πολλὰ γὰρ ἡμῶν, αἱ μὲν εἴσ' ἐπίφθονοι | αἱ δ', etc. In Æschin. c. Ctes. (§ 11, Bekk.), οἱ μὲν follows τινες, and the second οἱ μὲν is suppressed, as is often the case with ὁ μὲν, ὁ δέ alone. The formula often occurs as in Plat. Repub. 8. 560, A.

D. εἰ ἄρα τούτων. Græci frequenter relativam orationis structuram permutant cum conditionali. Stallb. The relative structure would be αἱ μὲν ἄρα τούτων, etc.

E. τέλος, etc. Comp. Cic. de Fin. 2. 2. 5: Hunc ipsum sive finem sive extremum sive ultimum definiebas, id esse, quo omnia, quæ recte fierent, referrentur, neque id ipsum usquam referretur.

A. ἐκ τρίτων, and ἐκ τρίτου, *in the third place, third.* 500 Eurip. Orest. 1173, σωτηρίαν σοι, τῷδ' ἐγὼ τ', ἐκ τρίτου τ' ἐμοί. Sympos. 213, B. ἐπολύετε Ἀλκιβιάδην, ἵνα ἐκ τρίτων κατακέηται. — Cap. 55. ὦν αὖ for αὖ ὦν. αὖ is out of its clause for the sake of rhythm.

B. See 464, B, seq. — παρασκευαί, the Schol. observes, is a middle term, standing for τέχνη and ἐμπειρία both, like ἐπιτηδεύσεις. — μέχρι ἡδονῆς, *terminating in pleasure.* This is explained by the next words, where

αὐτὸ τοῦτο refers to ἡδονήν, i. e. τὸ ἡδύ. — καὶ ἐτίθην, etc., and among those pursuits which relate to the pleasures, I set down cookery as a knack, and not an art; but of those which have to do with good (I set down) medicine as an art. — πρὸς φίλιον, supply Διός. — μήτε αὐτὸς οἶον, etc. In this sentence, the two main clauses begin with μήτε; and the clause beginning with μηδὲ is the second part of the first clause. Comp. K. largest Gr. § 743, R. 4. — μηδ' ὃ τι ἂν τύχῃς, etc., and do not, contrary to your opinion, answer whatever comes into your head, nor take what I say as though I were in sport.

C. οὐ τί ἂν μᾶλλον . . . ἢ τοῦτο. The last words are added to recall οὐ to mind, and τοῦτο takes the construction of τί rather than of περὶ τούτου οὐ. It often happens that ἢ and quam are so inserted after a genitive depending on a comparative. — ἐπὶ ὧν, i. e. τοῦτον ἐφ' ὧν. — τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς δὴ ταῦτα πράττοντα, whether I ought to spend my life in doing those deeds of the real man, forsooth, that you spoke of. The reference is to 485, A—D. δὴ is ironical. — ἢ ἐπὶ τόνδε τὸν βίον. We should expect τόνδε τὸν βίον, sc. ζῆν; but Plato forms this clause as though he had written πότερον ἐμὲ παρακαλεῖς ἐπὶ τοῦτον, etc.

D. εἰ ἔστι . . . τὸ βίω. A rare instance of a dual agreeing with a singular verb. As is usual in similar examples in Attic writers, where plurals not neuter are joined with a singular verb, the verb is ἔστι, and it precedes the noun.

E. Socrates breaks off in the middle of the sentence, to know whether Callicles is so far of the same opinion.

- 501 A. ἢ δ' ἱατρική, i. e. δοκεῖ μοι τέχνη εἶναι. Just below, ἢ ἱατρική is added to explain ἢ μὲν. Comp. ὁ μὲν . . . ὁ κολαζόμενος, 476, E. — ἢ δ' ἑτέρα τῆς ἡδονῆς . . . ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἔρχεται. There is a striking change of construction here. The sentence begins with ἡδονῆς, as if Plato had in his mind the form of the preceding sentence, and were going

to say, τῆς ἡδονῆς οὔτε τὴν φύσιν ἔσκεπται οὔτε τὴν αἰτίαν. But this thought, which afterwards appears in the participial form, is postponed, and the intervening clause, πρὸς ἣν ἡ θεραπεία . . . ἅπαντα, determined him to say, ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἔρχεται, accommodated to πρὸς ἣν, and to leave ἡδονῆς in the lurch, so to speak. It may be asked, why, when he read it over, he did not dismiss ἡδονῆς from its irregular position. The answer is, that the Greeks were governed in their style by nature, — a higher rule than grammar, — and did not object to such irregularities of structure as arise from the nature of the mind, and are heard in good conversation. — ἀτέχνως, and not ἀτεχνῶς. Comp. 491, A. — ἀλόγως τε παντάπασιν, *in a manner altogether irrational, making, I may say* (i. e. almost), *no estimates* (or discriminations), *a mere practice and experience.*

B. ᾧ δὲ καὶ πορίζεται. ᾧ refers to τῷ μνήμην σώζεσθαι τοῦ εἰωθότος γίγνεσθαι. — καὶ εἶναι τινες, i. e. καὶ εἰ δοκοῦσί σοι εἶναι τινες. It might have been said equally well, εἶναι τινας, etc. — ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ, i. e. as in the case of the body. — οὔτε μέλον αὐταῖς, etc., *nor having any concern about aught else but gratification merely, no matter whether it be for the better or the worse.* Here the structure changes to the impersonal participle, and the subject of the prior clause becomes αὐταῖς.

C. ἐμοὶ . . . δοκοῦσι εἶναι, *it seems to me that there are such, or they seem to me to exist.* The words refer to εἶναι τινες πραγματεῖαι, etc. It is strange that Stallb. and Ast, overlooking this plain sense, understand κολακεία as the predicate. — συγκατατίθεσθαι. The word means, properly, *to drop one's vote in the same vessel with another person,* as a judge in the court. ἡμῶν is ironical, as he had compelled Gorgias and Polus to agree with him.

D. οὐκ, ἀλλὰ καί. οὐκ denies the previous sentence taken as a whole. — χαρίζεσθαι ἔστι, i. e. ἔξῃστι.

E. *τοιούτη τις . . . διώκειν*. The infinitive explains the demonstrative, and depends on *δοκεῖ* repeated. — *ἄλλο οὐδὲν φροντίζειν*. This verb, in the sense of *caring about*, usually takes a genitive, or a genitive with *περί*, but sometimes a neuter accusative. Soph. § 182, N. 1. — *ἡ κιθαριστικὴ ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι*. Plato condemned all music on the flute, as tending to render the young unmanly and fond of pleasure. He was, however, for retaining the lyre and harp in education, but disapproved of some of the occasions where they were used, such as the public contests of choruses, dramatic or dithyrambic, thinking that pleasure and not good was their object, and that they tended to agitate and not to calm the soul. Comp. Repub. 3. 398 – 403. — *ἡ τῶν χορῶν διδασκαλία*, the exhibition of choruses, so called because the instruction of the chorus was the principal preparative. The chorus in dithyrambic poetry is especially intended. — *Κινησίας* of Thebes, so called, it is said, because ἐν τοῖς χοροῖς ἐχρήτο πολλῇ κινήσει. He was much laughed at for his poetry by the comedians (Aristoph. Birds, 1377, and Schol.), and attacked by the orators on account of his character (Lysias in Athenæus, 551, 552).

502 A. τί δὲ . . . Μέλῃς; i. e. ἐδόκει σοι, as above τί ἢ διδασκαλία καὶ ποίησις; i. e. καταφαίνεται σοι. A little below, τί δὲ δὴ ἢ σεμνή, etc., the construction is different, namely, τί δὲ δὴ ἐστὶ τοῦτο ἐφ' ᾧ ἐσπούδακε ἢ σεμνή, etc. What is said here is a mere passing fling at Meles on account of the badness of his odes.

B. ἡ . . . θαυμαστὴ ἢ τῆς τραγωδίας ποίησις. The ordinary collocation, as Stallb. remarks, would be ἡ θαυμαστὴ ποίησις, ἢ τῆς τραγωδίας. He cites Herodot. 7. 196, ὁ ναυτικὸς ὁ τῶν βαρβάρων στρατός; Repub. 565, D, τὸ ἐν Ἀρκαδίᾳ τὸ τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Λυκαίου ἱερόν, and other examples. — διαμάχεσθαι . . . ὅπως μὴ ἐρεῖ. Is its aim . . . to insist upon it

... *that it will not say*, etc. — εἰ δέ τι τυγχάνει ἀηδής. For ὃν omitted, comp. Soph. Electr. 313. — ποτέρως . . . παρεσκευάσθαι, *utro modo tibi videtur comparata esse*. For Plato's view of tragedy, comp. Repub. 8. 568, C, 2. 378, seq., and a noble passage, Leges, 7. 817. Another admirable passage treats of the corruption of tragedy by popular influence. Leges, 2. 659.

C. εἴ τις περιέλοιτο. Aristides, in opposing this passage, and the Schol., have περιέλοι, which Coray and Stallb. prefer. Ast, in defending the text, says that εἰ περιέλοι denotes *if one were to strip off*, εἰ περιέλοιτο, *if one were to strip off for himself*, i. e. in his own mind to conceive of it as stripped off. — μέλος, *musical accompaniment*; ῥυθμόν, *definite succession of arses and theses*; μέτρον, *definite succession of long and short syllables*. — ἄλλο τι ἢ λόγοι γίνονται. The verb is attracted in number to the predicate λόγοι.

D. οὐκοῦν . . . ἂν εἴη, *It (tragedy) would be then a rhetorical species of popular speaking*. — δῆμον τοιοῦτον, οἶον παιδων, i. e. to a people (or audience) composed of boys, etc. The grammatical construction, which would be οἷος ἐστι (δῆμος) παιδων, is forsaken through a singular kind of attraction, by which οἷος, ὅσος, ἡλίκος, with the noun or adjective they accompany, adopt the case of the antecedent. It has been inferred from this, and a few other passages of Plato, that women attended the theatre at Athens, at least in tragic exhibitions. Comp. Leges, 2. 658, D, 7. 817, C, and Becker's Charicles, excursus to Scene 10.

A. οὐχ ἀπλοῦν, etc. = τοῦτο ὃ ἐρωτᾷς οὐκέτι ἐστὶν ἀπλοῦν, 503 i. e. does not admit of a simple answer. — διαμάχεσθαι λέγοντα, *to persist in saying, or steadily to say*.

B. τί οὐχὶ . . . αὐτὸν ἔφρασας. Mt. § 503, c, says: "After τί οὐ an aorist often follows, where we should have looked for a present." A degree of urgency is contained

in this mode of speaking. It may be explained by the practice of expressing a wish by means of an interrogative sentence. "Why did you not tell me?" = "I wish you had already told me," and by implication, "Tell me at once." — αἰτίαν ἔχουσιν, *have it ascribed to them*, is here used in a good sense.

C. οὐκ ἀκούεις. Præsens hujus verbi de durante fama, —perpetuo ponitur. Stallb.; i. e. it is used of something which is said and may be heard until now. Comp. the editor's note on Prometh. 683 (ed. sec.). — νεωστί, i. e. about twenty-three years before. — οὐ καὶ ἀκήκοας. See 455, E. For Plato's opinion of Pericles, see the Introduction. — εἰ ἔστι γε . . . ἦν σὺ ἔλεγες ἀρετήν, ἀληθής. Comp. for ἀρετήν, Soph. § 151, Rem. 6. The apodosis of this sentence, which might be "they are good men," is omitted. "When a proposition with εἰ μέν, or ἦν μέν, has another with εἰ δὲ opposed to it, the apódosis is often suppressed in one of the two." Mt. § 617. In the ensuing clause, the predicate, ἐστὶν ἀληθές, is left out, and ὅτι before the infinitive is redundant. Examples are given by Heindorf, on Phædo, 63, C. Comp. 453, B, above. ὅτι was used as though δεῖ ἀποτελεῖν was to follow; but when Plato came to that part of the sentence, he accommodated ἀποτελεῖν to εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο: "if this, viz. ἀποπιμπλάναι, is not virtue, but this, viz. ἀποτελεῖν, etc., is so."

D. τοῦτο δὲ τέχνη τις εἶναι. The nominative here is used by anacoluthon, as if, instead of ἡναγκάσθημεν ὁμολογεῖν, Plato had written ὁμολογήθη. — οὕτωςιν ἀτρέμα, *quite calmly*, or *pretty calmly*. οὕτως, like *sic* in Latin, throws into the adverb before which it stands a certain modification of its meaning, which cannot be easily expressed. Comp. Eurip. Alcest. 680, for an analogous use of οὕτως with verbs.

E. ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, etc. ἄλλοι is used here as in 473,

C. The verb προσφέρει leaves the number required by δημιουργοί, through the influence of ἕκαστος, added in apposition to that noun. Comp. Mt. § 302, Obs. — οἶον εἰ βούλει ἰδεῖν. In this sentence the apodosis is omitted. One can supply in thought ῥαδίως τοῦτο ὕψει. But the true account of the sentence is, that the apodosis should have begun at ὥς εἰς τάξιν (“if you wish to look at painters, etc., — you will see that, etc.”); but by a change of style the clause ὥς εἰς τάξιν is made to depend on ἰδεῖν, and the apodosis loses its proper form under the impression that an imperative, ἴδε εἰ βούλει, instead of εἰ βούλει ἰδεῖν, had commenced the sentence.

B. καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰ σώματά φαμεν, i. e. τάξεως τυχόντα χρη- 504
στὰ εἶναι.

C. εἰπεῖν ὥσπερ ἐκείνῳ τὸ ὄνομα, *to mention the name for it, as you did for that.* In the MSS., ἐκείνο stands, which, if genuine, is put briefly for ἐκείνου τὸ ὄνομα.

E. ἡ ἄλλ' ὅτιοῦν, etc., *or anything else which sometimes will not be of more use to it (the body) than the contrary (i. e. abstinence from such gratifications will be) according to a right view of the case; — nay, even of less.* So this clause must be rendered as it stands. But I am persuaded, notwithstanding what Stallb. says, that ἡ ought to be inserted before κατὰ, as Heindorf proposes, or γε turned into δέ. For since γε shows that the clause κατὰ . . . λόγον relates to the foregoing, καὶ ἔλαττον stands quite by itself; and the asyndeton (καὶ being *etiam*) is intolerable.

B. οὐκοῦν . . . κολάζειν; ἀφ' ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ belongs to εἴρ- 505
γεν. — ὥσπερ . . . ᾧ relates to ἀκολασία. See Chap. 46, 48.

C. οὗτος ἀνὴρ. See 467, B. — κολιζόμενος is obviously in apposition with πάσχων; but we might have also had κολάζεσθαι in apposition with τοῦτο. According to Aristotle on Rhet. 1. 10. 17, cited by Stallb., κολάζειν (to chastise,

correct, lit. to cut off, prune) differs from τιμωρεῖσθαι (to take satisfaction from, punish) in this; that the former takes place for the sake of the sufferer, the latter for that of the doer. — μεταξὺ τὸν λόγον καταλύομεν; *are we ending the discourse in the middle?* Some inferior MSS. have καταλύσομεν, *are we going to end*, and some καταλύωμεν, which (or rather καταλύσωμεν, as the action is momentary) would be *shall we end*. The present denotes that they *are doing* that which is equivalent to stopping, that they *are beginning* to stop. — αὐτὸς γνώσει, *you yourself must judge*, i. e. I wish to stop, but leave it to you.

D. θέμις. This word, being here an accusative, must be indeclinable. Of this use few will doubt, after reading what Elmsley and Hermann (Soph. Œd. Col. 1191), and Buttmann (largest Gram. 1. § 58, and 2. p. 405) have written. The other examples occur in Œd. Col. u. s., Xen. Œcon. 11. 11, and Æsch. Suppl. 331. In Æsch. Choeeph. 632, it is a *neuter* nominative. No phrases are found besides θέμις ἐστί, θέμις εἶναι. This is a strange, but not a solitary anomaly. Comp. χρέων, δέινα sometimes indeclinable, κῥᾱτα in Sophocles nominative and accusative. — περίη, sc. ὁ μῦθος. The style changes from the plural to the singular. Comp. for the expression, Leges, 6. 752, A, οὔκουν . . . ἂν μῦθον ἀκέφαλον καταλίποιμι, πλανώμενος γὰρ ἂν ἀπάντη τοιοῦτος ὧν ἄμορφος φαίνοιτο.

E. τὸ τοῦ Ἐπιχάρμου. Athenæus (7. 308, C, and 8. 362, D) gives his words in a trochaic tetrameter, τὰ πρὸ τοῦ δὺ' ἄνδρες ἔλεγον εἰς ἐγὼν ἀποχρέω. — ἀναγκαιότατον εἶναι οὕτως. Supplem. ποιεῖν ellipsi inaudita. Equidem οὕτως interpretor: *in hoc rerum statu, quum tu nolis amplius mecum colloqui*. Stallb. οὕτως seems to me to be loosely used for τοῦτο. Comp. Soph. Antig. 706, ὡς φῆς σὺ — τοῦτ' ὀρθῶς ἔχειν, for ὁ φῆς σὺ.

506 A. οὐδὲ γὰρ . . . εἰδὼς λέγω. Socrates often places him-

self in the attitude of a searcher after truth, unable of himself to find it, and hoping that others know where it is.

B. *ἕως . . . Ζήθου*, till I had given him back the speech of Amphion for that of Zethus, i. e. until I had defended philosophy from his attack. See 485, E. *ἕως* with an imperfect or aorist indicative accompanies another clause containing the same tenses with *ἄν*, when a *res non facta* is spoken of.

C. *ἀχθεσθήσομαι*. This form is condemned by Mæris as un-Attic, but is found several times in Attic writers, where, however, it may have come from the scribes. *ἀχθέσομαι* is the approved form. — *εὐεργέτης . . . ἀναγεγράφει*. An allusion to the honorary votes recorded on marbles, in favor of foreigners who had rendered Athens a service. — *λέγε αὐτός*. *αὐτός* is *by yourself*, without another speaker, and so in *σοῦ αὐτοῦ διόντος* above.

D. *οὐ τῷ εἰκῇ*. An elegant and certain emendation of Stallb. (ed. sec.) for *οὐχ οὕτως εἰκῇ*. — *κάλλιστα παραγίγνεται*. One would expect *καλλίστη*. Coray wishes to strike out the word; Heindorf, to read *μάλιστα*. The sense is, *attends upon it*, or *is present most beautifully*, i. e. *is present in its greatest beauty*, or *highest perfection*.

A. *ἦν δὲ αὕτη*, i. e. now this we found to be. *ἦν* points 507 to the time when such a soul *was* (subjectively to them, i. e. appeared to be) *ἄφρων*, etc. Comp. 478, E, note.

B. *ἀ δεῖ . . . φεύγειν καὶ διώκειν*. With the definition of the *σώφρων ἀνὴρ* here given, Routh compares Aristotle's in the *Eth. Nicom.* 3, sub fin.: *ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ σώφρων ὧν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε*.

C. *τὸν δ' εὖ πράττοντα . . . εὐδαίμονα εἶναι*. Plato passes in this same way from *εὖ πράττειν* to *εὐδαίμονα εἶναι* in *Repub.* 1. 353, E, *Charmides* 172, A, *Alcibiad.* 1. 116, B. As *εὖ πράττειν* has the two senses of *acting well*, and *being prosperous*, Plato may seem to have unfairly used this am-

biguity in his argument. So Heindorf and Stallb. view the passage. Routh, on the contrary, says: "Vult philosophus consequens esse necessario *ex antecedentibus* eum qui recte agit felicem esse. Vix enim potest credi ut Plato duplici sensu verborum ἐὶ πρᾶττειν ad argumentum probandum abuti vellet." Finally, Ast, after Schleierm., correctly, as I think, observes, that Plato "in his conclusionem non ducit ex ambiguo, — sed usum loquendi cogitandus est in rem suam convertere, eumque quodammodo corrigere voluisse, ex ea enim quam posuit ratione, — nisi bonum quod est, nihil est prosperum ac beatum." With this Stallb., in his second edition, agrees.

D. βουλόμενον εὐδαίμονα εἶναι . . . διωκτέον. The subject of the action of a verbal may be in the accusative or in the dative. — ὥς ἔχει ποδῶν = ὥς ἔχει τάχους, Thucyd. 2. 92, = ὥς τάχιστα. Comp. Soph. § 188, N.; Cr. § 363, B. — παρασκευαστέον is the verbal of the middle voice here, = δεῖ παρασκευάσασθαι. Mt. § 447. 2. — ἰδιώτης (when opposed to the *state*), an *individual*. — In the next sentence, εἰς τοῦτο refers to ὅπως . . . ἔσεσθαι, and οὕτω πρᾶττειν to συντείνοντα and what follows it.

E. ἀήνυτον κακόν, an *endless* or *cureless evil*, is in apposition with the participial clause preceding it, and in the accusative. Soph. § 167, N. 4; Cr. § 334. 8; K. § 266, R. 2. — φασὶ δ' οἱ σοφοί, etc. The allusion is more particularly to Empedocles, who made *φιλία* and *νεῖκος* fundamental causes in his world of phenomena; the former, or the attracting principle, the cause of union among things unlike, of organization and of motion when *one* is made out of *many*, and the latter, or the dissolving principle, the cause of separation. He is the Agrigentine who taught in verse, that "quæ in rerum natura constarent, quæque moverentur, ea contrahere amicitiam, dissipare discordiam." Cic. de Amicit. 7. His causes for the phenomena of the world

were physical; and Socrates here gives playfully a moral turn to his doctrine.

A. τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο . . . κόσμον καλοῦσιν. The universe owed 508 the name κόσμος, order, *system*, to Pythagoras. Comp. Xen. Mem. 1. 1. 11, ὁ καλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν κόσμος, which shows that even then the appellation had not become very current. — ἡ ἰσότης ἡ γεωμετρικὴ. Geometrical equality is that of *ratios*, arithmetical, of *numbers*. It exists figuratively in morals and politics, when the receipts of one are to his claims as those of another to his, i. e. when justice prevails and assigns to each according to his due, and not according to his power of receiving. But πλεονεξία or selfishness disturbs and destroys this kind of equality. In the state, this equality takes power from the bad, i. e. from the unjust and ignorant, and gives it to the wise and virtuous, because it is right that only they should govern who can govern well. There is a noble passage on the two equalities in the *Leges*, 6. 757, B, cited by Routh.

B. ἐξελεγκτέος . . . ὤς. See 467, A, note. — κακίας δὲ οἱ ἄθλιοι. The predicate ἄθλιοι is omitted. See K. § 852. 2, largest Gr. This is the more natural, because the preceding words, εὐδαίμονες οἱ εὐδαίμονες, clearly indicate the construction. Stallb. has added ἄθλιοι, without authority or sufficient reason. — τί τὰ συμβαίνοντα. This use of τί in the predicate with a plural subject is not uncommon. Comp. Æschin. c. Ctes., ἀπόδειξιν ποιῆσαι τί ποτ' ἦν ἃ ἔπραξας, καὶ τί ποτ' ἦν ἃ ἔλεγες. (§ 165, Bekker.) The same formula is repeated just below, τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἃ . . . ὀνειδίζεις.

D. εἰμὶ δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ, etc. And that I am in the power of any one who has the will, as those punished by civil infamy are in any one's hand who wishes it (lit. belong to any one). There were three kinds of civil infamy at Athens, and they are particularly described by Andocides (p. 35, Reiske). The lowest consisted in a deprivation of

certain particular rights, as that of bringing an action as a public accuser. The next involved the taking away of all civil rights; and to this the highest added confiscation. As, in the two latter kinds, the person affected with ἀτιμία could not appear in court as a prosecutor or a witness, or complain of his wrongs before the people, he was plainly in the power of his enemies. — νεανικὸν denotes *high-spirited*, or rather *overbearing*. The clause is in apposition with τύπτειν ἐπὶ κόρῃς. Comp. 507, E. The same is true of τὸ ἔσχατον, as it respects ἀποκτείνειν. Socrates refers to 486, A — C.

E. τέμνεσθαι, when taken with σῶμα, is *in frustra disse-cari*.

509 A. καὶ εἰ ἀγροικότερόν . . . ἔστι. These words are used to excuse the confidence and want of deference to others which Socrates here displays. Comp. 462, E, 486, C. In the latter passage, we have εἰ καὶ ἄ., and here καὶ εἰ ἄ. According to Herm. (on Viger, note 307), referred to by Stallb., καὶ εἰ, *etiam si*, is used concerning that which we only assume as true; εἰ καί, *quamquam*, concerning that which we declare to be true. Socrates, then, does not here admit that his expression is impolite; but in 486, C, Callicles acknowledges by εἰ καὶ his trespass against the rules of good-breeding. — οὕτωςιν ut Latinorum *sic est primo aspectu*. Ast.

B. τίνα ἂν βοήθειαν, etc. *By his inability to afford what kind of aid to himself would a man be in truth ridiculous?* This alludes to 486, B, μήτε αὐτὸν αὐτῷ δυνάμενον βοηθεῖν. — ταύτην εἶναι τὴν αἰσχίστην βοήθειαν, μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν is for αἰσχιστον εἶναι ταύτην τὴν βοήθειαν μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν, *that it is most disgraceful not to be able to render this assistance*, etc. (viz. this assistance which will avert the greatest evil). With this very strange instance of attraction, if it be such, we may compare the expression in

our own language which Routh adduces, *this is the most shameful thing to be without*, for *it is most shameful to be without this thing*.

C. τὴν τοῦ δευτέρου κακοῦ, sc. βοήθειαν, and that the aid given to prevent the evil next in magnitude is second (second in shame if inadequate, and in honor if adequate; for this latter is implied). βοήθεια κακῶν is like ἀλκή κακῶν in Euripides. — καὶ τὰλλα οὕτως, sc. ἔχειν, not ἔχει, which Stallb. supplies.

D. ἀδικήσεται. See Soph. § 207, N. 6; Cr. § 554, a; K. § 251, R. 1. — τί δὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν; well, but what about doing wrong? This genitive without a preposition may be compared with that which accompanies verbs of speaking. Comp. Soph. Electr. 317.

E. τί οὐκ . . . ἀπεκρίνω. See 503, B, note. The imperfect ἀπεκρίνου is in most MSS.; but in this formula that tense is not used. — μηδένα βουλόμενον ἀδικεῖν. See 468, C, and the Introduction, p. xxiv.

A. ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσωμεν. See 480, A, note.

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B. φίλος μοι δοκεῖ, etc. Here ὅνπερ refers forward to ὁ ὅμοιος, and ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα is taken with φίλος. οἱ παλαιοί τε καὶ σοφοὶ alludes especially to Hom. Odys. 17. 218, ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὅμοιον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὅμοιον. The thought is found also in Sympos. 195, B, ὁ γὰρ παλαιὸς λόγος εὖ ἔχει, ὡς ὅμοιος ὁμοίῳ αἰεὶ πελάζει, and in Lysis, 214, where it is said that the bad, being unlike themselves, that is, variable and unstable, cannot be friends. Comp. also Leges, 716, C, τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον ὄντι μετρίῳ φίλον ἂν εἴη, τὰ δ' ἄμετρα οὐτ' ἀλλήλοις οὔτε τοῖς ἐμμέτροις.

C. δύναιτο φίλος γενέσθαι. Repentina subjecti mutatio, says Stallb., i. e. τούτῳ refers to ὁ τύραννος, and the subject of δύναιτο is ὁ τοῦ τύραννου βελτίων. This appears most probable, as Plato might easily return in his mind to the earlier subject of the clause, εἴ τις . . . εἴη; and as οὐδ' ἂν

οὗτος shows that the same subject was still in his mind. It is not, however, necessary, because either this person or the tyrant might be called a friend to the other. — ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει. See 468, E, note.

D. χαίρων, *impune*, the opposite of κλαίων, *passim apud dramaticos*. And so *gaudens* is used in Latin. — αὕτη, . . . ὁδός ἐστιν. αὕτη, the subject of ἐστι, refers to ἐθίζειν, but is attracted, as often happens, in gender, to the predicate ὁδός.

E. ἔσται ἐπὶ τὸ ὄψ τε εἶναι, *will be in favor of*, or *will tend to his being able*. Here the construction of the dative with the infinitive is followed by that of the accusative. See 492, B.

511 B. οὐκοῦν . . . ἀγανακτητόν; *Well, then, is not this just the thing to rouse indignation?*

D. προσεσταλμένη, *simple*, properly spoken of garments, *drawn close to the body*, in contrast to a garment which spreads out with numerous folds and plaits. — ἀλλὰ ταῦτα διαπραξαμένη, etc. *But when it has effected the same things with the forensic art, it charges, I presume, but two obols if it has brought a man safe from Ægina hither; and if from Egypt or the Pontus, — at the highest rate (ἐὰν πάμπολν), when it has conveyed in safety what I just now spoke of, the man himself, and his children, and property, and women; having landed them in the port, it demands but two drachms* Ast and Coray wish to change the order in this sentence. I see not why; for it is not more broken than often happens in earnest conversation. ἐπράξατο is the aorist of indefinite time. See 481, A. With ἐὰν πάμπολν, supply πράττηται.

512 A. λογίζεται οὖν ὅτι οὐκ, etc. Here οὐκ belongs to βιωτέον ἐστὶ καὶ ὀνήσειεν, which is the primary clause. But the sentence assumes an antithetical structure, the clauses εἰ μὲν τις, . . . εἰ δέ τις, and οὗτος μὲν, τούτῳ δὲ being paired off

against one another. On this form of sentences, Mt. § 622. 4, remarks, that "clauses are put in contrast with one another by means of *μὲν* and *δὲ*, of which only the second clause suits the connection, while the first in other languages would be treated as a parenthesis." Preserving the Greek order and form nearly, we may translate, "*He reflects that it cannot be (οὐκ), if a man afflicted with great and incurable diseases, whom he has saved from drowning, is miserable because he lost not his life, that he on the other hand ought to live, who has many incurable maladies in that which is more precious than the body, the soul, and that he (the person so reflecting) will do him good if he deliver him from the dangers of the sea, or the tribunal, or any other place. Nay, he knows,*" etc. The use of the optative *ὀνήσειεν* is to me at least perplexing. Stallb. renders it, with its attendant words, *neque a se ullo modo jurari posse*, and then in defence of it refers to Mt. § 529, on the *oratio obliqua*. But if I am not deceived, such a form as *λογίζεται* (being a present not equivalent to a historical tense, and not reducible to the form of *oratio obliqua*, as cases like *λέγεται ὥς τινά τις δέξαιτο* are) *ὅτι οὐκ ὀνήσειεν* would not be Greek, and if it were, must mean, not *can benefit*, but *probably benefits*. Heindorf conjectured *ὀνήσειεν ἄν*, *can (not) do him good*, which in some degree removes the difficulty. I beg leave to offer an opposite conjecture, *ὀνήσει*, on the supposition that the final syllable *εν* may owe its birth to *ἄν* wrongly repeated.

B. *οὐ νόμος ἐστί, it is not the custom.* — *μὴ ὅτι κυβερνήτου*, i. e. *μὴ εἴπῃς ὅτι*, *not to say, or to pass by the pilot*, who is not mentioned in order to select a stronger case, that of the general. Comp. *οὐχ ὅτι*, 450, E, note. — *ἐλάττω σώζειν* = *ἐλάττωνα σωτηρίαν πορίζειν*, or *ἀπεργάζεσθαι*. — *μή σοι δοκεῖ κατὰ τὸν δικανικὸν εἶναι*; *does he seem to you to be on a level with (and not rather above) the forensic man?*

Comp. Repub. 466, B, μή πη κατὰ τὸν τῶν σκυτοτόμων φαίνεται βίον; *does it seem to you to rank with the shoemaker's kind of life?*

C. λέγων καὶ παρακαλῶν ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖν. Briefly for λέγων δεῖν, καὶ παρακαλῶν ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖν. — ὥς οὐδὲν τᾶλλά ἐστιν, *on the ground that everything else is of no value* (in comparison with engineering). — ἀποκαλέσαις. This compound of καλέω, as Stallb. remarks, is often used when a name is given in anger or contempt, = *to call by a nickname, to call contemptuously, or with a scornful air*. Examples may be found in Æschin. c. Ctes., and in Reiske's Index to Demosth. — ἐξ ὧν τὰ σαυτοῦ ἐπαινέις = ἐκ τῶν ἐπαίνων οὗς τὴν σαυτοῦ τέχνην ἐπαινέις.

D. μὴ γὰρ τοῦτο . . . ἐατέον ἐστί. μὴ denoting *suspicion* that something is true, or *mild expression of opinion*, may be joined with an indicative; and the like may be said of ὅρα μὴ also. Comp. Soph. Electr. 581, 584 (where τίθης, and not τιθῆς, is supported by the MSS.); Alcibiad. 2. 139, D, ἀλλ' ὅρα μὴ οὐχ οὕτω ταῦτα ἔχει. μὴ may here be translated by *perhaps*, or *I suspect*. The sense is, *I suspect that a man deserving the name ought to throw away the idea of living as long as ever he can, and not love his life too well; and yielding the disposal of all such things to the Deity, as well as believing what the women say, that no one, whosoever he be, can escape his destiny, that he ought to consider thereupon how he can best live during the life which he is probably about to live, etc.* A fine parallel passage occurs in Leges, 2. 661, C. ἐπιτρέπειν, in the sense of committing or referring to, and of giving up to, takes a dative of a person, often with a genitive with περὶ. Æschin. c. Ctes. § 83, εἰ ἐπιτρέπειν ἐθέλοι πόλει τινὶ ἴσῃ καὶ ὁμοίᾳ περὶ τῶν ἐγκλημάτων, *if he wished to refer the grounds of complaint to some impartial and disinterested state*. Alcibiad. 1. 117, D, τῷ κυβερνήτῃ ἐπιτρέψας ἂν ἡσυχίαν ἔχοις; *would you let the pilot have his*

own way, and be quiet? For οὐδ' εἰς, more emphatic than οὐδέίς, comp. Eurip. Alcest. 671 (note in my ed.).

A. καὶ νῦν δὲ ἄρα δεῖ depends on σκεπτέον ἄρα. — τὰς 513 τὴν σελήνην καθαιρούσας. The Thessalian sorceresses, who drew down the moon by their incantations, drew down mischief also upon themselves. They lost, it was thought, their eyes or their children, to which last τοῖς φιλτάτοις alludes. Even an astrologer, in predicting an eclipse of the moon, which was akin, in the minds of the vulgar, to magical arts, was supposed to incur calamity. Hence ἐπὶ παντὶ σελήνην καθαιρεῖς, or καθέλκεις, is used proverbially of those who draw down calamities upon themselves by their conduct. The next words, σὺν τοῖς φιλτάτοις, must mean *with the loss of what we hold most dear*, i. e., as Socrates estimates things, *of virtue and truth*. σὺν here properly denotes the means, and it is only by inference from the connection that the phrase can imply *the loss of*. The preposition, as Stallb. observes, seems to be chosen with allusion to Iliad, 4. 161, σὺν τε μεγάλῳ ἀπέτισαν | σὺν σφῆσιν κεφαλῇσι γυναιξί τε καὶ τεκέεσσιν.

B. ἐν τῇ πόλει τῇδε, i. e. in Athens. See 469, D, and 468, E, note. — ἀνόμοιον . . . χεῖρον, *so long as you are unlike the political institutions either on the better side or on the worse*, i. e. so long as you are not assimilated exactly to the democracy of Athens, but are either like the true philosopher, in favor of *better* institutions, under which knowledge and virtue, and not the popular will, shall govern, and resemble such institutions in your character; or, on the other hand, have the selfish spirit in the extreme, like the tyrant who first corrupts, and then destroys, popular liberty. Thus, I suppose, the politics of Plato, as set forth in the Republic and Laws, require us to understand these words. — τι γνήσιον ἀπεργάζεσθαι, etc., *to effect any genuine or real result in regard to obtaining the friendship*

of the Athenian people, i. e. to be on terms of true friendship with Athens. δῆμῳ depends on φιλίαν. For τῷ Πυριλάμπον, see 481, D. — ὥς ἐπιθυμῆις πολιτικός εἶναι. Ast, after one MS., omits πολιτικός, but Stallb. justly says of it, *iteratur non sine vi et gravitate*. There is, as it seems to me, even something of scorn in the emphatical repetition of the word. ὥς is *since, seeing that*; not *as*, i. e. *according to* (your wishes).

D. πρὸς ἡδονὴν ὁμιλεῖν, i. e. τό τινα πρὸς ἡδ. σώματι καὶ ψυχῇ ὁμιλεῖν. With the indefinite subject of the infinitive agree the two subsequent participles.

E. ἡ δέ γε ἑτέρα, ὅπως. Supply ὁμιλεῖ, as ὁμιλοῦσα is understood just above with ἡ πρὸς ἡδονήν. — ἐπιχειρητέον . . . θεραπεύειν. The infinitive is added epexegetically, and the datives depend on the verbal. Comp. Soph. Electr. 543, 1277. For the construction of ποιοῦντας, see 492, B, note. It is without a copula as explaining οὕτως, and ὥς is taken with βελτίστους only.

- 514 A. εὐρίσκομεν. The Atticists and MSS. vary in regard to the augment of verbs beginning with εὔ. The earlier practice seems to have been, to leave the diphthong unchanged. Mt. § 167. 6. Below, 514, E, two of the best MSS. give ηὐρίσκομεν, and ηὐδοκίμει, 515, E. — ἐὰν μὴ . . . ἡντινοῦν explains and defines ἄνευ τούτου. Comp. a similar apposition of a clause beginning with ἐὰν μὴ in Soph. Antig. 87. — δημοσίᾳ πράξαντες τῶν πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων, *after we had engaged in a public capacity in any transactions of the state*. The genitive is taken partitively. The words πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων denote any employment in the state's service, as that of an ἐργολάβος, or *contractor*, like Phidias, and of an ἀρχιτέκτων, like Ictinus, the builder of the Parthenon.

B. εἰ ἐπιστάμεθα, and a little below, εἰ ὠκοδομήκαμεν. After *would it be incumbent on us to examine*, we should add

in English, *whether we knew*, εἰ ἠπιστάμεθα, relative to ἔδει ἄν, and not εἰ ἐπιστάμεθα, which is absolute: and so *whether we had builded* (in the pluperfect), not *whether we have builded*. But the Greeks, in many kinds of dependent clauses, preferred the absolute to the relative form, as here. The cause of this lay in that liveliness of mind which made the past present and the possible real, and often led them to the use of *oratio recta* for *oratio obliqua*.

C. *ἰδία . . . ἡμῶν*. According to Ast, ἡμῶν depends on ἰδία, which would alone express the idea, were not ἡμῶν wanted for the contrast with μετὰ τῶν διδασκάλων. Those who would reject such an expression as ἰδία ἡμῶν, which is destitute of the support of parallel examples, must read with Stallb., after one MS., ἰδία ὑφ' ἡμῶν. — οὕτω μὲν διακειμένων, etc. *It would be the part of prudent men, if so situated, to engage in public works*. Here ἦν has ἄν, but just below is without it. I think, with Ast, that although ἦν is often used without ἄν, (see Mt. § 508, Obs. 2,) yet here the influence of ἄν can extend to the second ἦν.

D. A very similar passage may be found in Laches, 186, B, C. In the first sentence, ἄν belongs to ἐπεσκεψάμεθα, which verb is taken with πάντα . . . ἄλλα, as well as with εἰ παρεκαλοῦμεν. The aorist, with ἄν following the imperfect, here denotes transitory action referable to present time (*if we were urging . . . we would examine*: see Hermann de partic. ἄν, 1. 10), or possibly (since we have ἐσκόπουν just below) there may be an inaccuracy of style, like that of using our potential pluperfect for the imperfect, — *would have* for *would*. Comp. 447, D, for the opposite use of the imperfect (εἰ ἐτύγγανεν ὦν . . . ἀπεκρίνατο), in speaking of something continuing in past time. Some would read ἐπισκεπτόμεθα here, but it is scarcely Attic. See 476, A, note.

E. ἀνθρώπους . . . ἐτύχομεν. The style passes freely from

the first person plural, as a representative of a general truth, to the third, and then back again. There is no reason why we should suspect ἀνθρώπους, or read ἔτυχον. ὥστε goes with ἐπιχειρεῖν. — ὅπως ἐτύχομεν, = *in an ordinary way, as we could, utcumque*. — τὸ λεγόμενον δὲ τοῦτο. See 417, A. δὲ is *just or even*. — ἐν τῷ πίθῳ, etc., *to try to learn the potter's art by beginning with the jar*, — the largest vessel, and therefore the hardest to make. This proverb occurs again in Laches, 187, B, in company with its opposite, ἐν τῷ Καρὶ ἡμῖν ὁ κίνδυνος, i. e. *to risk what you value least, attempt what you can best afford to fail in*; which refers to the Carian mercenaries in war, whose blood was less precious than their employer's.

515 B. σὸν ἰδιωτεύοντος. Soph. § 174; Cr. § 454; K. § 266. 2.

D. For what is here said of “the four,” see the Introduction. — ἀγαθοὶ πολῖται here is much the same as ἀγαθοὶ τὰ πολιτικά, which is used as an equivalent, 516, C, 517, A.

E. ἀκούω. See 503, C. — εἰς μισθοφορίαν . . . κατήσαντα, *by being the first to bring them into the practice of taking pay for performing their political duties*. Pericles introduced the practice of paying the judges. The pay was one obolus per diem at first, and then three. After the death of Pericles, the people also drew pay for attending in the assembly. All this is explained at large in that admirable book, Boeckh's Civil Economy of Athens, Book II. §§ 14, 15. — τῶν τὰ ὄσα κατεργότων. See 469, D. This phrase is explained fully by Protag. 342, B. “The Lacedæmonians,” Socrates there says, “conceal their philosophy, and thus deceive those in other states who affect Spartan manners, and *who, in imitation of them, have their ears bruised by blows received in boxing*, (ὄσα κατὰ γυμνασίαν μμούμενοι αὐτοῦς,) and bind the cæstus round their

hands and study gymnastics, and wear short tunics, just as though the Lacedæmonians surpassed the rest of Greece by such means." The phrase, then, denotes the partisans of Sparta, those who admire Spartan institutions, and are ill-affected towards Athens.

A. *γεγόνεσαν*. Comp. Soph. § 79 (91. 6, N. 4); Cr. 516 § 194. 1; K. § 120, R. 2. — *κλοπήν αὐτοῦ κατεψηφίσαντο*. Thucyd. merely says (2. 65) *χρήμασιν ἐζημίωσαν*. Plutarch mentions an accusation and a fine (Vit. Pericl. § 35), as does Diodorus also (12. 45); but the charge was no doubt false: he was *χρημάτων διαφανῶς ἄδωρότατος* by the testimony of the most impartial of historians. See Appendix, No. II. — *θανάτου ἐτίμησαν*. See 486, B, note: *δῆλον ὅτι*, 487, E, note. — *ὄνων ἐπιμελητῆς*. Comp. Xen. Memorab. 1. 2. 32, for a similar passage. — *ἀπέδειξε . . . ποιούντας*, *if he had caused them to do*. This verb and *ἀποφαίνω* are often used in the sense of causing something to appear, of *effecting*, *rendering*, and, like *φαίνω*, *δείκνυμι*, take their complement in the form of a participle.

B. *καὶ τότε . . . χάρισαι*. There is a similar play upon *χαρίζομαι* in Repub. 1. 351, C, *σοὶ γάρ, ἔφη, χαρίζομαι*. *Εὖ γε σὺ ποιῶν· ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ τότε μοι χάρισαι καὶ λέγε*.

C. *ὡς ἔφη Ὅμηρος*. Nusquam disertis verbis hoc dictum in eo quem hodie habemus Homero, nisi quis huc trahere velit quod Routhius fecit Odyss. 6. 120, 9. 175, *ἦ ῥ' οἷγ' ὑβρίζται τε καὶ ἄγριοι, οὐδὲ δίκαιοι*. Heindorf. Plato puts the *ἀγαθοὶ* and *ἡμεροὶ* together, in Repub. 5. 470, E, and makes *τὸ ἡμερον* a part of the philosophic nature in Repub. 3. 410, E. — *ὃν ἦκιστ' ἂν ἐβούλετο*, i. e. *εἰς ὃν*.

D. What is here said of Cimon and Themistocles is well known. What is said of Miltiades rests on the authority of Plato, and of the Scholiast on Aristides 3. 677, Dindorf, whom Valek. on Herodot. 6. 136 first cited from a MS. The Scholiast says *ὅτε ἐκρίνετο ἐπὶ τῇ Πάρῳ* (i. e.

on account of his fruitless attack upon the island of Paros soon after the battle of Marathon), ἡθέλησαν αὐτὸν κατακρημνῆσαι, ὁ δὲ πρύτανις εἰσελθὼν ἐξητήσατο αὐτόν. Plato perhaps exaggerates a little in saying ἐψηφίσαντο. The Prytanis, being president of the assembly of the people which tried the case, was probably one of those friends of Miltiades of whose advocacy Herodot. speaks, and by his intercessions led the judges to lower the penalty from death to a heavy fine. But for that, death, by being thrown into the pit, would have been his portion. See Grote's Greece, Vol. IV. p. 491. — τὸν ἐν Μαραθῶνι, *him who was at Marathon*, the general there. ἐν is used because the action was "in Marathonio agro." See Soph. Electr. 1. Thucyd. 2. 85, τῆς ἐν Στράτῳ μάχης, *at, near Stratus*. — τὸ βάραθρον is defined by Timæus (Lex. Platōn. s. v.), "a place like a well, where the condemned were thrown," and in Bekker's Anecd. 1. 219, is said to be "an excavation in Keiriadæ, a demus of the Ceneid tribe, where they threw down the capitally condemned, as the Lacedæmonians did into Kæadas." Herodot. 7. 133, says that the heralds of Darius were thrown by the Athenians into this place. Comp. Aristoph. Clouds, 1450, and the Schol. on Aristoph. Plut. 431.

E. εἰ μὴ διὰ, *but for*. This not unfrequent formula has always the same sense as if some part of κωλύω were understood. The origin of the phrase is not clear. Ast accounts for it as a confusion or union of two forms of speaking; e. g., in this case, εἰ μὴ ὁ Πρύτανις ᾗν, if the Prytanis had not existed, . . . ἐνέπεσεν ἄν, and διὰ τὸν Π. . . . οὐκ ἐνέπεσεν. — οὐκ οἶ γε ἀγαθοὶ ἡνίοχοι, etc. This sentence is formed like that explained in the note on 512, A. The sense is, *It is not true that good drivers are not at first thrown from their chariots, but when they have improved their horses by care, and have become better drivers themselves, that they are then thrown out*. Ζεύγος is often used of the vehicle, as well as of the yoke or pair of animals drawing it.

A. τῶν μέντοι ἔμπροσθεν. Here, by a kind of zeugma, ἔλε- 517
 γες, readily suggested by ὁμολόγεις, is to be supplied, togeth-
 er with τινάς, which is contained in οὐδένα. Comp. Soph.
 Antig. 29. — οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐξέπεσον. The metaphor is bor-
 rowed from charioteers, and is the more natural, as persons
 who lost their rank or authority were said ἐκπεσεῖν. Comp.
 Soph. Antig. 679. — οὔτε τῇ κολακικῇ. If they had used
 the true art of rhetoric, that is, had been good politicians,
 they would have made the people better, and not have had
 to rue its ingratitude : if the flattering art of rhetoric, they
 would have escaped from dangers, because that art, accord-
 ing to the Sophists, σώζει ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων μάλιστα
 μὲν ἑαυτόν. Aristides triumphs in a supposed inconsistency
 of Plato, who had before called “the four” κόλακας, and
 now says that they did not use τῇ κολακικῇ ῥητορικῇ. But
 he does not see into the meaning. The words contain a
 sneer at the rhetoricians. They were κόλακες, inasmuch as
 they studied to gratify, not to benefit ; and carrying such a
 motive into their public addresses, they imbued all their
 words with it. But if the false art of rhetoric can rescue
 from dangers, and makes that its first aim, they fell short
 of it. In other words, the art cannot gain its own dearest
 ends. They had the principles of the false rhetoric, but
 could not gain that for which the art was esteemed.

B. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ . . . μὴ . . . ἐργάσεται. πολλοῦ δεῖ is
 usually followed by an infinitive, and Stallb. says that he
 knows of no example like this. The reason for the con-
 struction seems to be, that πολλοῦ δεῖ, being in sense a nega-
 tive, adopts the construction appropriate to οὐ. οὐ μὴ ἐργά-
 σεται would be a familiar formula. — ὅς βούλει, a singular
 expression for (τις) ὃν βούλει, to be referred to the rule of
 attraction of the relative. Comp. Cr. § 526. γ. The verb
 must be regarded as coalescing with ὅς to form one notion,
 like *quivis* in Latin. — ὥς γε διακόνους εἶναι πόλεως, as to

their being servants of the state, or considering them merely as (ὥς γε) being servants of the state. Stallb. thinks that the phrase arises, by a *confusio duarum locutionum*, out of ὥς . . . διακόνους, and διακόνους εἶναι. But the infinitive with ὥς can be used in this relation to the main verb, as well as in others. — καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν, *and in regard to not letting them have their own way.* The infinitives limit διέφερον. — τούτων, politicians of the present day.

C. οὐδὲν πανόμεθα . . . αἰέ. Comp. 491, A. — ἀγνοοῦντες ἀλλήλων ὅ τι λέγομεν. ἀγνοέω takes a genitive, like μαθάνω and other verbs of learning or understanding. Soph. § 182; Cr. § 375. β; K. § 273. 5, f.

D. ἢ δυνατὸν εἶναι is for ἢ δ. ἐστι, by a change of style from direct to suspended discourse. Supply ὡμολογήκαμεν. — ῥιγῶ is for ῥιγοῖ, subjunctive of ῥιγόω; and so ῥιγῶν for ῥιγοῦν infinitive, in Aristoph. Clouds, 442. This is quite analogous to the contraction of πεινάω, and a few others in αω, by η instead of α, but is usual with no other verb except ἰδρώω. Buttmann (largest Gr. 1. 506, and note in Heindorf) thinks that both contractions are relics of a general method prevailing in old Ionic. — τούτων γὰρ ποριστικὸν εἶναι, etc. This sentence changes its structure, and proceeds as if ὄντα, and not εἶναι, had stood here. The anacoluthon is caused by the explanatory clause ἢ κάπηλων ὄντα . . . σκυτοδεσφόν, and by the difficulty of carrying out the original construction.

518 A. διὸ δὴ καὶ ταύτας . . . εἶναι. The construction changes from ὅτι and a finite verb, εἰδότε ὅτι ἔστι τις, etc., to an infinitive with its subject accus. — ταῦτ' αὖ οὖν ταῦτα, etc. *Now at one time you seem to be aware that I say that the selfsame thing holds good of the soul also, and you agree to it, as if understanding what I mean.* τοτὲ μὲν answers to ὀλίγον δὲ ὕστερον, and δὲ is, in a sense, out of its place.

B. προτεινέσθαι, to hold forward as a sample of what

one has got, hence to take, or select as a specimen. — *ὁμοιοτάτους . . . ὥσπερ*. See 485, A. — *Θεαρίων* must have been the fashionable baker at Athens. He is thus spoken of in a fragment of the Gerytades of Aristophanes (Athenæus, 3. 112, E): *ἦκω Θεαρίωνος ἀρτοπώλιον | λιπών, ἵν' ἐστὶ κριβάνων ἐδώδια*, — which is a parody of the beginning of the *Ipecuba*. And a longer fragment from the *Omphale* of Antiphanes, preserved in the same place, asks, (by way of parody on Soph. *Electr.* 257, perhaps,) how a man of noble birth could ever go out of the house where he saw the white loaves of bread . . . *οὐς δημόταις | Θεαρίων ἔδειξεν*. — *ἀρτοκόπος*. In a number of MSS., *ἀρτοποιὸς* appears. Still another word for the same thing is *ἀρτοπόπος*, which has most commendation from the Atticists, and which has probably been without reason thrust out of its place by the other words in a number of instances. See Lobeck on Phrynichus, 222. — *Μίθαικος*, etc. *Mithæcus*, who wrote the treatise called "*La Cuisine Sicilienne*." The Sicilians were in the gastronomic art to the Greeks what the French are now to the world, and Mithæcus was a Syracusan cook. *Repub.* 3. 404, D, *Συρακοσίαν τράπεζαν καὶ Σικελικὴν ποικιλίαν ὄψων, ὡς ξοικας, οὐκ αἰνεῖς*. Athenæus, 12. 518, C, *διabόητοί εἰσιν ἐπὶ τρυφῇ καὶ αἱ Σικελῶν τράπεζαι*. Comp. also Cicero *de Fin.* 2. 28. According to Maximus Tyrius (23. 1), cited by Routh, Mithæcus went to Sparta, but they, thinking that too many cooks would spoil their broth, drove him away. — To Sarambus (or Sarabus, as Meineke, *Com. Græc. frag.* 4. 525, would write the name) many later writers allude, but they seem to have derived their knowledge of him from this passage. See the commentators on Suidas, sub voce.

C. *παρασκευαστὰς ἀνθρώπων*. *ἄνθρωπος* is often added in contempt, having something of the force of our *fellow*. *ἀνὴρ* is used, on the contrary, with an honorable sense. This

is shown at large in Valckenacr's Opusc. 2. 243, ed. Lips. — οἷ, ἂν οὕτω τύχωσιν, etc. *Who, it may be, after they have filled and fattened the bodies of the men, and while they are praised by them, will cause the loss* (not only of this increase of flesh, but) *of their old flesh besides.*

D. ὅταν δὴ αὐτοῖς ἦκη, *when now their former repletion shall have brought on disease a good while afterwards.* ἦκω φέρων is often nearly the same as φέρω, and can only be figuratively explained here of the repletion acting as a cause *bringing in its train* disease as the effect.

E. Nothing is truer than these remarks. The seeds of present national evil are sown in the past, and yet we blame the men of the present for what we suffer, and praise the men of the past, who are the true source of our calamities. It is thus that some, who look with alarm on the turn our affairs are taking, worship Jefferson as a political saint. — καὶ φασι . . . αὐτοὺς is for καὶ οὗς φασι, by a change of style from the relative to the demonstrative.

519 A. καταβολή. περιοδική λήψις πυρετοῦ, interpretate Timæo Lex. p. 154 ubi v. Ruhnken. Heindorf. — Ἀλκιβιάδου. As he had some time before left Athens for the last time, Plato is here forgetful of dates. See 481, D, note, and Appendix, No. I.

B. ἀνακτούντων, sc. αὐτῶν, these politicians.

C. Comp. 460, C, and Xen. Memorab. 1. 2. 7. — κινδυνεύει ταῦτόν εἶναι, (τούτοις,) ὅσοι, *the same thing seems to hold good of those who*, etc. But Mt. § 632, has a different explanation of the form of the sentence.

D. καὶ τούτου τοῦ λόγου. For καί, Heindorf, without authority, writes καίτοι. But καί, in the beginning of imperative and interrogative sentences, marks liveliness of transition (Mt. § 620), like our *and* in animated questions, particularly in those where objections are refuted. — δηγομαι με ἡνάγκασας. See 482, C, 494, D.

E. *συχνούς τείνω τῶν λόγων.* The construction seems to be *τινας τῶν λόγων συχνούς τείνω*, i. e. *ὥστε συχνούς εἶναι*, *some things which I have to say I dwell largely upon.* But if *λόγων* depends on *συχνούς*, as it well can (comp. Soph. § 177. 1), the sense must be, I think, *a good many of my discourses I extend in length.* — *πρὸς φίλιον.* See 500, B.

A. *ὅταν τύχωσιν.* Comp. 514, E, 518, C. — What is 520 said here refers to Protagoras, Prodicus, and other professed teachers of virtue, as Heindorf remarks; and it is amusing to see the contempt felt by the friend of Gorgias, a mere teacher of words (*λέγειν οἶεται δεῖν ποιεῖν δεινούς*, Meno, 95, C), for the Sophists, whose pretensions were as much higher as wisdom is higher than eloquence.

B. *ἢ . . . ἅμα καὶ ἐαυτῶν κατηγορεῖν.* Here supply *δεῖν* or *ἀνάγκην εἶναι*, which is readily suggested by *ἐγχωρεῖν*. Comp. 517, A.

C. *προέσθαι*, to bestow freely, and in the first instance, without knowing what return the party receiving the favor will make. Comp. Thucyd. 2. 43, *κάλλιστον ἔρανον αὐτῇ προῖόμενοι*, *bestowing upon their country a most precious contribution.* So *προεμέρους εἰεργεσίαν*, Xen. Anab. 7. 7. 47, where Schneider adverts to this sense. — *ἄνευ μισθοῦ.* Protagoras, who first openly called himself a Sophist and took pay (Protag. 349, A), says (328, B) that he had a price, which his student might give if he pleased; but if not, that the student went to a temple, and paid so much as he (the student) pronounced on oath the instructions to be worth. For the opinions of Socrates on this point, see, among the rest, Xen. Memorab. 1. 6. 13. — *ἐνεχώρει.* The absolute form without *ἄν* is here used for the hypothetical with it. See Mt. § 508, Obs. 2; K. § 260, R. 3. — *τὴν χάριν*, the favor due, *the compensation*, as a mark of a grateful mind. — *καὶ μὴ συνθέμενος . . . τό ἀργύριον*, *and should not take the money in consequence of a bargain made*

with him (i. e. should not take it as the payment which was stipulated) at the very time when he was imparting to him the power of swiftness. ὅτι μάλιστα is joined with ἄμα to increase its preciseness.

E. εἰ μὴ τις αὐτῷ διδῶ. αὐτῷ refers to the indefinite subject of φάναι. — ἀντ' εὖ ποιεῖν. There can be little doubt that Stallb. is right in separating these words, in opposition to Buttmann (2. 361, largest Gr.), who writes in one word ἀντενποιεῖν. εὖ and δυς are united only to derivative forms, except in the instance of the strange word δυσ-θήσκων, used by Euripides. — εἰ εὖ ποιήσας. Heindorf writes ὁ εὖ ποιήσας, "sed fallitur, loco qui repudiat articulum non recte explicato." Hermann on Eurip. Hecuba, 485, 2d ed. The indefinite subject is understood, and εὖ ποιήσας denotes *after conferring a favor*.

521 A. ὥς διακονήσονται καὶ ὁμιλήσονται. Instead of writing τὴν τοῦ διακονεῖν καὶ ὁμιλεῖν, Plato deserts the construction of the nearest words, through the influence of ὥς ὑπαγόν, and accommodates the participles to παρακαλεῖς. See Mt. § 555, Obs. 2. Just below, Heindorf, Coray, and Stallb. think that ὥς has fallen out before κολακεύσονται.

B. εἴ σοι Μυσὸν γε ἥδιον καλεῖν. The sense of this vexed passage seems to be that which Stallb. and Olympiod., whom he cites from the MSS., give to it, *if you like better to call* (such a man) *a Mysian*, call him so; i. e. "You may give the political man the most contemptible name that you can find. Do as you like about that, since if you will not act so as to gratify the Athenians (εἰ μὴ . . . ποιήσεις) you will —." The apodosis to εἰ . . . καλεῖν is omitted, being readily suggested by the sense of the passage. It is οὕτως κάλει, or οὐδὲν κωλύει, or something equivalent. The apodosis which εἰ μὴ . . . ποιήσεις would have had, if Socrates had not cut the sentence short, is to be found in his words. With καλεῖν must be understood τοῦ-

τον, *this political man*, whom in fact, though not in so many words, Socrates calls a κολακα. But the connection with the foregoing must be owned to be rather loose. The Mysians stood low among the people of Asia Minor. Μυσῶν ἔσχατος (Theatet. 209, B) is a proverb for the vilest of the vile. Cicero, in his Or. pro Flacco, § 27, says: " Quid porro in Græco sermone, tam tritum atque celebratum est, quam, si quis despiciatui ducitur, ut Mysorum ultimus esse dicatur? "

C. οὐχ ἔξει ὃ τι χρήσεται αὐτοῖς. αὐτοῖς is *his property*, before spoken of in ἐάν τι ἔχω. In 465, C, the indicative, but in many places the subjunctive, follows ἔχω in this formula. The distinction seems to be, that with the future the action is viewed as simply future; with the subjunctive, as connected with and dependent on some contemplated cause and ground of action. Thus, in οὐκ ἔχει ὃ τι χρήσεται, the subject is in doubt about his future action; in οὐκ ἔ. ὅ. χρήσεται, about his rational future action. — ὥς μοι δοκεῖς. ὥς is exclamatory. — ὥς οἰκῶν . . . καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἰσαχθεῖς, *as though you were living aloof, and could not be brought (on trial) into court*. For εἰσαχθεῖς ἂν comp. 458, A, note.

D. ὃ τι τύχοι. Mireris Heindorfium ὃ τι ἂν τύχοι corrigentem. Nam optativus post relativa in obliqua oratione haudquaquam infrequens est. Addito ἂν hoc loco scribendum erat τύχη. Stallb. — The dissatisfaction with the political institutions of Athens, which is here clearly implied, was felt by Socrates to some degree, but far more by Plato, whose ideal turn of mind was not fitted to find satisfaction in the present under any system, particularly under one where demagogues reigned, and philosophers had to drink poison. — πονηρός. An allusion, no doubt, to the actual accusers. — οὐδέν γε ἄτοπον, sc. ἐγώ.

E. τὰ κομπᾷ ταῦτα. An allusion to what Callicles says, 486, C. — ὅδε ἐργασται ἀνὴρ. ὅδε, like οὗτος, 489, B,

used of a person who is present and pointed at, has no article. — καὶ αὐτοὺς, καὶ τοὺς νεωτάτους. αὐτοὺς is taken with ὑμᾶς εἵργασται, and serves to contrast the whole ὑμᾶς with the part νεωτάτους. καὶ = *and especially*. — νεωτάτους διαφθείρει. An allusion to the actual charge against Socrates. Comp. 522, B.

522 A. For εὐωχεῖν governing two accusatives, see Mt. § 421, Obs. 1; Cr. § 430. This construction (which γεύω also sometimes takes) seems to be owing to this; that the verb means substantially *to make to eat*, and needs an object for each of these notions. — The sentiment conveyed by this comparison of the cook and the physician is expressed in another way by Crates of Thebes, a Cynic philosopher who flourished at Athens in Alexander's time (Diog. Laert. 6. 86): τίθει μαγείρῳ μνᾶς δέκ', ἱατρῷ δραχμήν· | κύλακι τάλαντα πέντε, συμβούλῳ καπνόν· | πόρνη τάλαντον, φιλοσόφῳ τριώβολον.

B. οὔτε γὰρ ἡδονάς. Το οὔτε, εἰάν τε answers. An affirmative and a negative proposition are often thus bound together by οὔτε and τε; but οὔτε must come first. αὐτοῖς the judges implied in δικαστήριον. — οὔτε οἷς πορίζεται, i. e. οὔτε τούτους, οἷς ταῦτα (referring to ἡδοναί) πορίζεται. — ἀπορεῖν ποιοῦντα. This was a frequent charge against Socrates. The doubt he threw upon their former opinions, and the unsettled state of mind which he produced, may have been unwelcome to a few, and regarded as dangerous by a few more; but probably nothing made him more unpopular than his provoking way of bringing men who argued with him to a stand, so that they did not know what to say. Meno. says (79, D, cited by Heindorf), “O Socrates, I used to hear it said of you, before I became acquainted with you, that you do nothing else except αὐτός τε ἀπορεῖς, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖς ἀπορεῖν.”

C. πράττω τὸ ὑμέτερον δὴ τοῦτα, and *herein I am doing*

just (δὴ) *what is for your interest*. Ast takes πάντα ταῦτα with πράττω, as well as with λέγω, and ὑμέτερον . . . τοῦτο as added in apposition. — οὕτως διακείμενος (not οὕτω). Videtur οὕτως, etiam sequente consona litera, usurpatum esse ubi vi et pondere suo pollet plurimum. Stallb. — ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχοι. Heindorf wishes to erase ἐν, or write ἐν, with some reason, as ὑπάρχω takes with it a simple dative.

D. βοήθεια εἰναι. This noun with the dative denotes *help afforded to*; with the genitive, *against* (comp. βοήθεια κακοῦ, 509, C, βαρβάρων, Plat. Epist. 7. 332, E), or *to any one*. — There is an allusion here to 486, B.

E. αὐτὸ τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν. Comp. for the sentiment Plato's Apol. 28, B, et seq. — φοβεῖται, sc. πᾶς τις, by brachylogy supplied from οὐδεὶς, just above. See my note on Soph. Antig. 29. — ὡς τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει depends on λόγον λέξαι, as if it were λόγῳ δεῖξαι ὡς . . . ἔχει.

A. φασί, i. e. *as story-tellers say, when they begin a story*. — λόγον opposed to μῦθον is a *historical narrative, a true story*, as opposed to a *fictitious narrative*. — Ὅμηρος λέγει. Iliad. 15. 187. — καὶ ἀεὶ καὶ νῦν ἔτι, *et semper et nunc etiam*. Ast. ἔστιν includes a past tense.

B. νεωστί, *in modern times*, used relatively to the days of Saturn. — οἱ ἐκ . . . νήσων. The preposition is accommodated to ἰόντες (see Soph. Electr. 137), because the officers set over the blessed islands came *from thence*. Comp. Cr. § 659; K. § 300. 4; and 472, B, note.

C. ἐκατέρωσε, *in each direction*, to the blessed islands, and to the prison of punishment.

D. προκεκαλυμμένοι = ἔχοντες προκεκαλυμμένον. See Æsch. Prometh. 362; Soph. Electr. 51. The sense is, *having eyes and ears, and the whole body, spread as a veil before the soul*. — αὐτοῖς . . . ἐπίπροσθεν γίγνεται, *are in their way*. — τοῦτ' αὐτῶν, *this property of theirs, this in them*.

E. ἐξαίφνης ἀποθανόντος = εὐθὺς ἀποθανόντος, *the moment he is dead*. Soph. § 222, N. 4. — By a constructio ad sensum, ἔρημον . . . καταλιπόντα are in the masculine, because τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκάστου is the same as *each person*. — δύο ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας. Routh explains this by their being born of Europa, a Phœnician, and adds, that Minos was regarded by some as a stranger in Crete. “Sed Cretam insulam Asiæ assignasse videntur veteres sicut Libyam modo Europæ modo Asiæ contribuerunt; ut duas orbis terrarum partes posuerint, Asiam et Europam.” Ast. But no proof has been found elsewhere, that Crete was assigned to Asia.

524 A. ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι, etc. Virgil, *Æneid*, 6. 540: —

“Hic locus est, partes ubi se via findit in ambas:
Dextera, quæ Ditis magni sub mœnia tendit,
Hæc iter Elysium nobis: at læva malorum
Exercet pœnas, et ad impia Tartara mittit.”

B. οὐ πολλὸν ἦττον . . . ἤνπερ καὶ ὅτε ἔζη. A free and rather irregular construction, instead of οὐ πολλὸν ἦττον . . . ἢ ὅτε ἔζη. ἤνπερ is brought in through the influence of τὴν ἐξιν τὴν αὐτοῦ, and alters the ensuing words to suit itself.

D. οἷος εἶναι παρεσκεύαστο, etc., *such as he had prepared himself to be while living in regard to his body*, i. e. such as were his ways of using his body. Just below, ἐνδηλα ταῦτα refer to the qualities of body implied in οἷος εἶναι παρεσκεύαστο, as if οἷα ἔσχεν ἐν τῷ σώματι had been written.

E. κατείδεν . . . ψυχῆς. The aorist marks indefinite time (484, A, note): ψυχῆς depends on οἰδέν; *nothing belonging to, or in, the soul*. Comp. *Rep.* 376, A, ὁ καὶ ἄξιον θαύμασαι τοῦ θηρίου. — ἀλλὰ διαμεμαστιγωμένην, etc. Tacit. *Annal.* 6. 6, “Neque frustra præstantissimus sapientiæ firmare solitus est, si recludantur tyrannorum mentes, posse adspici laniatus et ictus; quando, ut corpora verberibus, ita sævitia, libidine, malis consultis animus dilaceretur.”

B. οἱ ὠφελοῦμενοι . . . καὶ διδόντες, i. e. those who, while 525 they suffer, are made better . . . are such as, etc.

C. τοῖς ἀεί. See 464, D; Prometh. 937.

D. τοὺς πολλοὺς . . . παραδειγμάτων. By a *constructio ad sensum*, παραδειγμάτων used of the persons who serve as examples, is joined to πολλούς, as if it were masculine. — Ὅμηρος. Odys. 11. 575, seq.

E. οὐ γὰρ ἐξῆν αὐτῷ, sc. συνέχεσθαι. — ἐκ τῶν . . . ἄνθρωποι, the men who prove to be even very wicked are of the class of the powerful. Here, 497, A, 526, B, and elsewhere, γίγνεσθαι means to become subjectively, i. e. to become in the view of the mind, to be found out to be.

C. ἐπισημνήμενος, εἰν τε, etc., putting his mark upon 526 him to show whether he thinks him curable or not. Comp. Repub. 10. 614, which I will give in English. “When, therefore, his soul went out of his body, he began a journey, with a number of others, and they came to a wonderful place, where there were two openings in the ground close by one another, and others opposite to them above in the sky. Between these judges sat, who, whenever they finished judging, bade the just take the road on the right and upwards through the sky, having first attached certificates (σημεῖα) to those who had been judged, in front; and ordered the unjust to take the road to the left and leading downward, with marks behind indicating all their conduct.” — οὐ πολυπραγμονήσαντος, who has not been “a busybody in other men’s matters,” who has not gone out of his own sphere of duties, to perform a part belonging to another. In Repub. 4. 433, A, it is made a definition of justice, that a man τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττει καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμονεῖ. Here the words especially point at taking an active part in politics, which, for a man who is not yet qualified for political life, is undertaking another’s duty to the neglect of his own.

C, D. *ἐκάτερος . . . νέκυσιν*. This passage is considered to be spurious by Heindorf and Ast, for reasons which, as far as I can see, are altogether insufficient. The passage from Homer is in *Odys.* 11. 568.

E. *ἀντιπαρακαλῶ*. *ἀντὶ* denotes *in my turn*, in reply to the exhortations which you gave me to engage in politics. Just below, *ἀντὶ . . . ἀγώνων* denotes *worth all the trials here*, i. e. to be set against or equal in importance to all the trials before human tribunals, where rhetoric, as its advocates alleged, would save a man from condemnation. *ἐνθάδε*, *ἐκεῖ*, and *ἐκείσε* are often used of *this life*, and of *death* or *a future state*; the context of course suggesting the explanation. Comp. *Soph. Antig.* 76; *Electr.* 356; *Eurip. Alcest.* 363.

527 A. *τὸν τῆς Αἰγίνης νιόν*. Æacus (son of Jupiter and Ægina), as being the judge for all from Europe. *Olympiod.* apud Stallb. says, "He adds Ægina because Callicles was from Ægina." But as that Platonic Scholiast can have known nothing about Callicles, I suspect that the last word, *Αἰγίνης*, is an error in transcribing for *Εἰρώπης*, occasioned by the similar word preceding it. — *χασμήσει*, etc. This noble passage alludes to 486, B. — *τυπτήσει*. The Attic form of the future of *τύπτω*, according to Thomas Magister and Mæris sub voce. Comp. *Aristoph. Clouds*, 1379, 1443. The later writers used all the forms from *τυπτέω*, unless it be the present and imperfect.

B. *ἐκείσε . . . συμφέρων*, *advantageous there*. See 526, E. The adverb of motion is used, because the journey from this world is thought of. It is the same as *when we go thither*. Comp. the opposite in *Æschin. c. Ctes.* § 97, Bekker: "He said that he wished to report to you *τὴν ἐκ Πελοποννήσου πρεσβείαν ἣν ἐπρέσβευσε*, *his embassy into Peloponnesus*, strictly *the embassy into P. from which he had returned*. — *ἡρεμῇ*, *remains quiet, unshaken*, i. e. *unre-*


futed. — οὐ τὸ δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι. Comp. the noble words in Repub. 2. 361, A, ἐσχάτη ἀδικία δοκεῖν δίκαιον εἶναι, μὴ ὄντα. Æschylus was the source of the expression, Sept. c. Theb. 574, οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ἄριστος ἀλλ' εἶναι θέλει, upon which words all the theatre turned and looked at Aristides, according to Plutarch in his life.

C. οὕτω χρηστέον. οὕτω is immediately explained by ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον αἰεῖ. — ἐνταῦθα, *to that kind of life.* ἐνταῦθα came perhaps to be used with a verb of motion, because with the motion its end, rest in the place, is often thought of. — ὥς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει, *as the discourse shows.* Stallb. gives ὥς ὁ σὸς λόγος, with the best of the MSS., to which Ast very justly objects. The same false reading appears 511, B, 460, C, and Socrates could not call the argument, so far as it proved this point, the argument of Callicles, to whom he here speaks.

D. πατάξαι. The interpreters are divided between πατάξαι, with which ἑασόν τινα and σε, from σου, just above, are to be supplied, and πάταξαι *sine te verberari.* Buttmann even denies that the middle can have this sense, and, I incline to think, with reason. It may denote *strike yourself*, or *get yourself struck* (i. e. do something which shall cause the action of striking to come back upon yourself), but not *allow yourself to be struck*, i. e., in this place, “bear such an infliction without thinking it the greatest evil in the world.” Stallb., in defence of the middle so used, cites from Aristoph. Clouds, 494, φέρ' ἴδω τί δρᾷς, ἣν τίς σε τύπτῃ; where Strepsiades replies, τύπτομαι: this word Stallb. takes in the sense of ἐὼ ἐμαντὸν τύπτεσθαι. I apprehend that τύπτομαι is in the passive. “What do you do,” says Socrates, “if a person beats you?” “I am beaten,” is the reply; i. e. I do nothing but suffer, I get beaten. We need not be troubled by σύ γε θαρρόων; for σὺ is occasionally repeated with γε in the second clause, with a certain increase of

force in the exhortation. Comp. Herodot. 7. 10, "I shall hear of you as being torn to pieces by dogs and birds, ἥ κου ἐν γῇ τῇ Ἀθηναίων ἢ σέ γε ἐν τῇ Λακεδαιμονίων;" Soph. *Ed. Tyr.* 1101, τίς σε . . . ἔτικτε . . . Πανὸς . . . προσπελασθεῖς, ἢ σέ γε . . . Λοξίου; The sense is true of ὁ γε, and *tu* in Latin. Nor do I see how θαρρόων opposes this construction any more than θαρρόύντως would. The sense, then, is, *Yes, indeed, and do you calmly let him give you this dishonorable blow.* — Stallb., I find, has given up his defence of πάταξαι, imperative middle, in his second edition.

E. οἷς οὐδέποτε ταῦτὰ δοκεῖ. Comp. 491, B. He includes himself in the censure, to give it a milder form.



A P P E N D I X.

No. I.

Where and when does Plato represent this Dialogue to have taken place?

1. *Where?* In the house of Callicles, say all with whose opinion I am acquainted, except Schleiermacher. He decides in favor of some public place, such as the Lyceum, where other conversations of Socrates were held. His reasons, given in a note on his translation of Gorgias (Vol. III. 473, of his Plato), are principally these. 1. Socrates (417, B) seems to be going into the place where Gorgias is. He meets Callicles without, who says, "Whenever you wish to come to my house, Gorgias will exhibit to you, for he lodges with me." (See the note on that place.) The words, *whenever you wish to come*, must relate to some future time. What does Callicles do, then, if they are at his house, (Schl. leaves to be implied,) but shut the door in his visitors' faces. To tell a stranger just entering your house to call at any time, without asking him in, is to turn him away. 2. Schl. finds it strange, and not consistent with Athenian politeness, that Callicles should have deserted his guests, and be going away from his own house. To these reasons of Schleiermacher's may be added two others. 3. If Socrates and his friend were at the door of Callicles's house to hear Gorgias display his rhetorical powers, and if Chærephon knew Gorgias well, why should they need the information that Gorgias lodged there? 4. Perhaps it may be

regarded as a slight argument, that Socrates says (506, A), *ἔωμεν χαίρειν καὶ ἀπώμεν*: to which Gorgias replies, "It does not seem to me that we ought yet *ἀπιέναι*." For *ἀπιέναι* must have the same subject as the preceding *ἀπώμεν*. Here, then, Socrates expects that the other parties to the conversation will go away from the place when the discourse is broken off; and Gorgias repeats what Socrates had said, including himself among those who would leave the place. But this could not be, if they were where Gorgias was staying.

No one within my knowledge has examined what Schleiermacher says on this point, or given reasons for choosing the house of Callicles as the scene of the Dialogue, except Cousin. His reasons, I must think, have little weight.

1. There would have been some allusion, direct or indirect, to the place, if a public one. The same might be said, with equal reason, I think, on the other side.
2. It was mainly in private houses, as Plato affirms in *Hippias Major*, that Gorgias spoke. Plato's expression is *ἰδίᾳ ἐπιδείξεις ποιούμενος*, and *ἰδίᾳ*, contrasted with *ἐν τῷ δήμῳ*, just preceding, means nothing more than *in other places besides the assembly*.
3. Of Callicles leaving his guests, and going out to talk with Socrates, he says, "Nothing is more natural than to go to meet persons who are visiting you, and whom you are to receive, at the entrance of your house." If I mistake not, the porter would have admitted the strangers, and the master of the house have been in a distant part of the building.
4. To Schleiermacher's main remark, he replies, that, as Gorgias was fatigued, Callicles could not ask him to repeat his exhibition, and therefore begged the visitors to call at another time. But need they be turned away? Might they not be invited in, without the necessity of a new exhibition on the part of Gorgias?

2. *When?* The passage 473, E, which is treated of at

large in the note, has been usually supposed to determine the time. But several scholars, as Boeckh (which I learn from C. F. Hermann's work, I. 634) and Foss, have ascribed an earlier date to the Dialogue, and one so early even as the first visit of Gorgias to Athens. The arguments, so far as I know them, with a single exception, are of little importance. They are, — 1. Pericles is spoken of as *νεωστὶ τετελευτηκώς*, 503, C. But *νεωστὶ* may be widely used. Comp. 523, B. “Nuper, id est paucis ante sæculis.” Cic. de Nat. Deor. 2. 50. It was twenty-four years before 405 B. C. And Pericles in this passage is contrasted tacitly with Themistocles, Cimon, and Miltiades, whose deaths were considerably earlier. 2. Archelaus is said to have committed the crimes by which he gained the throne “yesterday and the day before.” But this is very plainly a rhetorical contrast with the *παλαιοῖς πράγμασι*, just before spoken of. See 470, D. 3. Demus, son of Pyrilampes, was a youth when the Wasps was written, seventeen years before 405 B. C. See 481, D. Suppose him thirty-two in 405, Plato, I imagine, if he had been aware, at the time of writing, of his exact age, would not have scrupled to say what he does. 4. The passage, 473, E, where Socrates speaks of his ignorance of the way to put the question when he was a presiding officer, is inconsistent with Apology 32, B, which refers to the famous occasion in 406 B. C. Socrates, therefore, must allude to something else. I can scarcely conceive how any one, used to the style of the Platonic Socrates, can take what he says 473, E, as sober earnest. 5. In 481, D, and 519, A, Alcibiades is spoken of as beloved by Socrates after their intimacy must long have ceased, and as likely to be punished by the Athenians, after his last departure from Athens, and a little before his death. This appears to me the most serious objection to the year 405. But I apprehend that this is by

no means the only instance in which Plato assigns the relations of one time to another, changing the more immaterial circumstances, as the tragic poets did those of the fables, to suit his design.

No. II.

On what is said of Pericles, 516, A, and on the Character given to him in this Dialogue.

AN eminent historian (Thirlwall, Hist. of Greece, Vol. III., chap. 18, and Appendix, 2) has examined the passage above quoted, and thinks that Plato's charge of peculation at this time arose out of a confusion of dates and circumstances. This may be so, but there are two things which ought to be said on behalf of Plato, before we fully condemn him for injustice towards his great countryman. The first is, that he expresses no opinion as to the justice of the charge. If it is admitted to be unjust, his argument is so much the stronger, for it turns upon the *ingratitude* of a people towards its public servants. Indeed, taken in connection with the charges against Themistocles, Cimon, and Miltiades, it wears the appearance of an unfounded accusation. The other is, that the fact may have been as Plato represents it: the people, in a sudden outburst of displeasure, may have at this time fined him, upon a charge of peculation so frivolous, that Thucydides does not think it worthy of mention. The circumstances were these. Pericles was deposed from his office of general (Plut. Pericl. § 35, Diodor. 12. 45), — it may be at one of the *epicheirotoniæ*, or in consequence of a special process, an *eisangelia*. A suit was brought against him, — probably a *γραφή*, though Plutarch calls it a *δίκη*. Cleon, Simmias, or Laccratidas

was his accuser, and he was fined in a sum variously estimated at fifteen, fifty (Plut.), and eighty (Diodor.) talents. The nature of the suit is not stated, but it certainly may have been *κλοπή δημοσίων πραγμάτων*, based upon some trifling circumstance, occurring at a time when moneys would be under his control, as commander of the forces. The general Timotheus, with no more reason, perhaps, was accused of treason, and then, at the rendering of his accounts (*euthynæ*), charged with bribery, and fined one hundred talents. To this it may be added, that Aristides, in his vindication of Pericles, nowhere, so far as I have observed, taxes Plato with inaccuracy, but follows his statement, as if he thought it true. And this he does in a work where he accuses Plato of anachronisms and misquotations. (Aristid. 2. 319, 327, de Quatuorv. ed. Dindorf. In the latter place the Sophist says:—"If one should ask Plato whether, supposing he had been one of Pericles's judges when he was tried for peculation, he would have been one to condemn him, and would have given more weight to the words of Cleon than to those of Pericles, or," etc.)

Plato, then, in this very serious and not at all ironical passage (see Thirlwall, III. 91), may have given no credit to the charge against Pericles, and, notwithstanding the silence of historians as to the nature of the suit, may be right in calling it one for peculation.

Upon another point,—Plato's consistency in the character which he gives to Pericles,—I will say but a word. There are three passages which concern us here; Gorg. 515, C—517; Meno, 99, B—100, B, compared with 94, B; and Phædrus, 269, A—270, B. In Meno, *εὖδοξία*, or correct opinion, is ascribed to Pericles, without wisdom, and in Phædrus he has the credit of possessing consummate eloquence, derived from the discipline of Anaxagoras. In

Gorgias, he is denied to be a true orator, but in Phædrus is declared to be πάντων τελεώτατος εἰς τὴν ῥητορικήν. The seeming inconsistency can be explained by taking into consideration, that Plato judges of the orator in Gorgias by a moral standard, and in Phædrus looks at him as capable of producing a work of art; and perhaps by this consideration also, that while he would grant to Pericles all that knowledge of the mind which the physical instructions of Anaxagoras could furnish, he might still refuse to him the attributes of a truly philosophical artist.

No. III.

See 486, A, note.

THE verses yet extant of this dialogue between the brothers have been collected and emended by Valckenaer, Matthiæ, and others. We here add the passage adjacent to the lines cited or alluded to by Plato, according to Hartung's arrangement in his Euripides Restitutus (Hamburg, 1813). Zethus invites his brother Amphion to go a hunting, and, on his refusal, reproaches him with effeminacy of mind, as giving himself up to the musical art and to indolence, while he neglects useful pursuits. To this scene Horace alludes (Epist. 1. 18. 39):—

“Nec tua laudabis studia, aut aliena reprêndes,
Nec, cum venari volet ille, poemata panges.
Gratia sic fratrum geminorum, Amphionis atque
Zethi, dissiluit, donec suspecta severo
Conticuit lyra; fraternis cessisse putatur
Moribus Amphion.”

Zethus first speaks:—

Ἄμφιον, ἀμελείς ὧν ἐπιμελείσθαι σε δεῖ.
ψυχῆς δὲ . . . ὧδε γενναίαν φύσιν

γυναικομίμῳ διαπρέπεις μορφώματι •
 οὗτ' ἐν δίκης βουλαῖσιν ὀρθῶς ἂν λόγον
 προθεῖο πιθανόν, οὗτ' ἂν ἀσπίδος κύτει
 ὁμιλήσεις, οὗτ' ἄλλων ὕπερ
 νεανικὸν βούλευμα βουλεύσαιο. . . .
 κακῶν κατάρχεις τήνδε Μοῦσαν εἰσάγων
 ἀσύμφορόν τιν' ἄτοπον
 ἀργὸν φίλοινον χρημάτων ἀτημελή.

πολλοὶ δὲ θνητῶν τοῦτο πάσχουσιν κακόν.
 γνώμη φρονούντες οὐ θέλουσ' ὑπηρετεῖν
 ψυχῇ, τὰ πολλὰ πρὸς φίλων νικώμενοι.

ἀνὴρ γὰρ ὅστις εὖ βίον κεκτημένος
 τὰ μὲν κατ' οἴκους ἀμελία παρεῖς ἔῃ,
 μολπαῖσι δ' ἡσθεῖς τοῦτ' αἰεὶ θηρεύεται,
 ἀργὸς μὲν οἴκοις καὶ πόλει γενήσεται,
 φίλοισι δ' οὐδείς· ἡ φύσις γὰρ οἴχεται
 ὅταν γλυκεῖας ἡδονῆς ἥσων τις ἦ •
 καὶ πῶς σοφὸν τοῦτ' ἐστίν, εἰ τις εὐφυῇ
 λαβοῦσα τέχνη φῶτ' ἔθηκε χείρονα
 μήτ' αὐτὸν αὐτῷ δυνάμενον προσάρκεσαι ;

. μισῶ . . .
 σοφὸν λόγοισι, ἐς δ' ὕνησιν οὐ σοφόν.
 ἀλλ' ἐμοῖ πιθοῦ,
 παῦσαι δ' αἰδῶν, πολεμίων δ' εὐμονσίαν
 ἄσκει, τοιαῦτ' αἰεὶδ' ἀφ' ὧν δόξεις φρονεῖν,
 σκάπτων, ἀρῶν γῆν, ποιμνίοις ἐπιστατῶν,
 ἄλλοις τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτ' ἀφείς σοφίσματα
 ἐξ ὧν κenoῖσιν ἐγκατοικήσεις δόμοις.

ΑΜΦΙΩΝ.

ἐκ παντὸς ἂν τις πράγματος δισσῶν λόγων

ἀγῶνα θεῖτ' ἄν, εἰ λέγειν εἴη σοφός

ὅς δ' εὐγλωσσία
νικᾷ, σοφὸς μὲν, ἀλλὰ τοι τὰ πράγματα
κρείσσω νομίζω τῶν λόγων αἰεί ποτε.

λαμπρὸς δ' ἕκαστος καπὶ τοῦτ' ἐπείγεται,
νέμων τὸ πλείστον ἡμέρας τούτῳ μέρος
ἵν' αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τυγχάνῃ κράτιστος ὢν.

κ. τ. λ.

THE END.

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
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